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Abstract 
This thesis examines the implications for text and subject of the digital 
technology of hypertext. Focussing on the printed texts of Alasdair Gray, it 
explores the complex relationship between humans and technology depicted in 
his fictions. Gray's fictional examples provide the basis for a wider discussion 
regarding the impact of technology upon the lives of the subjects who engage 
with it and in particular who engage with the technologies of writing. It aims to 
illustrate how digital technologies of writing can be considered in light of some 
of the textual concerns raised by fiction and criticism in the late age of print, 
notably issues of narrative theory and the cultural function of linear stories and 
histories. Straining in many respects against the limitations of the printed form, 
Gray's boundary-pushing texts, whilst remaining firmly rooted in the aesthetic 
tradition of the book as object, perhaps anticipate a more flexible textual form. 
The digital space of hypertext can be seen to offer a new arena for the textual 
debate, but does it live up to the claims of some of its critics, particularly in 
terms of its rapport with aspects of contemporary theory? And what may be the 
consequences of text de materialised in the digital medium? As well as 
considering the textual possibilities of hypertext, the thesis also looks at the 
ways in which subjects relate to technology as well as those by which technology 
- and particularly writing technology - relates to them. Given the ambiguous role 
of technology in the life of the subject - employed on the one hand as part of a 
project and promise of rational enlightenment through science and on the other 
as a military and ideological means of repression - the consequences of 
technological development and of the digital revolution for the written word 
must be closely considered. Finally, the thesis questions the types of texts that 
may be constructed through an engagement with the digital technology of 
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Introduction 
Mopsyand Flopsy, the two black and white rabbits belonging to surgeon Godwin 
Baxter in Alasdair Gray's Poor Things are not, by Baxter's own admission, happy 
bunnies. "Mopsy and Flopsy were two ordinary, happy little rabbits," he explains 
to Archie McCandless (his friend and the narrator of Episodes from the Early Life 
of a Scottish Public Health Officer, the text making up the largest part of Gray's 
novel), "before I put them to sleep one day and they woke up like this. They are 
no longer interested in procreation, an activity they once greatly enjoyed" (Poor 
Things, p. 23). That they no longer do the usual bunny thing should come as little 
surprise to Baxter, given that his 'skeely' surgeon's fingers have bisected each 
partner of the once heterosexual bunny couple and spliced the opposing halves. 
The resultant bipolar specimens - male/female, black/white in equal and 
opposite measures - are living contradictions. Fortunately for Mopsy and Flopsy, 
their situation is only temporary; Godwin Baxter has decided that the following 
day he will return them to their original happy states. Some of the 
contradictions of modern science that they embody while spliced, however, 
cannot be so easily dismissed. In particular, the spliced rabbits testify that while 
scientific and technological advancement brings with it the capacity to solve 
many problems - the problem of being able to keep tissue and organs alive long 
enough to transplant them to a separate body, for example - it has also the 
capacity to create problems, and in ways that cannot always be foreseen. The 
rabbits are, one may say, a 'miracle' of science, but they are an unhappy 
miracle at that, and while Baxter's achievement in successfully performing the 
operation has been great, the end result is, arguably, pointless. Baxter's motives 
too are unclear, underlining a theme that recurs elsewhere in Gray's fiction: the 
realms of scientific and technological possibility are vast, but such possibilities 
may tempt action for little more than action's sake. 
Vague McMenamy CThe Crank That Made the Revolution') is particularly prone 
to such temptation and 'invents', among other things, an 'improved' mechanical 
duck. He does this by confining a real duck (belonging to his grandmother) in a 
contraption wherefrom its struggling legs power paddle wheels on either side. 
The result? 
On its maiden voyage the duck zig-zagged around the pond at a speed of 
thirty knots, which was three times faster than the maximum speed 
which the boats and ducks of the day had yet attained. McMenamy had 
converted a havering all-rounder into an efficient specialist. 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 38) 
A triumph but for the fact that the duck can now neither walk nor fly. Like 
Baxter's rabbits, the duck is rendered miserable, but this is not enough to deter 
the zealous young McMenamy who, carried away by his perceived success, 
pursues the idea of the 'improved' duck to disastrous consequence. 
He did not stop there. If this crankshaft allowed one duck to drive a 
vessel three times faster than normal, how much faster would two, three 
or ten ducks drive it? McMenamy decided to carry the experiment as far 
as he could take it. He constructed a craft to be driven by every one of 
his Granny's seventeen ducks .... Vague was fifteen years old when he 
launched his second vessel. Quacking hysterically, it crossed the pond 
with such velocity that it struck the opposite bank at the moment of 
departure from the near one. Had it struck soil it would have embedded 
itself. Unluckily, it hit the root of a tree, rebounded to the centre of the 
pond, overturned and sank. Every single duck was drowned. 
In terms of human achievement, McMenamy's duckboat ranks with 
Leonardo Da Vinci's helicopter which was designed four hundred years 
before the engine which could have made it fly. Economically it was 
disastrous. Deprived of her ducks, McMenamy's Granny was compelled to 
knit faster than ever. 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, pp. 38-41) 
The bathos here belies the seriousness of the situation: the ducks provided Vague 
and his grandmother with enough eggs to feed them, their only other means of 
sustenance being revenue from Mrs McMenamy's knitting. Without the ducks they 
must now also feed themselves from the knitting proceeds, forcing Granny to 
work doubly hard. As is so often the case with Alasdair Gray's writing, the comic 
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depiction of events is simply a palliative for a view of the world which is both 
deadly serious and inevitably political: Vague McMenamy's flirtations with 
technology are frivolous and comically absurd, yet their knock-on effects - from 
the ducks to his grandmother to the wider community of Cessnock who 
experience hardship after a knitting machine Vague invents to help out Granny 
costs them their businesses - provide shrewd commentary on the negative impact 
of industrialisation. 
That rabbits, ducks and grannies tend to come off second best in these human 
encounters with technology suggests something of the Darwinian nature of 
technological advancement. As George P. Landow has observed in his book 
Hypertext: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology, 
f[t]echnology always empowers someone. It empowers those who possess it, 
those who make use of it, and those who have access to it' (Landow, 1992, p. 
169). In Poor Things, the elevated status Godwin Baxter attains in Archibald 
McCandless's eyes following his surgery on the rabbits is evidence of such 
empowerment. Prior to witnessing Baxter's work, McCandless does not claim to 
disagree with the rest of their medical class at university who consider Baxter ffa 
harmless insignificant madman, who dabbles with brains and microscopes in an 
effort to look important" (Poor Things, p. 21). McCandless's reaction to Mopsy 
and Flopsy, however, sees Baxter set apart from his peer group - it is a mixture 
of wonder and pity, felt not just for the rabbits themselves but also for their 
fcreator'. 
The little beasts were works of art, not nature. The one in my hands 
suddenly felt terribly precious. I set it carefully down on the grass and 
gazed at Baxter with awe, admiration and a kind of pity. It is hard not to 
pity those whose powers separate them from the rest of us, unless (of 
course) they are rulers doing the usual sort of damage. 
(Poor Things, p. 23) 
As scientific miracle-maker, Godwin Baxter's apotheosis is now more than merely 
nominal. The dangers that can inhere when men assume the role of God, 
however, become apparent when, according to McCandless's narrative, Baxter 
uses his unorthodox surgical skills to transplant the living brain of a nine-month-
old foetus into its drowned mother's skull, thus bringing the drowned woman 
back to life, though with the mental capacity of an infant. That Baxter has been 
perceived as someone who fdabbles with brains' is telling - McCandless has 
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already told us earlier in his narrative that '[m]ost thought him a scientific 
dabbler' (Poor Things, p. 15) - the implication being that he is toying with 
something he doesn't fully understand. "Medicine is as much an art as a 
science," he tells McCandless (Poor Things, p. 16), but such artful employment 
of it brings him trouble: Bella Baxter, the woman created, turns out to be 
something of a handful, her erratic behaviour playing havoc with the delicate 
constitutional disposition of her creator and bringing him ultimately to his death. 
As with Vague McMenamy and his grandmother's ducks, Baxter has interfered 
with the natural order of things, commingling nature with artistic creation 
without a full reckoning of the consequences. His scientific endeavours are seen 
to be not just frivolous but dangerous, creating a larger-than-life person for 
whom he is wholly responsible yet cannot control. The parallels with that other, 
most famous tale of human folly in the name of science, Mary Shelley's 
Frankenstein, are clear enough. 1 
Where the creator's burden of responsibility is manifested in a sense of guilt 
that pervades the entire text of Frankenstein, it is more ambiguously dealt with 
in Poor Things. Certainly Godwin Baxter experiences moments of regret -
"I deserve death as much as any other murderer .... That little nearly 
nine-month-old foetus I took living from the drowned woman's body 
should have been coddled as my foster child. By recasting its brain in the 
mother's body I shortened her life as deliberately as if I stabbed her to 
death at the age of forty or fifty, but I took the years off the start, not 
the ending of her life - a much more vicious thing to do. And I did it for 
the reason that elderly lechers purchase children from bawds .... Without 
Sir Colin's techniques Bell would now be a normal two-and-a-half-year-
old infant. I could enjoy her society for another sixteen or eighteen years 
before she grew independent of me. But my damnable sexual appetites 
employed my scientific skills to warp her into a titbit for Duncan 
Wedderburn! DUNCAN WEDDERBURN!" 
He wept and I brooded. 
(Poor Things, p. 67-68) 
- but such moments are invariably short-lived. It only takes a few words from 
McCandless saying that he loves Bell the way she is for Baxter to recover from his 
1 Incidentally, our fictional 'father' in the text, Godwin Baxter, shares a name with 
William Godwin, Mary Shelley's real father, while the fictional mother-and-daughter 
(combined in one body) of the text, Bella Baxter, becomes a well-known feminist like 
Mary Shelley's mother, Mary Wollstonecraft. Mary Shelley's own elopement with Percy 
Bysshe Shelley parallels that of Bella Baxter with Duncan Wedderburn, who refers to 
Godwin Baxter in his manic letter as Godwin Bysshe Baxter, Poor Things, p. 94. 
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seeming torment, brighten up and state some of the more positive consequences 
of his actions. 
After this we grew slightly more cheerful. Baxter began strolling about 
the kitchen, smiling as he only did when he thought of Bell and forgot 
himself. 
"Yes," he said, "not many two-and-a-half-year-olds are so sure-footed, 
steady-handed, quick-witted. She remembers everything that happens to 
her and every word she hears, so even when it makes no sense she picks 
up the meaning later. And I have saved her from one crushing 
disadvantage I never had myself: she has never been small so has never 
known fear." 
(Poor Things, p. 69) 
The 'creation' of Bella may cause Baxter's own health to deteriorate, but Bell 
herself develops into a healthy, well-balanced woman - happier certainly than in 
her previous life as the mentally tortured Victoria Hattersley, which had ended 
in suicide by drowning.2 Unlike Victor Frankenstein, Baxter takes full 
2 This is all assuming we accept the veracity of McCandless's narrative, that Bell has 
indeed been created from the body of the drowned Victoria Hattersley and the brain of 
her unborn child. If we instead choose to believe BellalVictoria's 'Letter to Posterity' 
which follows it, it is still the case that Godwin Baxter's care for Victoria (who, this 
epistle asserts, arrived destitute on his doorstep as opposed to throwing herself off a 
bridge into the River Clyde) has had a huge positive impact in her development. See 
Bernstein, 1999, p. 114ff. for further discussion of Baxter's role in BellalVictoria's 
transformation and, concomitantly, Gray's transformation of the Frankenstein story. The 
question of the creator's duty of care to the created, especially in terms of the need for 
knowledge and identity, is comically dealt with in Flann O'Brien's novel At Swim-Two-
Birds, the text asking whether an author does not owe a duty of care to the written 
characters s/he creates. Dermot Trellis, the fictional author within the text is actually 
put on trial for his negligence in this respect towards his character, Furriskey. Furriskey 
has been fictionally created by Trellis - or 'born' - as a grown man and thus, it is 
suggested, has been denied the childhood experience necessary to his 'natural' 
development as an adult. Furriskey's situation is comparable with that of both 
Frankenstein's creature and Bella Baxter: they are adults without life experience, and 
for this their creators are responsible. The circumstances of Trellis's cross-examination 
are relayed in a shorthand textual summary: 
'In what manner was he born? 
He awoke as if from sleep. 
His sensations? 
Bewilderment, perplexity .... He was consumed by doubts as to his own identity, as to the 
nature of his body and the cast of his countenance .... He spent some time searching in 
his room for a looking-glass or for a surface that would enable him to ascertain the 
character of his countenance. 
You had already hidden the glass? 
No. I had forgotten to provide one. 
By reason of his doubts as to his personal appearance, he suffered considerable mental 
anguish? 
It is possible. 
You could have appeared to him - by magic if necessary - and explained his identity and 
duties to him. Why did you not perform so obvious an errand of mercy? 
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responsibility for the care of his charge and the nurturing and education he gives 
Bella make all the difference. The point is that his advanced use of science is not 
a bad thing per se: Baxter succeeds where Frankenstein failed in bringing up (as 
opposed to just creating) a rounded person and not a monster, so some good 
comes out of his artful science. Perhaps a fictional lesson has been learned. 
Baxter's success though, as we know, still comes at a price for himself. 
Differing again from Victor Frankenstein, Baxter takes pride in his creation 
and indeed in the fact that Bell has a will of her own. The God-fearing 
undercurrent of Frankenstein, too, is notably absent from Poor Things. Not 
having undergone any formative religious instruction and only reading the Bible 
later in life, Godwin Baxter views God in a refreshingly pragmatic way. Rather 
than thinking of himself as fplaying God' in the religious sense of transgressing a 
moral law, he sees it as the right and duty of humans to attempt to become 
Godlike. He argues both for the de mystification of God and the democratisation 
of fGod's' knowledge: 
"Forgive my excitement McCandless. You cannot share it because you 
have never been a parent, have never made something new and 
splendid. It is wonderful for a creator to see the offspring live, feel and 
act independently. I read Genesis three years ago and could not 
understand God's displeasure when Eve and Adam chose to know good 
and evil - chose to be Godlike. That should have been his proudest hour." 
"They deliberately disobeyed him I" I said, forgetting The Origin of 
Species and speaking with the voice of The Shorter Catechism. "He had 
given them life and everything they could enjoy, everything on earth, 
except two forbidden trees. Those were sacred mysteries whose fruit did 
harm. Nothing but perverse greed made them eat it." 
Baxter shook his head and said, "Only bad religions depend on mysteries, 
just as bad governments depend on secret police. Truth, beauty and 
goodness are not mysterious, they are the commonest, most obvious, 
most essential facts of life, like sunlight, air and bread. Only folk whose 
heads are muddled by expensive educations think truth, beauty, 
goodness are rare private properties. Nature is more liberal. The 
universe keeps nothing essential from us - it is all present, all gift. God is 
the universe plus mind. Those who say God, or the universe, or nature is 
mysterious, are like those who call these things jealous or angry. They 
are announcing the state of their lonely, muddled minds." 
"Utter blethers, Baxter!" I cried. "Our whole lives are a struggle with 
mysteries. Mysteries endanger us, support us, destroy us. Our great 
scientists have cleared away these mysteries in some directions by 
deepening them in others. 
(Poor Things, p. 99-100) 
I do not know .... I suppose I fell asleep' (At Swim- Two-Birds, p. 42-43). 
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Baxter, a dedicated follower of science, believes that there is nothing, finally, 
that cannot be known or explained, though he concedes the impossibility of 
anyone ever being able to know more than a fraction of all that can be known. 
"[W]hat you call mysteries," he tells McCandless, "I call ignorances, and nothing 
we do not know (whatever we call it) is more holy, sacred and wonderful than 
the things we know - the things we are!" (Poor Things, p. 101). His belief in the 
ultimate presence of truth is indicative of the scientific desire to t clear away' 
mystery - science, Baxter believes, can finally explain the universe.3 
Both Baxter's and McCandless's arguments allude, through their respective 
references to truth and mystery, to the privileged status of knowledge and again 
the issue is one of empowerment. Akin to the notion of technological 
empowerment and its concomitant status, this may be termed informational 
empowerment; that is to say the status that accrues to those in possession of 
knowledge that others do not or cannot have. Duncan Wedderburn, driven to the 
brink of lunacy by Bella's nymphomania, certainly resents Baxter's scientific 
3 According to Baxter, it could also have averted the crisis in the state of Denmark in 
Shakespeare's Hamlet which Baxter attributes wholly to sanitation problems at Elsinore, 
as Stephen Bernstein has pointed out (see Poor Things, p. 39-40 and Bernstein, 1999, p. 
115). Baxter, of course, is living through a time (the nineteenth century) of radical 
scientific discovery and progress that threatened to undermine many of the prevalent 
doctrines of Christianity. The evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin in particular 
(especially his The Origin of Species), whilst heralding a massive advancement of 
thought, were treated with suspicion and contempt in many quarters (and indeed still 
are). Bella Baxter alludes to Darwin's particular attempt at to 'clear away' mystery by 
scientific enlightenment when she says "So at last it looks as if the mystery of the Origin 
of Bell Baxter's Species is going to be solved" (Poor Things, p. 205). Gray comments upon 
the challenges of this historical period in A History Maker, quoting a poem by 
transcendentalist essayist, Brahmin and raconteur Oliver Wendell Holmes ('The times are 
racked with birth pangs. Every houri Brings forth some gasping Truth,' A History Maker, 
p. 111) and writing of it: 'The monstrous but quickly domesticated truths he describes 
here are nineteenth-century geological and biological discoveries not foreshadowed in 
the Bible. At first many feared these contradicted the word of God, undermined 
organized religion and would overturn established authority. In a few years it was 
obvious that ecclesiastical, legal and political bosses were as firmly established as ever, 
and scientific discovery was making industrial investment more profitable' (A History 
Maker, p. 182). Godwin Baxter's belief in the final presence of truth, as well as being 
significant in terms of the ambitions of the applied sciences, is also indispensable to the 
entire project of Western philosophy from Plato onwards which attempts to thoroughly 
rationalise experience using reason and logic, although Baxter himself is concerned with 
the scientific rather than philosophical or metaphysical quest for truth. As he explains to 
McCandless earlier in the book he was taught at home by his father who "only taught 
what interested him. He was a severe rationalist. Poetry, fiction, history, philosophy and 
the Bible struck him as nonsense - 'unprovable blethers', he called them" (Poor Things, 
p. 19). Consequently, Baxter was only taught maths, anatomy and chemistry. 
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knowledge and use of it. In a raving letter to Baxter in which he accuses Bella of 
witchery and Baxter of devilry he writes: 
Eve was ruled by the Serpent, Delilah by the Philistine Elders, Madame 
de Maintenon by Cardinal Thingummy and Bella Baxter by YOU, Godwin 
Bysshe Baxter, Arch-Fiend and Manipulator of this Age of Material 
Science! Only in Modern Glasgow - the BABYLON of Material Science -
could you have gained wealth, power and respect by carving up human 
brains, prowling through morgues and haunting the death-beds of the 
poor. 
(Poor Things, p. 94-95) 
He goes on to list a number of biblical prophecies, countering them by contrived 
analogy with what he terms fmodern facts': under the heading fB/BLE 
PROPHECIES' is the statement fThe Beast (and the Woman he supports) are also 
called Mystery'; under fMODERN FACTS' fChemistry, electricity, anatomy et 
cetera are Mysteries to nearly everybody - except you!' (Poor Things, p. 96). 
Wedderburn, like Archie McCandless, uses the metaphor of mystery; he clearly 
considers that the knowledge Baxter possesses is valuable and arcane, beyond 
the reach of all but an elite few. Baxter himself seems aware of the power his 
knowledge gives him and despite there being evidence in the text of his 
willingness to use this knowledge in a benevolent and socially conscious way - as 
well as taking care to give Bella a liberal education, he has also worked in his 
spare time in a clinic treating injured employees of iron and locomotive works, 
fvictims of heavy industry' as he calls them (Poor Things, p. 195) - he 
nevertheless seems reluctant to share his knowledge. When Bella discusses her 
own plans to become a doctor she believes she can learn from both McCandless 
and Baxter: 
"Think of all the lectures you will be able to give me, Candle, and how 
hard I will have to listen!" 
"Baxter knows a lot more than I do," I told her. 
"Yes," said Baxter, "but I will never tell people all of it." 
(Poor Things, p. 197) 
It is not just by virtue of his scientific knowledge that Baxter can claim to be 
elitist: he is a nonpareil when it comes to being able to read Bell's childish and 
elliptical handwriting. UWhat do the scrawls mean, Baxter?" McCandless asks in 
frustration when attempting to read her letters, ffHere - take them back. Only 
you can decipher them" (Poor Things, p. 151). Once again Godwin Baxter 
achieves the status of God, having the singular ability to solve the mystery of 
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Bella's text. As the Bible points out in a passage used by Gray as an epigraph to 
The Fall of Kelvin Walker, complete control of language and meaning is normally 
reserved for God alone: 
"In the beginning was the Word, 
and the Word was with God, 
and the Word was God." 
from Saint John's 
GOSPEL 
(Epigraph to The Fall of Kelvin Walker) 4 
Knowledge of language and writing, then, brings its own degree of eminence. 
Frankenstein's creature - who might also be termed a 'poor thing'5 - recognises 
this while observing the cottagers in conversation: 
I found that these people possessed a method of communicating their 
experience and feelings to one another by articulate sounds. I perceived 
that the words they spoke sometimes produced pleasure or pain, smiles 
or sadness, in the minds and countenances of the hearers. This was 
indeed a godlike science, and I ardently desired to become acquainted 
with it. But I was baffled in every attempt I made for this purpose. Their 
pronunciation was quick, and the words they uttered, not having any 
apparent connection with visible objects, I was unable to discover any 
clue by which I could unravel the mystery of their reference. 
(Frankenstein, p.107-108) 
Words and the knowledge of their meaning are once more considered a mystery, 
a divine secret. In an attempt to get to know the cottagers the creature 
4 Gray's capitalisation of the word GOSPEL serves to remind us of the supposedly 
unquestionable truth and authority of the gospel - the gospel truth. The technique of 
capitalising words to confer authority is also used by John Irving in his novel A Prayer for 
Owen Meany, where all Owen Meany's dialogue is capitalised, elevating the status of his 
character to that of deity. Capitalisation is often used somewhat ironically in Gray's 
fiction however, particularly in the context of slogans (reminiscent of Orwell). Such 
sloganisation highlights the way that words can be manipulated to gain advantage and 
underlines the danger of taking any words, even the gospel, at face value, as 'the truth' 
- as a poster on a bus window in Lanark pOints out: 'ADVERTISING OVERSTIMULATES, 
MISINFORMS, CORRUPTS' (Lanark, p. 434). Also in Lanark, the capitalist tenets that 
money can buy happiness and that time is money are advertised in a poster stating 
'MONEY IS TIME. TIME IS LIFE. BUY MORE TIME FOR YOUR FAMILY FROM THE QUANTUM 
INTERMINABLE. (THEY'LL LOVE YOU FOR IT.)' (Lanark, p. 454) - money is thus eventually 
equated to love. The 'truth' of this (literally) capitalist wisdom (produced by the logical 
argument) depends of course upon more conventional wisdoms, stating that neither love 
nor time can be bought, being considered false. Similarly, a capitalised piece of graffiti 
found both in Jake's bedroom in The Fall of Kelvin Walker and in the cathedral in Lanark 
reads 'GOD=LOVE=MONEY=SHIT' - the 'universal truth' of the statement 'God is Love' 
here being wholly undermined by the logic of the rest of the equation (The Fall of Kelvin 
Walker, p. 21, Lanark, p. 402). 
5 Each of the characters in Poor Things (whose working title was Poor Creatures) is, at 
one point or another, described with the adjective 'poor'. 
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endeavours to himself tbecome master of their language,' believing that this 
may lead them to accept him in spite of his appearance (Frankenstein, p. 109). 
He is perceptive enough to understand the power of language but too na"ive to 
fully estimate the impact his deformity will have upon his human counterparts. 
Only the blind man and, of course, the reader of his eloquent narrative are able 
to fall under the spell of his language. His reference to language as ta godlike 
science' is significant: it not only emphasises the privilege that comes with 
language and its knowledge (as has now been established along with the idea of 
status being gained from technology and its knowledge), it also expresses a fact 
that is frequently overlooked and which in this case takes the naiVety of an 
innocent to point out: language itself is a science, a technology. 
It is significant too that Frankenstein's creature recognises spoken language as 
a science: one of the many facets of Jacques Derrida's theoretical approach to 
language, his tgrammatology', is his critique of the commonly accepted view 
that speech is somehow more authentic or tnatural', more self-present - and 
thus closer to ttruth' - than the written word. For Derrida, the term writing 
signifies more broadly than the conventional notion of inscription (inevitably 
following on from precursory speech or thought) and refers rather to the general 
way that all language works, through systems of difference and deferral. 6 This 
will be discussed again in Chapter 2; for now it will suffice to say that for 
Derrida, spoken language presupposes and therefore depends on writing - it is 
always already suffused with writing's effects. As a system of knowledge 
codification dependent upon writing in its broad Derridean sense, speech is as 
much a science as is writing in its narrow inscriptional sense; speech, rather than 
being tnatural' as is usually assumed, is already mediated by writing long before 
inscription tintervenes'. 
If spoken language is only grudgingly recognised as a science, written 
language - inscription - too is commonly overlooked as a technology, at least 
until its transformations into printed and more recently digital text. The 
etymology of the word ttechnology' however, as Jay David Bolter has also noted, 
6 It should be noted that Derrida's term encompasses more than just the language of 
words - as Christopher Norris explains, 'Writing, for Derrida, is the 'free play' or element 
of undecidability within every system of communication,' (Norris, 1991, p. 28; see pp. 
26-41 for a full and clear discussion of the speech/writing debate). 
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with its origins in the Greek tekhnoiogia meaning tsystematic treatment' from 
the root tekhne meaning tart', justifies its use as applying to more than just 
mechanical (or machine) forms.? Bolter writes: 
In the ancient world physical technology was simpler, and the ancients 
put a correspondingly greater emphasis on the skill of the craftsman - the 
potter, the stone-mason, or the carpenter. In his dialogue the Phaedrus, 
Plato calls the alphabet itself a techne. He would also have called the 
ancient book composed of ink on papyrus a techne; Homeric epic poetry 
was also a techne, as was Greek tragedy. All the ancient arts and crafts 
have this in common: that the craftsman must develop a skill; a technical 
state of mind in using tools and materials. Ancient and modern writing is 
technology in just this sense. It is a method for arranging verbal thoughts 
in a visual space. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 35) 
Bolter's broad definition of technology encompasses all forms of inscription and 
even stretches to methodical and artistic forms of spoken language. In fact 
Bolter's example of Homeric poetry as tekhne brings us back to Derrida's 
speech/writing debate: Homeric poetry is an oral form, delivered and passed on 
via speech and memory rather than inscription, yet the systematic composition 
of ideas quintessential to oral poetry and leading to its inclusion here as a basic 
form of technology also reaffirms the dependence of the spoken word on writing 
as Derrida describes it. Such a broad view of technology certainly challenges the 
popular and modern notion of technology as inextricably bound to the machine. 
The portrayal of technology as being at odds with thuman' creativity is 
commonplace: Alasdair Gray's Lanark follows a long line of works - D.H. 
Lawrence's fiction and Fritz Lang's cinematic masterpiece Metropolis are good 
examples - that depict humans as struggling (usually vainly) in the face of 
increasing machine power. For the human subjects in these fictions the merciless 
efficiency of the machine creates an atmosphere of tedium and hopelessness, 
both in the workplace and at home (as clocks and mechanical instruments 
become domestic necessities). In these cases, as is common, technology is shown 
to exist in opposition to tnatural' human tendencies - the machine is the 
adversary of the individual. The danger for the humans in these situations is 
that, having to live and work with machines that curb their creativity (or at least 
disrupt their natural, biological rhythms of living and working), they lose their 
7 Definitions from The Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
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humanity, becoming themselves machine-like, devoid of imagination and indeed 
of hope for a fulfilling life. Whilst the metamorphosis of afflicted humans into 
hard-skinned and cold-blooded reptiles in Lanark offers the most obvious 
example of such dehumanisation in Gray's fiction, similarly imaginatively 
crushed subjects are everywhere among his canon. The male narrator of fNo 
Bluebeard' offers up a particularly pertinent example: as a computer 
programmer who has become in essence as logical and predictable as one of his 
programs, the tensions created by his overly pragmatic attitude within a series of 
unsuccessful marriages (to wives he enumerates rather than names) represent, in 
microcosm, the tension brought to the scene of human domesticity by 
technology. The presence of his computer in the living room of the matrimonial 
home shared with wife number 3 is a symbolic source of disquiet, a physical 
manifestation of technology's impingement upon fnatural' order and domestic 
balance (on the disintegration of this marriage wife 3 tells the narrator: ffThis 
hasn't been my home since you brought in that bloody machine," The Ends of 
our Tethers, p. 57-58). Gray does offer his protagonist the chance of redemption 
at the end of the tale: the realisation of what he has become prompting the 
narrator to show some genuine warmth towards his current wife (whose name we 
know to be Tilda, perhaps an indicator of the likelihood of her not becoming 
simply (ex) wife number 4), a warmth that had been extinguished by his slippage 
into a mindset of dehumanised techno-logic. 
I lay weeping for my whole past and could not stop for I suddenly saw 
what I had never before suspected: that I had lost three splendid women 
because I had been constantly mean and ungenerous, cold and 
calculating. Even my lovemaking, I suspected, had not been much more 
generous than my many acts of solitary masturbation between the 
marriages. I wept harder than ever. I crawled off the sofa, switched on a 
lamp and knelt on the floor beside the bed. Tilda stopped snoring, 
opened her eyes and stared at me. 
"Please, Tilda," I said between sobs, "please just let me hold your hand 
for a while." 
(The Ends of our Tethers, p. 58-59) 
Love, then, in this case provides the antidote for a life run according to 
technological (rather than human) principles. Here as elsewhere in Gray's fiction 
and the modernist tradition it follows, the introduction of technology into day-
to-day life is accompanied by the loss of something more meaningful and 
symbolic, by a lack of the individual imagination necessary for human intimacy 
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and empathy. The end result is an individual within a society resembling that 
prognosticated by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man, created, of course, 
not by technology alone, but by technology as it functions and is manipulated 
politically. 'As a technological universe,' Marcuse writes, 'advanced industrial 
society is a political universe, the latest stage in the realization of a specific 
historical project - namely, the experience, transformation, and organization of 
nature as the mere stuff of domination' (Marcuse, 1964, p. xvi). Individuals 
subjected to such politics are never far from the centre of Gray's writing: once 
more the dragon hide sufferers of Lanark strike the mind as the most arresting 
victims, their humanity diminishing as it does daily until they finally expire with 
an explosive release of pent-up thermic energy (a consequence of their 
preceding inability to release human warmth); the dragonhide victims become no 
more than reptilian heat-fuel for the Institution that is supposed to care for 
them, literal grist to the State's techno-political mill. For Marcuse, the pursuit of 
the so-called technological project will always involve a stifling of the individual 
in the interests of industrial-capitalist 'progress': 
A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in 
advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress. Indeed, 
what could be more rational than the suppression of individuality in the 
mechanization of socially necessary but painful performances; the 
concentration of individual enterprises in more effective, more 
productive corporations; the regulation of free competition among 
unequally equipped economic subjects; the curtailment of prerogatives 
and national sovereignties which impede the international organization 
of resources. 
(Marcuse, 1964, p. 1) 
But where does this leave writing? In his book Technology, Development and 
Domination, Tom Kitwood writes: IAll cultures have developed their practical 
arts to a high level of sophistication, in one way or another. The distinctively 
technological approach, which eliminates drama, ritual, all expressive qualities 
and even a great deal of human skill, is the unique product of the Western 
European tradition' (Kitwood, 1984, p. 2). Such a view is in keeping with 
Marcuse's one dimension, but, as Bolter's position has illustrated, depends upon 
a pejoratively narrow definition of technology that would surely exclude writing. 
Human skill is required for even the most basic form of writing, writing is 
frequently expressive and handwriting (chirography) can itself become an art 
form (calligraphy); yet no matter how 'natural' even handwriting may seem, the 
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fact remains that it is an artificial process, a technology, albeit a more 
immediate form than machine technology. Setting technology and the creativity 
of the individual at loggerheads, then, is not so straightforward as is often 
implied; such an opposition is based upon a questionable premise, a 
presupposition that individual creativity and technology can in fact be separated. 
As Bolter has indicated, creativity frequently manifests itself in the individual in 
a technological way, the individual having to develop 'a technical state of mind' 
as he puts it in pursuit of his or her art (Bolter, 1991, p. 35). The individual 
engaged in writing is at once creative and technological; once again writing - in 
this case the technological condition of writing - has always already intervened. 
Misgivings about technology and its apparatuses are understandable, given 
that so often throughout history technology has been misused by those it has 
empowered (as the parodic Vague McMenamy comically illustrates). Writing 
technology is no different in this sense: from its beginnings in chirography and 
later development into typography (print), writing - and thus knowledge, since 
knowledge is mainly passed on via the written word - was controlled by elite 
groups in society, as Kitwood recognises: 'Writing became a key instrument of 
administration, essential for the functioning of the centralised hierarchy. Of 
course only a very small proportion of the urban societies was literate, and these 
would virtually all be male' (Kitwood, 1984, p. 24). Initially ecclesiastical bodies 
and rulers of states controlled the production of manuscripts, codices and books, 
then, with the advent of print and the growth of industrial capitalism, those 
wealthy enough or with the good fortune to receive the patronage of the wealthy 
could pay to get published. In the nineteenth century of Poor Things, though 
books are in wide circulation it is still clear that access to books and the 
knowledge they contain - and of course access to a university education - is still 
largely a matter of privilege. Archie McCandless, son of a peasant farm worker, 
uses his mother's entire life savings to put himself through university, and 
cannot then afford a decent coat. Godwin Baxter on the other hand has the 
inheritance of his wealthy and learned late father, Sir Colin Baxter, to keep him 
going - this assures both his standard of living (in a multi-storey townhouse in a 
desirable area of Glasgow) and his access to knowledge which in turn enables 
'14 
him to follow in the footsteps of his surgeon father and, as we have seen, 
ensures his own privileged status. 
Certainly though, the elitism of writing has dissipated over time. Landow 
writes: 
The introduction of writing into a culture effects many changes, and all 
of them involve questions of power and status. When it first appeared in 
the ancient world, writing made its possessors unique. Furthermore, if 
writing changes the way people think as radically as [Marshall] McLuhan, 
[Walter J.] Ong, and others have claimed, then writing drove a sharp 
wedge between the literate and the illiterate, encouraged a sharp 
division between these two groups that would rapidly become classes or 
castes, and greatly increased the power and prestige of the lettered. In 
the millennia that it took for writing to diffuse through large proportions 
of entire societies, however, writing shifted the balance from the state 
to the individual, from the nobility to the polis. 
(Landow, 1992, p. 173) 
It must be emphasised, however, that such 'democratisation' of knowledge 
through writing has only been able to take place among literate communities in 
countries wealthy enough to provide educational resources and support to its 
citizens. Because of this, wealthier, so-called 'developed' countries have 
attained greater power and status than their poorer counterparts. Industrial 
capitalism, ideologically tied to Western nations, has developed into global 
capitalism; the Western nations with their advantages in wealth and power are 
thus able to direct the movement of global capital in ways that suit themselves 
and maintain the status quo, making it difficult for poorer countries to create 
and foster wealth. Illiterate communities living in poor countries, then, are 
largely at the mercy of the literate (who make the laws they are expected to 
abide by) and it is difficult to argue that the technology of the written word has 
so far advantaged them in any way. For those of us fortunate enough to live in 
wealthier countries the contrast is stark: the written word has become such an 
ever-present feature of our everyday lives that we no longer even perceive it to 
be the technology that it is, but consider it a natural, even evolutionary process. 
We are no longer hostile to writing, as we often are to other forms of 
technology, since it is so customary it appears to pose no threat; put simply, we 
have assimilated writing to such an extent that we feel lin control' of it. The 
same cannot be said of other technologies. We don't feel the same way about 
machines - about mechanical or digital technology - as we do about writing. 
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Machines, as depicted in Lanark, in Metropolis and elsewhere, are capable of 
such inhuman efficiency and power that they seem frightening - indeed 
monstrous - and outwith our control, engendering the feelings of powerlessness 
and hopelessness felt by so many of the inhabitants of Unthank, the post-
industrial dystopia featured in Lanark. 
Digital technology poses a further threat to the perceived autonomy of the 
individual: as an abstract technology based on billions upon billions of 'bits' of 
computer code - strings of binary data unintelligible to humans - it enables 
machines to carry out tasks far faster and with greater accuracy than mechanical 
technology could allow and infinitely faster than a human can even think. Digital 
technology is abstract to such a degree that even the most simple of tasks -
typing a sentence into a word processing application for example - carried out on 
a computer involves processes incomprehensible to the human mind. Such a 
measure of abstraction, when applied to the written word, must necessitate a 
re-evaluation of the way we think about writing in general. Many people view 
the new form of technology with suspicion because of the way it changes their 
relationship to writing, making it seem less immediate and natural. Just as the 
introduction of technology into the workplace and home engendered feelings of 
disruption, of a distance being placed between humans and their domestic 
circumstances that compromised their creative and imaginative lives (leading to 
the sort of disengagement that affects the narrator of 'No Bluebeard'), so it is 
suggested that digital technology intervenes in the comfortable relationship 
between the human being and the written word, somehow alienating individuals 
from their (written) reality. It has long been forgotten by most that people felt 
the same way initially about early forms of writing and perceived the written 
word as mediating speech. The issue again concerns the degree of abstraction of 
the technology - writing (inscription) is a more abstract act than speech, 
involving tools external to the human body (Bolter terms this 'estrangement', 
commenting that: 'Estrangement is the original sin that belongs to the act of 
visual representation: the spoken word does not call forth the same sense of 
estrangement' (Bolter, 1991, p. 212)). Digital technology involves further layers 
of removal from the human. Yet, as Derrida has argued, speech itself is only 
seemingly immediate and natural; since it depends upon the effects of writing 
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(in the Derridean sense), the spoken word has always already been mediated. No 
words, therefore - spoken, written or displayed on a computer screen· are 
actually wholly natural, innocent or tvalue-free' but are always subject to the 
general conditions of language, or textuality. Bolter comments: 
Writing, like language itself, is ... both natural and artificial. Even if the 
human capacity for language is innate, wired into our genes, we 
nevertheless use our innate capacity in an artificial, rhetorical way. 
Writing is certainly not innate. Yet writing can be taken in and become a 
habit of mind. What is natural seems more intimately and obviously 
human. For that reason we do not wish to dwell on the fact that writing 
is a technology; we want the skill of writing to be natural. We like our 
tools and machines well enough, but we also like the idea of being able 
to do without them. Putting away our technology gives us a feeling of 
autonomy and allows us to reassert the difference between the natural 
and the merely artificial. Since the time of Rousseau, much of the 
hostility directed against modern technology has been rooted in the 
belief that, as our technology becomes more complex, we are becoming 
creatures of our own creations. Today, the computer is a perfect target 
for such an assault on technology, because of the computer's apparent 
autonomy. 
But in the case of writing as elsewhere, it is not possible to put away 
technology. Writing with pen and paper is no more natural, no less 
technological than writing at a computer screen. It is true that the 
computer is a more complicated and more fragile device than a pen. But 
we cannot isolate ourselves from technology by reverting to older 
methods of writing. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 36-37) 
If it has been possible for us to assimilate earlier forms of writing to the 
extent that we have, then it is also possible that, in time, digital text will come 
to seem as natural to us as pen and paper. In From Text to Hypertext, Silvio 
Gaggi comments that the shifts in writing technology have tproduced changes in 
the psyche: changes in the way we structure our thinking, the way we feel 
ourselves to be, and the way we engage and interact with the world and others' 
(Gaggi, 1997, p. 113). Digital text and technology can already be seen to have 
changed the way many of us work and communicate: offices and homes in 
increasing number have personal computers, enabling digital rather than manual 
or mechanical word, image and audio processing; emails are frequently 
preferred to the now rather derogatorily termed tsnail mail'. The acceptance of 
digital technology has in this sense already begun and continues to increase. Yet 
the implications of the digital revolution on the written word in particular are 
more far-reaching than has so far been suggested here, for texts that exist in 
digital format exist differently to material texts - they are immaterial and as 
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such subject to change and manipulation beyond the possibilities of traditional 
text; that is to say they are dynamic rather than static. The possibilities for 
dynamic digital text provide the essence of the term 'hypertext' that has come 
to describe it. 
Delany and Landow define hypertext as 'the use of the computer to transcend 
the linear, bounded and fixed qualities of the traditional written text' (Delany 
and Landow, 1991, p. 3). Traditional written texts exist materially. They can be 
picked up, read, put back down again, and the next time they are picked up they 
will exist exactly as they did before; that is to say, they are stable entities. 
"Reading," Professor Uzzi-Tuzii in Italo Calvino's If on a winter's night a 
traveller says, "is always this: there is a thing that is there, a thing made of 
writing, a solid, material, object, which cannot be changed" (If on a winter's 
night a traveller, p. 72). The words making up printed texts are both fixed and 
permanent - it is impossible to change the words of a book without damaging or 
defacing it and even then the words will only have been changed in that single 
copy. Digital texts on the other hand are unstable, impermanent and 
changeable; because they exist only as binary data in the computer's memory 
they can be altered quickly and easily by just typing changes into the digital 
document as it is temporarily displayed onscreen. Saving the changes into the 
computer's memory effectively rewrites the text, so that the next time it is 
viewed the changes have been preserved - the text is no longer the same; it has 
changed and can be changed again at any time. If the computer is serving the 
document across a network the changes will have effect for everyone on the 
network viewing that document. Even if the document is not itself networked 
but exists in multiple digital copies on different users' machines, it is easy to 
electronically distribute the changed digital document to replace the old one. 
For such changes to be disseminated with traditional printed text, multiple 
copies of a changed document would have to be printed and distributed, a slow 
and laborious process, as well as a costly one (the reason that revised editions 
of textbooks, for example, appear only every few years rather than on an ad hoc 
basis). 
The volatility and transience of digital text must of course have implications 
for writing, for its forms, its writers and readers. Bolter has argued that the 
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fixity of traditional text led to books being considered fmonuments', a term that 
reflects their static and permanent nature. This in turn led to writers - the 
literal figures of authority behind such monumental fworks' - being held in 
disproportionate regard: since the words of the text could not be changed, the 
author could not be challenged, thus the author was distanced from the reader. 
Bolter goes on to suggest that digital text will engender new attitudes toward 
both text (rather than fwork') and author and implicit in his argument is the idea 
that digital text, as a new form of writing technology, is responding to the 
ideological and cultural needs of the current society, particularly to the 
postmodern theory of a fragmented culture in which there can be no 
fmonuments', no stable explanations. Bolter uses as an example one of the most 
familiar of printed monuments, the encyclopaedia: 
The attitude toward the knowledge contained in electronic encyclopedias 
will be opportunistic, almost irreverent, because of the temporary 
character of electronic information. This was not the case for an 
encyclopedia in manuscript or in print, where the technology encouraged 
more or less permanent structures of knowledge. Today we cannot hope 
for permanence and for general agreement on the order of things - in 
encyclopedias any more than in politics or the arts. What we have 
instead is a view of knowledge as collections of (verbal and visual) ideas 
that can arrange themselves into a kaleidoscope of hierarchical and 
associative patterns - each pattern meeting the needs of one class of 
readers on one occasion. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 97) 
These collections of ideas can be thought of as flittle narratives' - rather than 
the fgrand narratives' or monuments of the past - and, as Bolter has pointed out, 
they can be organised according to the needs of the readers of texts. The 
inherent flexibility of dynamic digital text - hypertext - means that it contains 
the potential to be organised in ways other than that defined by the author of a 






'Telling Stories': Narrative and the Book 
The printed book, like the codex and papyrus roll before it, is designed to be 
read in a linear fashion and because of this texts have conventionally been 
written in linear form. In the storytelling, folklore tradition, linear narrative was 
seen to be representative of lived experience, of the continuous passage of time 
and 'natural' forward-motion of events; a 'narrative journey' if you like. This is 
true not only of fictional storytelling but also of the telling of 'factual stories', 
or history. Jean-Franc;:ois Lyotard writes that: 
Ethnocultures were for a long time the apparatuses for memorizing 
information such that peoples were able to organize their space and their 
time. They were, notably, the way in which multiplicities of different 
times could be gathered and conserved in a single memory (Bernard 
Stiegler). Themselves considered as technai, they allowed collections of 
individuals and generations to have real stocks of information at their 
disposal through time and space. In particular they produced the specific 
organization of temporality that we call historical narratives. There are 
many ways of telling a story, but the narrative as such can be considered 
to be a technical apparatus giving a people the means to store, order and 
retrieve units of information, i.e. events. More precisely, narratives are 
like temporal filters whose function is to transform the emotive charge 
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linked to the event into sequences of units of information capable of 
giving rise to something like meaning. 
(Lyotard, 1991, p. 62-63) 
As well as reiterating the point that techniques of knowledge storage and 
retrieval are constitutive of technology in its basic sense as tekhne, Lyotard's 
comment emphasises that collected knowledge as it is manifested in and 
divulged by narrative is organised linearly and sequentially and it has been 
argued by Michel Foucault in particular that the desire for such linear narrative 
is in fact ideologically determined. For Foucault, historical narratives function to 
configure history as a continuous and unified chain of events that occur on the 
simple and cumulative bases of cause and effect. In so doing they serve to 
suppress difference - differing accounts of history - instead presenting it from a 
single point of view and with a single voice. For Foucault, this theory of 
continuous history is inextricable from the notion of the free and autonomous 
subject since the idea of history as a settled and linear progression enables 
individual subjects to feel settled themselves, fully aware of their place within 
the historical milieu: 
If the history of thought could remain the locus of uninterrupted 
continuities, if it could endlessly forge connexions that no analysis could 
undo without abstraction, if it could weave, around everything that men 
say and do, obscure synthesis that anticipate for him, prepare him, and 
lead him endlessly towards his future, it would provide a privileged 
shelter for the sovereignty of consciousness. Continuous history is the 
indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject: the 
guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; 
the certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a 
reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject - in the form of 
historical consciousness - will once again be able to appropriate, to bring 
back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by 
difference, and find in them what might be called his abode. Making 
historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making human 
consciousness the Original subject of all historical development and all 
action are the two sides of the same system of thought. In this system, 
time is conceived in terms of totalization and revolutions are never more 
than moments of consciousness. 
(Foucault, 1982, p. 12) 
Since history makes logical sense, the experience of the individual in a particular 
historical epoch also makes sense; thus are stable subjects created or, Althusser 
would say, interpellated. Unified historical narrative can therefore be argued to 
posit identity (both historical and individual), and if notions of stable identity 
are dependent on stable, continuous narrative it is natural that subjects in turn 
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desire and produce such narratives as will constantly and consistently reaffirm 
their own sense of identity. 8 
The idea of linear history as an ideological construct suppressing difference is 
explored by Alasdair Gray in A History Maker. In Kittock the henwife's notes on 
chapter five, history is set out as having been appropriated by different 
movements or groups of people at different stages of time and mythologised for 
their own ends; history is literally 'made' in this way. For each group or 
movement (except postmodernism9) their particular historical narrative is linear 
and functions ideologically as Foucault suggests. Take the example of the 
Renaissance: 
THE RENAISSANCE. Around A.D. 1400 some Italian republics and 
dukedoms so prospered by trade between Asia and Europe that they 
recovered the Roman sense that people could use intelligence to improve 
their community. Later historians called this recovery the Renaissance 
and redivided time as follows: 
1 - The Ancient World - everything before Christianity became the Roman 
imperial religion. 
2 - The Middle Ages - everything between the Ancient World and the 
Renaissance; a better time than the ancient world, because it made 
Europe Christian. 
3 - The Modern World - everything after the Middle Ages but better than 
these, because with Christian faith in the future modern Europeans were 
scientists continually enlarging the wisdom of the present, artists 
continually adding to the world's stock of beautiful things, traders 
bringing back rare goods from every continent in the world. Some 
historians felt so pleased with their part of Europe that they thought 
history had reached a lasting state of perfection. Bishop Bossuet felt this 
about Catholic France in the seventeenth century, the French 
8 This strategy of positing historical and individual identity is also correlative to the 
positing of linguistic identity in the two components of the linguistic sign, the signifier 
and signified, thereby stabilising meaning, affirming the authority of the sign and 
concealing the element of difference, or play. 
9 The postmodernist 'narrative' is not linear, though it still performs an ideological 
function. The scathing account of postmodernism here is characteristic of Gray - it is 
interesting to note the negative association between postmodernism and technological 
'development', Kittock showing the kind of hostility toward technology and its misuse 
discussed earlier: 'POSTMODERNISM happened when landlords, businessmen, brokers and 
bankers who owned the rest of the world had used new technologies to destroy the 
power of labour unions. Like owners of earlier empires they felt that history had ended 
because they and their sort could now dominate the world forever' (A History Maker, p. 
202). The alleged assertion of postmodernists that 'history had ended' echoes the 
comment in Italo Calvino's If on a winter's night a traveller that 'the dimension of time 
has been shattered ... We can rediscover the continuity of time only in the novels of that 
period when time no longer seemed stopped and did not yet seem to have exploded' (If 
on a winter's night a traveller, p. 8). For more of Gray on postmodernism, see especially 
his poem 'Postmodernism' and postscript comments about it in his collection Sixteen 
Occasional Poems 1990-2000, as well as the further discussion at the end of this chapter. 
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revolutionaries about equalitarian France in the eighteenth, Professor 
Hegel about Protestant Prussia in the nineteenth. 
(A History Maker, p. 199-200) 
The story of the Renaissance, then, depicts history as development, a direct and 
cumulative progression from the experience of past ages, which like the other 
accounts of history or tgrand narratives' that are described, will culminate in an 
ideal society. That what constitutes that ideal can with the luxury of hindsight 
be shown to differ not only between the grand narratives of Marxism, 
Christianity, the Renaissance et cetera as listed but also even within such 
narratives - as the examples of Bishop Bossuet, the French revolutionaries and 
Hegel attest - indicates the extent to which difference has been contained by 
them. If such mythologised accounts of history are believed by the subjects they 
serve, and if indeed it is believed that a perfect society has been or will be 
attained as a consequence of following a particular historical path, there would 
of course be little impetus for subjects either to question their narrative history 
or to act to change the status quo. This is what Kittock in her prologue refers to 
as t a dangerous easy-oasy habit of thinking the modern world at last a safe 
place, of thinking the past a midden too foul to steep our brains in' - precisely 
the attitude that predominates in the society of which Kittock and her son Wat, 
the novel's protagonist, are part (A History Maker, p. XIV). Wat Dryhope lives in 
the supposed Utopia of the twenty-third century where material poverty has at 
last been consigned to the past by the development of household powerplants, 
giant quasi-organic, quasi-digital appliances that can create or tsynthesise' any 
object on demand. 10 The problem with Wat's Utopia is the same problem as 
exists potentially for every form of Utopia: that subjects will cease to be 
political or critical agents of change, resulting in a society that is static and in 
10 This of course is one of the most forceful pro-technological arguments used to justify 
state spending on technological development: that technology can be finally used to 
eradicate human want. Such an argument brings the 'technological project' into line 
with the historical narrative of the Renaissance outlined in Kittock's notes - as Marcuse 
said, it is 'the latest stage in the realization of a specific historical project' (Marcuse, 
1964, p. xvi) - and again suggests culmination in some form of rational Utopia. Meg 
Mountbenger in fact uses the term 'rational Utopia' to describe the society of A History 
Maker (A History Maker, p. 116). For Marcuse, arguing from a Marxist perspective, the 
technological and historical project will result only in more inequality and human 
suffering than at present since the project is founded on the principles of capitalism (and 
therefore exploitation). 
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danger of stagnation. 11 In order to avoid ennui it is imperative that history is 
considered as process, rather than simply as a linear narrative of the past that 
explains how society came to be in the state it finds itself in; history should be 
considered dynamic rather than static and an essential element in its dynamism 
is its difference, or as Foucault would say, its multivocality. There are enough 
dissenting voices in A History Maker to ensure that political and historical 
process, rather than inertia and stasis, prevail. Kittock's notes that show the 
differing narrative accounts of history, or grand narratives, also extend to cover 
the historical narrative of her own and of Wat's twenty-third century (under the 
heading 'MODERNISM') and they indicate that any attempt to inscribe this 
particular era as unified historical epoch will also be undermined by difference: 
MODERNISM developed when households became the largest units of 
government on earth and satellite co-operatives the largest off it. Once 
again time was split into three. 
1 - Prehistory, before people lived in cities. 
2 - History, when increasing numbers did so and city cultures shaped 
family life everywhere. 
3 - Modernity, when the open intelligence network and powerplants 
made cities, nations, money and industrial power obsolete. 
The simplicity of our modern divisions misled many into treating 
history as a painful interval between prehistoric tribal communities and 
modern co-operative ones. Others wanted to lump the historic and 
prehistoriC eras together with a new calendar dated from the start of 
modernity, but disagreed about where to place the first year. Open 
intelligence gurus said the new era opened when the United States 
government let an early open intelligence network take over the 
Montana state education service in the 1980s. Others put it in the 
twenty-first century when the first modern powerplant sythesized a bowl 
of rice, a Samurai sword and a perfect Hokusai print on a Japanese 
peninsula - others when the first self-sustaining powerplant community 
took root in an Israeli kibbutz or in Salt Lake City or in the Vatican -
others when the Islamic league began distributing powerplants to every 
Mohammedan nation on earth - others when the open intelligence 
network announced an accord with Japan through which it would sell any 
Sixty people in the world their own powerplant if they owned an area of 
land able to support one. 
(A History Maker, p. 203-204) 
What Kittock's notes make obvious is that any given narrative 'history' is but one 
version of events among many. Certainly rhetoric is used to contain the 
multiplicity of the past by enveloping it in a linear and unified narrative; the 
11 For an interesting discussion on the difficulties of Utopia, see Italo Calvino's essay 'On 
Fourier, III: Envoi: A Utopia of Fine Dust' (Calvino, 1987, pp. 245-255). Also relevant are 
Fredric Jameson's comments on the 'anxiety' of Utopia in Jameson, 1991 (see in 
particular p. 331ff.). 
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question of which narrative history or version of events prevails over time is 
largely a question of politics and power. 
This is nowhere more potently observed than in Gray's fFive Letters from an 
Eastern Empire'. In this story the tragic poet of the empire, Bohu, is commanded 
by the emperor - literally a puppet manipulated by a clique of imperial 
fheadmasters' - to compose a poem celebrating what is termed the emperor's 
Hirrevocable justice" (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 113). Since the emperor then 
informs Bohu that he has just destroyed the empire's old capital and everyone 
living in it (including Bohu's own parents) for ffthe crime of disobedience" 
(ibid.), it is unsurprising that Bohu resorts to his own act of disobedience, writing 
against the emperor's wishes and actions. The poem he composes is as follows: 
TO THE EMPEROR'S INJUSTICE 
Scattered buttons and silks, a broken kite in the mud, 
A child's yellow clogs cracked by the horses' hooves. 
A land weeps for the head city, lopped by sabre, cracked by hooves, 
The houses ash, the people meat for crows. 
A week ago wind rustled dust in the empty market. 
"Starve," said the moving dust, "Beg. Rebel. Starve. Beg. Rebel." 
We do not do such things. We are peacefuL people. 
We have food for six more days, let us wait. 
The emperor will accommodate us, underground. 
It is sad to be unnecessary. 
All the bright mothers, strong fathers, raffish aunts, 
Lost sisters and brothers, all the rude servants 
Are honoured guests of the emperor, underground. 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 127) 
The survival of Bohu's poem intact would ironically relate the emperor's 
brutality and irrevocable injustice to future generations of the Eastern empire; 
instead the imperial clique, guided by the headmaster of modern and classical 
literature, ensure that Bohu's poem is manipulated to convey a rather different 
message. The rhetorical function of literature in general is here brought under 
scrutiny, the headmaster of literature writing: fthe headmaster of civil peace 
will remind me that the job of a poem is not to describe reality but to encourage 
our friends, frighten our enemies, and reconcile the middling people' (Unlikely 
Stories, Mostly, p. 131). The manipulation of Bohu's poem is in fact restricted to 
the changing of just a single syllable: the f/NJUSTICE' of the poem's title is to be 
changed to read fJUSTICE', enabling the poem to then be interpreted as having 
fulfilled the original imperial requirements. Rereading the poem in light of this 
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simple change is both disconcerting and chilling. It provides comment both on 
the persuasive power of language used rhetorically and, crucially, upon the role 
of (institutionally controlled) interpretation in language and writing. The t critical 
appreciation' of the poem delivered to the Imperial College of Headmasters by 
the headmaster of literature is itself a rhetorical redoubling (to borrow Derrida's 
term), highlighting the rhetorical force not just of Bohu's poem but of the 
headmaster's own reading of it, which too is designed for persuasion: tWith a 
single tiny change the poem can be used at once,' he writes, tl know some of my 
colleagues will raise objections, but I will answer these in the course of my 
appreciation' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 130). His critical appreciation takes 
the form of practical criticism - a technique commonly practised in literature 
departments of academic institutions, so often the target of such wry volleys 
from the writing of Gray - and acts to justify using Bohu's poem in service of the 
empire by arguing in turn that the poem itself acts to justify the emperor's 
actions. He writes: 
Bohu ... presents the destruction as a simple, stunning, inevitable fact. 
The child, mother and common people in the poem exist passively, dOing 
nothing but weep, gossip, and wait. The active agents of hoof, sabre, 
and (by extension) crow, belong to the emperor, who is named at the 
end of the middle verse: 
The emperor will accommodate us, underground. 
and at the end of the last: 
Bright mothers, strong fathers ... all the rude servants 
Are honoured guests of the emperor, underground. 
Consider the weight this poem gives to our immortal emperorl He is not 
described or analysed, he is presented as a final, competent, all-
embracing force, as unarguable as the weather, as inevitable as death. 
This is how all governments should appear to people who are not in 
them. 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly p. 132) 
Both Bohu's altered poem and the headmaster's appreciation of it can therefore 
be seen to perform precisely the function of unified and linear historical 
narrative as outlined above, presenting a singular account of events as tsimple, 
stunning, inevitable fact ... as unarguable as the weather'. What is clear from 
this story however, as well as from Kittock's notes in A History Maker, is the 
insufficiency of any single narrative account (and the insufficiency of taking any 
such account) to accurately represent the transformations, historical, political 
and cultural, of a particular time. Grand, exclusive and linear narratives have 
hence faced challenge from both literature and theory, and the digital 
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environment of hypertext now appears to offer an extremely hospitable arena 
for the development of such ideas. In order to illustrate the particular relevance 
of hypertext, however, it is worthwhile first to consider how ideas of multiple 
and non-linear narratives - narratives that do not deny difference - have been 
developed through fictional experiment and through the work of theory within 
the bound domain of print. 
As Mark Currie has observed, it is useful to consider the Derridean concept of 
the trace in relation to the insufficiency of linear historical narratives. 12 Without 
swimming too far among the complexities of Derridean theory at this point, it 
should be explained that Derrida uses the notion of the trace (with its 
connotations in French of track or footprint) to undermine the typically Western 
metaphysical concept of presence, of the self-sufficiency of written concepts (at 
the level of both signifier and signified). For Derrida, written concepts cannot 
meaningfully exist entirely in themselves: since they rely on difference - an 
accompanying concept of what they are not - they will always contain the trace 
of this difference, this negative 'other' .13 According to the logic of the trace 
then, linear historical narratives already contain the elements of their own 
undoing; their own insufficiency is inscribed in them. Currie writes: 
When Derrida refers to the metaphysical concepts of meaning, time and 
history he is drawing attention to this foundational illusion of presence 
which is destroyed by the trace - by the fact that the present, or 
presence itself, is a crossed structure of 'protensions' and 'retensions', 
bearing within it the spectres of its own past and future. If time and 
history are being readmitted here, it is in an unrecognisable form that 
destroys the linear sequence of past, present and future with the logic of 
the trace which understands the components of any sequence as 
constitutive of each other. 
(Currie, 1998, p. 78) 
Written histories must then always be incomplete, paradoxically constituted as 
much by what they lack as by what they contain. 
12 See Currie, 1998, p. 78ff. 
13 Derrida writes: 'The trace is not only the disappearance of origin - within the discourse 
that we sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did not 
even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the 
trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin. From then on, to wrench the concept 
of the trace from the classical scheme, which would derive it from a presence or from an 
originary nontrace and which would make of it an empirical mark, one must indeed speak 
of an originary trace or arche-trace. Yet we know that that concept destroys its name 
and that, if all begins with the trace, there is above all no originary trace' (Derrida, 
1976, p. 61). 
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The recognition that singular linear narrative is inadequate to the task of 
representing the heterogeneity of historical experience has long led writers 
working with the medium of print to experiment with narrative form. In the 
Scottish fictional tradition, the double narrative is one device that has been used 
to counter singular narrative accounts with often antithetical accounts that serve 
to represent the unrepresented, to offer the mirror-image or narrative tother' of 
the other narrative. Such conflicting narrative accounts can be considered as 
speaking the unspoken, fictively as well as in terms of the history of Scotland as 
a nation, representing the estrangement, marginalisation and indeed exclusion 
felt by many Scots subjects throughout the course of their turbulent historical 
relationship with their English neighbours and as part of a United Kingdom run 
largely (even now, in spite of the devolved Scottish parliament) from 
Westminster. 14 In James Hogg's 1824 novel The Private Memoirs and Confessions 
of a Justified Sinner, the narrative is split into two. The first part, tThe Editor's 
Narrative', tells the story of events in the life of one Robert Wringhim, the 
wretched adopted son of an over-zealous Calvinist minister. Filled with jealousy 
and spite towards both the natural father who shunned him and the elder 
brother who commands the father's favour, Wringhim malevolently pursues his 
brother, eventually murdering him. The second narrative takes the form of the 
alienated Wringhim's own private memoirs, which relate how he feels himself to 
14 The decision to involve UK troops in the Iraq war is a case in pOint. As a 'reserved 
issue', the decision to despatch troops (including many Scots troops) without a clear 
second UN resolution on the matter was made solely by Westminster, without the 
requirement that MSPs at Holyrood be consulted. For Gray on this subject see his story 
'15 February 2003' - the date of the anti-war march in Glasgow - in The Ends of Our 
Tethers, pp. 146-160. It should be pointed out, too, that the suggestion of a Scottish 
fictional 'tradition' is in itself troublesome, since Scottish voices are not always in 
agreement. Gray writes: 'I often get letters nowadays from people keen to discuss or 
discover views of Scottish identity, as if more than five million folk could possibly have a 
single identity' (The Ends of Our Tethers, p. 155), while Mark Currie comments: 'The 
most obvious point to make about a nation is that, if it is a thing in any sense, it is one of 
the most complex things one could think of, so that any attempt to represent it in its 
totality will be forced to employ a strategy of totalisation: that is, using some parts or 
characteristics to represent the whole complex entity. The nation is the structure of 
exclusion par excellence in that any attempt to totalise it will have to exclude, or 
marginalise, those parts of the nation that are not deemed representative of its total 
essence' (Currie, 1998, p. 91-92). Included among Scotland's many national voices are of 
course the voices of those who leave the legacy of a written Scotland; the Unionist voice 
of Sir Walter Scott is one that, while at odds with so many, is still widely recognised as 
the prime purveyor of 'Scottish tradition'. For a stimulating discussion of Scott's and 
Gray's written Scotlands see Stephen Bernstein's chapter on A History Maker in 
Bernstein, 1999, pp. 134-152. 
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be pursued by the evil shape-shifter Gil-Martin, who goads him into the murder 
(and whom he eventually discovers to be Satan). According to Wringhim, Gil-
Martin convinces him that the antinomian religious belief he has inherited from 
his adopted father actually provides justification for his crime, arguing that since 
Wringhim is among the number of preordained, his actions on earth are 
inconsequential. The second narrative, presenting Wringhim's side of the story, 
functions both to illuminate and to call into question the first, bringing into play 
the whole issue of na"ively reading the text: readers must twice 'suspend 
disbelief' and are thus unable to place complete faith in either version of 
events; each narrative account reveals the insufficiency of the other. 15 This split 
narrative tradition is continued by Robert Louis Stevenson in The Strange Case of 
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (which also considers the accompanying notion of the split 
personality or despicable alter-ego hinted at in Hogg's text), and is employed by 
Alasdair Gray in Poor Things, where Archie McCandless's narrative Episodes from 
the Early Life of a Scottish Public Health Officer is followed by and countered 
with his wife's 'Letter to Posterity'. In each case the second narrative provides a 
voice for the marginalised of the first - Robert Wringhim, Jekyll/Hyde and 
Bella/Victoria are all represented in terms of madness or mental instability and 
are all thus largely discredited by the first narratives - which challenges and 
weakens the status of these primary, allegedly factual (and allegedly sane) 
15 At the same time each is inscribed with its own insufficiency, each is subject to the 
logic of the trace: the memoirs constituting the second narrative have been written by 
someone in an obviously unstable mental state and are thus presented to the reader as 
being perhaps unstable or unreliable themselves; neither is the supposed impartiality of 
the first-person 'Editor's Narrative' altogether straightforward (its very title begging the 
question to what extent and to what end it has in fact been edited). The novel's title 
page describes the editor's contribution as 'a detail of curious traditionary facts, and 
other evidence,' but there is no indication of the editor's identity or of his possible 
motivations for collecting and 'publishing' such evidence; perhaps he simply has a 
penchant for a compelling yarn. At one point in the narrative the editor writes: 'We 
cannot enter into the detail of the events that now occurred without forestalling a part 
of the narrative of one who knew all the circumstances - was deeply interested in them, 
and whose relation is of higher value than anything that can be retailed out of the stores 
of tradition and old registers; but, his narrative being different from these, it was judged 
expedient to give the account as thus publicly handed down to us' (The Private Memoirs 
and Confessions of a Justified Sinner, p. 55). This statement serves to undermine the 
narrative that contains it - relegating it almost to the status of hearsay - whilst at the 
same time conferring authority on the other narrative whose author, although subject to 
mental delusion, nevertheless 'knew all the circumstances.' 
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narratives. 16 Outwith Scottish fiction, William Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury 
presents the reader with multiple narrative accounts of events: four consecutive 
narratives, narrated by four very different characters, while B.S. Johnson's 
House Mother Normal consists of ten narrative accounts centring around the 
same event, given by ten occupants of a geriatric home at varying stages of 
infirmity. 17 Offering more than a single line of narrative can thus be seen to 
problematise the notion of a single, unified story and instead reiterates the point 
that any given historical tmoment' or narrative account will be representatively 
inadequate and shot through with difference. 
In Poor Things, as well as having the two countering tmain' narratives we also 
have the added convolutions of the tlntroduction' to the two narratives by the 
inscribed author and editor, Alasdair Gray, and his fNotes Critical and Historical' 
that follow them. This third narrative level functions to frame the texts of 
McCandless and Bella/Victoria; it also, against its own alleged design, brings into 
question the authority of the McCandless text and at the same time suggests its 
own inadequacy as authority source. In so doing it subverts not just the notion of 
a singular authoritative narrative, but also the hierarchy of the narrative: 
editorial notes are conventionally considered tobjective' and therefore to have a 
higher status than the narrative they provide comment on, but the editor's 
introduction and notes in this case are anything but objective; similarly, 
although the McCandless text comes next in terms of narrative order, its place in 
16 Although, as has already been noted, the texts of the first narratives contain their own 
aporia: they question themselves from within as well as being questioned from without. 
In the case of Poor Things, Bernstein has argued that the contradictory narratives are 
representative of the contradictory era in which the novel is set: tBetter than trying to 
unearth some final truth in this novel, we might instead relish the discursive power 
arising from among its various voices; the resulting babble of contestation about the 
truth of the nineteenth century says most by saying most' (Bernstein, 1999, p. 111). 
17 Johnson also uses repetitive and parallel patterning throughout the ten narratives, 
encouraging an awareness of their spatial as well as temporal relationship to one 
another. Jonathan Coe writes: 'Taking his cue from Philip Toynbee's novel Tea with Mrs 
Goodman, he divides the book into ten sections of twenty-one pages each, and ensures 
that in every section, the same event (and the characters' differing responses to it) 
occurs not just on the same page but at precisely the same point on that page: so that 
the whole book becomes - to use a musical analogy - richly polyphonic, fugal, a novel 
that can be read 'vertically' as well as 'horizontally" (Coe, 2004, p. 24-25). Such 
interest in the spatial arrangement of the text of course prefigures the potential of 
hypertext, since it can be structured as a network rather than as a linear hierarchy, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 2. Further spatial experiments within print will also be 
discussed a little later on. 
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terms of narrative hierarchy is dubious. This much can be garnered from the 
editor's discussion of it in the introduction. The Alasdair Gray that edits the book 
is certain of the veracity of McCandless's narrative and dismissive of 
Bella/Victoria's and for this reason he exercises his editorial duties to place 
McCandless's text first and Bella/Victoria's second. This is a self-confessed 
attempt to sway the reader towards accepting the primary, McCandless narrative 
above that of BellaiVictoria, whose mental state he all too readily questions: 
I print the letter by the lady who calls herself "Victoria" McCandless as 
an epilogue to the book. Michael would prefer it as an introduction, but 
if read before the main text it will prejudice readers against that. If read 
afterward we easily see it is the letter of a disturbed woman who wants 
to hide the truth about her start in life. Furthermore, no book needs two 
introductions and I am writing this one. 
(Poor Things, p. XIII) 
Gray the editor comes across as being not entirely reliable, at best 
scatterbrained and disorganised, at worst negligent or even mendacious. He has 
managed to lose the original volume of Episodes from the Early Life of a Scottish 
Public Health Offker, claiming that '[s]omewhere between editor, publisher, 
typesetter and photographer the unique first edition was mislaid,' adding, 
'[t]hese mistakes are continually happening in book production, and nobody 
regrets them more than I do' (Poor Things, p. XVI). Aspersion is thus cast on the 
authenticity of the McCandless narrative as well as on Gray's own 'editorial' 
capacity. 18 The following excerpt from the introduction similarly undermines 
both its own text and that of McCandless; moreover, it once again questions the 
whole process of inscribing history in narrative by suggesting that the boundary 
between history and fiction is neither clear nor given: 
I '" told Donnelly that I had written enough fiction to know history when I 
read it. He said he had written enough history to recognize fiction. To 
this there was only one reply - I had to become a historian. 
I did so. I am one. After six months of research among the archives of 
Glasgow University, the Mitchell Library's Old Glasgow Room, the 
Scottish National Library, Register House in Edinburgh, Somerset House in 
London and the National Newspaper Archive of the British Library at 
Colindale I have collected enough material evidence to prove the 
MCCandless story a complete tissue of facts .... Michael Donnelly has told 
me he would find the ... evidence more convincing if I had obtained 
official copies of the marriage and death certificates and photocopies of 
18 Although Gray insists on the integrity of the McCandless text: 'I promised to make no 
changes to Archibald McCandless's actual text. Indeed, the main part of this book is as 
near to a facsimile of the McCandless original as possible' (Poor Things, p. XIII). 
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the newspaper reports, but if my readers trust me I do not care what an 
"expert" thinks. 
(Poor Things, p. XV-XVI) 
That this inscribed Gray believes he has become a 'historian' in the space of six 
months should of course worry rather than reassure his readers, as should his 
lack of regard for the advice of the text's 'real' historian, Michael Donnelly. All 
his statement does reassure readers of, in fact, is the peril of taking any 
narrative at face value, and the disturbance of the book's narrative hierarchy 
indicates that the principle of taking narrative level as a general indictor of 
narrative authority is not to be trusted either. This is true for historical 
narratives as much as for fictional ones; indeed history and fiction, since both 
are subject to the conditions of narrative, are shown here to be inseparable. 
In addition to this literary and theoretical critique of authoritative singularity 
in narrative, linear and unified narratives have also faced interrogation within 
the important context of narrative representations of the passage and 
experience of time, the chronological notion of time being bound up with the 
representation of history/story as linear progression (and the reader may here be 
referred back to the earlier quote from Lyotard). Gerard Genette in Narrative 
Discourse writes of the well-known distinction between 'story time' (the time of 
the story being told, or order of events) and 'narrative time' (the time of the 
telling of the story, or the time of the discourse) and describes some of the 
techniques at the author's disposal for using narrative time to disrupt the time 
or linear chronology of the story. 19 As Genette points out, authors can use 
techniques like flashback or retrospection (analepsis) and foreshadowing or 
anticipation (prolepsis) to change the order of the story's events as it is related 
and have done so since Homer (the opening of The Iliad first describing the 
wrath of Achilles and its consequences then retrospectively recounting the 
reasons for it (Genette, 1980, p. 36-37)). In Gray's fiction such narrative 
anachrony occurs most explicitly in Lanark, where the order of the four 
constitutive Books is 3, 1, 2, 4 rather than the chronological 1 , 2, 3, 4, and 
where, as Cairns Craig has noted, repetition and recurrence are indicative of a 
19 See Genette, 1980, p. 33ff. Genette categorises the techniques under the headings of 
order, duration and frequency. For a discussion of Genette's categories in relation to 
hypertext see Liest01, 1994. 
33 
force at times more powerful than simple forward motion.20 In Lanark's 
intercalendrical zone - a zone connecting the underworld of the Institute with 
the living world sustaining it from above - the protagonist Lanark's efforts to 
traverse the zone with his girlfriend Rima are continually met with the same 
impasse: the door with the paradoxical sign: 
EMERGENCY EXIT 3124 
NO ADMITTANCE 
(Lanark, pp. 378, 381). 
Forward progress in the intercalendrical zone is an impossibility for within it the 
dimensions of time and space are skewed; as Munro tells Lanark and Rima as 
they enter it, "[a] month is as meaningless there as a minute or a century" 
(Lanark, p. 374). Lanark and Rima's experience of time within the zone is 
circular and repetitive rather than linear and progressive and is in fact symbolic 
of their experiences outwith the zone in the larger environment of the novel as a 
whole: there they struggle to move beyond or escape from a number of difficult 
situations, finding themselves trapped within the moment, inhibited in any 
attempt to move from present to future by the seemingly insurmountable 
obstacles that repeatedly present themselves and by their own incapacity for 
meaningful action. Their fictive experiences suggest that human experience of 
time is not always straightforward and chronological - as linear narrative 
suggests - and should not therefore always be represented as such. In this case 
the subversion of linear movement in the narrative reflects more accurately the 
experience of its characters than would a linear or chronological narrative. Just 
as Lanark's narrative cannot move sequentially from Book 1 to Book 4, neither 
can its subjects direct themselves beyond the circumvolutions of the narrative's 
logic: 3124, as emergency exit and order of Books, affords them no temporal 
future, no final means of escape. 
Linear and temporal advancement of the story may also be subverted by 
narrative digressions or interpolations (which as well as taking the form of 
topical digressions from the 'main' story can include analeptic or proleptic 
digressions within it).21 Digressions, in the Proustian (and Joycean) mode, 
20 See Craig, 1991, p. 98ff. 
21 In their most extreme form, digressions can even replace the main story, as in Italo 
Calvina's If on a winter's night a traveller. In this text, the reader's desire for a single, 
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operate to defy story time through lyrical expansion in narrative time, the 
textual interruptions they effect being an aspect of modernist writing designed 
to figuratively undo the demands of time perceived as controlling force. 22 This is 
connected to the notion of technology's apparently unwelcome appearance on 
the domestic scene, since the instrument of time in human life is a technological 
one, the clock.23 As such, fictional depictions of the relationship between 
linear story is continually exploited and frustrated as a series of digressions successively 
spin off along completely new trajectories, repeatedly assuming the status of the 'main' 
story and in fact confirming that there is no 'main' story in this text, no one story that 
dominates at the expense of the others (or, perhaps more accurately, each story only 
temporarily moves to the centre, is only temporarily admitted as being the 'main' story). 
The only 'story' that remains stable is that of the reader's search for a story: this is the 
constant thread that runs through the separate stories or narratives presented by the 
text, the text's inSCribed reader embarking on a mission to follow up or retrieve the 
various story threads he encounters as a result of his engagement with a number of 
'faulty' textual copies, books within the book. The inscribed reader's efforts aim to 
ensure that each story is granted a beginning, a middle and an end, in order that he 
might thus bring his experience of reading these texts into line with his hitherto familiar, 
conventional and comfortable experiences of reading linear books linearly. This process 
is reinforced by the real reader's act of reading the text, which, since this is a printed 
book, will conform to the linear experience of reading the book page by page, from start 
to finish. It is this pursuit of linear story that works eventually, and paradoxically, to 
unify the text, at the very same time as the text is involved with the contradictory work 
of presenting itself as anti-story, as a fragmentary rather than continuous and unified 
narrative. The digressions in Calvi no's text also work to disrupt conventional notions of 
narrative hierarchy: digressions in texts usually take the form of temporary diversions 
from a 'main' story and are therefore subordinate to the primary narrative. Since the 
diversions in this text never return to any other 'main' story and are simply replaced by 
further diversions, they can be considered as neither embedded nor subordinate 
digressions and therefore each of them assumes (temporarily) the status of 'main' 
narrative. The only possible indicator of a hierarchy in terms of these narrative 
diversions comes from the position imposed on them by the linear structure of the text: 
that is to say that the first narrative in the sequence may be assumed to have a higher 
status than the second, the second higher than the third and so on, purely as a result of 
their ordinal placing within the book (and since the episodes in this book are designed to 
be read linearly, rather than in a random order). Linearly structured books in general 
may therefore be seen to reinforce narrative hierarchies through their very form, and 
Calvino's text in particular again upholds a tradition of print while working to interrogate 
it. 
22 For a discussion of the functioning of lyrical enlargements and recurrences in the 
fiction of both Proust and Joyce, see Coyle, 1995. Time has commonly and superstitiously 
been looked upon as authoritarian and personified as male, as with the mythical figure of 
Father Time (an alternative paternal authority source to God the Father). In Alasdair 
Gray's 1982 )an;ne, Jock McLeish's father adopts this role. Jock tells us early on in the 
novel that 'my father ... was a timekeeper at the pithead, a strong union man' (p. 18), 
and subsequently reinforces this description: 'my father the timekeeper' (p. 91); 'My 
father the socialist timekeeper' (p. 138). 
23 See Stevenson, 1991 for comment on the portrayal of the clock in modernist writing as 
well as in Gray's, and Bernstein, 1999, p. 63ff. which pays particular attention to the 
subject of digital timekeeping in Gray's work. 
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humans and their technological timepieces have tended to carry negative 
undertones. As the Lilliputians take inventory of Lemuel Gulliver's possessions in 
Swift's GuWver's Travels, their comments regarding his attitude to his pocket-
watch satirically hint that his reverence towards it verges on enthralment: 
There were two pockets which we could not enter: these he called his 
fobs ... Out of the right fob hung a great silver chain, with a wonderful 
kind of engine at the bottom .... He put this engine to our ears, which 
made an incessant noise like that of a watermill. And we conjecture it is 
either some unknown animal, or the god that he worships: but we are 
more inclined to the latter opinion, because he has assured us ... that he 
seldom did any thing without consulting it. He called it his oracle, and 
said it pointed out the time for every action of his life. 
(Gulliver's Travels, p. 28-29)24 
The clock has already undergone the transformation currently taking place in the 
domain of writing, that from mechanical to digital technology, and while this has 
facilitated a greater accuracy in timekeeping, James Gleick in his book Faster 
offers a fascinating account of the detrimental effect of this change in terms of 
our quality of life. Focussing on time with such precision as digital technology 
allows, he hypothesises, has made us overly aware of the role of time in our 
lives, resulting, as the book's subtitle asserts, in The Acceleration of Just About 
Everything, an obsession with doing things quickly, efficiently and with optimal 
24 Flann O'Brien both explores and exploits our attitudes to time in At Swim-Two-Birds. 
The fictional depiction of a clock by the text's narrator (himself an inscribed author) is 
surprising in that it shows the clock to be weak, struggling to control time rather than 
powerfully (and manfully) representing and reinforcing it: 'On the window-ledge there 
was a small bakelite clock which grappled with each new day as it entered his room 
through the window from Peter Place, arranging it with precision into twenty-four hours. 
It was quiet, servile and emasculated; its twin alarming gongs could be found if looked 
for behind the dust-laden books on the mantelpiece' (At Swim-Two-Birds, p. 31). This 
forms a clear contrast to the image of the clock as carried by Gulliver: it is 'quiet' as 
opposed to making 'an incessant noise'; 'servile' rather than oracular. Nevertheless, this 
clock still manages to organise time precisely. It also appears' emasculated', but only by 
virtue of human intervention, the forced removal of its gongs. Time and its instruments 
of keeping are elsewhere in this text associated with male authority, in the same vein as 
Jock McLeish's father in 1982 Janine is timekeeper. In At Swim-Two-Birds, the male 
authority figures are the narrator's uncle and his network of cronies who are seen, like 
time, to be presiding over events: 'The old boys know a thing or two,' the narrator's 
uncle tells him, 'There are more things in life and death than you ever dreamt of, 
Horatio' (At Swim- Two-Birds, p. 214). It is significant that on the occasion of the 
narrator passing his university exams the 'old boys' make a gift to him of a watch: this is 
representative of his coming-of-age and his own admittance into the network of male 
timekeepers who bear witness to, or 'watch' over, the passing of time. On presenting 
the gift of the watch, the uncle says, 'We hope that you will accept it and that you will 
wear it to remind you when you have gone from us of two friends that watched over you 
- a bit strictly perhaps - and wished you well' (ibid.). 
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saving of time. 25 We are now in a rush to do everything, Gleick maintains, so that 
we may cram as much into our day as possible and still finish our daily tasks with 
time to spare. This he terms the tlose-not-a-minute anguish of our age,' 
suggesting that our obsession with time now defines us (Gleick, 2000, p. 9). 
Spending more time working, shopping and commuting than ever, we now spend 
less time on even our most basic human needs of eating and sleeping. Relaxation 
time, too, is often carefully accounted for, organised into precise temporal slots 
for things like exercising and entertainment. Truly tspare' or tfree' time is fast 
becoming an endangered species, something we seem never to be able to 
accumulate enough of. Little wonder then that time comes at such a premium, 
to be saved at all costs. Time, the poster slogans in Lanark tell us, is the most 
valuable of commodities, necessary for both life and love -
MONEY IS TIME. TIME IS LIFE. BUY MORE LIFE FOR YOUR FAMILY FROM THE 
QUANTUM INTERMINABLE. (THEY'LL LOVE YOU FOR IT.) 
(Lanark, p. 454) 
- but it is in scarce supply: 
YOU HAVEN'T MUCH TIME - PROTEST NOW. 
(Lanark, p. 42) 
The acceleration of life and compulsion to save time described by Gleick is 
recognisable in Unthank's slogans too: 
QUICK MONEY IS TIME IN YOUR POCKET - BUY MONEY FASTER FROM THE 
QUANTUM EXPONENTIAL. 
(Lanark, p. 432-433) 
A consequence of doing things faster may of course be that we do things with 
too much haste, without enough careful thought, with the result that our 
experience of the things we do will be impoverished, lacking the richness and 
resonance that comes with experience entered into thoughtfully, savoured 
25 This may even include our habits of lovemaking. Milan Kundera in his novel Slowness 
writes: 'Speed is the form of ecstasy the technical revolution has bestowed on man .... A 
curious alliance: the cold impersonality of technology with the flames of ecstasy. I recall 
an American woman from thirty years ago, with her stern, committed style, a kind of 
apparatchik of eroticism, who gave me a lecture (chillingly theoretical) on sexual 
liberation; the word that came up most often in her talk was 'orgasm'; I counted: forty-
three times. The religion of orgasm; utilitarianism projected into sex life; efficiency 
versus indolence; coition reduced to an obstacle to be got past as quickly as possible in 
order to reach an ecstatic explosion, the only true goal of lovemaking and of the 
universe' (Slowness, p. 4). 
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rather than rushed. 26 Reading and writing, too, may fall victim to this tendency. 
Gleick amusingly but depressingly observes: 
Even reading to children is under pressure. Hence the 1983 volume One-
Minute Bedtime Stories, traditional stories condensed, according to its 
publisher, "so they can be read by a busy parent in only one minute." 
You may feel that children themselves are not that busy. At least they 
may not need a stopwatch for the dash from once-upon-a-time to 
happily-ever-after, even if Sesame Street has done its work on their little 
psyches. But this book must have hit the mark, because many sequels 
followed, including One-Minute Birthday Stories, One-Minute Teddy Bear 
Stories, and One-Minute Christmas Stories. Perhaps the young targets of 
this bedtime largesse will grow up to join the ranks of those who consider 
a full-length book to be a quaint object. 
(Gleick, 2000, p. 142) 
It is against this impulse of moving too readily onwards, eye ever on the next 
thing in a race towards the finish line, that texts such as those of Proust and 
Joyce operate, requiring a contemplative disposition rather than an eager or 
impatient one on the part of the reader. Creating space for contemplation is one 
of writing's and reading's most important functions, engendering deep thought 
and difficult but productive discourse and some criticism has been levelled at 
hypertext on this basis, the digital environment of hypertext being viewed by 
many as one inconducive to quiet thought and absorbed reading. (This point will 
26 And Gleick points out that some of the most prominent historical thinkers took their 
time in evincing the theories that have become central to modern life: 'One could make 
an all-star list of slow but effective thinkers. Charles Darwin considered himself too slow-
witted to engage in argument. "I suppose I am a very slow thinker, " he said the year he 
published The Origin of Species. Einstein modestly described himself as a slow thinker' 
(Gleick, 2000, p. 109). Being slow these days, however, taking one's time in life, is less 
and less considered a positive attribute. 'Why has the pleasure of slowness disappeared?' 
asks Milan Kundera ruefully, 'Ah, where have they gone, the amblers of yesteryear? 
Where have they gone, those loafing heroes of folk song, those vagabonds who roam 
from one mill to another and bed down under the stars? Have they vanished along with 
footpaths, with grasslands and clearings, with nature? There is a Czech proverb that 
describes their easy indolence by metaphor: 'They are gazing at God's windows.' A 
person gazing at God's windows is not bored; he is happy. In our world, indolence has 
turned into having nothing to do, which is a completely different thing: a person with 
nothing to do is frustrated, bored, is constantly searching for the activity he lacks' 
(Slowness, p. 4-5). Kundera goes on to remark upon a situation highlighting perfectly the 
point that experience is impoverished through haste: 'I check the rearview mirror: still 
the same car unable to pass me because of the oncoming traffic. Beside the driver sits a 
woman. Why doesn't the man tell her something funny? Why doesn't he put his hand on 
her knee? Instead, he's cursing the driver ahead of him for not going fast enough, and it 
doesn't occur to the woman, either, to touch the driver with her hand; mentally she's at 
the wheel with him, and she's cursing me too' (Slowness, p. 5). On the same topic and 
with specific reference to Proust's writing, see also Alain de Botton's highly readable 
How Proust Can Change Your Life, particularly (if in a rush) the chapter 'How To Take 
Your Time'. 
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be returned to in the following chapter). Calvino, in If on a winter's night a 
traveller compares the act of reading with that of lovemaking, and asks whether 
the race towards climax may be 'opposed by another drive which works in the 
opposite direction, swimming against the moments, recovering time?' (If on a 
winter's night a traveller, p. 156). His question is relevant to the task of patient 
reading, an undertaking also addressed by Lyotard: 
Development imposes the saving of time. To go fast is to forget fast, to 
retain only the information that is useful afterwards, as in 'rapid 
reading'. But writing and reading which advance backwards in the 
direction of the unknown thing 'within' are slow. One loses one's time 
seeking time lost. 
(Lyotard, 1991, p. 3) 
'Seeking time lost' is precisely the work of Proust's narrator Marcel in A La 
recherche du temps perdu, and his narrative digressions are a means of forcing 
pause, of losing time, or in any case of resisting the advancing and seemingly 
inexorable tug of time. Rather than conveying a sense of forward directional 
force, the narrative creates instead a space for taking stock, for contemplation. 
Marcel's mythical experience of tasting the madeleine in the Combray section of 
the text facilitates his vivid recollection of his own past (the involuntary memory 
it prompts being deemed more truthful than a voluntary remembering of events 
which, being merely 'the memory of the intellect,' would be lacking in 
substance and so distorting (In Search of Lost Time, Vol. 1, p. 50)). Marcel's 
involuntary memories enable him to conceive of his childhood time spent in 
Combray in full and accurate detail and as such they fill in the blank space of a 
newly imagined pyramid, opening exponentially outwards from the seemingly 
isolated 'moment', replacing the 'slender cone of this irregular pyramid' -
formed in his imagination by the downstairs rooms of his grandmother's house in 
Combray and the staircase leading up to his own bedroom 'at the summit' -
where he had previously felt himself held in isolated captivity by his inability to 
recollect the past (and thereby to expand the moment) (ibid.). Marcel's 
bedroom, until the epiphany brought on by the madeleine, had been for him 
seen always at the same evening hour, isolated from all its possible 
surroundings, detached and solitary against the dark background, the 
bare minimum of scenery necessary ... to the drama of my undressing; as 
though all Combray had consisted of but two floors joined by a slender 
staircase, and as though there had been no time there but seven o'clock 
at night. 
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(In Search of Lost Time, Vol. 1, p.50) 
The taste of the madeleine, however, enables him to lyrically reconstruct the 
Combray beyond his bedroom: 
And as soon as I had recognised the taste of the piece of madeleine 
soaked in her decoction of lime-blossom which my aunt used to give me 
(although I did not yet know and must long postpone the discovery of 
why this memory made me so happy) immediately the old grey house 
upon the street, where her room was, rose up like a stage set to attach 
itself to the little pavilion opening on to the garden which had been built 
out behind it for my parents (the isolated segment which until that 
moment had been all that I could see); and with the house the town, 
from morning to night and in all weathers, the Square where I used to be 
sent before lunch, the streets along which I used to run errands, the 
country roads we took when it was fine. 
(In Search of Lost Time, Vol. 1, p. 54) 
Such poetic narrative expansions as the Combray section function in Proust's text 
to recapture time lost to Marcel - opening doors in his memory that had been 
closed for years and enabling him to gently meditate on the fullness of his past 
rather than merely compelling him to hurry towards his future - and in so doing 
they also forestall the direct and forward progression of story time in the 
narrative. 27 As with the non-chronological narrative of Lanark, it is suggested 
that the narrative convolutions of A la recherche du temps perdu may be more 
adequate to human experience of time than directly linear narrative. Genette 
observes: 
Interpolations, distortions, temporal condensations - Proust, at least 
when he is aware of them .'" justifies them constantly (according to an 
old tradition that will not die with him) by a realistic motivation: he 
invokes in turn the concern to tell things as they were "lived" at the 
time and the concern to tell them as they were recalled after the event. 
Thus, the anachronism of the narrative is now that of existence itself, 
now that of memory, which obeys other laws than those of time. 
(Genette, 1980, p. 157)28 
Whereas such digressive enlargements are used by Proust's narrator to defy 
the onward march of time by expansively recalling the past, the narrator of 
27 This notion of unexplored areas of the mind, of memory, also lies behind the quote 
from Paul Valery that provides the epigraph for Alasdair Gray's 1982 Janine: 'There are 
boxes in the mind with labels on them: To study on a favourable occasion; Never to be 
thought about; Useless to go into further; Contents unexamined; Pointless business; 
Urgent; Dangerous; Delicate; Impossible; Abandoned; Reserved for others; My business; 
etcetera' . 
28 See also Genette's footnotes to pp. 157 and 158 for further evidence of this concern on 
the part of Proust (Genette, 1980). 
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Alasdair Gray's 1982 Janine, Jock McLeish, uses them likewise to resist the 
linearity of time but in a converse manner, as a technique deliberately to deny 
his past. McLeish's digressions take the form of graphically detailed pornographic 
fantasies, functioning in his narrative as an avoidance tactic, an effort to 
postpone narration of the real circumstances of his life. These are so painful he 
would rather not think about them: a failed marriage and series of failed 
relationships; a job as an on-the-road supervisor of a nationwide security 
installation firm that only serves to increase his isolation; a conscience that 
quite simply will not let up in the task of torturing him mentally about his 
failings in life; these, in conjunction with his chronic alcoholism make his reality 
a rather sad story. Pornographic fantasy, for Jock, offers a temporary escape, 
and in order that fantasy can provide him with sufficient fodder to hold reality at 
bay he creates a parallel fantasy universe, a life for himself wherein he never 
fails since he is in complete control of everyone and everything in it, especially 
its main character, Janine. Unlike Proust's Marcel, Jock does not want to recall 
the details of his life, does not seek time to contemplate, and would drink 
himself into oblivion rather than investigate the contents of his memory. 'I 
refuse to remember my marriage,' he stubbornly states. 'I will pour into the 
mouth of this head another dram of stupidity. The questioning part of this brain 
is too active tonight' (1982 Janine, p. 15). Jock adopts a strategy of deliberate 
forgetting in order to repress memories of his past and he attempts to apply this 
strategy whenever he feels himself to be in danger of remembering anything too 
painful. The word 'forget' is used repeatedly in his narrative as an abrupt stay 
against his thoughts of people and events that have figured in his past: memories 
of happier times as a child at home with his mother: 'forget that' (p. 20) and of 
his mother's dissatisfaction with her own life: 'oh forget it forget it forget it' (p. 
23); his best friend Alan: 'He died. Forget him' (p. 106); his first love Denny: 
'Denny was seventeen forget her' (p. 129); his ex-wife Helen's affair: 'Then 
Helen met whatsisname and grew younger, yes, and beautiful, yes, and I was 
growing interested in her again when forget all that' (p. 33) and the episode he 
identifies as the defining point in his life, when, in the face of her threatening 
and humiliating father, he makes the decision to marry Helen: 
We all have a moment when the road forks and we take the wrong 
turning. Mine was when Helen told me she was pregnant and I said I 
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needed a week and later the doorbell rang and, forget it, I opened the 
door and Mr Hume and his two sons walked straight past me and, forget 
it, stood in the middle of my own room, yes, my own room and FORGET 
IT. FORGET IT. 
(1982 Janine, p. 26) 
Eventually even God - Jock telling us 'He detests my fantasy life' (1982 Janine, 
p. 133) - comes in line for the forgetting treatment: 'Fuck off God and don't 
come back. I intend to forget you' (ibid.). 
Just as he so often describes his fantasy heroine Janine, however, McLeish, 
too, is 'worried and trying not to show it' (1982 Janine, pp. 12, 13, 18, 311, 
340): his strategy is failing him. Less and less able to voluntarily forget all that 
he would, he becomes increasingly dependent on alcohol as an artificial source 
of memory loss. Once more finding himself haunted by his self-confessed 'wrong 
turning', he turns to drink to help him forget: 
I hated most of all a total stranger old enough to be my father who 
walked past me with his two sons into the middle of my own room and 
WHISKY quickquickquickquickquick on to the floor, get the emergency 
bottle out of the, damn this lock, case under the bed. Raise lid, grasp 
bottle, unscrew top. Good stuff. Take it from neck. Again. Again. Dip this 
foul brain deep in cleansing alcohol. Again. Oh warmth, stupidity, my 
dear dear friend ... Carefully pour glassful. Get in bed. Sip slowly. The 
parts of this mind are blissfully disconnecting, thoughts separating from 
memories, memories from fantasies. If I am lucky nothing now will float 
to my surface but delicious fragments. 
(1982 Janine, p. 69) 
Even whisky cannot, in the end, protect Jock from the facts of his past. He 
continues trying to use his fantasy digressions to distract himself, ceding, 'Since 
the best whisky in the world cannot fill my mind with happy memories I must get 
back to a fantasy and keep control of it this time' (1982 Janine p. 86), but 
involuntary memory proves in this text to have just as much force as in Proust's 
and Jock ultimately fails in his attempts to stop the encroachment of reality on 
fantasy. He can neither control his involuntary memories nor fully escape them 
through alcohol and decides that his only remaining option is complete 
termination of thought and memory in suicide. But in this he also fails. He must, 
therefore, finally face up to his reality. 
Though McLeish's approach to dealing with his past is far removed from 
Marcel's, the form of his narrative nonetheless owes much to its modernist 
predecessors, as Stephen Bernstein points out: 
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But as with Joyce's unpacking of 16 June 1904 until one day seems to 
encompass all time, 1982 Janine's single night contains the story of Jock 
McLeish's life. Gray's model is Proustian as well. Even though Jock gives 
up reading the French author's A la recherche du temps perdu because 
he dislikes "books with heroes who do not work for their living," Marcel's 
experience of the madeleine makes "a distinct impression" on McLeish 
since it "abolished time for him. Women's bodies do that for me ... " 
(166-67). McLeish's avoidance techniques are to some degree on display 
here as he conceals the actual Proustian dimensions of his childhood 
experience. Among the earliest memories introduced into his narrative is 
"the taste of a chocolate biscuit," which combines with other elements 
to recover the sense that "I was vast. I was sure that one day I would do 
anything in the world I wanted" (19). By the end of the novel, with his 
desires redirected, McLeish is indeed poised to do anything in the world 
he wants. True to the anglicized title he gives Proust's work, he too can 
boast of Time Redeemed. 
(Bernstein, 1999, p. 62) 
McLeish, in the second half of the novel, and somewhat gingerly at first, 
attempts to come to terms with his past and this part of his narrative becomes 
more or less a straightforward bildungsroman, a fairly traditional linear and 
chronological narrative. Up until his decision to tell his story straight, however, 
his narrative is laced with a series of ever more fantastical diversions and 
deferrals that inhibit the linear unfolding of his life story (and even his 'straight' 
story may not be altogether straight: as he prepares to narrate it, the margins of 
the text proclaim it to be yet another 'DIVERSION' (1982 Janine, pp. 192 and 
193), while Jock points out that, 'Telling a straightforward story is like cooking a 
meal, hard to do thoroughly if you are doing it for yourself alone.' He thus 
resolves, 'I must use my imagination again, deliberately this time, to conjure up 
a suitable audience' (1982 Janine, p. 194). We are made aware, therefore, that 
the story we are about to be told is subject to his skills of narration and, as we 
know, narratives - like memory - can play tricks. 'Remember.' He later tells 
himself. 'If you cannot remember, invent.' (1982 Janine, p. 317)).29 At the same 
time as pornographic fantasy imposes itself on the story of Jock's life, however, 
postponing its linear narration, his life story may similarly be considered an 
29 Jock, as the narrator of his story, of course has the prerogative to tell it however he 
likes, directly or indirectly, plus or minus a few embellishments here and there. When 
describing the director of the theatre group he does the lighting for he tells us: 'The 
director, who also played the hero, struck me as a silly man and a bad actor. I can still 
picture him distinctly: effeminately handsome with narrow, pale-blue eyes and well-
groomed wavy blond hair. He wore sandals, black slacks and sweater, also an earring and 
many silver necklaces. But in the fifties men who wanted to look gorgeous never wore 
jewellery, so I have imposed these on him from a later decade' (1982 Janine, p. 221). 
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imposition on and digression from the sequential divulgence of his fantasy. Two 
interweaving narratives are here at play, each disrupting and impinging on the 
other. Each time reality inadvertently threatens to invade Jock's fantasy world 
in the form of a digressive and involuntary memory, it is forcefully expelled as 
he invokes his technique of deliberate forgetting and returns once more to his 
similarly digressive fantasy universe and to the story of Janine. The text is in a 
state of flux as the two narrative strands vie for textual space: the fantasy 
narrative continually slips into that of real thought and memory -
But Janine is not (here come the clothes) happy with the white silk shirt 
shaped by the way it hangs from her etcetera I mean BREASTS ... the 
white suede miniskirt supported by her hips and unbuttoned as high as 
the top of the black fishnet stockings whose mesh is wide enough to 
insert three fingers I HATED clothes when I was young. My mother made 
me wear far too many of them, mostly jackets and coats. 
(1982 Janine, p. 18) 
- whilst the narrative of reality is persistently and abruptly abandoned in favour 
of fantasy: 
The clean tidy room, the click of my mother's needles, Jane Russell's 
soft shoulders and sulky mouth, the evening sunlight over the town in the 
bend of the river where the colliers' sons were guddling trout, a 
mushroom cloud in the Pacific sky above Bikini atoll, Jimmy Shand's 
music and the taste of a chocolate biscuit were precisely held by my 
mind and nobody else's .... I thought it likely that I would marry Jane 
Russell. I was ten or twelve at the time and believed sex and marriage 
were nearly the same thing. Now I am almost fiforget that forget that 
forget that where did I leave Janine? 
In a fast car trying not to be afraid, her vulnerable breasts in a white 
silk shirt [ ... J 
(1982 Janine, p. 19_20).30 
Each narrative strand, fantasy and reality, destroys the linearity of the other, 
preventing it from progressing and this lack of forward movement is comparable 
with the circular narrative logic of Lanark. As with Lanark and Rima, McLeish too 
is hemmed in by his own text, continuously forced back upon himself since he 
fails to move either of his narratives forward. Time does not move forward in the 
first part of 1982 Janine since McLeish finds himself unable to comprehend his 
own time linearly; as he says (and his words could equally be those of Lanark or 
Rima), '1 am travelling in a circle again' (1982 Janine, p. 194). He can deal with 
30 The influence of Proust's text upon Gray's is evident, the syntax of this lyrical passage 
offering an explicit pastiche of a Proustian sentence. 
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neither concept of past or future: both to him are unthinkable. As far as time 
goes, Jock is stuck. 
1982 Janine and Lanark do not just upset the temporal linearity of their 
narratives though: they also subvert the spatial or structural linearity of 
conventional narrative through typographical departures from the printed norm. 
The technology of print goes hand in hand with the linear development of 
narrative since the words on a printed page, like the pages in their own turn, 
follow one after the other, presenting their story through the linear sequence of 
consecutive words, sentences, paragraphs and chapters. Print, as a textual form, 
can therefore be seen to reinforce linearity as a property of narrative. In 1982 
Janine, following Jock's attempt at suicide through swallowing pills, the words 
on the printed page begin to behave unexpectedly, separating into three 
columns representing the 'Ministry of Voices' inside Jock's head and forming 
sections of text that appear in irregularly shaped paragraphs, and that are at 
times upside-down or on their sides. 31 In Lanark's 'Epilogue' section, the Index of 
Plagiarisms and scholarly footnotes that here accompany the 'main' story of 
Lanark the character are metatextual devices entailing a similar splitting of the 
page into columns or sections that follow separate narrative trajectories; the use 
of columnar text also features in Gray's short story 'Logopandocy' and in The 
Book of Prefaces. In each case the text ceases to be organised linearly and the 
reader must decide how to make progress through the text, choosing which 
among the alternative textual trajectories to follow: s/he may either pursue a 
single trajectory through its constitutive pages until its end is reached, then turn 
back through the pages to its start point to pick up another narrative thread, or 
may read through all the information that appears on a single page before 
turning over, thus moving linearly through the pages of the text but non-linearly 
through the individual columns or narrative paths (since each column or path 
31 Alasdair Gray, in an interview with Kathy Acker explains: 'I came to imagine my man 
taking pills and falling into a fever in which the voices crowding his mind become 
simultaneous. On one margin the voice of his body complains of the feverish temperature 
he's condemned it to, while in the middle his deranged libido fantasises and alternates 
with his deranged conscience denouncing him for having such fantasies. On the other 
margin, in very small print, the voice of God tries to tell him something important, tell 
him he has missed the point of living in a voice he can hardly hear, because it is not 
thunderously denouncing, to correct him in gentle, senSible words' (Acker, 2002, p. 55-
56). 
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spans a number of pages, necessitating its temporary abandonment if the reader 
wishes to read the rest of the page's contents).32 
Columnar text is not of course a new invention on the part of Gray, but his 
use of it within a fictional context is fairly unconventional: it is more commonly 
found in ffactual' texts such as newspapers and reference books 
(encyclopaedias, dictionaries, telephone directories and the like). These types of 
texts may also be considered to be structurally non-linear, the reader more 
often opening them at specific points in search of information confined to a page 
or two, rather than reading them consecutively from start to finish (indeed 
anyone attempting such a task with a text like a dictionary or phone book would 
be considered somewhat eccentric). Works of reference in particular depend 
largely on structural and organisational elements like indices, contents pages, 
page and chapter numbers which provide a guide to the reader, enabling him or 
her to dip into the text and find information relatively quickly; they also provide 
the reader with an important element of choice regarding the order in which 
32 The abandonment of a singular narrative path in favour of multiple paths also brings 
into play the issue of narrative hierarchy, Gray's texts exploiting conventional 
typographic and metatextual devices to explore and to question the status relations 
between the different textual elements (the feditorial' Introduction and Notes Critical 
and Historical of Poor Things have already provided an example of this, functioning to 
undermine rather than to reinforce their own, allegedly objective and authoritative 
position in the textual hierarchy). In each text CLogopandocy', Lanark, 1982 Janine) one 
particular narrative path appears privileged (if not initially then as the paths progress) 
due to the larger size of its columns and often also of its font. In 1982 Janine's 'Ministry 
of Voices', the 'main' path (as the previous footnote explains) follows Jock's alternating 
fantasy/reality mind-state while the voice of God - theoretically the most authoritative -
is represented by the most marginalised textual path. The textual hierarchy of Lanark is 
similarly subversive: here the Index of Plagiarisms and footnotes are subordinate to the 
text they accompany, which assumes the status of 'main' narrative (by virtue not only of 
the large proportion of the page it occupies and its larger font size but also of its content 
since it continues the narrative of Lanark's journey which had been the main narrative 
up to this point). On p. 489, however, the supposedly marginal Index and footnotes 
threaten to crowd out the so-called fmain' narrative, in spite of its larger font, by taking 
up the majority of the page and reducing the space available for Lanark's story to a 
small block paragraph. The footnotes also pull rank on the body of the text, 
authoritatively (and condescendingly) commenting upon the words of Nastler, the text's 
inscribed author/God: '[O]ne is compelled to ask why the "conjuror" introduces an 
apology for his work with a tedious and brief history of world literature, as though 
summarizing a great tradition which culminates in himself!,' (Lanark, p. 489-490). The 
footnote thus undermines the supposedly infallible authority of Nastler whilst providing a 
fictional send-up of footnotes in conventional scholarly texts which often impose 
editorial 'corrections' or conditions on the body text. It also admits to having 'thieved ... 
from T.S. Eliot, Nabokov and Flann O'Brien,' the fictional means of offering 'a parade of 
irrelevant erudition through grotesquely inflated footnotes' (Lanark, p. 490). 
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s/he wishes to read the text, denied in strictly linear narratives. Delany and 
Landow comment that, 'Over the centuries, readers developed a repertoire of 
aids to textual management; these aids operated both within a single volume, 
and in the relations between volumes. They constituted a proto-hypertext, in 
which we can find important models for hypertext design today' (Delany and 
Landow, 1991, p. 4). In the advent and development of such devices for textual 
organisation we may therefore see the structural signs of an emerging resistance 
to the inherent linearity of the printed textual form, a resistance that has 
evolved concomitantly within the sphere of narrative and narrative theory as has 
already been outlined, and which prefigures the capabilities of digital textuality. 
Bolter writes: 
In a modern book the table of contents (listing chapters and sometimes 
sections) defines the hierarchy, while the indices record associative lines 
of thought that permeate the text. An index permits the reader to locate 
passages that share the same word, phrase, or subject and so associates 
passages that may be widely separated in the pagination of the book. In 
one sense the index defines other books that could be constructed from 
the materials at hand, other themes that the author could have formed 
into an analytical narrative, and so invites the reader to read the book in 
alternative ways. An index transforms a book from a tree into a network, 
offering multiplicity in place of a single order of paragraphs and pages. 
There need not be any privileged element in a network, as there always 
is in a tree, no single topic that dominates all others. Instead of strict 
subordination, we have paths that weave their way through the textual 
space. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 22) 
Structural and organisational elements of printed texts like those that have 
been mentioned form part of what is termed the paratext: those features that 
do not strictly comprise the main body of the text but which surround and 
accompany it. The role of the printed paratext is a paradoxical one for 
structurally paratextual elements can work against the principle of linearity 
imposed on a text by its printbound form at the selfsame time that they help 
constitute the text as book. Genette, in his book Paratexts, writes: 
[The] text is rarely presented in an unadorned state, unreinforced and 
unaccompanied by a certain number of verbal or other productions, such 
as an author's name, a title, a preface, illustrations. And although we do 
not always know whether these productions are to be regarded as 
belonging to the text, in any case they surround it and extend it, 
precisely in order to present it, in the usual sense of this verb but also in 
the strongest sense: to make present, to ensure the text's presence in 
the world, its "reception" and consumption in the form (nowadays, at 
least) of a book. These accompanying productions, which vary in extent 
47 
and appearance, constitute what I have elsewhere called the work's 
paratext. 
(Genette, 1997, p.1) 
The paratext is indispensable to the notion of the book as object; a text without 
paratext would appear naked, stripped of the accoutrements that would 
normally indicate its status as book.33 In providing alternatives to a singular, 
linear reading of the text while working still to present it as linear, bounded 
artefact, however, the paratext can be seen to unravel the printed form of the 
book in the very act of confirming it. 
It would not be an exaggeration to claim that Alasdair Gray's books are 
nowadays unique in terms of their attention to paratextual detail: indices, 
footnotes, detailed chapter headings, synopses and marginal summaries like 
those encountered in Lanark and 1982 Janine - organisational paratextual 
features that would seem more at home in the non-fiction environment and 
which allow the fictional text to be consulted akin to the manner of a reference 
work - comprise only some of the paratextual devices he exploits in his 
publications. As Genette's definition of the paratext points out, it includes visual 
embellishments in addition to organisational ones and Gray's texts are as visually 
stimulating as they are textually adventurous. Furnished with his own 
illustrations inside and out and, in the hardback editions, offering decorated 
book boards and inner papers as well as the odd erratum slip, that rather 
charmingly tactile textual corrective from a bygone era, Gray's creative 
paratexts present his texts not just as books but as objets d'art, as Elspeth King, 
former curator of the People's Palace local history museum in Glasgow where 
Gray worked for a while as Artist Recorder, appreciates: 
The reading of a book by Alasdair Gray provides an aesthetic, sensory 
pleasure, from the dust jacket to the valediction on the last page. Every 
part of his own books has been designed by him. No other Scottish writer 
has sought and obtained involvement in the design and production in this 
way. His commitment to perfection and to producing work that 
contributes to re'enforcing local and national identity has raised 
publishing standards. There is so much visual interest in each work, with 
board papers either profusely illustrated (as in Unlikely Stories, Mostly 
and The Book of Prefaces) or in primary colours (Something Leather, Ten 
Tales Tall and True), and followed by end papers, title and contents 
33 Derrida, in Glas, offers a useful analogy regarding paintings: 'just imagine the havoc of 
a theft that would only deprive you of frames and of every possibility of reframing your 
valuables or your art objects' (Derrida, 1986, p. 94). 
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pages that pay homage to the best traditions of book production, that 
readers sometimes omit to remove the dust jackets and discover the 
boards themselves, beautifully stamped in gold and silver with bold 
designs and Gray's guiding principle: Work as if you live in the Early Days 
of a Better Nation. 
Gray has always used typography to change mood, enhance the 
meaning of the text or convey a mindset. The changes in typeface are 
never gratuitous. The appearances of words have been selected with the 
same care as they have been written, and work together for a purpose. 
His encyclopaedic knowledge of the printer's art has enabled him to 
invent historical title pages (as in Poor Things) and his love of beauty in 
books has led to the re-introduction of the book ribbon (Poor Things, 
Mavis Belfrage, The Book of Prefaces) by the publishers Bloomsbury. Two 
errata slips were issued in red and black type for Prefaces within days of 
its publication .... The dropped capitals containing portraits (Something 
Leather) and animals (Ten Tales Tall and True) are stunning in their 
economy of line, and in their effect on the page. 
In short, the books written and designed by Gray are beautiful works, 
which do homage to the arts of the type setter, printer and bookbinder 
.... Each publication by Gray is as much a work of art as it is a work of 
literature. 
(King, 2002, p. 117-118)34 
Gray is every inch the artist as well as writer - he studied to be a mural 
painter at Glasgow School of Art, worked for a time as an art teacher and painter 
before fully developing his writing career and continues to paint as well as write, 
most recently working on a mural on the ceiling of a renovated church in 
34 His paratexts are also party to a fair amount of mischief-making and trickery, as the 
wilfully obstinate editorial notes of Poor Things should already have indicated. Beware 
the reader who takes them at face value! As often as not, they provide a tongue-in-
cheek challenge to authority: the authority and privilege that different textual and 
particularly paratextual elements, masquerading as metatexts, profess to have over 
others in the conventional context of print. So the textual 'corrective' provided by the 
metatextual erratum slip of Unlikely Stories, Mostly reads simply and playfully: 
'Erratum: This slip has been inserted by mistake.' Likewise, the reviews and blurb that 
adorn most of Gray's book covers are rarely of certain origin. Those plainly written by 
himself, under the aegis of an obviously contrived or comically assumed pseudonym, 
inevitably throw the others into doubt, leaving them struggling to fully shake off the 
apocryphal suggestion. Genette forms a distinction between those paratexts he terms 
autographic, written by the author, and those written by another, such as an editor, 
publisher or reviewer which are termed allographic. Gray's autographic paratexts can be 
seen to diffuse this separation since they so often pose as allographic. The metatextual 
privilege of the 'allographic' comment is undercut both because of this and by its 
invented content, which is typically comic; one of the funniest examples is a review on 
the back cover of the paperback edition of Unlikely Stories, Mostly, allegedly by 'Lady 
Nicola Stewart, Countess of Dunfermline, The Celtic Needlewoman': 'This anthology may 
be likened to a vast architectural folly imblending the idioms of the Greek, Gothic, 
Oriental, Baroque, Scottish Baronial and Bauhaus schools. Like one who, absently 
sauntering the streets of Barcelona, suddenly beholds the breathtaking grandeur of 
Gaudi's Familia Sagrada, I am compelled to admire a display of power and intricacy 
whose precise purpose evades me. Is the structure haunted by a truth too exalted and 
ghostly to dwell in a plainer edifice? Perhaps. I wonder. I doubt.' 
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Glasgow's West End - so he understands well the power of the visual icon as well 
as the verbal one. The visual icon - the image - can symbolise a scene or 
narrative within a single space and as such is both spatially and temporally non-
linear. Images in fact carry the mythical significance of Proust's madeleine or 
Borges's Aleph, symbolically expanding the moment from a single fixed point, 
offering many meanings simultaneously (globally and synchronically rather than 
linearly and diachronically). Derrida, in The Truth in Painting, writes: 
A spatial, so-called plastic, art object does not necessarily prescribe an 
order of reading. I can move around in front of it, start from the top or 
the bottom, sometimes walk round it. No doubt this possibility has an 
ideal limit. Let us say for the moment that the structure of this limit 
allows a greater play than in the case of temporal art objects (whether 
discursive or not), unless a certain fragmentation, a spatial mise en 
scene, precisely (an effective or virtual partition) allows us to begin in 
various places, to vary direction or speed. 
(Derrida, 1987, p. 49-50) 
Paratextual features of texts may be considered as providing some degree of 
fragmentation, enabling the reader to fbegin in various places,' but they still 
operate within consecutive pages of a book (the case of the fspatial mise en 
scene', the fragmentation of the book, will be returned to shortly). Images, 
though, while they can be seen to function in a similar way to poetic or lyrical 
text in that they create a contemplative space with which to counter 
straightforward directionality, can go further in their disruption of temporal 
linearity than can text because of their own temporal non-linearity. Fictional 
texts like those already discussed can work to intervene in the discursive 
linearity of narrative by manipulating the order and pace of the telling of the 
story, but they themselves are still temporal objects in the sense that they 
require forward movement through the pages of the text on the part of the 
reader (paratextual features, such as we have seen exploited in Gray's fiction, 
can displace this forward movement up to a point, but most fictional texts are 
nonetheless designed to be read linearly, from start to finish). Fictional 
narratives such as we have seen can therefore disrupt story-time but rely on the 
consecutive arrangement of pages and another form of temporality - the time it 
takes to work through them (narrative or discourse time) - to do so. Genette 
writes: 
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Like the oral or cinematic narrative, [the written literary narrative] can 
only be "consumed," and therefore actualized, in a time that is obviously 
reading time, and even if the sequentiality of its components can be 
undermined by a capricious, repetitive, or selective reading, that 
undermining nonetheless stops short of perfect analexia: one can run a 
film backwards, image by image, but one cannot read a text backwards, 
letter by letter, or even word by word, or even sentence by sentence, 
without its ceasing to be a text. 35 Books are a little more constrained 
than people sometimes say they are by the celebrated linearity of the 
linguistic signifier, which is easier to deny in theory than eliminate in 
fact .... The temporality of written narrative is to some extent conditional 
or instrumental; produced in time, like everything else, written narrative 
exists in space and as space, and the time needed for "consuming" it is 
the time needed for crossing or traversing it, like a road or a field. The 
narrative text, like every other text, has no other temporality than what 
it borrows, metonymically, from its own reading. 
(Genette, 1980, p. 34) 
This borrowed temporality, or what Genette calls, 'this false time standing in for 
a true time and to be treated - with the combination of reservation and 
acquiescence that this involves - as a pseudo- time,' is what constitutes narrative 
time (ibid.). The image does not require such a process of sequential temporal 
'traversal'.36 
35 [Although Lotaria, a character in Calvino's If on a winter's night a traveller, comes 
close to having such an 'analexic' reading experience: she claims to have 'read' books by 
virtue of reading just a computer-generated list of the words of the text in order of their 
frequency of occurrencel See If on a winter's night a traveller, pp. 186-189.] 
36 Gunnar Liest0l has observed that all forms of reading and writing, including hypertext 
since it is a form of writing, are temporally linear in this sense of their dependence upon 
narrative or discourse time, the time it takes the reader to traverse the textual space: 
'Reading and writing are linear phenomena;' he writes, 'they are sequential and 
chronological, conditioned by the durative ordering of time, although their pOSitions as 
stored and in space may have a nonlinear organization. But once a word or sentence is 
read, it is chosen and taken out of its nonlinear context and positioned as a sequence in 
the linear chain and in conditioned time. However discontinuous or jumpy the writing or 
reading of a hypertext might be, at one level it always turns out to be linear .... Thus, 
nonlinearity exists only as positions in space, different alternatives of which one may 
choose only one at a time. But in the act of choosing ... one moves from the dimension of 
space to the dimension of time. So the moment one reaches into nonlinearity ... one 
reduces nonlinearity to linearity. We cannot escape. We always find ourselves at the 
intersection of time and space, and this situation frames all our actions. It is the origo 
where history and stories are created and where we all live our lives. Nonlinearity, one 
might say, is never actually experienced directly. It exists only as a logical negation and 
at a distance in both time and space' (Liest0l, 1994, p. 106-107). This is also the rub of 
Proust's madeleine and Borges's Aleph for those in the texts who attempt to inscribe 
them: the simultaneity of the witnessed image - the vast involuntary memories in 
Marcel's case and the infinity of the view offered the narrator of 'The Aleph' - may only 
be related through writing them down sequentially, word by word, in a descriptive 
process of ekphrasis. Borges's narrator writes: 'How can one transmit to others the 
infinite Aleph, which my timorous memory can scarcely contain? ... the central problem -
the enumeration, even partial enumeration, of infinity - is irresolvable. In that 
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Images formed an important part of early written texts. Mediaeval 
manuscripts were often elaborately decorated - illuminated - with illustrations 
and rubrication and Gray pays homage to their beauty both visually, through his 
own illustrated books, and verbally: 
At Jarrow, Wearmouth and the Holy Isle of Lindisfarne [the monks from 
lona] and their pupils made gospel books in a style sometimes called 
Hiberno-Saxon, meaning Irish-English. The initials of words were 
surrounded or filled with richly interwoven Celtic scrolls and spirals, 
skilfully inlaid with gold and the jewelled colours the Anglo-Saxons used 
in their finest metal ornaments. Remember a piece of music, or a 
building, or machine, or anything which gave you delight along with the 
astonishment that people could make it. Pages of the book of Kells and 
the Lindisfarne gospel are as good as that. 
(The Book of Prefaces, p. 37-38) 
In the era of print, however, images found themselves marginalised, due for a 
long time to the technological limitations of the printing press and the expense 
of creating print blocks with engraved images that could be used only once (in 
comparison to moveable type, which could be reused in different textual 
combinations). By the time that technological developments could enable images 
to be more easily included, their exclusion from the printed page had been 
sealed through force of habit: it no longer seemed necessary or indeed proper to 
include visual information alongside text, except perhaps in the form of 
illustrations to children's books or tspecial' books like encyclopaedias, or as 
diagrams in technical or scientific documents. In the realm of books, then, the 
potential of the image as signifier - and as non-linear signifier - was sacrificed in 
favour of printed text and has not since been fully rediscovered. In Gray's texts, 
however, the image once again assumes the status accorded it in mediaeval 
manuscripts. 
The Book of Prefaces in particular, with its illustrations, red rubrication and 
marginal glosses, has a distinctly mediaeval appearance. 37 The marginal gloss 
unbounded moment, I saw millions of delightful and horrible acts; none amazed me so 
much as the fact that all occupied the same point, without superposition and without 
transparency. What my eyes saw was simultaneous; what I shall write is successive, 
because language is successive' (Jorge Luis Borges, Collected Fictions, p. 282-283). 
37 And Landow has suggested that mediaeval texts in many ways offer the type of textual 
accompaniment that, while marginalised by print technology could be easily 
incorporated into hypertext. He describes how, 'Medieval manuscripts present a sort of 
hypertext combination of font sizes, marginalia, and illustrations, and visual 
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was another prevalent feature of handwritten manuscripts that offered an 
escape from the straightforward linearity of the text and which largely 
disappeared with print, as Bolter has pointed out: 
The margins of a medieval manuscript often belonged to the scholarly 
reader: they were the reader's space for conducting a dialogue with the 
text. The margins defined a zone in which the text could extend into the 
world of the reader. And during generations of copying, text could also 
move from the margins into the center, as glosses from readers made 
their way into the text itself. In the age of print, marginal notes became 
truly marginal, part of the hierarchy of the text that only the author 
defined and controlled: eventually they became footnotes and endnotes. 
Readers could still insert their own notes with a pen, where there was 
sufficient white space, but these handwritten notes could no longer have 
the same status as the text itself. They were private reactions to a public 
text. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 162-163) 
The Book of Prefaces reinstates the marginal gloss in print, once more dividing 
the page into columns that engage the reader in a process of reading multiply 
rather than singularly and linearly. The marginal glosses also offer a paradoxical 
means of commenting on and questioning the main body of text, comprised of a 
series of prefaces to works written in English from the period of Old English up 
until 1920 (due to issues of copyright thereafter). By definition, marginal text is 
marginalised, pushed to the side of the 'main' or central text on the page, and 
as Bolter notes above, if marginal text is handwritten it does not carry the same 
weight as the printed text it accompanies (due both to its appearance and to the 
fact that it is most likely anonymous: without an attached name it lacks literal 
authority). The printed margins of The Book of Prefaces, however, though still 
marginalised in terms of their size and position on the page, can no longer be 
considered secondary to the main text in terms of content: since they contain 
commentary from authors (since Gray required the assistance of several others 
to complete his anthology) esteemed enough to have their own words 
permanently consigned to print - just like the authors of the prefaces they 
accompany - their status is elevated. By commenting authoritatively on the 
contents of the main text they challenge its very status as primary text and their 
own status as marginal. It is also significant that the 'main' text being 
questioned from the margins is a preface, for the preface usually occupies a 
embellishment, in the form of both calligraphy and pictorial additions' (Landow, 1992, p. 
52). 
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position of privilege in the textual hierarchy. Prefaces would normally be 
privileged over the texts they introduced since, as Derrida has observed, they 
serve to present these texts, after the event of their being written (belatedly), 
as unified (having 'continuity and underlying laws' and an 'overall concept or 
meaning' (Derrida, 1981, p. 3)). The preface, therefore, conventionally operates 
as a representative act of textual mastery. 
The Book of Prefaces, though presenting itself beautifully and deliberately as 
a book, as an object of aesthetic pleasure that relies completely on the 
conventions of print technology and the paratextual features of the text to 
constitute it as such, manipulates these very conventions and paratextual 
features to question some of the textual inhibitions and assumptions that the 
book form engenders. The Book of Prefaces is designed as a reference book, 
using organisational paratextual elements to assist the reader in reading it non-
linearly. Gray, in his own preface to the text, offers this injunction: 'since 
nobody reads a book like this from start to finish, I advise you to tackle it like a 
reviewer. Go first to the author and period you like best, then fish for tasty bits 
in other places' (The Book of Prefaces, p. 11). The structural elements that 
enable the reader to read the text in small and separate sections (separate not 
only between individual prefaces but also among them, due to the columnar 
arrangement of each preface and its accompanying marginal gloss), along with 
this piece of authorial advice in the preface (itself a composite element of the 
paratext) work together to subvert the linearity of the page-by-page reading that 
the book form encourages and that the chronological arrangement of material 
also suggests. And the authority of text that would comply with the singular and 
linear development supported by the bound form of the book has also been 
dissolved. As already explained, this text is made up of a series of prefaces: it 
therefore consists of many little texts rather than one single text, and these 
little texts are themselves interrogated from the sidelines, by the margins that 
comment on them. Neither does the text fit straightforwardly into either 
category of 'fact' or fiction, in spite of its appearance as conventionally factual 
reference book: though presenting itself in the 'Publisher's Blurb' on the book's 
dust jacket as historical document - 'This book is ... a unique history of how 
literature spread and developed through three British nations and most North 
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American states' - and suggesting it be kept for reference 'in every household 
and hotel bedroom,' the text also acknowledges an inherent element of creative 
licence (inherent and necessary, since no language, and thus no metalanguage, is 
ever transparent). It reminds us of language's trickery, its built-in mUltiplicity, 
when offering two separate definitions of the word 'gloss': 'gloss' is both a noun, 
meaning 'a marginal commentary,' and a verb, meaning 'to veil in specious 
language' (The Book of Prefaces, p. 11). In giving this double definition, the text 
hints at its own doubleness since it functions itself as a gloss of past texts. It 
warns, then, that the words of its glosses will, necessarily, 'veil' as much as 
reveal the 'facts' about these texts; as with all written histories, the line 
between fact and fiction in this text can never be altogether clear. Gray 
typically pre-empts (and so perhaps tries to deflect) criticism - in this case 
regarding the unavoidable insufficiency of his text as 'factual' and complete 
work of reference - when he suggests, in the' Author's Blurb' of the dust jacket, 
that the book be kept in the toilet. Hailing it 'A BOOK FOR TODAY,' he writes, 
'Only the rich and illiterate can ignore our anthology. With this in their lavatory 
everyone else can read nothing but newspaper supplements and still seem 
educated.' Such a statement is characteristic Gray doublespeak, simultaneously 
elevating and deprecating his own work, keeping the reader all the while vigilant 
to the rhetorical dangers - and playful charms - of language and textuality. 
The Book of Prefaces, in fact, can be seen in its entirety to function in an 
identical manner to the paratext in general, for it is all paratext, composed 
entirely of prefaces, commentary and other paratextual constituents. If the 
paratext is considered - as it has been by both Genette and Derrida - as 
occupying an ambiguous zone between text and hors-texte, this book in 
particular must also be considered as operating in the same ambiguous way: as 
both book and non-book. 38 As book of paratexts and as paratextual book, The 
38 Genette writes: 'More than a boundary or a sealed border, the paratext is, rather, a 
threshold, or - a word Borges used apropos of a preface - a "vestibule" that offers the 
world at large the possibility of either stepping inside or turning back. It is an "undefined 
zone" between the inside and the outside, a zone without any hard and fast boundary on 
either the inward side (turned toward the text) or the outward side (turned toward the 
world's discourse about the text), an edge, or, as Philippe Lejeune put it, "a fringe of 
the printed text which in reality controls one's whole reading of the text'" (Genette, 
1997, p.1-2). In The Truth in Painting, Derrida discusses the function of the parergon 
(Kant's terminology), the ornamentation that surrounds the work (ergon) and occupies 
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Book of Prefaces, though undoubtedly celebrating the artistic potential of the 
book as object, is nevertheless straining against its limitations. S.B. Kelly has 
written that IThe Book of Prefaces is a hymn to the book' (Kelly, 2002, p. 68); it 
might more accurately be described as an elegy. Like the order of constitutive 
books in Lanark, the print bound form itself appears to be a trap, from which 
textuality struggles to free itself. Whilst Lanark's attempts to move beyond his 
narrative's entrapping logic end in his final interment in and by the book -
THE LAND LIES OVER ME NOW. 
I CANNOT MOVE. IT IS TIME TO GO. 
(Lanark, p. 560) 
- the paratextuallogic of The Book of Prefaces, on the other hand, offers a 
means of circumventing the book's boundaries, a potential escape route from its 
linear form. Whilst proclaiming itself on its dust jacket to be ITHE BOOK OF 
BOOKS,' The Book in the end destroys the book by tearing it into paratextual 
pieces. 
Gray is not the only one tearing up books. Derrida is at it as well, in 
recognition of the insufficiency of its form. He writes: 
While the form of the "book" is now going through a period of general 
upheaval, and while that form now appears less natural, and its history 
less transparent, than ever, and while one cannot tamper with it without 
disturbing everything else, the book form alone can no longer settle ... 
the case of those writing processes which, in practically questioning that 
form, must also dismantle it. 
(Derrida, 1981, p. 3) 
Like Alasdair Gray in The Book of Prefaces, Derrida, in Glas, presents the 
fragments of torn-up books by other writers, at the same time that he develops 
more fully the potential of columnar text - a textual device already encountered 
in Gray's writing - to Idismantle' the book by working against its linear form. 
With Glas, Derrida puts theory into practice in typical fashion, exploring the 
possibilities for reading textual columns by means of a text itself written entirely 
in columns. The text is composed of two physically separate but semantically 
the same pOSition - in I para ' or 'beside' the work - as the paratext: 'the parergon: 
neither work (ergon) nor outside the work {hors d'oeuvre}, neither inside nor outside, 
neither above nor below, it disconcerts any opposition but does not remain 
indeterminate and it gives rise to the work. It is no longer merely around the work. That 
which it puts in place ... does not stop disturbing the internal order of discourse' 
(Derrida, 1987, p. 9). On the prefix 'para', see J. Hillis Miller, quoted in a footnote to 
Genette, 1997, p. 1. 
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interrelated columns: the left-hand column contains commentary on translated 
philosophical passages - textual fragments. - from Hegel; the right-hand column 
commentary on passages or fragments translated from the literary writer Jean 
Genet. 39 Derrida's concern is with illustrating how the two columns interact: 
they may appear separate on the page and deal each with separate content, yet 
when reading the text of the two columns this apparent separation dissolves. 
Acting, as Christopher Norris describes it, as fa kind of perverse interlinear 
gloss,' text from the one column seems to offer comment on that of the other 
and vice versa, so that the reader continually reads among the two rather than 
linearly reading one at a time (Norris, 1991, p. 166). The interdependence of the 
textual chunks in and among both columns demonstrates and celebrates the play 
of language: fThe columns deceive and play with you, threaten to beat on each 
other without leaving you any issue' (Derrida, 1986, p. 224). Whatever meaning 
the separate texts of Hegel and Genet may originally have purported to carry has 
been dismantled along with the texts themselves and may only be reconstructed 
insofar as the reader performs the endless work - or plays the endless game - of 
pursuing intertextual traces between the texts. The text offers its own 
39 As always, Denida's writing works to undo oppositions, or rather to let oppositions 
undo themselves. In the case of Glas as elsewhere, one of these oppositions is that 
between literary and philosophical discourse. For Derrida, philosophical discourse (and 
critical discourse in general, including criticism of literary texts) sets itself up falsely as 
an objective discursive form, a metalanguage, involved with the rational quest of 
discovering the 'truth' about its object. In doing so, it is argued, philosophical and 
critical discourse is in denial of its dependence on language (as vehicle of expression) 
and thus of its own rhetorical nature, since language is inherently rhetorical. 
Philosophical discourse is, therefore, literary discourse: they are the selfsame (this 
inherent literariness of criticism is precisely what Alasdair Gray recognises when he 
offers the double definition of 'gloss', as already mentioned). Literature, on the other 
hand, since it is explicitly rhetorical, does not make the pretence of objectivity: it avoids 
the deceit of criticism by admitting its own deceit. Norris writes: 'Derrida's attentions 
are ... divided between 'literary' and 'philosophical' texts, a distinction which in practice 
he constantly breaks down and shows to be based on a deep but untenable prejudice. His 
readings of Mallarme, Valery, Genet and Sollers are every bit as rigorous as his essays on 
philosophers like Hegel and Husserl. Literary texts are not fenced off inside some 
specialized realm of figurative licence where rational commentary fears to tread. Unlike 
the New Critics, Derrida has no desire to establish a rigid demarcation of zones between 
literary language and critical discourse. On the contrary, he sets out to show that certain 
kinds of paradox are produced across all the varieties of discourse by a motivating 
impulse which runs so deep in Western thought that it respects none of the conventional 
boundaries ... There is no language so vigilant or self-aware that it can effectively escape 
the conditions placed upon thought by its own prehistory and ruling metaphysic' (NorriS, 
1991, p. 21-22). 
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hypothesis, and again, like Gray's blurb to The Book of Prefaces, suggests that 
the book - or indeed the form of the book - is toilet-fodder: 
"what remained of a Rembrandt torn into small, very regular squares 
and rammed down the shithole" is divided in two .... Each little square is 
delimited, each column rises with an impassive self-sufficiency, and yet 
the element of contagion, the infinite circulation of general equivalence 
relates each sentence, each stump of writing ... to each other, within 
each column and from one column to the other [ ... ] 
In little continuous jerks, the sequences are enjoined, induced, glide in 
silence. No category outside the text should allow defining the form or 
bearing of these passages, of these trances of writing. There are always 
only sections of flowers, from paragraph to paragraph, so much so that 
anthological excerpts inflict only the violence necessary to attach 
importance to the remain(s). Take into account the overlap-effects, and 
you will see that the tissue ceaselessly re-forms itself around the 
incision. 
(Derrida, 1986, pp. 1 and 25) 
A new text is therefore built, or grafted, from the reader's work of tracking 
the overlaps between the leftover pieces of the old. The Book of Prefaces, too, 
has presented itself in similarly surgical terms as the result of a process of 
fgrafting together pieces cut from the corpus of other writers' (The Book of 
Prefaces, dust jacket).40 This carries associations of the collection or 
amalgamation not only of the textual fragments (or tissue), but also of the work, 
or graft, of both author and reader: fgrafting together,' they create a new type 
of text (their joint endeavours constituting a form of brkoLage). The process of 
fwork' or labour as necessary for human life and happiness is a central tenet in 
Gray's oeuvre: almost all of his hardback books are emblazoned with the motto, 
fWork As If You Live in the Early Days of a Better Nation.' We have already seen 
how Jock McLeish, in 1982 Janine, dislikes A La recherche du temps perdu's 
Marcel because he does not work for a living. In Lanark, the absence of 
meaningful occupation in Lanark's life gnaws at him, festering (literally as well 
as metaphorically) like a disease: 
40 This surgical metaphor of dissection and graft among the textual corpus has been used 
elsewhere by Derrida - in Dissemination, he writes: 'Dissemination generalizes the theory 
and practice of the graft without a body proper,' (p. 11) - and also by Gray, if Poor 
Things is considered as a textual reworking, or re-grafting, of the Frankenstein corpus 
(which itself of course centres around a grafted corpse). This textual metaphor will be 
returned to again in the course of this thesis, particularly with reference to Shelley 
Jackson's hyperfiction Patchwork Girl. 
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The directions on the dgarette packet led me to the house where I write 
this, thirty-one days later. I have not looked for work in that time or 
made friends, and I count the days only to enjoy their emptiness. 
5ludden thinks I am content with too little. I believe there are dties 
where work is a prison and time a goad and love a burden, and this 
makes my freedom feel worthwhile. My one worry is the scab on my arm. 
There is no feeling in it, but when I grow tired the healthy skin round the 
edge starts itching and when I scratch this the scab spreads. I must 
scratch in my sleep, for when I waken the hard patch is always bigger. 50 
I take the doctor's advice and try to forget it. 
(Lanark, p. 23) 
Perhaps Lanark's skin condition, dragonhide, could be eased by some tgrafting' 
on his part, rather than through him simply trying to forget about it (as we have 
seen from the example of Jock McLeish, forgetting about things is sometimes 
easier said than done and does not in any case deal effectively with the 
problem), though Lanark's reluctance to work comes from a lack of ideas about 
what to do with himself rather than from unWillingness. As he observes above, 
his happiness has already been questioned by Sludden, the rather unpleasant 
leading member of the young clique that frequents Unthank's Elite Cafe. Lanark, 
having conceded that he is not himself happy, but is at least content, explains 
his contentment simply with the words ttWhat else can I have?" (Lanark, p. 5). 
Sludden, though, persists in arguing that Lanark should pursue happiness rather 
than simply settle for contentment: 
He said carelessly, "Moments of vivid exdtement are what make life 
worth living, moments when a man feels exalted and masterful. We can 
get them from drugs, crime and gambling, but the price is rather high. 
We can get them from a spedal interest, like sports, music or religion. 
Have you a special interest?" 
"No." 
"And we get them from work and love. By work I don't mean shovelling 
coal or teaching children, I mean work which gives you a conspicuous 
place in the world." ... 
Lanark brooded on this. It seemed logical. He said abruptly, "What work 
could I do?" 
(Lanark, p. 5-6) 
Although Sludden's reasons for recommending work as a vehicle for personal 
happiness are not necessarily admirable - gaining ta conspicuous place in the 
world' and tmastering other people' (Lanark, p. 6) are reasons based purely on 
personal betterment at the expense of others rather than on any notion of work 
as socially as well as personally fulfilling - his argument nevertheless has some 
merit in the basic sense that work can make people feel better about 
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themselves. 41 Lanark counters the need for work with the need for freedom: the 
human requirement for both leads to a classic double bind, for if the individual 
engages in work s/he must generally surrender an element of freedom (few work 
for themselves, and even those that do will largely do so of necessity, through 
the need to earn some money). He does, however, begin to do some writing 
following his chat with Sludden and it has a positive effect on his life. Describing 
it as "disciplined work," he admits, "I sleep better after it" (Lanark, p. 29). "In 
a couple of terse, commonplace sentences," as a stranger at a party tells him, 
he has "connected the ideas of work, discipline and health" (ibid.). His landlady, 
41 Lanark's idea of work as a potential 'prison' is, however, a valid one: work can seem 
that way, since usually its terms are controlled not by the workers themselves but by 
others, by sometimes unscrupulous employers, often in the form of faceless (and so 
impersonal or inhuman) corporations. This notion on Lanark's part comes from his own 
experience in Glasgow, in his previous incarnation as Duncan Thaw, though he does not 
recognise it. Thaw's friend, Coulter, had there experienced work in this negative way, 
controlled by employers who have little concern for the wellbeing or safety of their 
employees: 'Coulter was talking about work. "At first the novelty made it not too bad. It 
was different from school, and you were getting paid, and you felt a man ... sitting in 
your overalls with the other workers, crowding in at the gate and clocking on and then 
intae the machine shop ... and then the thumping and banging and feeling of danger ... 
and you turn and there's a ten-ton girder swinging toward you on the overhead crane." 
"That's hellish I Are there no rules against that sort of thing?" 
"There's meant tae be a lane kept clear up the middle of the shed, but in a work 
like McHarg's it's not easy." 
Coulter chuckled .... "Aye. Well, anyway, this business of being a man keeps you 
happy for mibby a week, then on your second Monday it hits you. To be honest 
the thought's been growing on you all through Sunday, but it really hits you on 
Monday: I've tae go on doing thiS, getting up at this hour, sitting in this tram in 
these overalls dragging on this fag, clocking on in this queue at the gate. 'Hullo, 
here we go againl' 'You're fuckin' right we gol' and back intae the machine 
shop .... I chose it. And I'm a man now. I have tae take it seriously, I have tae 
keep shoving my face against this grindstone'" (Lanark, p. 215-216). For Coulter, 
work is a sort of hell to which he is continually compelled to return, made 
bearable only eventually through his complete emotional detachment from it: 
"Mind you, this feeling doesnae last. You stop thinking. Life becomes a habit. 
You get up, dress, eat, go tae work, clock in etcetera etcetera automatically, 
and think about nothing but the pay packet on Friday and the booze-up last 
Saturday. Life's easy when you're a robot. Then accidents happen that start you 
thinking again" (Lanark, p. 216). Like the narrator of 'No Bluebeard,' Coulter has 
himself become machine-like, dehumanised by too much work that involves no 
real imaginative process (and again the notion of technology, of the machine, as 
having a negative impact on the human sphere is apparent). His sense of 
detachment, his disengagement from thinking about things can also be compared 
to that of Jock McLeish, whose own work is unsatisfactory and which he 
persistently tries to forget about, attempting to desensitise himself with alcohol. 
The problem with work in these cases - unlike work that would bring a sense of 
satisfaction, the type of work that is needed - is that it is dull and repetitive (and 
sometimes also exploitative), providing no imaginative nourishment, no real 
sense that it is worthwhile. 
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Mrs Fleck, has also made the connection between work and health and tries to 
encourage Lanark to work when his depression causes his condition to worsen: 
"Why don't you get up, Lanark, and look for work? J've lost a husband by 
that" - she nodded to the arm - "and a couple of lodgers, and all of 
them, before the end, just lay in bed, and all of them were decent quiet 
fellows like yourself ... I don't like talking about it, but I've an illness of 
my own - not what you have, a different one - and it's never spread very 
far because I've had work to do. First it was a husband, then lodgers, 
now it's these bloody weans. I'm sure if you get up and work your arm 
will improve." 
(Lanark, p. 40-41) 
Lanark's despair at the prospect of finding suitable work for himself and 
submission to his dragon hide - tLet it spreadJ he thought. What else can I 
cultivate?' (Lanark, p. 40) - is a critical reflection of the unemployment crisis in 
Scotland around the time of Lanark's publication; the steady erosion of the 
industries that had once supported the nation - mainly steel, coal and 
shipbuilding, reduced largely to servicing scarce Ministry of Defence projects 
(work at the Forge in Lanark's Unthank, too, consists only of making components 
for the Q39 missile, see Lanark, pp. 30 and 41) - and the unsympathetic political 
climate of the Thatcher era were making it increasingly difficult for tdecent 
quiet fellows' like Lanark to find jobs. Doctors' surgeries along with dole offices 
became overcrowded as the lack of work took its toll on people's mental and 
physical wellbeing. An old woman campaigning for more sunlight in Unthank tells 
Lanark, ttfor troubles of that personal kind hard work is the only answer, hard 
work for a decent cause" (Lanark, p. 43). The importance of this notion of work 
or tgraft' is indispensable to an understanding of Gray's own work and will be 
returned to again in the course of the thesis. 
Throughout Glas, Derrida puns on the word tremain(s)' and its different 
signifying senses, one of these being the sense of what is left over of something 
(the remainder), with the associative notion of what remains, what is left behind 
after death (as in human remains).42 Derrida muses upon what remains of the 
42 It also carries the notion of what 'remains' as being waste, perhaps waste suitable for 
the toilet, as has already been suggested. Derrida has touched on this idea before: in 
'Outwork', his preface to Dissemination and dissemination of the preface, he argues that 
the text which follows the preface actually essentially erases it, cancels it out by saying 
again and in greater detail what the preface has already said. The preface does not 
completely disappear, however, but 'remains' residually (like the imprint on a so-called 
'magic slate', the child's writing toy referred to by Freud as a "mystic writing-pad", see 
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texts of Hegel and Genet in this new text and in so doing he picks up on the idea 
of the written text as monument (observed earlier by Bolter). In this case, the 
written monuments of Hegel and Genet remain only as remains, as the columns 
of a structure in ruin, a structure that has fallen, paradoxically, to create 
another form of monument, the tomb (playing on the associations in French of 
the phrase 'Ia tombee', translated as 'falls' or 'falls away'): 'Therefore, but as a 
fall, it erects itself there' (Derrida, 1986, p. 1). What is being undone here, what 
'falls (to the tomb(stone)),' is the printed text's own status as monument 
(Derrida, 1986, pp. 1 and 2). The remaining monumental columns are compared 
to the pillars of Hercules and to the phallic columns of India and it is suggested 
that these columns contain elements that necessitate their structural re-
evaluation, just as the intertextuallanguage of the textual columns requires and 
facilitates a renegotiation of textual form and reading practice.43 The 
monumental columns, textual and physical, are (always already) engaged in a 
process of transformation, a process of redefinition: 
Derrida, 1981, p. 8-9 and accompanying footnotes). Derrida writes: 'Prefaces, along with 
forewords, introductions, preludes, preliminaries, preambles, prologues, and 
prolegomena, have always been written, it seems, in view of their own self-effacement. 
Upon reaching the end of the pre-(which presents and precedes, or rather forestalls, the 
presentative production, and, in order to put before the reader's eyes what is not yet 
visible, is obliged to speak, predict, and predicate), the route which has been covered 
must cancel itself out. But this subtraction leaves a mark of erasure, a remainder which 
is added to the subsequent text and which cannot be completely summed up within it' 
(Derrida, 1981, p. 9). He goes on to ponder the form this 'remainder' might take and 
here makes reference to the notion of it as toilet waste: 'But if something were to 
remain of the prolegomenon once inscribed and interwoven, something that would not 
allow itself to be sublated {releve} in the course of the philosophical presentation, would 
that something necessarily take the form of that which falls away {la tombee}? And what 
about such a fall? Couldn't it be read otherwise than as the excrement of philosophical 
essentiality - not in order to sublate it back into the latter, of course, but in order to 
learn to take it differently into account?' (Derrida, 1981, p. 11). Derrida similarly puns on 
the word 'remain(s)' in the chapter and essay 'Cartouches,' in Derrida, 1987, pp. 183-
247. 
43 The columns - textual and monumental- also occupy the position 'para' to the text or 
monument: they are both parerga. 'What constitutes them as parerga is not simply their 
exteriority as surplus, it is the internal structural link which rivets them to the lack in 
the interior of the ergon . ... [W]hen it supports an edifice, the column was ... a parergon: 
a supplement to the operation, neither work nor outside the work' (Derrida, 1987, pp. 59 
and 121). The form of the column - as both geometric textual and architectural feature -
is also considered in B.S. Johnson's fictional text Albert Angelo. Centring around the 
eponymous character Albert, an architect, the discussions of architecture and 
construction of buildings in this text are self-reflexive, commenting also upon the 
construction of the text, the novel form (see particularly p. 66 and ff., where the text 
splits into monument-questioning columns). 
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Now at the outset - but as a setting out that already departed from itself 
- these columns were intact, unbreached, smooth. And only later (erst 
spiiter) are notches, excavations, openings (Offnungen und 
AushOhlungen) made in the columns, in the flank, if such can be said. 
These hollowings, holes, these lateral marks in depth would be like 
acddents coming over the phallic columns at first unperforated or 
apparently unperforatable. Images of gods (Gotterbilder) were set, 
niched, inserted, embedded, driven in, tattooed on the columns. Just as 
these small caverns or lateral pockets on the flank of the phallus 
announced the small portable and hermetic Greek temples, so they 
broached/breached the model of the pagoda, not yet altogether a 
habitation and still distinguished by the separation between shell and 
kernel (Schale und Kern). A middle ground hard to determine between 
the ... column and the house, sculpture and architecture. 
So no one can live there. Whether dead or alive. It is neither a house 
nor a burial place. Who contemplates such a structure, who can do so, 
one wonders. And how can an altar, a habitat, or a burial monument, 
town planning or a mausoleum, the family and the State, find their 
origins there. 
(Derrida, 1986, p. 3) 
How then, as readers, do we contemplate these remain(s), this textual structure 
wherein 'no one can live'? Perhaps we can start by leaving behind our rational 
and metaphysical quest for the stable house of originary meaning, or singularly 
stable and linear textuality, and work instead with what remains: the 
multiplicity of textual remnants and the nomad logic of the trace. 
If The Book of Prefaces can be considered an elegy to the printbound form of 
the book, then Glas sounds its death knell. 44 The problem faced by Glas, 
however, and identified by Derrida elsewhere, is that it is obliged to denounce 
the printbound form from within the printbound form, and while the text 
recognises that it depends upon machine technology to set itself forth as a 
challenge to linear writing -
No glas without the interposition of machinery. 
This is not handled like a pen. 
(Derrida, 1986, p. 224) 
- the form of technology it relies on is nevertheless the restricted one of print. 
'The end of linear writing,' Derrida writes in Of Grammatology, 'is indeed the 
end of the book, even if, even today, it is within the form of a book that new 
44 'The glas 
In my voluptuous bell {cloche} 
death's bronze dances 
the clapper of a prick sounds 
a long libidinal swing' (Derrida, 1986, p. 220). 
63 
writings - literary or theoretical - allow themselves to be, for better or worse, 
encased' (Derrida, 1976, p. 86). Bearing in mind that De La GrammatoLogie was 
first published in France in 1967, 'new writings' from that era began to take up 
the task of attempting to tear the text from the encasing straightjacket of the 
book. Philippe Sollers, on the cover of his Numbers, a novel consisting not of 
continuous narrative but of separately numbered passages grouped in sets of 
four, writes: 
How can the contradiction between discourse and (hi)story be lifted? 
unless it be through an exit out of the representational scene that 
maintains their opposition? through a text whose orderly permutations 
open not upon some spoken expression, but upon the constantly active 
historical real? 
Between the imperfect (sequences 1/213) and the present (sequence 
4), which make up the square matrix that engenders the narrative and its 
reflection, is inscribed the textual work that destroys any spectacular or 
imaginary ·'truth." That destruction affects not only the hypothetical 
"subject" of the story - his/her body, sentences, and dreams - but also 
the story itself, which is overturned and gradually immersed in texts of 
various cultures. Writing thus begins to function "outside," to burn in a 
self-constructing, self-effacing, self-extending, space according to the 
infinity of its production. Such a theater, having neither stage nor house, 
where words have become the actors and spectators of a new community 
of play, should also enable us to capture, across its intersecting surfaces, 
our own "time": the advent of a dialogue between West and East, the 
question of passage from alienated writing to a writing of the trace, 
through war, sex, and the mute, hidden work of transformation. 
The novel printed here is not a printed novel. It refers to the mythical 
milieu that is now washing over you, slipping into you, out of you, 
everywhere, forever, as of tomorrow. It attempts to winnow out the 
movement of the depths, the depths that follow upon books, the depths 
of the thought of masses, capable of shaking the very foundations of the 
old mentalist, expressionist world, whose end, if one takes the risk of 
reading, is at hand. 
(Sollers, Barbara Johnson trans., quoted in her introduction to Derrida, 
1981, p. xxix-xxx) 
Sollers attempts to represent the 'mythical milieu' he describes by disturbing 
the structure or form of his narrative, enabling his text to be read in more than 
one order. By writing that, 'The novel printed here is not a printed novel,' he 
also explicitly and emphatically denies the book form as a suitable vehicle for his 
experiment. The transformations of tour own "time'" are to be 'captured,' 
ensnared or entangled perhaps, like a fly in a sticky web, in the 'intersecting 
surfaces' of the spatial textual matrix he creates (rather than being divulged in a 
conventionally linear temporal narrative). Numbers uses the metaphor of the 
theatre to create an imagined space wherein the text is free to perform, or play, 
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and it also relies on the visual arrangement of text into geometric shapes, 
organised vertically as well as horizontally on the page, creating (once again) 
textual columns (to support the textual 'stage'). Malcolm Charles Pollard 
comments: 
there are references to the vertical, suggesting Chinese, where writing 
works along a vertical rather than a horizontal plane, that is from north 
to south. One should interpret therefore these allusions to the horizontal 
and vertical ... in terms of the flow and breaking in upon the flow of 
Western writing. This verticality [is] a metaphor of the disruption of 
narrative continuity ... [and] also a reaffirmation of the spatial over the 
temporal ... The repeated use of the word 'colonne' [column] in Nombres 
... relates this vertical cut in narrative continuity to the structure of a 
peculiarly textual theatre. So the theatre could be said to provide an 
abstractly geometric framework, which in a sense takes the novel outside 
its own parameters as if towards a different genre, or territory and, 
through the implicit references to artifice, makes it less concerned with 
representation than with what has already ... been called 'la veritable 
histoire' 
(Pollard, 1994, p. 87). 
The 'genre, or territory' that Sollers's text gestures towards could be argued, 
with justification, to be that of hypertext. 
Rendering 'la veritable histoire' can also be seen as the concern of B.S. 
Johnson's 1969 novel, The Unfortunates, the following quote (from Laurence 
Sterne's Tristram Shandy) providing one of the text's three epigraphs: 
"I will tell you in three words what the book is. - It is a history. - A 
history! 
of who? what? where? when? Don't hurry yourself - It is a history-book, 
Sir (which may possibly recommend it to the world) of what passes in a 
man's own mind." 
History, then, is seen to be no more than a single person's account (his story).45 
The 'his story book' in this case is famously presented not in printbound form but 
in a box, as a collection of pamphlets and loose leaves to be read: 
Apart from the first 
and last sections 
(which are marked as such) 
... in random order. 
(The Unfortunates, inner cover of book box) 
Johnson goes on to add, tongue-in-cheek: 
If readers prefer not 
to accept the random order in 
45 Tackling the gender presumptions of this statement would take another thesis. 
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which they receive the novel, 
then they may 
re-arrange the sections into any 
other random order before 
reading. 
Like Sollers, Johnson too argues that the 'contradiction between discourse 
and (hi)story' may only be properly addressed by exiting the linear-historical 
representational scene: 'his story' is not linear. Another of the text's epigraphs 
printed on the inside of the book's box, calls, in the words of Samuel Johnson, 
for "a judicious and faithful narrative" of life. Johnson (B.S.) believes this can 
only be achieved through a narrative which, rather than being organised into a 
neat order, is instead disorganised and fragmentary, displaying some of life's 
own tendency toward randomness. For Johnson, truthfulness to life is 
fundamental to good writing, all else is lies. 46 'Life does not tell stories,' he 
wrote in the introduction to his short prose collection Aren't You Rather Young 
To Be Writing Your Memoirs? 'Life is chaotic, fluid, random; it leaves myriads of 
ends untied, untidily. Writers can extract a story from life only by strict, close 
selection, and this must mean falsification. Telling stories really is telling lies' 
(quoted in Coe, 2004, p. 5). The Unfortunates deals with the difficult subject of 
the death from cancer of one of Johnson's close friends, Tony, at the age of only 
twenty-nine. Johnson witnessed the disintegration and wreckage of Tony's 
46 He writes: 'The difficulty is to understand without generalization, to see each piece of 
received truth, or generalization, as true only if it is true for me, solipsism again, I come 
back to it again, and for no other reason. In general, generalization is to lie, to tell lies' 
(The Unfortunates). Although it should be clear, following what has so far been observed 
of Gray's and Derrida's attention to the inherently rhetorical and playful nature of 
language, that no writing can ever really claim truthfully to tell the truth (if the truth is 
even there to be told. This belief in the ultimate presence of truth underpins the whole 
history of Western metaphysical thought, as has already been explained, yet Derrida's 
concept of the trace undermines any such stable notions of absolute presence, of 
complete self-sufficiency), it should also be clear that singular and linear narratives are 
particularly unrepresentative of life and experience since they present only single 
versions of events with a single voice. The recognition that the complexity of experience 
may be better represented by a more complex narrative form does not involve the same 
degree of reduction that is required with conventional linear narrative: offering multiple 
or fragmentary accounts of events rather than single or unified ones is a means of 
admitting that any notion of 'objective truth' is in fact unstable, since 'truth' is 
composed of many, continually fluctuating, elements or traces. As Mark Currie has 
earlier put it, 'presence itself, is a crossed structure of 'protensions' and 'retensions" 
(Currie, 1998, p. 78). Johnson, by making reference to his own solipsism, recognises that 
he is only qualified to attempt to represent the 'truth' according to himself, to give his 
own particular version and no-one else's. He does not, therefore, purport to write of 
general or transcendental truths, 'universally acknowledged.' 
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previously orderly life as he fought the ravages of the disease and his own 
recalled memories of Tony are, for him, too difficult and ruptured to be dealt 
with chronologically, linearly, other than fragmentarily. He writes in The 
Unfortunates of his difficulty in finding a way to cope with his own thoughts -
the thoughts of what he perceived to be an untidy mind - as he is prompted, by 
returning (as a football writer) to the city where Tony had studied, to remember 
their earlier meetings and conversations: 
Tony ... had a great mind for such detail, it crowded his mind like 
documents in the Public Records Office, there, a good image, perhaps 
easy, but it was even something like as efficient, tidy, his mind, not as 
mine is, random, the circuit-breakers falling at hazard, tripped equally 
by association and non-association, repetition, ... My visits here were long 
talks broken only partly by eating, what a generalization, there, more 
talk on his part than mine, far more, but I learnt, I selected and elected 
to hear what I needed, what was of most use to me, at that time most 
use, from his discourse, yes, the word is not too pompous, discourse, a 
fine mind, a need to communicate embodied in it, too, how can I place 
his order, his disintegration? 
(The Unfortunates) 
For Johnson, he could place Tony's 'order' only through ordering his own text 
paradoxically as non-ordered, 'his disintegration' only through the disintegration 
of the form of his book. Johnson, in his introduction to the Hungarian edition of 
the text, published due to cost restrictions as a printbound book, writes of, 'the 
physical feel, disintegrative, frail, of this novel in its original format; the 
tangible metaphor for the random way the mind works' (quoted in Jonathan's 
Coe's introduction to The Unfortunates, p. xii). The conventional bound format 
of the book, Johnson recognises, does not carry the same significance, does not 
convey the same sense of randomness as do the scattered pages and pamphlets. 
He wrote: 
The memories of Tony and the routine football reporting, the past and 
the present, interwove in a completely random manner, without 
chronology. This is the way the mind works, my mind anyway t ... But} this 
randomness was directly in conflict with the technological fact of the 
bound book: for the bound book imposes an order, a fixed page order, on 
the material. I think I went some way towards solving this problem by 
writing the book in sections and having those sections not bound together 
but loose in a box. 
(From Aren't You Rather Young To Be Writing Your Memoirs?, 
quoted in Coe, 2004, p. 22) 
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As Johnson recognises, the problem imposed by the fixed page order of the book 
is not completely solved by his text, since the sections of text making up The 
Unfortunates themselves still rely on the linear page-turning mechanism to 
greater or lesser degrees, depending on their length, and he does still provide 
specific 'first' and 'last' sections, ensuring that the text, like the printbound 
book, still has fixed points of entry and exit. He still, therefore, maintains some 
of the author's traditional prerogative in exerting control over the sequence of 
his narrative. 47 
This is also true of Julio Cortazar's book, Hopscotch, despite the assertion in 
the blurb on the back cover that 'Hopscotch, written in 1963, was the first 
hypertext novel. Anticipating the age of the web with a non-structure that 
allows readers to take the chapters in any order they wish, Hopscotch invites 
them to be the architects of the novel themselves.' In fact Cortazar invites the 
reader to choose between two possible orders of reading the text, composed of a 
series of sections of varying length. Hopscotch takes the form of a printbound 
book, but like The Unfortunates meditates on the frailty or fragmentariness of 
experience; Morelli, the inscribed author within the text, has written a 
fragmented text on the basis that, from his experience, life is not orderly but is 
rather an impressionistic arrangement of juxtaposed events, ordered and unified 
only by their metamorphosis into narrative, into story (not 'his' but 'hers' in this 
instance): 
Somewhere Morelli tried to justify his narrative incoherencies, 
maintaining that the life of others, such as it comes to us in so-called 
reality, is not a movie but still photography, that is to say, that we 
cannot grasp the action, only a few of its eleatically recorded fragments . 
... [G]iving coherence to the series of pictures so they could become a 
movie (which would have been so very pleasing to the reader he called 
the female-reader) meant filling in with literature, presumptions, 
hypotheses and inventions the gaps between one and another 
photograph. 
(Hopscotch, p. 458) 
47 The French writer Marc Saporta, in his novel Composition No.1, presents the entire 
text in loose-leaf form. For further discussion of Saporta's text, see Bolter, 1991, p. 
140ff. He writes: 'Saporta's experiment in chance fiction seems to be an inevitable step 
in the exhaustion of printed literature. When all the other methods of fragmenting the 
novel have been tried, what remains but to tear the pages out of the book one by one 
and hand them to the reader? From the ideal of perfect structural control, Saporta brings 
us to the abdication of control' (Bolter, 1991, p. 142). 
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Both Johnson's and Cortazar's texts are concerned with the presentation of 
thoughts and memories. Memory, which comprises in effect the history tof what 
passes in a man's own mind,' is not of course linearly structured: memories are 
stored randomly in the neural network of the brain. The idea of the mind as a 
type of storage unit - more or less tidy depending on the person, as Johnson has 
pointed out - has been explored by Alasdair Gray in 1982 Janine, as Jock McLeish 
struggles to organise the contents of his head and as Paul Valery's epigraph to 
the text has already made clear (tThere are boxes in the mind with labels on 
them'). Such a spatial metaphor of the mind is directly compatible with the way 
the computer stores information, to be used when needed and recalled, hence 
the acronym RAM, the computer's own Random Access Memory. This connection 
is explicitly detailed in Hopscotch: 
Each neuron in the brain contains millions of different molecules of 
ribonucleic acid, which are distinguished by the disposition of their basic 
constituent elements. Each molecule of ribonucleic acid (RNA) 
corresponds to a well-defined protein, the way a key is perfectly adapted 
to a lock. The nucleic acids tell the neuron the make-up of the protein 
molecule it is to form. According to the Swedish researchers, these 
molecules are the chemical translation of thoughts. 
Memory would correspond, therefore, to the ordering in the brain of 
the nucleic acid molecules, which play the same role as perforated cards 
in modern computers. For example, the impulse which corresponds to 
the note mi as it is picked up by the ear, will slide rapidly along from one 
neuron to another until it has reached all of those containing the 
molecules of RNA corresponding to that particular stimulus. The cells 
immediately construct molecules of the corresponding protein which that 
acid governs, and we have the auditory perception of the note. 
(Hopscotch, p. 354) 
If it is suggested that the form of the novel can offer ta diagram of certain 
aspects of the inside of [a] skull,' as B.S. Johnson writes at the end of House 
Mother Normal (p. 204), a spatial representation of the way the human mind 
works, then hypertext, as a form of textuality operating upon and within the 
network system of the digital computer, clearly offers a particularly relevant 
vehicle for the expression of such novel ideas based on the notion of the mind as 
network and the transmission of message data - thoughts and memories - within 
it. This will be discussed again in the following chapter. The form of the book as 
such a vehicle on the other hand has been stretched to its very limits, literally 
torn apart in the process of attempting to traverse the breach between its own 
linear-hierarchical model and that of the network. Printed texts that attempt to 
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undo the spatial linearity of the printbound form and to mimic the properties of 
the network can therefore be viewed as providing a 'bridge to the literature of 
the electronic medium,' as Bolter has observed (Bolter, 1991, p. 142). 
The fragmentary texts of The Unfortunates and Hopscotch more or less 
constitute what Derrida earlier referred to as 'spatial mise en scene': although 
both texts have defined start points, thereafter the reader - in the case of 
Hopscotch - can move backwards as well as forwards through the text while the 
reader of The Unfortunates can also 'move around' (in both senses of the 
phrase) the separate sections of text on account of its spatial dislocation 
(Hopscotch relies on 'virtual' textual partitions, while The Unfortunates is 
physically ('effectively') partitioned. See Derrida, 1987, p. 49-50, quoted 
above). Their fragmentation - spatial and temporal - is also indicative of the 
condition of human life and experience in the modern and postmodern eras. As 
the earlier discussion of Michel Foucault's critique of the idea of a continuous 
and singular history has illustrated, history can no longer be considered as a 
simple, straightforward and cumulative progression of events through time, but 
is manifold and complex, bearing always the trace or mark of its own difference. 
Any attempt to represent history as unified and singular - through a unified and 
singular narrative account - will therefore be both inaccurate and misleading and 
attempts to convey in some way the difference and discontinuity of human 
experience, particularly regarding our relationship with time, have characterised 
the printed texts considered here so far. The emphasis in literature has shifted 
from exposition of so-called 'universal truths' encapsulated in grand narrative 
accounts to creating instead a more particular sense of history, of events and 
experience as they occur to individuals at given times in their lives. B.S. 
Johnson's experimentation with narrative form is a direct response to the 
writings of James Joyce and Samuel Beckett, whose ideas he tried to develop in 
his own work. He argues, 'Present-day reality is markedly different from [ ... ] 
nineteenth-century reality. Then it was possible to believe in pattern and 
eternity, but today what characterises reality is the possibility that chaos is the 
most likely explanation' (from Aren't You Rather Young To Be Writing Your 
Memoirs?, quoted in Coe, 2004, p. 13). Of the fragmentariness of life as it came 
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to be expounded by modernism and the resultant shift in attitudes toward 
history David Harvey writes: 
If modern life is indeed so suffused with the sense of the fleeting, the 
ephemeral, the fragmentary, and the contingent, then a number of 
profound consequences follow. To begin with, modernity can have no 
respect even for its own past, let alone that of any pre-modern social 
order. The transitoriness of things makes it difficult to preserve any 
sense of historical continuity. If there is any meaning to history, then 
that meaning has to be discovered and defined from within the 
maelstrom of change, a maelstrom that affects the terms of discussion as 
well as whatever it is that is being discussed. Modernity, therefore, not 
only entails a ruthless break with any or all preceding historical 
conditions, but is characterized by a never-ending process of internal 
ruptures or fragmentations within itself. 
(Harvey, 1990, p. 11-12) 
The effect on the individual of this jettisoning of the past will be considered in 
greater detail in Part Two. The direct influence of modernist writings upon 
Alasdair Gray's texts has already been witnessed and it is not surprising that 
Cortazar's text, too, pays explicit homage to the literary tradition it succeeds. 
Morelli's conception of his fragmented text as offering a kaleidoscopic view of 
events is one that shades from the modern expanded moment of the Proustian 
madeleine - here a 'Bagley biscuit' . into the simultaneity of the Borgesian Aleph 
and the post modernist realm of insuperable diversity and collage: 
Reading the book, one had the impression for a while that Morelli had 
hoped that the accumulation of fragments would quickly crystallize into 
a total reality. Without having to invent bridges, or sew up different 
pieces of the tapestry, behold suddenly a city, or a tapestry, or men and 
women in the absolute perspective of their future, and Morelli, the 
author, would be the first spectator to marvel at that world that was 
taking on coherence. 
But there was no cause for confidence, because coherence meant 
basically assimilation in space and time, an ordering to the taste of the 
female-reader. Morelli would not have agreed to that; rather, it seems, 
he would have sought a crystallization which, without altering the 
disorder in which the bodies of his little planetary system circulated, 
would permit a ubiquitous and total comprehension of all its reasons for 
being, whether they were disorder itself, inanity, or gratuity. A 
crystallization in which nothing would remain subsumed, but where a 
lucid eye might peep into the kaleidoscope and understand the great 
polychromatic rose, understand it as a figure, an imago mundi that 
outside the kaleidoscope would be dissolved into a provincial living room, 
or a concert of aunts having tea and Bagley biscuits. 
(Hopscotch, p. 459) 
Postmodernism admits no unified or totalising narratives, only 'little' 
narratives of difference and this brings us back to Bolter's point from the 
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introduction about information in the electronic medium: like Morelli's text, it 
too can be kaleidoscopic, organised into a vast number of possible combinations 
(see Bolter, 1991, p. 97, quoted above). The text, therefore, in addition to its 
literariness, can also become subject to the mathematical rules of possibility and 
chance. This combinatory factor is key to an understanding of post modern 
culture (and to the concept of textual work as bricolage, as mentioned earlier). 
Italo Calvi no writes: 
In the particular way today's culture looks at the world, one tendency is 
emerging from several directions at once. The world in its various 
aspects is increasingly looked upon as discrete rather than continuous. I 
am using the term "discrete" in the sense it bears in mathematics, a 
discrete quantity being one made up of separate parts. Thought, which 
until the other day appeared to us as something fluid, evoking linear 
images such as a flowing river or an unwinding thread, or else gaseous 
images such as a kind of vaporous cloud - to the point where it was 
sometimes called "spirit" (in the sense of "breath") - we now tend to 
think of as a series of discontinuous states, of combinations of impulses 
acting on a finite (though enormous) number of sensory and motor 
organs. Electronic brains, even if they are still far from producing all the 
functions of the human brain, are nonetheless capable of providing us 
with a convincing theoretical model for the most complex processes of 
our memory, our mental associations, our imagination, our conscience . 
... The process going on today is the triumph of discontinuity, 
divisibility, and combination over all that is flux, or a series of minute 
nuances following one upon the other. The nineteenth century, from 
Hegel to Darwin, saw the triumph of historical continuity and biological 
continuity as they healed all the fractures of dialectical antithesis and 
genetic mutations. Today this perspective is radically altered. In history 
we no longer follow the course of a spirit immanent in the events of the 
world, but the curves of statistical diagrams, and historical research is 
leaning more and more toward mathematics. And as for biology, Watson 
and Crick have shown us how the transmission of the characteristics of 
the species consists in the duplication of a certain number of spiral-
shaped molecules formed from a certain number of acids and bases. In 
other words, the endless variety of living forms can be reduced to the 
combination of certain finite quantities. Here again, it is information 
theory that imposes its patterns. 
(Calvina, 1987, pp. 7-10) 
Such kaleidoscopic patterning of fragments takes the place, in postmodern 
culture, of any notion of unity. The fragmentation of culture and dismantling of 
the 'monument' is addressed in Alasdair Gray's short story 'Wellbeing'. This 
story was first published as 'Wellbeing: A Fiction' at the end of Gray's political 
pamphlet Why Scots Should Rule Scotland 1997 and has been reworked for the 
recent collection of stories The Ends of Our Tethers. Here the story opens: 
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I saw a plain strewn with marble rocks, the smallest higher than a man, 
the largest as big as a cathedral. They were pieces of a statue that had 
once stood taller than Ben Nevis. Groups of little people moved with 
horse-drawn wagons among these rocks. They were searching for a piece 
recognisably human yet small enough to carry away - the lobe of an ear 
or tip of a toe. Each group wanted to put such a fragment where they 
could love and pray to it, as it would prove there had once been power, 
beauty and unity that the world no longer contained. A group found a 
rock pierced by a beautifully smooth oval arch, part of a nostril. As they 
lifted it into their cart other groups combined to attack and rob them. 
This happened to all who found a good fragment, so none was ever 
carried away and love and prayer were impossible. 
(The Ends of Our Tethers, p. 161-162) 
The shattered statue here is reminiscent of that in Percy Shelley's poem 
fOzymandias', but whereas Ozymandias's fcolossal wreck' of stone 
rOzymandias', 13) signifies the hollow end of an era of control by a cruel and 
tyrannical king, mourned by no one, the breaking up of the monument in Gray's 
story is a source of lament. The fall of Ozymandias's stone figure is just, since 
Ozymandias himself was despotic enough to be considered almost inhuman, but 
in fWellbeing' the disintegration of the stone human form is treated as signifying 
a loss of humanity, a sad destruction of what was once valuable. This depiction 
of loss is a typical indicator of Gray's attitude towards postmodernism, despite 
the fact that many of his texts operate in ways that may justifiably be described 
as post modern (the ludic and self-reflexive game-playing of Lanark's Epilogue 
section and the fmetafictional' Notes of Poor Things and A History Maker give a 
few ready examples). For Gray, postmodernism offers a theory of culture that, 
because it lacks any unifying principles, lacks real meaning. It is perhaps 
significant that the word funity' did not appear in the original incarnation of 
fWellbeing: A Fiction' but was added to the later one, suggesting Gray's 
increasing intolerance and criticism of postmodernism's theories of disunity.48 In 
the notes to his poetry collection Sixteen Occasional Poems 1990-2000 he writes 
of listening to a speaker at a conference in 1995 about visual and verbal art talk 
mostly about postmodernism: 
His energetic speech led to a discussion that said nothing about links 
between vision and word and ignored deSCriptions of our intricate 
universe and how well or badly we live in it. Ideas Homer, Jesus, 
48 The relevant sentence in the earlier publication reads: 'Each group wanted to remove 
such a fragment to where they could love and pray to it, because it proved there had 
been power and beauty the world no longer contained' (Why Scots Should Rule Scotland 
1997, p. 112). 
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Shakespeare, Mark Twain et cetera thought important seemed irrelevant 
to the Postmodern speech game. Then chaos theory was mentioned with 
enthusiasm by one who seemed to think it a liberation from logical 
constraint instead of a logical way to solve problems. 
(Sixteen Occasional Poems, postscript) 49 
What is hinted at here is the notion of postmodern theory as somehow absolving 
the individual of responsibility to act, a criticism that will also be looked at more 
closely in Part Two. Gray's hostility is towards postmodernism as it has been 
received by critics like Fredric Jameson and Jean Baudrillard, as a cultural 
ideology that, through its attention to surface, to only the superficial qualities or 
simulated representations of things - since 'pattern and eternity' are no longer 
deemed relevant - lacks depth or substance (the emphasis upon simulation will 
be returned to later in the thesis). For Jameson this focus on superficiality is 
dangerous for it masks the real workings of politics and movement of capital at a 
structural level (see Jameson, 1991). As has been observed in an earlier 
footnote, this view of postmodernism as pulling a veil over the more sinister 
concerns of big business is one that has been voiced by Gray in his fiction, in the 
notes of Kittock, the 'wise' henwife of A History Maker (see footnote 9). The 
result is that 'love and prayer [are] impossible' and individuals lose control over 
their own lives, which become meaningless and shapeless, shattered like the 
fictional statue. At least according to this rationale. There are, however, 
alternative approaches to postmodernism and the consequences of its 
fragmentary logic for text and subject. 
More positively, the proliferation of possible combinations (and thus of 
available choices) that postmodernist theory points to may be considered as 
providing diversity and interest enough to be life-enriching; thought is not stifled 
49 Gray's concern to illustrate the importance of ideas of thinkers from the past like 
Shakespeare and Mark Twain, and indeed to illustrate a continuity of thought is evident 
in The Book of Prefaces, where he writes of 'The Pleasure of History' and the merits of 
observing pattern - unity of thought - through literature: 'It is refreshing to read how 
makers find great allies in the past to help them tackle the present. It helps us to see 
that literature is a conversation across boundaries of nation, century and language .... 
Great literature is the most important part of history. We forget this because we are 
inclined to see great works as worlds of their own rather than phases of the world shared 
by everyone ... , It is very hard to imagine a passage of history in any solidity and fluidity 
for more than a few years, even when we have lived through it. But we may get some 
experience of a civilization over several centuries from extracts which let us see, on 
adjacent pages, language changing from decade to decade in words of authors who 
usually know they are changing it' (The Book of Prefaces, p. 9-10). 
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or closed off by being forced along a rational, unified - and therefore predictable 
- path. 50 This is alluded to in Hopscotch with reference to the possible capacities 
of the neural network: 
The richness and variety of thought is explained by the fact that an 
average brain contains some ten thousand million neurons, each of which 
contains in turn several million molecules of various nucleic acids; the 
number of possible combinations is astronomical. This theory, 
furthermore, has the advantage of explaining why it has not been 
possible to discover in the brain clearly defined and special zones for 
each one of its higher functions; since each neuron has several nucleic 
acids at hand, it can take part in various mental processes, and evoke 
diverse thoughts and memories. 
(Hopscotch, p. 354) 
Hypertext, as a fragmentary textual form that operates, like the human brain, 
on the principles of the network, should offer a more suitable vehicle for 
experimenting with this theory of combination and possibility than does the 
printbound form. Postmodern theories of time and space would also seem 
incompatible with the singular and linear form of the book; they are more akin 
to the type of writing space - the theatrical matrix that gestures towards 
hypertextuality - suggested by Philippe Sollers's Numbers, of which Pollard 
writes: 
Fundamental to a theatre-like stage in the text are the many allusions to 
the horizontal and vertical axes. However these allusions do not produce 
a precisely delimited space such as that contained within the theatre's 
boards and walls, but tend to create in the reader's mind an image of 
abstract space that unlike the theatre building has no inside and no 
outside. 
(Pollard, 1994, p. 86) 
This notion of the textual space as an abstract theatrical space is consonant with 
the postmodern metaphor of the city space as theatre space, as discussed by 
Jonathan Raban in his book Soft city and documented by Harvey in The Condition 
of Postmodernity. Harvey writes of Raban's text: fThe city was more like a 
theatre, a series of stages upon which individuals could work their own 
distinctive magic while performing a multiplicity of roles' (Harvey, 1990, p. 5). 
This space, like the textual space of hypertext, can optimistically be celebrated 
as a space of possibility, an arena wherein a proliferation of possible 
50 The postmodernist notion of choice has also come in line for criticism, as will be 
discussed in Part Two. 
7" ,) 
combinations may be usefully worked or acted out. The textual network of 
possibility offered by hypertext provides the basis for the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2. 
The Scene of Hypertext 
Where print technology has been seen to reinforce the linear arrangement of 
narrative, digital technology can conversely be considered to support the notion 
of the narrative network. Since digital text is stored purely as binary data in the 
computer's memory and displayed only temporarily onscreen, as already 
outlined, it contains the potential to be retrieved from memory and displayed in 
any number of possible combinations (unlike printed text which is fixed 
permanently on the page) . This potential gained from the digital storage of text 
makes it an easy and indeed natural process to organise hypertext in a variety of 
ways (as opposed to in a singular linear hierarchy) and so to offer the reader 
multiple paths through the text; achieving this in print involved a resistance - on 
the part of the author or reader, or both - to the given and physically linear form 
of the book. This stress upon digital text's potential is an important one, for not 
all hypertexts exploit this potential: hypertexts are not nonlinear (or non-
hierarchical) per se. Some in fact mimic the properties of traditional printed 
text, just as some printed texts like Glas or The Unfortunates attempt to take on 
some of the attributes of a hypertextual network. In practice hypertext has been 
employed, for example, to create digital versions of printed texts which are not 
set out in a particularly different way from their traditional printed 
counterparts; that is to say, they are set out on an axial basis, centring round a 
primary and linear textual axis, rather than actually being structured as a textual 
network. The BookWorm series of digital texts operate in such a fashion, as do 
the more recent TK3 format' eBooks' ;51 in both cases the presentation of texts as 
'digital books', even to the extent of displaying the text onscreen in an image 
resembling a printed page, complete with dog-eared corners, gestures back to 
the conventions of print and to the traditional comfort zone of the reader, 
rather than forwards to the possibilities of the digital form. Of course, the 
convenience of the hypertext link, which facilitates the direct connection either 
from one point in the 'primary' text to another or to other related material 
'outside' the primary text (other fictional, reference or critical texts, or 
diagrams, for example), has implications for the way axial-based texts like these 
can be read, despite the linearity of their main text. 
Hypertext linking can, for example, allow the 'main' text to be accompanied 
by a large amount of other data (data that would be difficult to collect and 
consult within the medium of print and given the physical limitations of reading 
a printed book). The issue here is partly one of access: related materials may not 
always be possible to obtain in print and their availability depends upon the 
facilities at the reader's disposal when reading the primary text. Unless s/he is 
located within a particularly well-equipped library, it is unlikely s/he will be 
able to access the same comprehensive amount of material that may be 
appended in a hypertext system.52 There is another side to this coin, however: in 
51 Some of which are available for free download from the NightKitchen website 
(www.nightkitchen.com). 
52 Although in the case of the TK3 digital texts, appending too much additional 
information, particularly non-textual data, would result in files becoming too large to be 
easily downloadable, especially by readers with only a basic modem connection (and the 
theoretical implications of the concept and practice of 'downloading' text will be 
returned to a bit later in the chapter). Landow has argued that unobstructed access to 
linked material in general makes it easier for the reader to orient him or herself with 
regard to the referential context of hypertext as opposed to that of print: 'Scholarly 
articles situate themselves within a field of relations, most of which the print medium 
keeps out of sight and relatively difficult to follow, because in print technology the 
referenced (or linked) materials lie spatially distant from the references to them. 
Electronic hypertext, in contrast, makes individual references easy to follow and the 
entire field of interconnections obvious and easy to navigate' (Landow, 1992, p. 5). This 
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making vast amounts of data more accessible there is the danger that data not 
explicitly linked to and included within the hypertext system becomes devalued. 
If a hypertext already includes links to a large amount of referenced 
information, the reader of the hypertext will be perhaps less likely to follow up 
other, implicit, textual references or to seek out sources of his or her own. Silvio 
Gaggi writes: 
For a text to be excluded from hypertext is likely to be even more 
crippling than its being excluded from the "canon" as presently 
constituted. The ease and speed of navigating among texts embedded in 
hypertextual networks has as its flip side a tendency to ignore texts that 
are not included, as if they did not exist at all. 
(Gaggi, 1997, p. 117) 
Landow, ever the optimist when it comes to propounding and defending the 
possibilities of hypertext, argues against such a criticism, believing that 
hypertext systems should be considered positively, as offering readers the 
chance to view more linked data than ever before rather than as negatively, 
restricting the material that can be viewed, and he stresses that hypertext 
systems should include fa multiplicity of viewpoints and kinds of information' in 
order to defend themselves against any such charge of totalitarianism (Landow, 
1992, p. 177). Nevertheless, this remains a valid criticism of hypertext, for no 
hypertext system will or can ever be exhaustive; some information will always 
find itself excluded. The reader, therefore, should be aware that although 
hypertext links can lead to many relevant references and sources, they will not 
lead to all references and sources; though the role of the reader is modified by 
hypertext, by the ease and speed with which hypertext enables linked data to be 
consulted, the traditional role of the scholarly reader who would pursue both 
explicit and implicit references from the printed text - to other books and 
material - is still a valid one within the hypertextual context. 
The more data that is linked to the main textual axis, the more opportunities 
there are for the reader to diverge from a straightforwardly linear reading of the 
text, to become sidetracked by reading accompanying material which may itself 
contain further links faway' from the main text. Although the reader of a printed 
view of the hypertextual space can usefully be contrasted with Fredric Jameson's view 
regarding postmodern spaces in general. For Jameson, the abolition of distance between 
objects is a disorienting spatial feature, rather than a helpful one, as will be discussed 
again in Chapter 3. 
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text may be similarly sidetracked from a strictly linear reading by, for example, 
paratextual devices like footnotes and marginal commentary as described in the 
preceding chapter, or by references or allusions to other texts, the tangibility 
and discreteness of the book - the object held in the hand - along with its 
inherently linear, page-by-page form, will always serve to reinforce the sense of 
a single dominant textual axis. A reference to a book on a shelf in another room 
is unlikely to challenge the reader's notion that the book s/he is currently 
holding is the dominant text; a hypertext link from one text to another may do 
precisely that, making the linked text the current text 'held' or displayed on the 
reader's screen. Since material within a hypertext system is not separated in 
space and since boundaries between texts are virtual rather than physical, the 
notion of textual discreteness or autonomy that the book form supported is 
consequently weakened. Virtual boundaries are easier to breach than concrete 
ones: Delany and Landow point out how, 
the individual hypertext ... bonds with whatever text links to it, thereby 
dissolving notions of the intellectual separation of one text from others 
as some chemicals destroy the cell membrane of an organism. Destroying 
the cell membrane will kill the cell; but destroying our conventional 
notions of textual separation has no fatal consequences. 
(Delany and Landow, 1991, p. 10) 
The process of textual osmosis that Delany and Landow describe creates 
hypertexts that Landow has elsewhere termed 'open-bordered', with no clear 
points of demarcation between where one text stops and another starts 
(Landow, 1992, p. 61).53 Hypertext, then, lacks both the solidity of the book and 
the singularity that the solid form upholds. 
53 Landow links this aspect of hypertext to the type of textual seepage that Derrida has 
argued occurs in any type of text, even in print (see Landow, 1992, p. 60-61); hypertext, 
Landow suggests, simply makes the process explicit. As will be argued shortly, however, 
with reference to Kristeva's notion of intertextuality (closely related to the problem and 
indeed impossibility of differentiating between what lies inside and what outside a text, 
as indicated by Derrida in the by now immortal line: 'Il n'y a pas de hors-texte'), 
advancing hypertext as the perfect embodiment of poststructuralist textual theory is not 
the straightforward transaction Landow often implies. (Of particular relevance to the 
analogy of the textual border and the cell membrane is Derrida's 'The Double Session' (in 
Derrida, 1981, pp. 173-286), which talks of the 'hymen' between texts of Mallarme and 
Plato. The latin phrase used is: 'Hymen: INTER Platonum et Mallurmatum,' which plays 
on the translation of 'hymen' as both 'marriage' and as 'membrane', signifying 
simultaneously linkage and separation (see Derrida, 1981, p. 181-182». 
80 
This will also result in an erosion of textual authority if we consider the book, 
as Bolter suggests and Derrida implies, as a written monument. The monument is 
fixed and permanent, it stands by itself and thus imposes itself upon the textual 
landscape as an independent and authoritative object and landmark. In a large 
hypertext system, a text may contain links to other complete texts, texts that 
are themselves axial-based fmain' texts, in which case the axial-based 
hypertexts will in fact have become part of a larger hypertext network (though 
they are not themselves network-structured). In this case the so-called fmain' 
text will abdicate its position of authority by allowing other texts to dominate, 
to fmove into' its virtual space and assume its role when the reader follows a 
link. Such a digital text is not detached from outside challenge in the same 
obvious way that the printed text is. Delany and Landow ask: 
[I]f hypertext fosters integration rather than self-containment, always 
situating texts in a field of other texts, can any individual work that has 
been addressed by another still speak so forcefully? One can imagine 
hypertext versions of books in which the reader could call up all the 
reviews and comments on that book; the "main" text would then 
inevitably exist as part of a complex dialogue rather than as the 
embodiment of a voice or thought that speaks it unceasingly. Hypertext, 
by linking one block of text to myriad others, destroys that physical 
isolation of the text, just as it also destroys the attitudes created by that 
isolation. Because hypertext systems permit a reader both to annotate an 
individual text and also to link it to other, perhaps contradictory texts, it 
destroys one of the most basic characteristics of the printed text: its 
separation and univocal voice. 
(Delany and Landow, 1991, p. 13) 
It should be noted, though, that not all hypertext systems permit the reader 
to annotate the text in the way that Delany and Landow describe. The reader 
may add notes and f dog-ear' or mark pages of TK3 format texts from within the 
environment of the TK3 Reader, the software required to view the TK3 texts 
(and free to download from the NightKitchen website), but is precluded from 
creating links unless s/he purchases the TK3 authoring software. Storyspace, the 
leading hypertext authoring and publishing software and vehicle for most 
currently available non web-based hyperfiction (as well as for non-fictional and 
seminal hypertext networks like the In Memoriam Web created by Landow and 
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Jon Lanestedt at Brown University), 54 similarly allows the reader to create his or 
her own notes or to add new links only if they have the full version of the 
Storyspace software. The lay reader, purchasing a Storyspace hypertext CD-ROM 
without owning the fully functional version of the software may only view (and 
not modify) the hypertext with the stand-alone Storyspace Reader which is 
provided along with the hypertext and which lacks the functionality of its 
relatively expensive parent software. This raises once again the entwined issues 
of accessibility and elitism already touched upon: for writing in the digital age to 
be as democratising as Landow hopes it must be accessible to all, not just to 
those who can afford it or who are lucky enough to work or study within the 
academic cloisters where such software may be networked or freely accessible. 
Currently, full participation in the hypertext systems offered by TK3 and 
Storyspace is available to the reader only at a price. The Storyspace hypertexts 
themselves are also relatively expensive, costing around three times the price of 
a paperback book. 55 Democracy, then, is a seemingly costly business (as Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, now governor of California, would doubtless confirm), and the 
danger of informational disenfranchisement being exacerbated rather than 
alleviated by hypertext remains very real. 
The sprawling space of the World Wide Web offers a venue for hypertexts that 
would at least make them available to all with access to a computer and an 
internet connection, but high quality web-based hypertexts available beyond the 
university campus can be difficult to find among the Web's more general 
proliferation of 'interactive' cyberspace sci-fi (see for example 
www.darklethe.net). The saturation of cyberspace with textual junk is one 
reason why some hypertext authors have been keen to distance themselves from 
this aspect of the World Wide Web: Michael Joyce, the 'godfather' of 
hyperfiction - author of the pioneering afternoon: a story and co-developer, 
54 The In Memoriam Web was originally conceived and created with the now defunct 
Intermedia software, and has since been transferred into Storyspace format, as has 
Landow's other major hypertext network, The Dickens Web. 
55 At the time of writing the cost of the full Storyspace software is $295, while individual 
hypertexts (which come with the Storyspace Reader) cost $20-$25 on average. The TK3 
authoring software is less expensive - $149, or $59 for a yearly subscription - but it lacks 
the functionality of Storyspace. TK3 is really only suitable for the creation of the type of 
axial-based hypertexts mentioned so far - digital 'books', in effect - whereas Storyspace 
facilitates the creation of sophisticated network-structured hypertexts, to be discussed 
shortly. 
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along with Jay David Bolter and John B. Smith, of the Storyspace software - has 
retracted his online public presence from the Web,56 while Eastgate, the 
publishing company behind Storyspace, declare themselves on their website 
purveyors of only 'serious hypertext' (see www.eastgate.com). The Eastgate 
Reading Room (www.eastgate.com/ReadingRoom.html) hosts some original and 
'serious' (mainly network-structured and innovative) Web hypertexts, including 
Joyce's Twelve Blue, but the section of the website dedicated to 'Hypertext on 
the Web' is less well furnished: acknowledging 'While the web as a whole is a 
hypertext, most Web sites are not especially hypertextual. This page collects 
links to Web sites which use hypertext in interesting and instructive ways' 
(www.eastgate.com/Hypertext.html). the page contains a large number of 
outdated links to texts that have either been moved or removed, perhaps 
suggesting how 'interesting and instructive' these hypertexts are really deemed 
to be (see www.eastgate.com/hypertextlWebHypertext.html). Rather more 
cynically, it could also be pointed out that these web-based hypertexts do not 
make Eastgate any money, and the financial factor is surely significant when 
questioning the relatively exiguous amount of hypertextual quality on the Web, 
affecting publishers and authors alike. A career as a hypertext author is unlikely 
to be very lucrative if the author's work is always to be offered for free online 
rather than sold on CD-ROM, and authors must be wary of finding themselves in 
the situation currently experienced by music artists, with music frequently 
downloaded royalty-free from the Web rather than bought from a bona fide 
source like a record store wherefrom royalties will eventually find their way back 
to the artist. In future, 'pay-per-view' type hypertexts may become available 
online, just as the iTunes music store is presently attempting to claw back the 
digital music market by offering high quality digital music files for download at a 
cost, some of which feeds back to the artist. 57 In the meantime, however, would-
56 Joyce's webspace now displays a photograph of a cairn of stones, though his online 
work can still be viewed (see http://faculty.vassar.edu/mijoyce/). 
57 This line of argument also touches upon the question of the text being the intellectual 
'property' of an author, a philosophical can of worms in itself, and upon the notion of 
text as commodity, a persistent problem for text within the ideology and market system 
of capitalism and one that hypertext alone does not escape or solve (as will be discussed 
again later in the chapter). Although Landow and others emphasise the potential of 
hypertext as a collaborative writing medium (moving away from such a proprietary 
notion) and some useful collaborative hypertext projects are available to view online -
see, for example, The Victorian Web (www.victorianweb.org), The PostColonial Web 
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be readers of fserious hypertext' must be satisfied with either trawling through 
the dross of the Web in the hope of finding something hypertextually worthwhile 
or, less frustrating but more costly, purchasing their hypertexts on CD-ROM. 
For those less financially-challenged hypertext readers with the fully 
functional Storyspace or TK3 software, there is another issue relating to the 
hypertextual notes and links that may be created: these will only be available to 
themselves, within their own version of the software on a single machine, unless 
the software and hypertext is networked within an academic environment, as are 
for example the In Memodam Web and The Dickens Web. 58 Academic campuses 
aside, some web-based hypertexts created with Storyspace, such as Twelve Blue, 
are generally available to view online (www.eastgate.com/TwelveBlue). but the 
reader may not modify them. The question of the degree to which readers should 
be able to intervene in changing a hypertext is not a straightforward one and 
must be weighed up on the merits of both private and public intervention. 
Providing a publicly available web-based hypertext that would be capable of 
adapting to the needs of every single reader would be fraught with difficulty, not 
just technically but in terms of content too. Allowing each reader full access 
privileges to alter online hypertexts by adding, modifying or removing links and 
notes could quickly result in a network of texts and links so large and diverse as 
to be unwieldy; once again the fserious' reader may be faced with the daunting 
prospect of sifting through unhelpful links and material in an attempt to separate 
the wheat from the type of chaff that has resulted in Joyce's withdrawal from 
the public sphere of the Web. The issue really is one of quality control: other 
readers' comments do not always provide insightful information about a text, as 
anyone who has been distracted by banal, facile or even puerile marginalia when 
(www.postcolonialweb.org) or the Noon Quilt project, 
(http://trace.ntu.ac.uk/quiltlinfo.htm) - these are frequently academic projects 
contributed to by students (who are fulfilling course obligations) or their tutors (who 
earn an independent wage). Freely available collaborative writing projects are a nice 
ideal but are unlikely to pay the bills of a budding hypertext writer; it is perhaps 
understandable, then, that writers by and large are keen to protect at least some of 
their work (Michael Joyce, for example, has some of his work freely available online, but 
some that may only be purchased on CD-ROM, and, despite being probably the most 
widely-known writer of hyperfiction to date, he is not sustained financially by his writing 
alone but also earns an academic wage). 
58 Though these may also be purchased as stand-alone hypertexts on CD-ROM from 
Eastgate. 
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reading a printed book will be aware. Robert Arellano's (a.k.a. Bobby Rabyd's) 
online, network-structured hypertext Sunshine '69 (www.sunshine69.com). while 
inviting participating readers to sign a guestbook and enter their own related 
stories into the Sunshine'69 web, presents these reader entries on a separate 
page entitled '69 Stories rather than fully enmeshing them in the web of its own 
story and displays an awareness that inviting free comment risks the posting of 
useless as well as useful information: IRub here to see the smut' it self-
consciously suggests (www.sunshine69.com/guestbook.html). On the other hand, 
other readers' links and notes may provide welcome textual suggestions that 
would not be available for public perusal if restricted to a single machine or 
software copy; some of the contributions on '69 Stories are serious attempts to 
offer alternative views on Sunshine 169's textual premise (the end of a decade of 
promise with the murder of a concert-goer, Meredith Hunter, at the Rolling 
Stones' concert at Altamont in 1969) and they succeed at least in conjuring up 
different ideas of what it meant to be around at the time. Academia does 
provide a sheltered arena wherein networked hypertexts may be manipulated by 
only certain groups of students and their tutors, thus facilitating (but by no 
means guaranteeing) the inclusion of what should be only relevant and valuable 
material, perhaps bridging some of the gap currently existing between public, 
relatively protected hypertexts and private ones, which can be annotated and 
expanded to suit each reader. Navigating a hypertext using the full version of 
Storyspace enables the reader to create his or her own path through the text, to 
take notes, make links and to save this particular reading experience to a disk on 
the machine being used, preserving it for another time. Although such digital 
note-taking and linking remains a private activity and does not alter the 
hypertext as it exists to be viewed by other readers - akin to scribbling notes in 
the margins of personal copies of a printed text - it at least alters the text, and 
the nature of the text, in a way useful to the individual reader. 
As already described, links between texts can reduce the sense of textual 
autonomy that the book form engendered, though theorists (mainly 
poststructuralist) have suggested that it was only ever the form of the book and 
not the text it Icontains' that was autonomous in the first place (indeed, to 
follow the poststructuralist argument, this text simply cannot be contained). 
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While Bolter stresses that fThe printed book or written codex encourages the 
notion of the text as an organic whole - a unit of meaning that is physically 
separate from and therefore independent of all other texts' (Bolter, 1991, p. 
163), Michel Foucault, in a frequently quoted passage from The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, challenges this same notion, stating that the book, fbeyond its 
internal configuration and its autonomous form ... is caught up in a system of 
references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a 
network' (Foucault, 1982, p. 23). Foucault does not here make the explicit 
distinction, as does Roland Barthes, between the book as object - tantamount to 
what he calls the fwork' - and the book's text. Barthes writes: fThe text must 
not be confused with the work. A work is a finished object, something 
computable, which can occupy a physical space (take its place for, for example, 
on the shelves of a library); the text is a methodological field' (Barthes, 1981, p. 
39). Barthes goes on to quote himself from fFrom Work to Text', stating that, 
fThe work is held in the hand, the text in language' (ibid., and Barthes, 1977, p. 
157) and continues in that essay: fit follows that the Text cannot stop (for 
example on a library shelf); its constitutive movement is that of cutting across 
(in particular, it can cut across the work, several works) ... the metaphor of the 
Text is that of the network' (Barthes, 1977, pp. 157 and 161). Although axial-
based hypertexts are not themselves network-structured (since they are still 
structured around a linear textual axis) they can, by virtue of their links faway' 
from the main axis to other texts (and perhaps to other textual axes), situate 
themselves within a larger textual network - they are part of a macro-network, 
rather than being themselves micro-networks, one might say - and this makes 
them relevant to the metaphor of the text that Barthes suggests. 
The idea of the text as network, as unstable entity impossible to confine 
between the covers of the book - that flittle parallelipiped that contains it' or, 
rather, fails to contain it (Foucault, 1982, p. 23) - has been well documented by 
poststructuralist theory, especially by those, including Barthes, involved with the 
Tel Quel journal in France in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Derrida's concept of 
the trace and of differance - a term carrying the two senses of the French verb 
differer (to differ and to defer) and signalling language's combined dependence 
upon both difference (language as a system of signs with no positive values as 
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outlined by Saussure) and infinite deferral (language's referential nature 
ensuring that meaning is constantly postponed, dispersed through an endless 
chain of signifiers)59 - as well as Julia Kristeva's writings on intertextuality, point 
towards the text as an entity that will always disseminate meaning along an 
inexhaustible number of possible trajectories, rather than containing it within 
the words on the printed page. The meaning of these words can never be stable 
but will always be subject to textual 'play' or undecidability (since the two 
elements of the linguistic sign, the signifier and signified, exist in a one: many 
relationship ratio, rather than a one:one ratio. The resultant textual process, 
Barthes maintains, cannot be reduced to the term 'signification'; he prefers 
instead Kristeva's term signifiance. See Barthes, 1981, p. 37-38). Such 
indeterminacy can be clearly apprehended in a text like Glas, where 'meaning' 
can only be pursued through the intertextual play of the text's columns - the 
'text-between', to borrow Barthes's term, of Hegel's and Genet's texts - and 
never finally grasped (Barthes, 1977, p. 160). 
When Kristeva writes of intertextuality, she is referring to intertextuality as it 
occurs and functions naturally in language - through the co-implication, 
inscription and disruption of words with other words or elements from other 
signifying systems - rather than to the more simplistic, though popular, notion of 
textual reference to other texts (literary allusion in other words).60 Although this 
form of 'literary' intertextuality can be interesting and challenging (and indeed 
fun) enough for the reader who chooses to take up the gauntlet of exploring 
literary references and allusions to influential sources within a text - and 
Alasdair Gray's texts offer plenty fodder in this respect, not least in Lanark's 
Index of Plagiarisms - it both oversimplifies and misstates the concept as 
outlined by Kristeva. Unfortunately it is largely in this reduced sense that the 
term has been picked up by those perhaps a little too eager to depict hypertext 
as the technological embodiment of some of the ideas explored by 
59 As Judith Butler puts it: 'linguistic signification is a series of substitutions that can 
never reclaim an original meaning. In effect, to be in language means to be infinitely 
displaced from original meaning' (Butler, 1987, p. 198). 
60 Derrida's 'trace' is again a useful concept to bear in mind here (though it by no means 
sums up intertextuality as Kristeva describes it): each word or signifier in language is not 
self-suffident but accrues meaning only through its relationship to other signifiers and 
the traces or intertextual imprint (to and from these) it bears. 
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poststructuralist theory. Landow writes of the In Memoriam Web: f[it] uses 
electronic links to map and hence reify a text's internal and external allusions 
and references - its inter- and intratextuality' (Landow, 1992, p. 36) and with 
Delany describes how: 
Milton's various descriptions of himself as prophet or inspired poet in 
Paradise Lost and his citations of Genesis 3: 15 create intertextuallinks. 
Similarly, his citations of the biblical text about the heel of a man 
crushing the serpent's head and being in turn bruised by the serpent link 
to the biblical passage and its traditional interpretations as well as to 
other literary allusions and scholarly comment upon all these subjects. 
(Delany and Landow, 1991, p. 11) 
Bolter, in a similar vein, enthuses over the potential of a hypertext version of 
James Joyce's Ulysses which would enable its many literary sources to be 
gathered together and linked (see Bolter, 1991, p. 137). Whilst Bolter recognises 
that intertextuality foccurs everywhere', discusses the possibilities for viewing 
hypertext in a manner akin to the process involved in reading Glas and is in 
general more measured in his appreciation of hypertext than Landow, he still at 
times seems to consider intertextuality reductively, privileging the qualities of 
textual reference and allusion: 
Stressing connections rather than textual independence, the electronic 
space rewrites the possibilities of reference and allusion. Not only can 
one passage in an electronic text refer to another, but the text can bend 
so that any two passages touch, displaying themselves contiguously to 
the reader. Not only can one text allude to another, but the one text can 
penetrate the other and become a visual intertext before the reader's 
eyes. The intertextual relationship occurs everywhere in print - in novels, 
gothic romances, popular magazines, encyclopedias, grammars, and 
dictionaries - yet the electronic space permits us to visualize 
intertextuality as no previous medium has done. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 163-164) 
There are obviously merits in the ability to explicitly link from one text to 
other referenced texts: the factor of being able to easily view linked texts (that 
might not have been accessible otherwise) has already been mentioned and as 
Delany and Landow earlier pointed out, links between texts will encourage the 
reader to consider texts as existing as fpart of a complex dialogue' rather than 
as discrete and funivocal' as the printed form might suggest (see Delany and 
Landow, 1991, p. 13, quoted above). It could also be argued that such linking 
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demystifies the process of literary allusion, making texts less elitist. 61 Literary 
snobbery of this type is the subject of the lofty - and tongue-in-cheek -
statement by Flann O'Brien's narrator of At Swim-Two-Birds that: 
The modern novel should be largely a work of reference. Most authors 
spend their time saying what has been said before - usually said much 
better. A wealth of references to existing works would acquaint the 
reader instantaneously with the nature of each character, would obviate 
tiresome explanations and would effectively preclude mountebanks, 
upstarts, thimbleriggers and persons of inferior education from an 
understanding of contemporary literature. 
(At Swim-Two-Birds, p. 25) 
Comically, Brinsley - the narrator's friend and audience - gives this statement 
the response it probably deserves: 'That is all my bum' (At Swim-Two-Birds, p. 
25). Despite the obvious comedy of this exchange, and its suggestion of the 
difficulty or indeed impossibility of writing anything that is not in some way 
derivative, it also makes the point that literary texts can be rather exclusive; 
few would argue that even the most competent reader will find him or herself a 
little intimidated by, for example, the wealth of textual references in Joyce's 
Finnegan's Wake, or even Ulysses for that matter. Lanark's Index of Plagiarisms, 
though seemingly encouraging the 'exclusive' allusive game, actually functions 
more subversively than at first it might seem. As Stephen Baker suggested in a 
talk given as part of the 'Beyond Scotland' lecture series,62 Lanark plays on and 
indeed provokes the reader's desire to follow up allusions in the text, but 
effectually frustrates this provoked desire by giving the reader all the 
interpretative answers towards the end in its Index, which lists all occurrences of 
'literary plagiarisms', tacit and explicit. The Index declares: 
There are three kinds of literary theft in this book: 
BLOCK PLAGIARISM, where someone else's work is printed as a distinct 
typographical unit, IMBEDDED PLAGIARISM, where stolen words are 
concealed within the body of the narrative, and DIFFUSE PLAGIARISM, 
where scenery, characters, actions or novel ideas have been stolen 
61 The elitism of the written word in general has already been discussed in the 
Introduction. With regard to the claims for hypertext as a tool of literary demystification 
Bolter comments, lit is true that the computer takes the mystery out of intertextuality 
and makes it instead a well-defined process of interconnection, the collective act of 
reading one text in the light of others. Any sense of mystery that remains is the residue 
of the age of writing or printing, when the technology provided no good way to embody 
the movement from one text to another' (Bolter, 1991, p. 203). Again, Bolter uses the 
term intertextuality in only its narrow 'literary' sense. 
62 Held in the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow on 3rd November 2000. 
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without the original words describing them. To save space these will be 
referred to hereafter as Blockplag, Imp lag, and Difplag. 
(Lanark, p. 485) 
The Index is seemingly exhaustive and incredibly thorough, even pedantic; the 
entry for 'POE, EDGAR ALLAN', to give an example, reads: 
Chap. 8, para. 7. The "large and lofty apartment" is an Imp lag from the 
story The Fall of the House of Usher. Chap. 38, para. 16. The three long 
first sentences are Implag from The Domain of Arnheim. The substitution 
of "pearly" pebbles for "alabaster" pebbles comes from Poe's other 
description of water with a pebbly bottom in Eleonora. 
(Lanark, p. 495) 
Such a painstakingly detailed reference of references undoubtedly errs on the 
side of inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness (thankfully for all the 
'mountebanks, upstarts, thimble riggers and persons of inferior education' who 
might be thinking of reading Lanark), and while this perhaps 'democratises' the 
text to an extent to which even Landow may be impressed, it could also be 
argued that by giving away the 'answers' to the text's interpretation, the Index 
in some way cheats the reader, robbing him or her of the pleasure that may be 
obtained through the independent pursuit of textual allusion. The Index, in other 
words, does the reader's traditional work. The reader is not left altogether idle, 
however. On the contrary, Lanark can be considered· in a way very similar to 
that in which Calvino's If on a winter's night a traveller manipulates and 
frustrates the reader's desire for a traditional story (one with a beginning, a 
middle and an end), causing the reader (implied and real) to question his or her 
own assumptions about what it means to read for such a 'unified' story - as 
redirecting the reader's focus onto the ways in which texts normally draw us in 
and make us willing participants in the textual transaction, part of which relies 
on our collusion in such seemingly cosy, seemingly satisfactory allusive games. 
Baker draws the analogy between the simultaneous provocation and frustration 
of the reader's desire that occurs in Lanark (and elsewhere in Gray's fiction) and 
the manipulation of desire that underpins capitalism, constituting it and upon 
which it wholly depends (see also Baker, 1995). Following Theodor Adorno, Baker 
argues that capitalism requires that subjects be kept in a state of perpetual 
longing (more on this in Chapter 3), desiring things that can theoretically be 
achieved - through working and striving harder, of course· but in practice never 
are. Capitalism, he argues, dangles the carrot of possibility temptingly in front of 
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our noses, but agonisingly always just slightly beyond the reach of our mouths. 
The culture industry, too, plays its own part in this process, and books, like other 
art forms, have not escaped the cultural dominant of capitalism but have 
themselves assumed the status of commodity, have themselves become caught 
up in the same systems of labour, exchange, and tantalising desire as are 
commodities within the social and economic spheres. 63 The point here is that the 
would-be satisfactory 'intertextual' game of the literary text could be construed 
as just another dangling carrot, inviting the reader to take part in a tacit textual 
transaction that, if intertextuality is considered in Kristeva's sense of the term, 
can never be completed. Gray, changing the rules of the 'intertextual' game 
with his Index of Plagiarisms, in effect subverts the whole premise of the 
transaction by simulating its premature foreclosure. 
Following the same intertextuallogic, Gray's Index of Plagiarisms must, 
however, be a counterfeit gesture: in attempting to transcribe the text's 
intertextual references it pretends to exhaust the inexhaustible. The Index 
entries for Robert Burns and Ralph Waldo Emerson suggest as much: 
BURNS, ROBERT 
Robert Burns' humane and lyrical rationalism has had no impact upon the 
formation of this book, a fact more sinister than any exposed by mere 
attribution of sources. See also Emerson. 
EMERSON, RALPH WALDO 
Ralph Waldo Emerson has not been plagiarized. 
(Lanark, pp. 486 and 488) 
'Mere attribution of sources' may be the function of Gray's Index, but it is not 
the function of intertextuality, which would suggest that Burns, Emerson and 
many other unmentioned authors will indeed be inscribed more deeply in Lanark 
than the Index obliquely admits. Barthes writes of 'the Text' that it is: 
woven entirely with citations, references, echoes, cultural languages 
(what language is not?), antecedent or contemporary, which cut across it 
through and through in a vast stereophony. The intertextual in which 
63 Baker quotes from Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment: 'The culture 
industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually promises. The 
promissory note which, with its plots and staging, it draws on pleasure is endlessly 
prolonged; the promise, which is actually all the spectacle consists of, is illusory: all it 
actually confirms is that the real pOint will never be reached, that the diner must be 
satisfied with the menu. In front of the appetite stimulated by all those brilliant names 
and images there is finally sat no more than a commendation of the depressing everyday 
world it sought to escape' (Baker, 1995, p. 11). 
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every text is held, it itself being the text-between of another text, is not 
to be confused with some origin of the text: to try to find the 'sources', 
the 'influences' of a work, is to fall in with the myth of filiation; the 
dtations which go to make up a text are anonymous, untraceable, and 
yet already read: they are quotations without inverted commas. 
(Barthes, 1977, p. 160) 
This is entirely in line with Kristeva's position on intertextuality. Distancing 
herself from the common misappropriation of the term, she explains: 
The term intertextuality denotes [the] transposition of one (or several) 
sign-system(s) into another; but since this term has often been 
understood in the banal sense of 'study of sources', we prefer the term 
transposition because it specifies that the passage from one signifying 
system to another demands a new articulation of the thetic - of 
enundative and denotative positionality. If one grants that every 
signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various signifying systems 
(an intertextuality), one then understands that its 'place' of enunciation 
and its denoted 'object' are never single, complete and identical to 
themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable of being tabulated. In 
this way polysemy can also be seen as the result of a semiotic 
polyvalence - an adherence to different sign-systems. 
(Kristeva, 1986, p. 111) 
Kristeva's ideas on intertextuality stem from her work on Mikhail Bakhtin and 
are really transformative restatements - thus explicitly embodying 
intertextuality as they describe it - of Bakhtin's notions of dialogism and 
heteroglossia. For Bakhtin, discourse is always dialogic (having more than a 
single meaning) or double-voiced (speaking with more than a single voice) rather 
than monologic and stable. No discourse, therefore, can make claims on 'truth', 
since every discourse will be shot through with alternative meanings (the trace 
of other discourses) and, specifically, will mean different things (and speak in 
different voices) to different people within different social contexts (thus 
applying Saussure's concept of linguistic difference beyond the abstract systemic 
level of langue and the restricted contextual level of utterance or parole and 
emphasising the social function of language; language as discourse, in other 
words). Bakhtin's term 'heteroglossia', like the Derridean trace, likewise 
signifies the openness of language and the inevitability of polysemy. As described 
in the preceding chapter's discussion of The Book of Prefaces, the word 'gloss' 
already displays language's doubleness; prefixing 'gloss' with 'hetero' also 
stresses its otherness: language, as has been outlined, signifies as much through 
the traces of what it does not say as what it (superficially) does. Graham Allen in 
his book Intertextuality writes: 'If we call an utterance 'heteroglot' we refer to 
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the presence within it of other utterances, past utterances and future responses 
or redeployments' (Allen, 2000, p. 213). Kristeva's concept of intertextuality or 
transposition relies on the same notions of textual dependence: language is not 
self-contained, self-identical, self-sufficient; rather it is a network or fabric of 
crossed and infinite codes. These codes, for Kristeva as for Bakhtin, are also 
context-dependent, as Allen has pointed out: 'Bakhtin and Kristeva share ... an 
insistence that texts cannot be separated from the larger cultural or social 
textuality out of which they are constructed. All texts, therefore, contain within 
them the ideological structures and struggles expressed in society through 
discourse' (Allen, 2000, p. 36).64 Kristeva's mention of transposition as requiring 
'a new articulation of the thetic' refers to her division of language into two 
phases, the pre-linguistic 'semiotic phase' (of early childhood) and the linguistic 
or 'thetic phase' wherein the subject must enter into discourse within the 
accepted rules of the dominant social order (corresponding directly to Jacques 
Lacan's psychoanalytic statement of the subject's movement from the Imaginary 
experience of the senses to the Symbolic order of language). Since entering into 
the 'thetic phase' will necessitate the repression of the semiotic subject at many 
levels (in order that s/he will conform to the 'rules' of the thetic discourse), 
Kristeva argues that the unconscious impulse of the semiotic will seek to 
manifest itself subversively in the very discourse that functions to repress it (i.e. 
the semiotic will make itself known through the thetic).65 For Kristeva, then, 
transposition demands the re-articulation of the thetic precisely because the 
thetic (which pretends to rationalise and so unify discourse and is thus 'Other' or 
estranged) is persistently being ruptured by the attempts of the demanding 
semiotic to signify (alluded to in the section entitled 'Hiding' in Tim 
McLaughlin's hyperfiction Notes Toward Absolute Zero: 'Someone is hiding in the 
64 And the codes need not always be textual. Kristeva writes: 'the passage from one sign 
system to another ... involves an altering of the thetic position - the destruction of the 
old position and the formation of a new one. The new signifying system may be produced 
with the same signifying material; in language, for example, the passage may be made 
from narrative to text. Or it may be borrowed from different signifying materials: the 
transposition from a carnival scene to the written text, for instance' (Kristeva, 1986, p. 
111 ). 
65 Kristeva refers to the drives of the semiotic within a text as being the text's 
'genotext', whereas the conventional operation of the thetic is termed the 'phenotext', 
thus the genotext works to disrupt the phenotext and to illustrate the inadequacy of its 
authority. 
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back of this literary machine with inappropriate words and rejected phrases. A 
small voice that occasionally demands the first person'). The thetic - or linguistic 
discourse - is thus inevitably polysemous, inevitably and unavoidably 
intertextual. 
Intertextuality, then, is much more than Imere attribution of sources' and as 
such can never be fully or explicitly mapped, either by the type of exercise Gray 
undertakes in Lanark's Index of Plagiarisms or by the process of hypertextual 
linking. Indeed, as Barthes has already pointed out, many of the signifying forces 
at play within a text are not even identifiable - they are rather lanonymous, 
untraceable' - so could not possibly be pinned down. He stresses: 
The Text is plural. Which is not simply to say that it has several 
meanings, but that it accomplishes the very plural of meaning: an 
irreducible (and not merely an acceptable) plural. The Text is not a co-
existence of meanings but a passage, an overcrossing; thus it answers not 
to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explosion, a 
dissemination. The plural of the Text depends, that is, not on the 
ambiguity of its contents but on what might be called the stereographic 
plurality of its weave of signifiers (etymologically, the text is a tissue, a 
woven fabriC). 
(Barthes, 1977, p. 159) 
(And the threads constituting the fabric of the text are endless.) 
Acknowledging that hypertext cannot be the complete embodiment of 
intertextuality should not make it entirely redundant, however, and the separate 
- and of course intertextual - realms of poststructuralist theory and hypertext 
can still usefully inform one another. Bolter, writing of intertextuality in more 
than the narrow literary sense he has adopted at other times - Iintertextuality is 
more than the references within a text and allusions between texts that are 
common in literature; it is the interrelation of all texts in the same subject, 
language, or culture' (Bolter, 1991, p. 202)66 - recognises that a text's 
intertextuality may never be completely laid bare by hypertext, but still argues 
for hypertext's relevance. He writes that: 
there is a great difference between the infinite and the inaccessible. 
Electronic writing with its graphical representations of structure 
encourages us to think that intertextual relations can indeed be mapped 
66 Though, to be pedantic perhaps, this is not yet an accurate description since 
intertextuality transcends the boundaries of signifying system (being not exclusively 
restricted to text) as well as those of 'subject, language, or culture'. 
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out, made explicit - never fully, but with growing accuracy and 
completeness. 
(Ibid. ) 
The point is that immediate access from one text to another that relates to it is 
still a useful textual feature: infinite access via the hypertext link may be an 
impossibility but that does not negate the benefits of access per se. 67 As well as 
67 And Bolter has shown his frustration with what he sees as the unhelpful 
poststructuralist preoccupation with notions of infinity. He argues that it is pointless in a 
way to continually argue the infinite nature of a text's reference and the impossibility of 
ever representing it; since no written medium in practice can ever be infinite this is 
really a superfluous observation, he contends. 'Semiotics regards representation and 
interpretation as a process without end .... In fact any practical system is limited .... The 
electronic space is subject to the same limitation. An electronic text may grow and grow 
as it comes to include the work of many hands, but no electronic text can be infinite -
not only because it is the work of finite human beings, but also because the computer 
itself, as a technology of writing, is finite. All computers must operate with a limited 
memory and a finite speed of computation. The machine is always stymied when it 
confronts infinity, in symbolic applications as in numerical ones. So in electronic writing, 
the network of elements must always be limited, and the act of interpretation must 
reconcile itself to this limitation .... Students of semiotics and of deconstruction must 
ultimately address the finite character of the textual world. They understand that all 
texts are finite, and yet they seem to be looking back to that Faustian culture in which 
the infinite is the highest, if unsatisfied, aspiration' (Bolter, 1991, p. 203-204). This so 
far misses the point of much poststructuralist theory, which is concerned more with 
highlighting the inadequacy of any textual form to deal in objective truths than with 
aspiring towards a simultaneously infinite and impossible textuality. Bolter does go on to 
address this theoretical aspect, but while he recognises poststructuralism's anxiety 
regarding truths, yet he seems also to underestimate the implications of the 
poststructuralist argument, which will of course extend to hypertext as a mode of 
written signification. He writes: 'All of deconstruction's work is to show that the 
transcendental signified cannot be achieved. But even to worry about such an 
achievement shows that deconstruction is only half way toward a new view of signs. The 
old view of transcendence and infinity still matter enough to the deconstructionist that 
he or she feels the need to refute them. 
The new view of signs is embodied unambiguously in electronic hypertext. Here the 
writer and reader know that there is no transcendence, because they know that the 
topical elements they create are arbitrary sequences of bits made meaningful only by 
their interconnecting links. They feel no need to refute the old view, the product of the 
printed and written book, which are both closer to the spoken language. In the computer 
meaning is always deferral, the pointing from one place to another. The fact that 
electronic signs only refer to other signs is the fundamental characteristic of the 
medium, made apparent in every act of electronic writing. In an electronic space there 
is no infinite regression, not because the reader eventually reaches the transcendental 
signified, but rather for the mundane reason that the resources of the machine, though 
vast, are always finite. All this suggests again that the computer takes us beyond 
deconstruction, which for all its ambivalence, is still incapable of acquiescing in the 
arbitrary and limited character of writing. Electronic readers and writers have finally 
arrived at the land promised (or threatened) by post-modern theory for two decades: the 
world of pure signs. While traditional humanists and deconstructionists have been 
battling over the arbitrary, self-referential character of writing, computer specialists, 
oblivious to this struggle, have been building a world of electronic signs in which the 
enabling texts to be linked to other literary texts, hypertext facilitates the 
linking of texts to historical or contextual material, as is the case with the In 
Memoriam and Dickens webs - which would constitute part of a text's intertext 
in Kristeva's terms - or to related non-textual material, such as images, audio 
and video (which again can be construed intertextually). Hypertext, if not 
viewed reductively as a written mode that tries (and fails) to demonstrate fully 
the condition of the text as described by poststructuralist theory (reductively 
since such a mode must necessarily reduce or totalise that which theory has 
indicated is irreducible), may instead be viewed simply as a mode that enables 
battle is over' (p. 203-204). This rather lengthy quotation from Bolter reveals (certainly 
in poststructuralist terms) a theory as dangerous as it is self-contradictory: the theory 
that hypertext operates in a realm of 'pure signs' that both displays and resolves the 
inadequacy of signification and in so doing finds itself impervious to critique. Bolter is 
right to point out that poststructuralism 'worries', as he puts it, about the logocentric 
tendencies of the written word and the end - theoretically held by the transcendental 
signified - of interpretation; poststructuralism also, however, worries about the 
consequences of ceasing to worry, the consequences, that is to say, of too readily 
'acquiescing in the arbitrary and limited character of writing', of colluding with the 
practical limitations of written signification, which would indeed signify the end of 
interpretation, the unwelcome end of the 'battle' with text. (Forestalling the endless 
work of critique in this way would result in a form of critical stasis like that envisioned 
by Richard Rorty and discussed briefly in a later footnote (see footnote 76). Such stasis 
would also be comparable to the political stasis observed in Alasdair Gray's A History 
Maker and discussed in the preceding chapter, the allegedly Utopian political society of 
A History Maker being analogous to the type of textual Utopia Bolter seems to anticipate 
in hypertext. For Bolter, hypertext functions to demystify language by laying bare its 
referential dependencies. He writes that: 'the computer makes the act of reference 
explicit, and in doing so it makes apparent the purely conventional nature of writing. A 
hypertext system spells out the process of interpretation in an algorithm and embodies 
that process in a programming language: there is nothing mysterious about a program 
that follows pointers from one symbolic unit to another' (Bolter, 1991, p. 200). This 
would seem to bring Bolter's position into line with the notion of technology as being 
part of a rational and scientific 'project' of enlightenment and mastery discussed in the 
Introduction, the technology of hypertext enabling the mystery of linguistic reference to 
be 'cleared away'). Bolter, by arguing that the 'new view of signs' is 'embodied 
unambiguously' in hypertext, is surely arguing that hypertextual discourse is beyond 
interpretation, that it need no longer be questioned since it transparently and 
unequivocally demonstrates the condition of language: to 'unambiguously' embody the 
'new view of signs' - which is really just a replication of the 'old' view of signs that 
operate on the infinite bases of difference and deferral but within the finite medium of 
practical application, whether it be the spoken word, the printed word or the electronic 
word - is surely finally to marry the signifier and signified, identifying the one 
unambiguously with the other (one:one), the result of which would be of course the 
elusive transcendental signified, or 'truth' itself. Bolter, in arguing against theoretical 
notions of infinity, inadvertently finds himself in the dangerous position of advocating 
hypertext as a transparent and thus entirely closed discourse; a contradictory discourse 
wherein 'there is no transcendence,' yet which itself assumes transcendental status. His 
argument, one might say, self-deconstructs. 
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some of poststructuralism's concerns to be worked or played out - without 
tending towards completion, such as Bolter seems to be suggesting in the 
quotation above - more explicitly than is possible with print (though never wholly 
explicitly). It should also be borne in mind that while hypertext is a relatively 
new form of writing, it is still a written form and as such will not escape the 
more general problems and conditions of textuality indicated by poststructuralist 
theory; it will also be as open to critique as any other form of writing. Rather 
than being a textual form with all the answers (as Landow would often have it), 
hypertext simply offers another vehicle for asking questions. 
The idea of the text as ongoing - and as questioning - process (rather than 
simply as product or f answer') as well as being relevant to hypertext as a 
dynamic form also circulates in the theories of poststructuralism, particularly in 
the writings of Barthes and Kristeva. Kristeva's response to the challenges set by 
Modernist texts such as those by Joyce and Mallarme, which she believes 
explicitly invite the (endless) process of interpretation and critique (involving 
the reader at the level of production rather than simply f consumption' of textual 
meaning or textual goods), is a case in point. She writes: 
Any 'literary' text may be envisaged as productivity. Literary history 
since the end of the nineteenth century has given us modern texts which, 
even structurally, perceive themselves as a production that cannot be 
reduced to representation (Joyce, Mallarme, Lautreamont, Roussel). 
Therefore, a semiotics of production must tackle these texts precisely in 
order to join a scriptural practice concerned with its own production to a 
scientific thought in search of production. And it must do so in order to 
bring out all the consequences of such a confrontation, that is, the 
reciprocal upheavals which the two practices inflict on one another. 
Developed from and in relation to these modern texts the new 
semiotic models then turn to the social text, to those social practices of 
which 'literature' is only one unvalorized variant, in order to conceive of 
them as so many ongoing transformations and/or productions. 
(Kristeva, 1986, p. 86-87) 
This theory of text as process or productivity is enmeshed with the role of the 
reader inasmuch as the reader fworks' to construct the text (this will be 
discussed again later, particularly in Chapter 4). It likewise corresponds with the 
poststructuralist theory of text not as the container for some pre-existent 
meaning or fmessage' (writing as ecrivant) but as the conveyance of multiple 
and not-yet-existent meanings (writing as ecrivain). Barthes writes: 
The text is a productivity. This does not mean that it is the product of a 
labour (such as could be required by a technique of narration and the 
mastery of style), but the very theatre of a production where the 
producer and reader of the text meet: the text 'works', at each moment 
and from whatever side one takes it. Even when written (fixed), it does 
not stop working, maintaining a process of production. The text works 
what? Language. It deconstructs the language of communication, 
representation, or expression (where the individual or collective subject 
may have the illusion that he is imitating something or expressing 
himself) and reconstructs another language, voluminous, having neither 
bottom nor surface, for its space is not that of the figure, the painting, 
the frame, but the stereographic space of the combinative play, which is 
infinite once one has gone outside the limits of current communication 
(subjected to the opinion, to the 'doxa') and of narrative or discursive 
verisimilitude. 
(Barthes, 1981, p. 36-37)68 
The metaphor of the text as theatre has already been used by Sollers and 
discussed in the preceding chapter, and the hypertextual mode can usefully offer 
an alternative theatrical space - or scene - for the f combinative play' of 
language (particularly when a hypertext is network-structured, as will be 
discussed shortly). Hypertext can also explicitly open the stage to textual 
performance and contribution from authors and readers alike. Bolter describes 
how: 
Mapping in the electronic space can be a collective process: the writer 
creates some connections, which pass to the first reader, who may add 
new connections and pass the results on to another reader, and so on. 
This tradition, this passing on of the text from writer to reader, who then 
becomes a writer for other readers, is nothing new; it is the literal 
meaning of the word "tradition." 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 202) 
In this manner, then, the process of textual interrogation and interpretation -
the theatrical 'tradition' of the text - may carry on dynamically, and this 
dynamic aspect of hypertext, the fact that the text is not fixed as with print but 
changeable, is one of its great strengths as has already been observed (though as 
68 The term signifiance, mentioned earlier, is also highly relevant to any discussion of 
textual productivity and works to contradict any comfortable notion of 'signification' 
(based on writing as ecrivant) where the text is treated as mere 'repository' and 'this 
signification appears as embalmed in the work-as-product' (Barthes, 1981, p. 37). 
Barthes argues: 'A fortiori, when the text is read (or written) as a mobile play of 
signifiers, with no possible reference to one or several fixed signifieds, it becomes 
necessary to distinguish carefully between signification, which belongs to the level of the 
product, of the statement, of communication, and the signifying work, which belongs to 
the level of production, enunCiation, symbolisation: it is this work that we call 
'signifiance'. 'Signifiance' is a process ... 'Signifiance' is 'the without-endness of the 
possible operations in a given field of language" (ibid., p. 37-38). 
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Barthes points out, textual fixity does not in itself preclude productivity, for the 
text will always be in process). Again, hypertext can just demonstrate some of 
text's attributes more explicitly than the printed form allows: the openness of 
hypertext, the fact that it can so easily be modified, undermines any notion of 
the text as 'product' and instead offers it up continually for change and critique. 
The problem with this textual 'tradition' as described by Bolter is that it of 
course depends once more upon each reader - each link in the traditional and 
productive chain - having full access privileges to modify the text before passing 
it on and, as has already been outlined, though this may be the case within an 
academic context, the potential of hypertext in terms of dynamic and 
collaborative textual interpretation has yet to filter through to the general 
public in any serious way. Readers of hypertexts without the necessary access 
privileges are thus only offered a restricted insight into the process of 
hypertextual interpretation and indeed into the potential of the hypertextual 
form: they may view a dynamic and interrogative text but may not themselves 
contribute to it. Once again the twin bugbears of textual access and elitism 
return to upset the hypertextual applecart and once again they cannot be 
adequately seen off. 
Allen offers the following cautionary advice regarding the perceived affinity 
between hypertext and elements of poststructuralism: 
Despite these clear connections between intertextuality and new 
computer systems, it remains difficult to imagine that technological 
changes by themselves will produce more active and productive 'author-
readers' and an increased 'democratization' of language, reading and the 
communication and possession of information. At times Landow and 
others seem rather too easily to take the basic theories of 
poststructuralism without considering the deeper motivations which 
produced those theories. We might, for instance, wonder whether 
systems which are said to increase the capacity of readers to 'download', 
process and then utilize 'information', or systems which immensely 
speed up and facilitate 'communication', actually fit as well as they 
appear to do with the kind of arguments against notions of 'information', 
the 'consumption' of literature, and the 'clear' and 'transparent' 
conveyance of meaning we have seen at the heart of Tel Quel theory. 
When we remember that in Kristeva and Barthes 'text' and 
'intertextuality' are terms meant to highlight a resistance to notions of 
reading, direct and full communication, and the capitalist exchange or 
consumption of texts, then 'hypertextuality' can seem less obviously 
connected to poststructural theory. 
(Allen, 2000, p.206) 
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Whilst this moots an interesting point, and whilst Allen's scepticism is not 
without foundation - use of the term 'democratization' in relation to knowledge 
and hypertext has, for example, up to now been rather over-optimistic given the 
hypertext accessibility issues that have raised themselves so frequently thus far, 
and poststructuralist theory has been a little too zealously plundered and 
stitched to hypertext by Landow in particular - I would argue that it seems in 
places based upon some of the popular terminology surrounding computer 
technology as a whole as well as upon the more general problem of textual 
, exchange' within a market economy rather than on a precise consideration of 
hypertext as a textual medium. It is easy to take a computer-related term like 
, download' and argue that the concept of downloading information - of 
retrieving complete digital 'files' - is entirely alien to poststructuralist notions of 
the text, which as an irreducible productivity can as little be contained or 
retrieved from within a downloadable file as a printed book: this much is 
obvious. Just as alien to the poststructuralist concept of text, and just as obvious 
for that matter, is reference to the act of 'purchasing' text in the form of a book 
from a bookshop. The issue really centres around the perceived commodification 
of the text within a capitalist system rather than on the particular textual 
medium; , download' is just another term that spuriously suggests complete 
textual exchange, like the notion of 'buying' a printed book or, it should be 
added, a hypertext on CD-ROM. Other sound bites Allen uses, such as clear 
communication or utilization of information could as easily be applied to text in 
any medium, though they have become more prevalent in the digital age. They 
are not, though, solely applicable to hypertext. The point is that the problems 
Allen connects with hypertext are problems of terminology and economic 
ideology rather than of textual functionality (and equivalent problematic 
terminology may be found for and applied to any textual medium that is subject 
to the rules of the market economy). Again it seems pertinent to make the point 
that hypertext, as medium, will still be both liable to the general conditions and 
problems of textuality and, importantly, as open to critique as any other textual 
medium. 
While hypertext does not resolve the problems inherent in treating text as a 
marketable commodity (and Allen is right to draw attention to this), it can - in 
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the same way as other forms of text - subvert the capitalist exchange system to 
some extent through its tendency towards textual productivity (the text no 
longer being a stable product to be consumed under the normal rules of 
exchange). Indeed, as has already been pointed out, hypertext as a dynamic 
textual form can make its productivity - and instability - more explicit than can 
text in the fixed medium of print. Allen's negative use of the word 'process' with 
relation to hypertext can in this context be shown to be terminologically 
dubious: he argues that processing information, which he ties exclusively to 
encounters of the subject with digital text and seems also to identify with 
notions of consumption and completion, is another act that is theoretically out 
of sync with poststructuralism. When we consider the term without such 
accompanying notions and think instead of Barthes and Kristeva's emphasis on 
productivity and textual process, however, it can be argued that 'processing' is 
positively integral to the text's signi/iance and the 'performance' of both text 
and subject. '[S]ignifiance puts the subject in process/on trial [en proces]', 
Kristeva points out (Kristeva, 1986, p. 91), and Barthes writes: 
'Signifiance' is a process, in the course of which the 'subject' of the 
text, escaping the logic of the ego-cogito and engaging other logics (that 
of the signifier and that of contradiction), struggles with meaning and is 
deconstructed ('is lost'). 'Signifiance' ... is thus work, not the work by 
which the subject (intact and external) might try to master the language 
(for example the work of style), but that radical work (which leaves 
nothing intact) through which the subject explores how language works 
him and undoes him as soon as he stops observing it and enters it. 
(Barthes, 1981, p. 38) 
Text and subject, then, are always (already) 'in process' (the process of the 
subject will be returned to in Part Two); 'process' is therefore a positive - and 
poststructuralist - term relevant to text in the media of both print and 
hypertext. Poststructuralism and hypertext, I would suggest, still have much to 
offer one another, despite Allen's concerns. 
If the text is to be viewed, as Barthes has indicated, as textured, as 'a tissue, 
a woven fabric' (Barthes, 1977, p. 159), its threads may be imagined as reaching 
out beyond an 'individual' text to all the other texts and signifying codes that 
constitute it (or are at least at play among it), thus undermining any clear sense 
of the 'inside' or 'outside' of the text. Although hypertext links cannot reach out 
to all of these codes, they can still reach from many different points or textual 
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nodes and - more explicitly than is possible with the printed text - they can 
illustrate (or fabricate) the condition of the 'voluminous', creeping text, the text 
that must always exceed or overspill its borders, creeping outwards from the 
node. Foucault has already described the book as 'a node within a network' 
(Foucault, 1982, p. 23), and hypertext can go some way to situating the 
individual text (if we can still refer to such a thing) within a network of linked 
and intertextual material. This network, though not infinite, is potentially vast: 
even non-web-based hypertexts may have a facility for the inclusion and creation 
of links to digital files located either on the user's machine or on a local or 
remote network or the World Wide Web. 
Hypertexts of the axial-based type discussed so far, when linked to other 
texts of the same type will become part of such a hypertext network, as already 
observed, but although there may be many possible linked axes to choose from, 
each axial structure in itself still suggests a dominant line of reading (from 
beginning to end of that particular textual axis). Although such a linear reading 
will be disrupted by the presence of links to other material and even to other 
complete texts this could similarly be argued of a reading in print given an active 
reader who wishes to pursue some of the text's suggested references or allusions 
to other books. 69 Axial-based hypertexts, though encouraging and making it 
easier for the reader to follow up linked references in and from the text, still 
rely on a basic model of linearity and do not, therefore, take full advantage of 
hypertext's potential for the spatial or structurally nonlinear organisation of 
text; the text conceived of and explicitly structured as network. 70 So while axial-
69 For a general discussion of differing types of textual nonlinearity, including 
hypertextual nonlinearity, see Aarseth, 1994. 
70 For a discussion of axial versus network-structured hypertexts, see Landow, 1994, p. 
23ff. At their worst, axial-based hypertexts can offer little more than badly annotated 
versions of traditional texts that do not use hypertext technology in an innovative way 
and are of scant academic interest, as Joyce has pointed out with reference to the 
number of axial-based hypertexts that were created with the Hypercard software (a 
basic application that essentially enabled texts to be annotated with digital reference 
'cards'). He writes: 'the ready adaptability of [hypertext] tools to more traditional uses 
is especially compelling given the technological frosting they so easily spread on stale 
cake. This disincentive to change is in no way novel, either in the long history of cardinal 
technologies or, especially, in the short history of microcomputers in education. The 
adaptability of Hypercard, for instance, makes it easy to "author" educational software 
that merely redistributes the command lines of the worst kinds of supposedly interactive, 
"drills and skills, " CAl software into gaily embossed buttons and peekaboo card fields. 
Like the Applesoft Basic revolution in educational software that preceded it and that it 
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structured hypertexts are interesting enough in that they can be seen to provide 
a workspace (or playground) for text that is relevant to poststructuralism, it is 
network-structured hypertexts that have most to offer in terms of narrative 
theory. 
With network-structured hypertexts, text is separated into discrete and 
fragmentary units known in hypertext parlance and following Roland Barthes's 
use of the term in 51 Z, as lexias. Barthes writes: 
The lexia will include sometimes a few words, sometimes several 
sentences ... The lexia is only the wrapping of a semantic volume, the 
crest line of the plural text, arranged like a berm of possible (but 
controlled, attested to by a systematic reading) meanings under the flux 
of discourse: the lexia and its units will thereby form a kind of 
polyhedron faceted by the word, the group of words, the sentence or the 
paragraph, i.e., with the language which is its "natural" exdpient. 
(Barthes, 1990, p. 13-14) 
These lexias, or many-faceted polyhedrons, may then be arranged or conjoined 
by the reader of the hypertext in a multiplicity of ways, in a similar manner to 
the reader's organising of the textual 'fragments' of The Unfortunates. It is this 
possibility for textual manipulation - for the text to be arranged differently with 
each reading - which, hand in hand with the hypertext link, make hypertext a 
truly dynamic form and constitute its difference from the fixed form of print. 
Hypertext does not - as some seem to fear - displace (replace or usurp) writing 
as we know it, writing as it has been manifested in print (since print is only a 
manifestation of Derrida's broad definition of writing), it simply permits 
hypertextual writing, a form of writing that can be based around the model of 
the network rather than that of the line. Barthes's idea of the word as facet can 
be easily apprehended in hypertext where words are themselves links to other 
lexias or material, offering multiple nodes or points of textual contact. In 
Storyspace hypertexts, for example, any word or phrase within a given lexia may 
'yield', giving way to another lexia or textual space when the mouse is clicked or 
dragged over that word. A single lexia may contain many words that yield, 
so clearly resembles, the Hypercard revolution requires us to rely upon skeptical eyes, 
keep a shrewd ear open to word-of-mouth (or word-of-network) advice, and exercise a 
cool hand (and quick delete finger) in choosing among a burgeoning list of titles' (Joyce, 
1996a, p. 40-41). Such technological 'over-promising,' Joyce argues, 'threatens the 
credibility and creativity of innovators, who find themselves having to disaffiliate and 
differentiate before they can discover' (ibid., p. 41). 
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enabling the reader to read the linked lexias in many different combinations; 
conversely, a lexia may contain no yielding words in which case the reader must 
press the return key to view the next lexia. Although this may suggest that the 
hypertext could be read linearly, simply by pressing return all the way through 
the text to 'the end', most hypertexts in practice will bring readers to some sort 
of textual impasse if they press return more than a few times - either leading the 
reader back to a start page or leading them in a textual circle - necessitating the 
reader's active pursuit of alternative textual paths. The reading of a network-
structured hypertext, then, can never be a singularly linear activity. 
Just as with the sections of The Unfortunates, though, each lexia will have its 
own internal linearity: since language itself is an inherently linear vehicle of 
signification, subject to 'the celebrated lineadty of the linguistic signifier' as 
observed by Genette (1980, p. 34, quoted in the preceding chapter) and 
bemoaned by Borges's narrator in 'The Aleph', it can represent ideas only by 
stringing them out, word by word, in a line. In order then for a text to be totally 
nonlinear, words would need to be able to be arranged completely randomly 
(tantamount to the picking of words out of a hat), most likely resulting in an 
accompanying loss of semantic relevance. Unlike images, which signify 
independently, words depend on their contiguous relationship to other words in 
order to garner significance. While lexias with multiple yielding words or nodes 
may subvert their own internal linearity by offering escape routes via the link, 
following links from yielding words without fully reading the sentences or 
paragraphs that contain them would result in a fairly meaningless reading 
experience. For this reason it is useful to consider hypertext not as a textual 
form permitting complete nonlinearity but as one facilitating multi-linearity (a 
term preferred by Landow), a multiplicity of possible textual combinations, with 
each textual component or lexia being subject to its own internal and linear 
logic. 71 Hypertext, like all other forms of text, will also rely upon the time it 
71 This consideration is by now fairly commonplace. Liest0l confirms Landow's adoption 
of the term 'multi-linearity' and comments: 'Multilinearity or -sequentiality are not pure 
negations of line and sequence but designate complex structures of various kinds and 
occurrences of linearities or, rather, multiplication of linearities. Nonlinear, on the other 
hand, is an empty term in the discourse on hypermedia that only shows how preoccupied 
writers on the subject have been with defining hypermedia in opposition to traditional 
media' (Liest0l, 1994, p. 110). This seems to me an overstatement of the case: the term 
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takes to traverse the lexia that constitute it: this traversal time or what Liest0l 
calls the time of the 'discourse-as-discoursed' is also temporally linear as noted 
in the previous chapter (Liest0l, 1994, p. 96).72 Nevertheless, the possibilities for 
arranging and rearranging hypertextuallexias will of course enable hypertexts to 
manipulate story-time in ways more intricate than is possible with print, leading 
Bolter to comment that: 'The traditional printed novel molds time as a 
traditional sculpture molds the space it occupies, creating a complex but 
unchanging effect. The electronic text manipulates time as a piece of kinetic 
sculpture manipulates space' (Bolter, 1991, p. 161). The linear traversal time of 
the discourse-as-discoursed may also itself be arrested by the inclusion in the 
hypertext of other forms of digital signs: hypermedia elements like image, video 
or audio data, or even kinetic text. 73 Though the image may function similarly to 
disrupt linearity within conventional text as discussed in Chapter 1, images have 
been largely marginalised by the limitations of print technology (Alasdair Gray's 
nonlinear, when applied to narrative, does not necessarily invoke thoughts of a random 
assemblage of words. I would suggest that it simply implies a narrative that does not 
proceed in a single or chronological sequence, and is not therefore the empty or 
redundant term Liest!2ll supposes. 
72 The term 'discourse-as-discoursed' is specific to hypertext, a further addition to the 
levels of story-time and discourse (or narrative)-time as explained by Genette. Liest!2ll 
writes: 'With hypertext and hypermedia something new is added to the story-discourse 
dichotomy. A third level, or a third line is introduced that may be called the discoursed 
text or discourse-as-discoursed - the actual use and reading of the digitally stored text. 
It is, in other words, the creation of a path based on the selection and combination of 
elements existing in a spatial and nonlinear arrangement of nodes [lexias] and links. The 
chronology of the story line may remain intact depending to a certain extent on 
fictiveness in the text. The discourse line, however, divides into two levels: the 
discourse as a nonlinear text stored in space and the discourse as discoursed, as actually 
read' (Liest!2ll, 1994, p. 96-97). 
73 While both video and audio would seem, on the face of it, to be temporally linear 
media, Liest!2ll has pointed out that this need not always be the case, drawing attention 
to, for instance, the type of bidirectional video often used to digitally represent objects 
or panoramic landscapes onscreen (QTVR movies where the user can 'pan' around the 
object or landscape, for example). See Liest!2ll, 1994, p. 109ff. for further discussion. 
Regarding the inclusion of sound in hypertexts, he writes: • Along the syntagmatic 
message or discourse line, melody is linear because displayed over time. Harmony 
appears when several voices (polyphony) at the same time make up parallel lines. In 
hypermedia the simultaneity found in harmony appears when sound is displayed parallel 
to text, video, or both. These elements form constellations of parallel linearity' (ibid., 
p. 110). This fugal quality of hypertext will be discussed again shortly with relation to 
different layers of text. Such parallel lines of text and sound as Liest!2ll describes may be 
experienced in the Sunshine '69 web, where readers may choose a 'soundtrack' to 
coincide with their reading (see www.sunshine69.com/69_8_track.html). Rob Swigart's 
hyperfiction Down Time also accompanies the text with sound data, while Donna 
Leishman's work (see www.6amhoover.com for examples) merges music and audio data 
with still and moving images, creating narrative structures that are largely non-verbal. 
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profusely illustrated texts standing out as exceptions to the general rule). With 
hypertext, however, it is as easy to include images as text since both are to the 
computer simply binary arrangements of information; they are, as Richard 
Lanham has pointed out, digitally equivalent (see Lanham, 1988, p. 273).74 
Hypertextual writing, rather than being a written form admitting writing in only 
its narrow sense of verbal inscription (as is so often the case with writing in 
print), readily incorporates other, non-verbal forms of writing. 
It should by now be apparent that hypertexts based on a network model 
provide an apt ground or textual space wherein to explore some of the 
theoretical concerns relating to narrative that have been expressed in print and 
debated in the preceding chapter. Since the lexias in a networked hypertext can 
be combined to create a number of textual variations, the narratives they 
engender will be discontinuous and fragmentary rather than continuous and 
unified and so will undermine any notion of a single and authoritative text or 
version of events. No single narrative account or path will then be privileged, 
allowed to dominate at the expense of others. Landow writes, 'hypertext does 
not permit a tyrannical, univocal voice. Rather the voice is always that distilled 
from the combined experience of the momentary focus, the lexia one presently 
reads, and the continually forming narrative of one's reading path' (Landow, 
1992, p. 11). In terms of historical narratives, a hypertext may include many 
versions of events, many dissenting voices, organised into different narrative 
strands or lexias; a hypertext is not a structure of exclusion in the way that a 
singular linear narrative is, as Bolter explains: 
Instead of one linear argument, the hypertext can present many, possibly 
conflicting arguments. A hypertext on the fall of the Roman empire 
might include several explanations without seeking either to combine or 
to reconcile them. Instead of confronting a single narrative, the reader 
would then move back and forth among several narratives, each 
embodying one of the explanations. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 117) 
74 Although inclusion of such hypermedia elements is not without practical limit since 
non-textual data takes up a larger amount of disk space than does text. Hypertexts on 
CD-ROM will therefore be restricted in terms of how much non-textual data they can 
include, while hypertexts available either to download from the Web or to view online 
must be sized accordingly, to avoid lengthy download or display times for the reader 
(though this may be less of a problem in future as internet bandwidths increase). 
'106 
As already discussed in terms of linked data, however, it could be argued that 
explanations or arguments not included or given voice within the hypertextual 
network might become even more marginalised than they would be from a 
linear, printed text, since the hypertext may present itself and may be viewed as 
all-inclusive, incorporating all forms of discourse (and thus being completely 
democratic). This charge (of exclusiveness in the guise of inclusiveness) does 
have some validity, as already pointed out (and see Landow, 1992, pp. 177 and 
182ft for his defence). Landow raises the question, 'Does hypertext, in a manner 
analogous to critical pluralism in literary theory, appropriate threatening 
political positions? Does it, in particular, enforce dialogue (on its own terms) and 
thereby exclude extremist positions?' (Landow, 1992, p. 182). His refutation of 
the charge rests with what he calls 'the presence of the (politically) responsible, 
active reader: because the reader chooses his or her own reading paths, the 
responsibility lies with the reader. In linking and following links lie responsibility 
- political responsibility - since each reader establishes his or her own line of 
reading' (ibid., p. 184). Landow is responding in particular to the critique of 
critical pluralism in Ellen Rooney's book Seductive Reasoning and continues: 
This conception of the reader's political responsibility matches Rooney's 
description of an active, constructionist reader who takes responsibility 
for what she reads. Rooney herself credits Althusser with recognizing 
that "Marx founds a radical theory and practice of reading by refusing 
the ideology of 'innocent' reading which makes a written discourse the 
immediate transparency of the true, and the real discourse of a voice" 
(44). So, one may add, do hypertext systems. 
(Landow, 1992, p. 184-185) 
This is, in my opinion, something of a fudged response on Landow's part (leaving 
the reader holding the hot potato of 'responsibility'), for the degree of 
responsibility that may come to rest with the reader depends entirely upon the 
degree of freedom the reader has in 'linking and following links.' In some 
hypertext systems, certainly (such as 5toryspace, if the full version of the 
software is accessible), the reader has the power to create new sets of links, and 
in these cases the reader may responsibly choose to link to a previously excluded 
discourse. The reader may, however, be using software (such as the Storyspace 
Reader) that does not afford him or her this privilege, and many hypertexts 
simply do not allow the reader to modify the text at all. In these cases the 
reader's responsibility may extend only as far as the pre-determined set of links 
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contained within the hypertext system s/he is traversing. Landow's argument, 
then, tends towards the most Utopian vision and application of hypertext - a 
hypertext where the reader has complete control over what is being read and 
linked to - and not necessarily to most practical instances of the technology. I do 
think he is on to something, however, with his appreciation of Rooney's Marxist 
argument of refusing an 'innocent' reading; this is simply the task of the reader 
in any medium, to be alert to the opacity of language and discourse and to guard 
against what Catherine Belsey refers to as 'the tyranny of lucidity': those forms 
of discourse that purport to be transparent, a clear window through which the 
'truth' may be viewed (Belsey, 1980, p. 4). Landow is also right to point out 
that hypertext is particularly resistant to 'innocent' reading: hypertext, because 
it can admit many different arguments or explanations that can be arranged and 
rearranged by the reader (even augmented or deleted by a reader with the 
requisite access privileges), naturally highlights the insufficiency of any single 
line of reasoning; the suggestion of alternatives in itself perhaps suggests the 
existence of further arguments. I would argue, then, that the notion of reader 
responsibility must be extended beyond the responsibility of choosing between 
the number of given alternatives within a particular hypertext network to involve 
a recognition that further, equally valid alternative arguments, also deserving of 
attention, can exist outwith that network, even if they cannot be explicitly 
linked to from it. Once again it would seem that the reader is left with the 
potato. Except that I would also suggest that there exists a responsibility on the 
part of the hypertext network - that is to say on the part of the creators or 
authors of the hypertext network - not to present the network as all-inclusive, as 
entirely self-contained and self-sufficient. Hypertexts can still include references 
and allusions to arguments and information that are not explicitly linked to, to 
information that lies 'outside' or beyond the network, in the real world arena of 
books, libraries and other media that would encourage an interested and active 
reader to engage in further research. The responsibility, therefore, for hypertext 
readers and writers alike, lies in recognising that although the network can 
represent difference (and may be a more suitable medium for doing so than is 
printbound text) it can never contain it. 75 
75 This notion of shared responsibility is one that has also been put forward by Allen. He 
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Singular accounts of history, as described in Chapter 1, are arguably in danger 
of arresting discourse, of resulting in a stasis like that experienced in A History 
Maker, since they attempt to deny difference (or at least to contain or 
homogenise it, to explain it away within a singular linear argument). Multiple 
narratives on the other hand, such as hypertext networks permit, fall into line 
with the postmodern assertion of variety and multiplicity, of dynamic discourse, 
this variety and dynamism (which is also relevant to the poststructuralist concept 
of textual productivity) being positively vital: necessary as well as life-sustaining 
and enriching. 76 The hypertext can then be viewed as a texture of possibility, 
what Michael Joyce has described as 'a present tense palimpsest where what 
shines through are not past versions but potential, alternate views' (Joyce, 
1996a, p. 3). The notion of the hypertextual space as palimpsest can also be 
compared with the metaphor of the textual theatre put forward by Sollers: 
hypertext creates a spatial matrix or stage - a mise en scene in the theatrical as 
well as spatial sense - wherein differing texts, created through the varying 
arrangements of lexias can be seen to perform, and where each performance 
necessarily bears the palimpsestic trace of simultaneous but presently absent 
others. Derrida's comments on Sollers's Numbers in Dissemination seem 
particularly potent: 
The thickness of the text thus opens upon the beyond of a whole, the 
nothing or the absolute outside, through which its depth is at once null 
and infinite - infinite in that each of its layers harbors another layer. The 
act of reading is thus analogous to those X rays that uncover, concealed 
asks: 'Can hypertext incorporate the differences between gendered or nationally or 
racially specific languages, or between other social classes or other minority dialects and 
points of view? Can it produce the kind of double-voiced discourse described within 
feminist and postcolonial criticism? or the kind of resistance to dominant discourse 
described within poststructuralist theory?,' and suggests that, 'If the answers 
hypertextuality provides prove to be negative, it will not be the fault of the new 
digitalized computing technology itself. Rather, the fault will lie in the producers, 
deSigners, programmers, authors and readers of that new medium' (Allen, 2000, p.206-
208). 
76 Landow usefully points to Richard Rorty's concept of 'edifying discourse' as outlined in 
Philosophy and the M;rror of Nature, a philosophy that 'aims at continuing a 
conversation rather than at discovering truth,' thereby avoiding stasis (Rorty, 1980, p. 
373). Landow argues that, 'Hypertext ... embodies the approach to philosophy that Rorty 
urges,' for it does not attempt to 'close off conversation' by confining it to a single 
explanatory narrative (Landow, 1992, p. 70). Such arresting of discourse would, in 
Rorty's view, result in the 'freezing-over of culture' and 'the dehumanization of human 
beings' (Rorty, 1980, p. 377). See Landow, 1992, p. 70 and Rorty, 1980, especially p. 
357ff for further discussion. 
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beneath the epidermis of one painting, a second painting: painted by the 
same painter or by another, it makes little difference, who would 
himself, for lack of materials or in search of some new effect, have used 
the substance of an old canvas or preserved the fragment of a first 
sketch. And beneath that etc .... All this requires that you take into 
account the fact that, in scratching upon this textual matter, which here 
seems to be made of spoken or written words, you often recognize the 
description of a painting removed from its frame, framed differently, 
broken into, remounted in another quadrilateral which is in turn, on one 
of its sides, fractured. 
The entire verbal tissue is caught in this, and you along with it. You 
are painting, you are writing while reading, you are inside the painting. 
(Derrida, 1981, p. 357) 
While Derrida is here specifically referring to the four square arrangement of the 
text of Numbers and its resistance to or subversion of the conventional format of 
print, the fragmentary lexias of hypertext may similarly be considered to remove 
the text from the rigid frame that the book form traditionally provides. 77 The 
textual space has been renegotiated - redrawn· by such writing as matrix or 
network, and the reader, too, is always implicated in the creative or 
performative process. 
As already observed, rather than there being an absence of sequential 
narrative in the digital medium, hypertext will instead give rise to many small 
narrative sequences: 'little narratives' representing difference in discourse. 
Jonathan Coe referred to B.S. Johnson's novel House Mother Normal as being 
77 Derrida's analogy of the text that tries to free itself from or 'fractures' the rigid 
framework of the book and the painting removed from its frame returns to his 
preoccupations with parerga - the elements that are neither clearly inside nor outside 
the text but which serve to 'frame' and support it - and to the observations made earlier 
about the conventional role of a book's paratext. The paratext traditionally 'enframes' 
the text, presenting and constituting it as a book; a book without paratext or parergon is 
like a painting without a frame (see footnote 33). While Sollers's text cannot altogether 
dispense with its framing devices - it still after all takes the form of a printed book, in 
spite of the proclamations on its cover to the contrary - it can nevertheless fret against 
them and bring their ambiguous position into relief; the shifting text requires that its 
'frame', as part of the textual space (inside and outside at the same time), is 
consistently being remade. Derrida writes: 'Thanks to the incessant movement of this 
substitution of contents, it appears that the painting's border is not that through which 
something will have been shown, represented, described, displayed. A frame was, and 
assembles and dismantles itself, that's all. Without even showing itself, as it is, in the 
con-sequence of those substitutions, it forms itself and transforms itself' (Derrida, 1981, 
p. 357). Hypertext can highlight the ambivalence of the paratext further: to begin with, 
in hypertext the text cannot be objectified or made present by the paratext in the same 
tangible way as with print since the hypertext has only a virtual presence onscreen. This 
virtuality, along with the constantly shifting and yielding text in the hypertextual reading 
and writing space, will resist any attempt to 'frame', confine or stabilise the text. The 
function of hypertextual paratexts will be looked at again a little later in the chapter. 
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'richly polyphonic, fugal' on account of its paralleling of discourses on a spatial 
as well as temporal level (Coe, 2004, p. 24; see also footnote 17) and the same 
term has been used by Lanham with reference to the capabilities of hypertext, 
where it seems signally appropriate: 'Hypertexts are, in more than a manner of 
speaking, three-dimensional. Fuguelike, they can carryon an argument at 
several levels simultaneously. And if we cannot read them exactly 
simultaneously, we can switch back and forth with great rapidity' (Lanham, 
1988, p. 283). In a similar way to House Mother Normal, Arellano's hyperfiction 
Sunshine '69 also presents its story from the perspectives of several (fictional 
and 'non-fictional') characters involved with the events at Altamont, only the 
alternative perspectives in Sunshine '69 exist simultaneously and are complexly 
linked together rather than being divulged one after the other in a linear 
sequence. Their spatial relationship to one another is thus made explicit: it is 
performed in the network rather than represented on the page. 'Jump into 
Norm's head,' the reader is urged. 'Take a spin with Orange Sunshine. Hang with 
the Glimmer Twins. If, as Tim occasionally prescribes, you ever need a change of 
set, don't panic, just rub the people button at the bottom of the page' 
(www.sunshine69.com/69_Suits.html). Sunshine '69 is a network-structured 
hypertext, so its narrative is fragmented, but readers can choose to follow story 
fragments based around the contents of each character's pockets. Every 
character carries a pocket watch so that their actions may be mapped to a 
particular time and to the actions surrounding the other characters. Like the 
musical fugue, the narrative structure though fragmentary is intricately 
patterned; it is not random, and it still manages to tell the story, though not in a 
conventionally linear way. 78 
78 Diane Greco comments of Sunshine '69 that: 'The story's greatest appeal lies in how it 
works, not by a driving plot, but by accretion. As the timeline and the calendar show, 
history itself - not the Big History of the histOrians, really, but the little-h history of 
quotidian accretion, the accumulated detritus of ordinary events - carries the burden of 
moving the story forward, replacing a mechanism of plot with an ordering that simulates 
"real time," "lived time," one day at a time. So the reader filters and sorts, organizes 
and backtracks, and eventually comes away with an understanding of the complexity 
involved in any project, historical or otherwise, of telling the truth by telling a story' 
(Greco, 1999, www.virtualwriter.netltechnology.php). The concern that narrative 
representations - stories - be as 'truthful' to life as they can be has already been 
expressed by B.S. Johnson and discussed in the previous chapter; Greco does not here 
suggest that hypertextual stories will tell the truth instead of 'telling lies', as Johnson 
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Lanham, talking of the hypertextual fugue, goes on to ask whether we 
'mustn't ... avail ourselves of the nomenclature of musical arrangement to find 
terms adequate to this fugal, but at the same time totally literary, occasion?' 
(Lanham, 1988, p. 283): Barthes's term 'stereophony' as well as the descriptions 
'polyphonic' and 'multivocal' that Bakhtin has used to refer to the type of 
dialogic discourse he advocates would seem to offer some such terminological 
possibilities,79 although again Graham Allen wisely urges caution, warning (with 
justification) against the type of over-optimism Landow displays in harnessing 
Bakhtinian terminology to hypertext. 
Landow's references to Bakhtin are ... at times more questionable than 
they might appear. We can see this most clearly when we remind 
ourselves, as Landow does near the conclusion of his Hypertext, that not 
all members of society are currently able to deploy the new computer 
technology .... In discussing the issue of access Landow makes two central 
points. Using historical examples, he argues that it is never possible to 
determine whether a new technology will be a force for democratization 
or will merely shore up existing power groups, or even create new 
dominant classes and groups. He then argues, contradicting his first 
point, that the new 'information technology' will necessarily produce an 
increase in 'democratization' (ibid.: 174) .... Democracy, for Bakhtin and 
the theories of intertextuality he helped to inspire, stems from the 
release of plurality and multivocality, the dialogic and hybrid play of 
different languages, dialects, registers and/or speech genres. It remains 
open to question whether hypertextuality will incorporate such a dialogic 
play of voices and languages or will in fact be a medium through which 
monologism exerts its centripetal force in society. 
(Allen, 2000, p. 206-207) 
Open to question certainly, though it might be observed that hypertext in 
facilitating muWple and simultaneous levels or lines of discourse can more easily 
represent (or perform) the fugue than can printed text, which remains bound to 
the linear form. If linear histories are structures of exclusion it has also been 
argued that Simply narrating the history of the excluded - in the way that some 
of the texts considered in Chapter 1, including Poor Things, offer double 
narratives to give voice to those conventionally silenced by singular written 
remarked of narrative (quoted in Coe, 2004, p. 5), but rather that they can illustrate, 
through their own structural complexity and fragmentation, the difficulties inherent in 
attempting to relate any form of lived experience through words and narrative. 
79 See for example Barthes, 1977, p. 160 and Bakhtin, 1973, ppA, 226 (and elsewhere) 
where he writes of the 'polyphony,' 'multivoicedness' and 'varivoicedness' of 
Dostoevsky's novels. 
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'histories' - merely replicates such an exclusive structure. Mark Currie comments 
that: 
For Derrida, Foucault's New Historical writing is a sample of the 
structure of exclusion from which it seeks to distinguish itself both in the 
appeal to a historical moment which is the origin of exclusion and in the 
way that the history of madness merely reproduces the metaphysics of a 
linear history for the excluded: it gives the privilege of representation to 
the deprived and therefore upturns the power relation without changing 
the way that history is written .... Here again it is the pragmatic 
contradiction that if one opposes a particular strategy one cannot 
continue to use it oneself. To do so is like taking money from the rich 
and giving it to the poor without addressing the principle of inequality. 
This dichotomy can be expressed in historiographic terms: that it is not 
enough to oppose the positivistic assumptions of history by writing a 
positivist history of the oppressed - it is the traditional practices of 
historical writing themselves which operate as ideological containment. 
(Currie, 1998, p. 86) 
The problem that Currie draws attention to is, as we have seen, partly one of 
linguistic representation itself, which must to some extent always be linear in 
that it can only represent ideas by stringing them out word by word. Language is 
not inherently singular, however, and the play of words may tell more than one 
story, which is Derrida's point in critiquing New Historicism, which simply 
attempts to tell rother' stories without employing writing in a different way from 
that which rendered them rother' in the first place. New Historicist writing, in 
Derrida's opinion, fails to recognise that language, or the text, is already 
inevitably plural, inevitably' other'. Hypertextual writing on the other hand 
potentially resists New Historicism's dependence on both singularity (by offering 
multiple stories fragmentarily, with many possible combinations) and linearity 
(by offering them simultaneously). Hypertext, it can be argued, with its dynamic 
and impermanent structure provides an ideal medium for the type of storytelling 
encouraged by Kristeva in her 'Toccata and Fugue for the Foreigner', a 
storytelling that may preserve the semiotic 'otherness' of discourse in the 
discourse of the thetic IOther' without forcing or reducing it into a single, 
unified narrative. Associating this sense of linguistic estrangement with the 
estrangement of the foreigner, she writes: 
Let us not seek to solidify, to turn the otherness of the foreigner into a 
thing. Let us merely touch it, brush by it, without giving it a permanent 
structure. Simply sketching out its perpetual motion through some of its 
variegated aspects spread out before our eyes today, through some of its 
former, changing representations scattered through history. Let us also 
il 
lighten that otherness by constantly coming back to it - but more and 
more swiftly. Let us escape its hatred, its burden, fleeing them not 
through leveling [sic] and forgetting, but through the harmonious 
repetition of the differences it implies and spreads. Toccatas and Fugues: 
Bach's compositions evoke to my ears the meaning of an acknowledged 
and harrowing otherness that I should like to be contemporary, because 
it has been brought up, relieved, disseminated, inscribed in an original 
play being developed, without goal, without boundary, without end. An 
otherness barely touched upon and that already moves away. 
(Kristeva, 1981, p. 3) 
In addition to its fugal disposition, Lanham also refers to the three-
dimensional quality of hypertext, which arises from the capacity to structure 
information spatially as well as temporally in the digital medium; a network is of 
course a three-dimensional concept. The network can only be represented two-
dimensionally, however, by the textuallexias on the flat computer screen; the 
reader cannot 'move around' the lexias as s/he could by walking around a three-
dimensional object like a sculpture, for example. The reader can, though, 'move 
around' the lexias in the sense that the lexias can be moved and arranged 
onscreen; the onscreen representation of the network therefore allows a far 
greater degree of spatial fragmentation - Derrida's 'spatial mise en scene' - and 
requires a higher degree of spatial awareness and engagement on the part of the 
reader than does conventional printed text. Bolter comments: 
The electronic reader is encouraged to think of the text as a collection of 
interrelated units floating in a space of at least two dimensions. The 
reader's movement among units does not require flipping pages or 
consulting the table of contents: instead the reader passes instantly and 
effortlessly from one place to another. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 160) 
With many hypertexts in practice, however (and certainly with aU Storyspace 
hypertexts), only one lexia may be viewed at a time. In the case of most web-
based hypertexts the text of a linked lexia simply replaces that of the original or 
linking lexia within the current browser window, while in Storyspace clicking a 
link to another lexia closes the current window before opening the new one 
rather than keeping each window open, which would enable lexias to be 
arranged side by side and compared in a way similar to the textual columns in 
Glas (though opening new windows for every single lexia is obviously hugely 
impractical in terms of the demands it would place on the computer's operating 
system: opening new windows is a memory intensive process). To circumvent this 
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Storyspace offers a separate overview or map window (this forming part of the 
hypertextual paratext) wherein the spatial and semantic relations between 
lexias may be viewed (see Fig. 2.1). 
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Fig. 2.1. Storyspace map view from Michael Joyce's hyperfiction Twilight: A 
Symphony 
Correspondences between different lexias in the network can thus still be fairly 
easily compared and connected and textual patterns may be seen to emerge 
through such a spatial appreciation of the text, leading Robert Coover in his 
article 'Literary Hypertext: The Passing Of The Golden Age' to suggest that 'the 
most radical and distinctive literary contribution of the computer has been the 
multilinear hypertextual webwork of text spaces, or, as one might say, the 
intimate layering and fusion of imagined spatiality and temporality' (Coover, 
1999). The visible structure of such hypertexts, Bolter has argued, encourages 
writing that is 'topographic' (Bolter, 1991, p. 25): spatially rather than simply 
temporally envisaged and with emphasis on a text's architecture as well as its 
content. The writer must therefore come to think of his or her text in new ways: 
The elements of the text are no longer fragments of a prior whole, but 
instead form a space of shifting possibilities. In this shifting electronic 
space, writers will need a new concept of structure. In place of a closed 
and unitary structure, they must learn to conceive of their text as a 
structure of possible structures. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 144) 
The attention that the visible network structure of a hypertext brings to bear 
upon the constructed ness or artifice of the text has implications too for the 
reader who engages with it (a point that will be expanded upon in the following 
chapter). 
The spatial organisation of material in a network-structured hypertext also 
brings us back to the notion of the hypertext network as analogous to the human 
mind as observed in Chapter 1. That the processes of the human brain in storing, 
retrieving and associating information are poorly represented by the two-
dimensional practice of writing and reading text in the linear-hierarchical form 
of print has long been suspected. Vannevar Bush in his seminal article As We May 
Thjnk, first published in 1945, wrote that 'The human mind does not work that 
way. It operates by association. With one item in its grasp, it snaps instantly to 
the next that is suggested by the association of thoughts, in accordance with 
some intricate web of trails carried by the cells of the brain' (Bush, 1945, p. 40-
41).80 While Proust's narrative in A ta recherche du temps perdu attempts to 
articulate the convolutions of memory, it can do so only temporally within the 
restrictions of the printbound form, and not spatially, 'as we may think' or as we 
retrieve or recollect information from our neural networks (though, it should be 
added, the temporal unfolding of memories provides the very essence of Proust's 
novel, conceived as it was particularly for the printed form: it manipulates the 
limitations of print to achieve its complex temporal effect).81 Coover writes of 
hypertext that it offers 'the tantalizing new possibility of laying out a story 
spatially instead of linearly, inviting the reader to explore it as one might 
explore one's memory or wander a many-pathed geographical terrain' (Coover, 
1999). Readers and writers in the electronic medium, he suggests, are now able 
'to read and write in the way that we think, creating and/ or accessing the 
various elements of a narrative the way one accesses the fragments of one's life 
80 Bush also anticipated a means of storing information in a linked network - the 'memex' 
machine - long before the digital computer made the process a ready possibility. 
81 Bolter maintains that the printed form means writers have to 'force' their thoughts 
into a linear narrative, which is not the way the mind works, and so although hypertext 
may seem to be a technologically 'difficult' writing form, he argues that it is actually 
conceptually easier to work with than print. See Bolter, 1991, p. 146. 
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story held in memory' (ibid.).82 Whether or not digital networks really do 
implement the structure of the human brain is a matter for scientific debate; 
hypertext can in any case enable some of our preoccupations about how we as 
humans read, learn and use information to be explored among the textual 
structure and space of the network. 83 
Again the term Random Access Memory is called to mind (a fitting phrase) and 
seems especially appropriate, applicable to both mind and medium. Luca Toschi 
alludes to this when he comments that: 
82 William Paulson, in an interesting article 'Computers, Minds, and Texts: Preliminary 
Reflections', suggests that rather than the digital computer being considered as 
replicating the network structure of the mind, our very notions of the way the mind 
works are instead more likely to be constructed on the basis of the computer model, just 
as in the past the mind has been metaphorically associated with other writing media and 
technologies. He points out that: 'For Plato and Aristotle, memory and mind could be 
compared to a wax tablet, a medium of writing. The tabula rasa was to be a standard 
figure of philosophy until at least Locke, who compared the mind prior to experience to 
"white paper, void of all characters." ... The digital computer is now our privileged 
model of organization ... [it] has given new force and legitimacy to La Mettrie's program 
of describing mind as a strictly physical system of processes. The modern discipline of 
artificial intelligence (AI) works to construct such a system, and neuroscientists are 
beginning to use computer analogies as they try to understand the brain as a system of 
neurons. In place of the mind as text or machine, we theorize the mind as 
supercomputer' (Paulson, 1988, pp. 291-293). Berkeley cognitive scientist George Lakoff, 
in an interview with John Brockman to discuss his book Philosophy in the Flesh 
(coauthored with Mark Johnson) agrees that: 'When you start to study the brain and body 
scientifically, you inevitably wind up using metaphors. Metaphors for the mind, as you 
say, have evolved over time - from machines to switchboards to computers. There's no 
avoiding metaphor in science' (www.edge.org/3rd_culture/lakoff/lakofCp2.html). 
Lakoff also provides a sound warning: 'But no matter how ubiquitous a metaphor may be, 
it is important to keep track of what it hides and what it introduces. If you don't, the 
body does disappear. We're careful about our metaphors, as most scientists should be' 
(ibid.). The metaphor of the mind as network then, and the seemingly direct and 
analogous relationship between the neural and the digital network, should also be 
considered with some caution and with an awareness that the mind may be being 
conceptually inscribed and constructed as network rather than vice versa. 
83 Though I do not wish to implicate hypertext as a purely expressionist form, mirroring 
thoughts with words, as Bolter seems to suggest. He writes: 'The computer speeds the 
writing process itself, as the writer moves quickly between verbal ideas and their visual 
expression on the computer screen. The network of ideas in the author's mind merges 
with their expression in the computer, and this structure in turn merges with the 
network of all texts stored in this or other connected machines. It is as if the computer 
could dissolve Plato's distinction between internal and external memory - the distinction 
that is fundamental to all writing' (Bolter, 1991, p. 216). Although the structure of the 
hypertext network may seem to more accurately represent the structure of the mind 
than does the printed page, the contents of the mind - its thoughts - are still (always 
already) being mediated and transformed by the written word, which will conSistently 
scuttle any expressionist attempt. 
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the computer ... is attempting, and succeeding, in a way which simply has 
not been possible with the tools at our disposal until today, to reproduce 
physically the virtuality of the human mind. The computer can therefore 
.. , force us to materialize the network of relationships that we are 
accustomed to holding in the privacy of our imaginations. To make 
explidt, through simulation, a possible text, without necessarily 
eliminating the possibility of the survival of large areas which for the 
moment we do not feel it is correct to restore, and which therefore can 
in the future perhaps be dealt with differently, and to read this 
simulation without starting each time from scratch, will provide a new 
and valuable way of analyzing a text. 
(Toschi, 1996, p.202-203) 
Such postponement in the restoration of areas of the textual network as 
described by Toschi is akin to Jock McLeish's postponement of aspects of his 
memory in 1982 Janine; the boxes in his mind labelled 'Never to be thought 
about; Useless to go into further; Contents unexamined' and suchlike (1982 
Janine, epigraph). On the other hand, the 'delicious fragments' of information 
that Jock hoped would 'float to the surface' of his mind could equally easily be 
imagined floating to the screen surface of a hypertextual network (1982 Janine, 
p. 69). This is emphatically not to suggest that 1982 Janine, or indeed any other 
of Gray's texts, would be better as a hypertext than as a printed book: 1982 
Janine, like A la recherche du temps perdu was written for the printed medium 
and works well as a book, and as pointed out in the preceding chapter Gray goes 
out of his way to ensure that his texts endure as books, as tangible artistic 
objects. The point here is simply that hypertext can be seen to provide a 
relevant textual space wherein ideas such as those dealt with by Gray in his 
printed fiction may be usefully addressed; the ideas migrate easily to the 
electronic medium. Hypertext as a naturally fragmentary textual form is 
particularly suited to representing the fragmented, certainly non-chronological 
nature of memory as dealt with in texts like 1982 Janine, A fa recherche du 
temps perdu and The Unfortunates; memory which, as Genette writes, 'reduces 
(diachronic) periods to (synchronic) epochs and events to pictures - epochs and 
pictures that memory arranges in an order not theirs, but its own' (Genette, 
1980, p. 156). Barthes, in 'The Theory of the Text,' writes of the 'safe-guarding 
functions' of written text, of 'the stability and permanence of inscription, 
designed to correct the fragility and imprecision of the memory' (Barthes, 1981, 
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p. 32}. Hypertext, rather than offering a stable 'corrective' for the memory's 
fragility and imprecision, works instead to preserve it textually.84 
Memories in the neural network, like narrative paths in the hypertext network 
and like the imago mundi offered by the Aleph, are simultaneously co-present: 
they exist at once within the mind, though they may only be narrated 
sequentially in words, as they are by Jock McLeish, by the narrator of The 
Unfortunates and by Proust's Marcel. 85 Similarly, as Lanham has recognised 
above, although differing narratives or levels of discourse exist simultaneously as 
possibilities within the hypertextual network, they can never actually be read 
simultaneously: only one may be followed at a time due to the inherently 
sequential nature of text already described. Nonetheless, the reader's choosing 
of one particular narrative path will only privilege that path temporarily: it 
assumes the status of primary or central path by chance and only for as long as 
the reader chooses. Rather than the textual hierarchy being determined as in 
print either by the status relationships between different parts of the text 
(between the 'main' text and footnote or marginal text, for example) or simply 
by the hierarchy of succession that the linear form of a printbound text imposes, 
84 Joel Weishaus's web hypertext Inside the Skull House is explicitly concerned with 
attempting to plot (topographically) the geography and some of the contents of the 
human brain through the temporal and spatial arrangement of narrative, suggesting the 
suitability of the hypertextual form for representing textually what B.S. Johnson 
attempted to depict in House Mother Normal: 'a diagram of certain aspects of the inside 
of [a] skull' (House Mother Normal, p. 204). Weishaus's hypertext tells us: 'Inside the 
Skull-House is a journey cast in the epic mode. Brain, its hero(ine), is perhaps the most 
complex and elegant achievement of this universe. Brain's quest to unravel the 
chemistry of its circuits and the mystery of their prOjections, including the "hard 
problem" of consciousness, adds humor to the science, and relief that my path is not 
pathology, but metaphor, mythology, etymology, hierology, and devices of electracy. 
Because it draws upon the singular experiences that cause its topography to be 
unique, Brain is outfitted in the first person, while its journey is both modular and 
interdependent .... In its quest to understand itself, Brain is set adrift on a stormy 
vocabulary. There are promising landfalls, numinous adventures, and a beckoning horizon 
that serves as a learning curve, "linking acts and footsteps," conjuring a mind that 
describes a journey while unpacking a life' (Inside the Skull House, 
www.cddc.vt.edu/hostlweishaus/skull/intro.htm). 
85 Genette writes: 'The importance of "anachronic" narrative in the Recherche du temps 
perdu is obviously connected to the retrospectively synthetic character of Proustian 
narrative, which is totally present in the narrator's mind at every moment. Ever since 
the day when the narrator in a trance perceived the unifying significance of his story, he 
never ceases to hold all of its threads simultaneously, to apprehend simultaneously all of 
its places and all of its moments, to be capable of establishing a multitude of 
"telescopic" relationships amongst them: a ubiquity that is spatial but also temporal, an 
"omnitemporality'" (Genette, 1980, p. 78). 
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in network-structured hypertexts there is potentially no textual hierarchy other 
than the constantly shifting one determined by the reader. Delany and Landow 
write: 
Hypertext linking situates the current or "on-screen" textual unit at the 
center of the textual universe, thus creating a new kind of hierarchy in 
which the power of the center dominates that of the infinite periphery. 
But because in hypertext that center is always a transient, decenterable 
virtual center - one created, in other words, only by one's act of calling 
up that particular text - it never tyrannizes other aspects of the network 
in the way a printed text does. 
(Delany and Landow, 1991, p. 11) 
This is not to say, though, that textual hierarchies simply do not exist within 
hypertext systems; the possibility of dispensing with narrative hierarchy is just 
another aspect of hypertext's potential. As already pointed out, axial-based 
hypertexts are designed with a primary textual axis and this in itself must impose 
some form of hierarchy, even if it is a simple process to link from this axis to 
other material, which may then become the reader's central focus. Unless this 
linked material can itself link to another textual axis - if the axial-based 
hypertext is part of a larger network - the reader witt have to return to the 
original textual axis. The structure of an axial-based hypertext will be like that 
of a tree, and the tree structure will always privilege the 'main' trunk of the 
tree over its branches; the linked material in axial-based hypertexts, then, will 
be subordinate to the text around which they are arranged. Network-structured 
hypertexts, too, can be subject to textual hierarchies, as Bolter points out with 
reference to the controls that an author may impose on his or her hypertext: 
The electronic writer still has available all the techniques of hierarchical 
organization from the technology of print. He or she may still establish 
subordination and may still seek to define cause and effect. The 
electronic writer may embed hierarchical structures inside of larger 
networks, or networks inside of hierarchies. The line, the tree, and the 
network all become visible structures at the writer's and reader's 
disposal. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 113-114) 
The author of the hypertext, for example, may organise it in such a way that 
some lexias only become available to readers after others have been read, or 
may make some links in the text unidirectional rather than bidirectional, forcing 
the reader along a particular narrative path that cannot be traced backwards. 
This is really a matter of the level of control the author of a hypertext may have 
no 
over the reader. For the purpose of the current argument it will suffice to say 
that such possibilities for authorial intervention in the path through the 
hypertext that the reader fchooses' provide an indication of how certain 
arrangements of lexia, or narrative paths, can be privileged above others, even 
within a network-structured text. This said, it should again be stressed that the 
model of the network is one far more amenable to representing difference - and 
so resisting singular or authoritative readings - than is the linear-hierarchical 
model because of its wider structural potential (the potential for lexias to be 
combined in a number of ways and indeed in every possible way, rather than 
along the line of a single dominant principle). Supporting this statement is the 
fact that a hypertext network does not exist as a final text, an entity that will 
fremain and explain,' as Wimsatt and Beardsley famously declared of the poem 
(Wimsatt, 1960, p. 39). Instead, a hypertext exists as a collection of textual 
possibilities and this textual indeterminacy, brought into play by the volatility 
and manipulability of the hypertext stored as network of lexia, undermines any 
notion of obtaining an authoritative reading of the text. Again the emphasis is 
upon hypertext's potential, this time upon the text it can become, rather than 
the text it is, for it is not a determinate text. Lanham comments on this with 
regard to the difficulty of pinning down hypertext to bring it into line with 
copyright laws (laws based on the premise of fintellectual property' in the fixed 
medium of print): 
To litigate a copyright case you must have a fffinal cut," a fixed version, 
upon which to base your arguments. What if there isn't any? The 
dilemma goes to a yet deeper distinction. Intellectual property in words 
may never have been rooted in a substance, an essence, but we could 
fool ourselves most of the time that it was. Words there on the page. 
Look at them. Compare them. That book there with the splendid red 
binding, that's mine. I wrote it. The Great American Novel. The 
definitive edition of The Great American Novel. The greatest critical 
discussion of The Great American Novel. The electronic word has no 
essence, no quiddity, no substance of this sort. It exists in potentu, as 
what it can become, in the genetic structures it can build. It is volatile 
not only in how it is projected onto an electronic screen but in how it 
works in the world. In both places, its essence is dynamic rather than 
static. 
(Lanham, 1988, p. 281) 
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With hypertext, then, there is no privileged 'final cut'. 86 
This difficulty in pointing to the final hypertext raises some interesting 
theoretical questions. Firstly, it draws attention to the insubstantiality and high 
degree of abstraction of this type of text. If the hypertext exists only as a 
possibility, only as what it can become, then can it be described as having any 
textual sUbstance at all? Certainly, one may point to the hypertext as it exists for 
example on the tangible object of a CD-ROM, but this object in itself does not 
carry any textual significance, unlike the object of the book. The CD may be 
stamped with the title of the hypertext it carries, the author's name, even an 
image - elements normally considered as paratextual, but these paratexts do not 
occupy quite the same zone as their counterparts in print, as previously touched 
upon: they are physical and tangible while the text they 'present' is virtual and 
intangible87 - but the CD is otherwise textually meaningless until inserted into 
the CD drive of the computer and 'read' or decoded by the machine. This 
86 This aspect of hypertext is mirrored in other creative genres as a result of their 
transition to digital technology; DVD technology, for example, now means that films can 
be presented along with elements like deleted scenes, scenes that the film's director 
may have preferred to keep in, but was forced to cut for commercial reasons (film length 
- as in the case of Peter Jackson's Lord of the Rings films, already lengthy for modern 
cinema audiences even without his preferred scenes which are included in the 
'extended' DVD versions of the films - or studio interference, for instance). DVD 
technology means that films are now stored on the basis of discrete scenes - the 
cinematic equivalent of textual lexias. They can certainly be viewed in the conventional 
way, as a single unbroken sequence (by choosing the 'Play Movie' option on the DVD) but 
the digital storage of single scenes means they may also be viewed in any other order the 
viewer chooses. With Christopher Nolan's film Memento, a film based around the 
amnesia of its central character and his anachronistic piecing together of fragmentary 
memories of events in his life, there is an option in the DVD to play the film as a 
sequence of scenes based on the chronological order of events; this option exists 
alongside the conventionaL 'PLay Movie' option and in effect offers the viewer an 
alternative film. In the case of film in the digital medium, as with text, the 'finaL cut' is 
no longer clear-cut. 
87 As already mentioned, structural elements like overviews and maps (or 'search' 
features such as that included in Swigart's Down Time wherein the reader can search for 
all linked stories by typing keywords into a 'Storyline' search space), hypermedia 
elements like images, audio and video as already outlined, as well as the usual titles, 
accompanying blurb and suchlike elements will all constitute part of the hypertextual 
paratext and, like the paratexts of traditional print, they can function to disrupt linearity 
in the text. In large hypertext networks, the notion of the paratext as occupying an 
ambiguous zone on the borders of the text, neither inside nor out (hors-texte) is 
particularly well illustrated by, for example, explanatory or annotative materials that 
may themselves be linked to 'other' hypertexts. The condition of the paratext is thus 
made explicit by such hypertextual para texts: they are at once boundaries and 
transitions, part of the text and not part of the text (or part of the 'other' text). With 
hypertext, this notion of 'other' or hors-texte becomes increasingLy difficult to define. 
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problem becomes even more apparent when considering a hypertext stored on 
the hard disk drive of a computer or remotely on a networked disk: most people, 
even if they were to open up the plastic casement of their computers and peer 
inside, would have no idea where the hard drive was or what it looked like, far 
less be able to point to the elusive fsubstance' of the hypertext that resides 
there; in the case of hypertexts on the Web stored remotely from the user, the 
user will only ever have the possibility of viewing the virtual instantiation of the 
text onscreen and never of seeing where the freal' text is located. 
The hypertext, as textual object, has been digitally dematerialised, as 
Lanham has pointed out. He writes: 
Digitization both desubstantiates a work of art and subjects it to 
perpetual immanent metamorphosis from one sense-dimension to 
another. ... Such desubstantiation volatilizes our whole sense of artistic 
quiddity, of the existence of art objects. They live finally in the digital 
code, the sensuous manifestation only a temporary "printout." 
(Lanham, 1988, p. 273) 
The fact that the reader of digital text only ever encounters a temporary and 
intangible onscreen simulation of a text, a fvirtual' text, also calls into question 
that text's authenticity: the freal' or substantial instance of the text exists only 
on disk and cannot actually be fread' by anyone. The twin issues of authenticity 
and simulation are central concerns of postmodern theory, as indicated in 
Chapter 1, but are not new to critical theory, dating back to Plato's notion of 
the simulacrum, an imperfect copy for which no original exists. Contemporary 
theorists (most notably Jean Baudrillard) have, however, argued for the 
particular relevance of the simulacrum in our current society of late consumer 
capitalism. Baudrillard develops the Marxist theory of the commodity that has 
become so ubiquitous that any relation to direct use value has been severed, 
leading to an obscene proliferation of commodities without use and thus without 
substance. fThe obscenity of the commodity,' he writes, fstems from the fact 
that it is abstract, formal and light in opposition to the weight, opacity and 
substance of the object' (Baudrillard, 1985, p. 131); such abstraction and 
insubstantiality is what Oedipa Maas finds herself struggling against throughout 
Thomas Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49, before eventually resigning herself to 
the impossibility of encountering anything that she can really be sure of, 
anything she can finally prove is other than superficial, other than simulacra. 
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The only logic she can eventually believe in - in place of the Western logical and 
metaphysical quest for 'truth' - is the binary and computational logic of 
either / or: either something is substantial, 'real', meaningful, or it is just 
another simulation, a hollow, shifting surface. Oedipa can never finally tell, 
For it was now like walking among matrices of a great digital computer, 
the zeroes and ones twinned above, hanging like balanced mobiles right 
and left, ahead, thick, maybe endless. Behind the hieroglyphic streets 
there would either be a transcendent meaning, or only the earth. In the 
songs Miles, Dean, Serge and Leonard sang was either some fraction of 
the truth's numinous beauty (as Mucho now believed) or only a power 
spectrum. Tremaine the Swastika Salesman's reprieve from holocaust 
was either an injustice, or an absence of wind; the bones of the Gis at 
the bottom of Lake Inverarity were there either for a reason that 
mattered to the world, or for skin divers and cigarette smokers. Ones and 
zeroes. So did the couples arrange themselves. 
(The Crying of Lot 49, either p. 125-126 or elsewhere) 
The presence of the computer, the digital storage device that must reduce all 
that is tangible - including tangible textuality - to its basic binary logic of either 
one or zero, to a virtual, shifting surface, is here metaphorically linked to the 
process of desubstantiation and 'inauthentication' that Oedipa sees happening 
all around her. Just as Kittock in Alasdair Gray's A History Maker suggested the 
complicity of technology with businessmen who used it 'to destroy the power of 
labour unions' and thus to control production and capital (A History Maker, p. 
202), technology once again finds itself partnered with what has been seen by 
Baudrillard, Jameson and others as a negative consequence of postmodernism or 
'the cultural logic of late capitalism' (Jameson, 1991): the proliferation of 
simulated representations and resultant loss of the 'real'. 88 
88 This is where the theories of poststructuralism and postmodernism converge: in their 
assertion that the 'real' can never be found or ascertained, if it was ever indeed 'really' 
- finally or unequivocally - there to be lost in the first place. While this has been taken 
by many to be a nihilist approach, dangerous even (as in the controversial debate on 
holocaust denial, for example), it should be considered that the consequences of not 
adopting such strategies of infinite doubt are, in poststructuralist terms, themselves 
dangerous: reaching the 'transcendental signified', as has already been argued, would 
herald the end of interpretation, closing discourse and effecting the sort of critical 
atrophy warned against by Rorty. Poststructuralism, it seems to me, does not in fact 
argue that the 'real' does not exist at all (or that events might never really have 
happened, the sort of dangerous ground Baudrillard treads when suggesting that the Gulf 
war was mainly a media event, see Baudrillard, 1995), just that the 'real' or 'truth' is 
not a structure of pure presence that can ever be finally reached (grasped and held) by 
linguistic or other forms of discourse, which are themselves always subject to the 
slippages that occur in the gap between signifier and signified (and indeed also in the 
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The question of authenticity in relation to the written word is not exclusively 
linked to digital text: mass production and distribution of printed texts - the 
commodification of the book in other words - has meant that readers never 
actually engage with the original text written by the author, leading writers like 
Calvi no and Borges self-consciously to question the possibility of ever getting to 
gap between intention and utterance or inscription. Colin McCabe writes that, 'This 
separation [between what was said and the act of saying] bears witness to the real as 
articulated. The thing represented does not appear in a moment of pure identity as it 
tears itself out of the world and presents itself, but rather is caught in an articulation in 
which each object is defined in a set of difference and oppositions' (McCabe, 1992, p. 
136». The 'real', then, can only exist linguistically or through other signifying media 
(news broadcasts and televised images, to give examples relevant to postmodernism and 
to Baudrillard's notion of the 'hyperreal' media event) inasmuch as it is constructed by 
them and through their slippages; thus it must itself be slippery and elusive: 'lost'. From 
a poststructuralist point of view it is more irresponsible to proclaim that truth or the real 
has been or can be 'found' through discourse than to respectfully suggest that it is too 
complexly structured (since it is a structure comprised not of pure presence but also of 
absence, a structure of difference) to be explained by a language that will in any case 
always transform it (since language is unavoidably polysemous and opaque). That 
poststructuralism has been taken for nihilism finds precedence in similar readings of 
Nietzsche, Nietzsche being arguably poststructuralism's most significant and relevant 
philosophical forebear. Nietzsche's philosophy too has been read as dangerous - even 
read dangerously as fascist - most notably with regard to his emphasiS on the lack of 
positive values (and the famous statement of The Gay Science that 'God is dead' 
(Nietzsche, 1974, p.167» and the so-called 'will to power'. His writings can be seen to 
permeate and inform much of Alasdair Gray's work. In The Fall of Kelvin Walker, the 
protagonist Kelvin displays both an awareness of Nietzschean concepts - demonstrated in 
his own (parodic) will to power - and an ironic lack of awareness about his own 
ideological negativism. Speaking of his hometown in Scotland, Glaik, he tells a new 
acquaintance: "culturally, it lacks scope. It was the lack of scope that made me leave it. 
Have you read Nietzsche? ... Your conversation has what I would call a Nietzschean 
flavour to it. Anyway, I can talk to you about him without embarrassment. It is no 
exaggeration to say that in Glaik there was nobody, nobody I could discuss Nietzsche 
with. Nobody .... There are no thinkers or artists in Glaik" (The Fall of Kelvin Walker, p. 
7-8). When asked if he himself is an artist, Kelvin replies incredulously: "Me? No! I have 
no artistic talent at all, I'm glad to say. But where there are plenty of artists people are 
generally open to new ideas, especially Nietzschean ideas, and it is by these that I mean 
to succeed" (The Fall of Kelvin Walker, p. 8). While this rather interesting aside 
illustrates the type of negative, nihilistic thinking that may come about from such 
(mis?)readings of Nietzsche or indeed of poststructuralist theory, engaging with Gray's 
work on these terms is the work of another thesis. To return briefly to the discussion of 
the 'lost real', it should be pointed out that psychoanalysis, too, is concerned with this 
concept, which has also been referred to in psychoanalytic terms as the Imaginary 
(Lacan) or the semiotic (Kristeva). That is to say, the 'real' here refers to the stage or 
condition of the subject (or organism at this point) before s/he enters into linguistic 
discourse (the Symbolic or the thetic) and becomes a fully-fledged subject (both a 
subject in and subject to discourse). For Lacan and psychoanalytic theory, although the 
lost real will always be unobtainable for the subject who has entered into language -
Belsey writes: 'the real is that organic being outside signification, which we can't know, 
because it has no signifiers in the world of names the subject inhabits' (Belsey, 1980, p. 
58) - it does have a prior existence outside language. 
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grips with the freal' text.89 The inclusion of the erratum slip in some editions of 
Alasdair Gray's books highlights the point: each copy is potentially faulty, 
flawed, imperfect; each is no more than a simulacrum. 9o Nevertheless, this 
notion of textual simulation is acutely applicable to text in the electronic 
medium. Lyotard writes: 
After they have been put into digital form ... items of data can be 
synthesized anywhere and anytime to produce identical chromatic or 
acoustic products (simulacra). They are thereby rendered independent of 
the place and time of their 'initial' reception, realizable at a spatial and 
temporal distance: let's say telegraphable. 
(Lyotard, 1991, p. 50) 
The only ever fvirtual' appearance of digital text will of necessity always 
question its status as freal', and if a text is perhaps not real, then does it really 
say what its virtual simulation says it says? This is the question asked in Alasdair 
Gray's short story fPillow Talk' regarding the text of an alleged email, the 
message being disputed not just in terms of its content, ffFive words - I want to 
leave you - just that" (The Ends of Our Tethers, p. 61), but also on the basis of 
its ever being sent. As in fNo Bluebeard', computers are again associated with 
89 The inscribed reader's search for the text of If in a winter's night a traveller, the 
'book' he begins reading in Calvino's book of the same name but whose text goes no 
further than the first chapter, is continually foiled by his encounters with erroneous 
printed copies: further incomplete texts, forgeries and apocrypha. As with Oedipa Maas, 
his attempts to work through the textual copies, to penetrate the faulty surfaces and 
find the 'true meanings' within, are destined to lead only to further frustration. He may 
as well be searching amongst Borges's 'Library of Babel', a postmodern labyrinthine 
space composed of 'an indefinite, perhaps infinite number of hexagonal galleries' and 
containing all possible combinations of all possible books: 'All - the detailed history of 
the future, the autobiographies of the archangels, the faithful catalog of the Library, 
thousands and thousands of false catalogs, the proof of the falsity of those false 
catalogs, a proof of the falsity of the true catalog' and more (Collected Fictions, pp. 112 
and 115). To complicate matters further, each book in the library is identically formed in 
terms of page, line and letter numbers, and the titles printed on the books' covers do 
not correspond to what is inside. Another of Borges's stories, 'Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis 
Tertius', also centres around this notion of the authenticity of printed books, in this case 
the authenticity of those printed 'monuments', encyclopaedias. Differing copies of the 
same volume of The Anglo-American Cyclopaedia are found not to be identical: one 
contains interpolated material about the unknown region of Uqbar. Summarising Uqbar's 
'Language and Literature', the interpolated section records 'that the literature of Uqbar 
was a literature of fantasy, and that its epics and legends never referred to reality but 
rather to the two imaginary realms of Mle'khnas and Tlon' (Collected Fictions, p. 70). 
The attempt to find out about Uqbar, then, leads only to a process of continual referral 
away from 'reality' into further levels of fantasy and simulation. 
90 Bolter is not altogether accurate, then, in his assertion that 'The conceptual space of a 
printed book is ... defined by perfect printed volumes that exist in thousands of identical 
copies' (Bolter, 1991, p. 11). 
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impersonality - inhumanity even - and coldness: email is seen to be a convenient 
way to end a relationship, a way that shifts the responsibility for what the 
message says away from its human writer or sender, since its words are so 
abstracted from them as to be doubtable. The message's 'author', an unhappy 
wife, denies having written the contentious words and accuses her husband of 
using them as an excuse to raise an issue he is too cowardly to address 
otherwise. The digital message, whether real or not, gives him the grounds to 
ask a difficult question. 
"Do you want to leave me?" 
"Yes, but I never told you so. I've never told anyone that - they think 
ours is such a solid marriage. You must have noticed it's a farce and this 
is your bloody cunning way of blaming me for something I never said and 
was never going to say." 
"Blethersl" he cried, "I am never cunning, never cruel. I remember those 
words coming up very clear and distinct on the computer screen: I want 
to leave you." 
(The Ends of our Tethers, p. 61) 
The ethereality of the email message is here juxtaposed with the alleged, and 
only apparent solidity of the marriage, which it would seem is itself only a 
'virtual' simulation, a sham. The digital message, since its authenticity is 
controvertible, enables its words to be relayed without the same risk as in real 
life: their consequences may always be undone since they can never be finally 
proven. The consequences can, like the text of the electronic message, be 
dismissed in the end as virtual, not 'real'. While the email has only an illusory 
substance r'You're right. I must have dreamed it," the husband concedes (The 
Ends of our Tethers, p. 62)), the chances of the wife acting upon her desire to 
leave as a result have little more firm grounding in reality: 
After a white he said, "But you want to leave me." 
She sighed and said nothing. 
"When witt you do it?" 
"I don't suppose I't! ever do it," she murmured, stitt appearing to read, 
"I haven't the courage to live alone. You're an alcoholic bore but not 
violent and I'm too old to find anyone better." 
(The Ends of Our Tethers, p. 62) 
Paralleling an inadequate, superficial marriage in 'Pillow Talk' with an 
inadequate or certainly dubious digital message implicates the digital text in the 
story's general conveyance of loss or lack: both marriage and text, it is 
suggested, are little more than convenient surfaces, lacking the depth and 
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substance that would make them meaningful and worthwhile. While the digital 
form being criticised here is an email message and not a hypertext it has been 
argued that digital textual environments in general encourage a less serious, 
certainly less contemplative approach to text than that fostered by quiet reading 
in print (and such an increasingly hasty attitude towards - and degradation of -
text can certainly be witnessed in the successor of the email in terms of fast and 
direct digital communication, the mobile phone text message). The hypertext 
link, in facilitating the rapid and easy movement from one text or lexia to 
another or indeed to other media like images or video, may also be viewed as 
creating a reading environment where the compulsion is always to keep moving, 
to keep following links (emphasising the fhyper' in hypertext) rather than to read 
patiently and focus on the import of the current lexia or textual fmoment'. The 
World Wide Web in particular, as has already been observed, contains a large 
amount of hypertextual trash that may in itself be partly responsible for the type 
of short attention span so commonly associated with modern audiences, whether 
audiences of text or of other media: something potentially more interesting is 
only of course a mouse-click away. Coover comments: 
In terms of new serious literature, the Web has not been very hospitable. 
It tends to be a noisy, restless, opportunistic, superficial, e-commerce-
driven, chaotic realm, dominated by hacks, pitchmen, and pretenders, in 
which the quiet voice of literature cannot easily be heard or, if heard by 
chance, attended to for more than a moment or two. Literature is 
meditative and the Net is riven by ceaseless hype and chatter. Literature 
has a shape, and the Net is shapeless. The discrete object is gone, 
there's only this vast disorderly sprawl, about as appealing as a scatter of 
old magazines on a table in the dentist's lounge. Literature is 
traditionally slow and low-tech and thoughtful, the Net is fast and high-
tech and actional. 
(Coover,1999) 
Such notions of ffast' and factional' reading - akin to the One-Minute Bedtime 
Stories despairingly addressed by Gleick in the preceding chapter - are surely at 
odds with the type of slow, serious reading so valued by scholars and encouraged 
by written texts like those of Joyce, Proust and Gray. Gray in Why Scots Should 
Rule Scotland 1997 writes of his boyhood local public library that fit was a source 
of wonder and gratitude to me that anybody could enter and browse through this 
warm quiet treasury of alternative worlds' (Why Scots Should Rule Scotland 
1997, p. 96) and the sensory emphasis regarding this inviting and hospitable 
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environment for reading books is explicit. The thought of reading texts on a 
computer screen, especially on the Web, evokes a rather less cosy picture. 
Nostalgia for the comfortable and known realm of the printed book is 
understandable: new technologies are rarely greeted with unreserved enthusiasm 
and seldom do they appear comfortable. Nostalgia is a natural by-product of any 
move to a new 'type', whether of text or anything else and worries about the 
impact of 'modern' lifestyles upon the practice of serious reading and thought 
have been voiced for a long time. Wordsworth, in his Preface to the Lyrical 
Ballads of 1805 wrote in dismay that: 
a multitude of causes unknown to former times are now acting with a 
combined force to blunt the discriminating powers of the mind and, 
unfitting it for all voluntary exertion, to reduce it to a state of almost 
savage torpor. The most effective of these causes are the great national 
events which are daily taking place and the increasing accumulation of 
men in dties, where the uniformity of their occupations produces a 
craving for extraordinary inddent, which the rapid communication of 
intelligence hourly gratifies. To this tendency of life and manners the 
literature and theatrical exhibitions of the country have conformed 
themselves. The invaluable works of our elder writers, I had almost said 
the works of Shakespeare and Milton, are driven into neglect by frantic 
novels, sickly and stupid German tragedies, and deluges of idle and 
extravagant stories in verse. When I think upon this degrading thirst after 
outrageous stimulation, I am almost ashamed to have spoken of the 
feeble effort with which I have endeavoured to counteract it. 
(Lyrical Ballads, p. 25) 
One wonders what Wordsworth would have made of today's lifestyles and modes 
of communication - the ubiquitous email or text message - or indeed of 
hypertext and hypermedia. But as Wordsworth's Preface indicates, the digital 
revolution and the environments of digital text and of the Web, though certainly 
enabling rapid textual communication, cannot be held solely responsible for our 
allegedly diminished attention spans and desire for speedy textual gratification. 
Wordsworth suggests there existed plenty trashy text of the printed kind to both 
provoke and attempt to quench such a 'degrading thirst for outrageous 
stimulation,' even two centuries ago, and the same can be said today. Walking 
into all but the most independent or highbrow of bookshops one is faced with a 
preponderance of 'easy-reading', 'fast' and factional' books: disposable, airport-
type novels; lifestyle books telling us how to cook gourmet dinners with minimal 
time and effort or how to cram 'meditative' yoga sessions into our frenetic day; 
countless books with titles like 'Quantum Physics in a Nutshell' or the mini-sized 
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'Little Books' of Whatever, which suggest that we don't in fact have time to read 
a 'Big Book' of anything anymore. Diary-like travel books, too, are increasingly 
popular, perhaps since they provide the type of bite-sized information that is 
suitable for travelling readers, only on their commute to and from work, and 
between dips into their Little Books of Calm. Travel writer Bill Bryson's recent 
book A Short History of Nearly Everything, in attempting to sum up knowledge 
about the world in a slim volume probably better sums up how much time we 
now feel we can devote to the serious business of learning. The 'warm quiet 
treasury of alternative worlds' that so awed Gray is a notion of reading that 
seems as outdated and unlikely in the current circulatory realm of print as it 
does to the mode of hypertext, though it should still be possible - with some 
effort - to attain a peaceful reading space for both. 
Undoubtedly the current technologies available for reading hypertexts 
onscreen do not conjure up thoughts of comfort, of a 'warm, quiet' reading 
experience; the glare of the computer screen and whirr of the processor or fan is 
hardly relaxing and seems far less appealing than the thought of curling up on 
the sofa with a book. While in the future it is likely that technological 
improvements will create possibilities for hypertext that are not as sore on the 
eyes as are current screen technologies and that would enable a variety of 
reading positions (digitally projected text, for example, which would enable text 
to be projected onto any plain surface), at the moment the convenience of 
reading hypertext is limited, a factor that has so far ensured the survival of the 
book.91 But this argument cuts both ways: although one of the most common 
complaints against hypertext is that it cannot be read 'comfortably' (in bed or in 
the bath for example), it could also be pointed out that neither can hypertext 
encourage the type of on-the-hoof reading so prevalent with print. Hypertext 
first requires the dedicated effort of sitting down in front of the computer 
screen, whether it be that of a laptop or a desktop machine. Serious learning 
most of all requires effort, for it cannot be done quickly; nor can it be done 
lazily, and perhaps the endeavour of thoughtful reading should not be too warm 
91 Though Landow stresses the importance of distinguishing between the mode and the 
medium of hypertextuality - 'between electronic textuality and its display on changing 
technology' (Landow, 1994, p. 4) - it is difficult to discuss hypertext usefully without 
reference to its practical means of conveyance. 
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and comfortable, lest we fall asleep in the process, metaphorically as well as 
literally. Perhaps an element of discomfort can be a good thing (and may even 
be a necessity), a notion that will be returned to in Part Two. 
Thus much for the comfortable warmth of the reading experience, but what 
about hypertext and the possibilities for 'quiet' reading? A sense of stillness, 
away from the 'noise' of life (and especially modern life) is unarguably 
prerequisite for any serious engagement with and contemplation of text. From 
this point of view the Web is perhaps not the most suitable home for serious 
text, especially if the reader is concerned that the time spent online reading will 
be reflected in the phone bill. That said, many internet users now have 
broadband or dial-up connections that are paid for at a flat-rate premium, so 
that the amount of time spent online is inconsequential, and if an online 
hypertext is good enough to engage the reader in the first place and shelter 
them through this engagement from the distractions of the Web, there is no 
reason why it shouldn't hold their attention and provide a space interesting 
enough to provoke thought. The same may be said of hypertexts on CD-ROM. 
Although reading a hypertext would seem to offer a radically different type of 
reading experience to reading a book, especially in the case of network-
structured hypertexts where the reader is consistently forced to click the mouse 
and make choices regarding their path through the text, once readers get used 
to the initial sense of unfamiliarity within the hypertext environment they can 
concentrate upon the content of the text in much the same way as they would 
with print (though they will probably be made more aware of the structure of 
the text than with print, a thought that I will come back to in the next chapter). 
Coover writes of the early experiences of reading hypertexts that, 'once we got 
used to it, there was no reason [why] we could not achieve that sort of focused, 
deeply imagined 'lost' reading experience we so treasured in books' (Coover, 
1999), and whilst the notion of a 'lost' reading experience is one that I would 
suggest should not be too enthusiastically pursued (as will be explained further 
in Chapter 3), Coover nevertheless maintains that hypertext does not preclude 
the type of thoughtful, directed 'serious' reading that can be described as 
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valuable unreservedly.92 Bolter too sees no reason why the computer cannot 
offer the same sort of quiet refuge as that described by Gray with reference to 
the library, commenting that: 
The computer can in fact provide a quiet place for readers and writers to 
pursue [their own] interests, relatively secure from the noise of what 
remains of shared cultural elements. The computer as a writing space 
can also be a place to hide from the sensory overload of the daily world 
of work and leisure and the other electronic media. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 238) 
Other electronic media may pervade the space of the hypertext, however. 
When hypertext contains audio-visual hypermedia elements - elements that 
could themselves provide 'sensory overload' - it has been argued that the text 
becomes marginalised, crowded out by the other media.93 Certainly many 
hypertexts now attempt to fuse alternative signifying methods with text, 
layering music and image data, for example, or manipulating the aesthetic and 
durative appearance of text onscreen. Donna Leishman's The Bloody Chamber 
(www.6amhoover.com/chamber/index_flash.htm) is an example of a 
hypermedia narrative structure that deliberately uses visual elements rather 
than text. While Leishman's website claims that her hybrid structures are 
'creating screen-based multiple state environments: reacting against systems of 
clarity and coherence' (www.6amhoover.com) they do so specifically by reacting 
against the written word. In this sense it is perhaps arguable whether such 
environments should still in fact be called hypertexts. At the same time as they 
would seem to marginalise text, however, they draw attention to the existence 
and signifying potential of nonverbal, non-phonocentric forms, which have 
themselves been marginalised historically by the written word but which are just 
92 It could also be added, with reference to texts that are situated within a network of 
referenced material, that the work and time of the scholar may be made more efficient, 
or more intellectually valuable anyway, by being directed more quickly into the task of 
analytic thought, with less time needing to be spent on the prosaic donkey-work of 
unearthing resources. (This should quickly be tempered with the observation that this 
feature of hypertext may of course also encourage the lazy scholar, who does not wish to 
seek out his or her own resources beyond the hypertextual network.) 
93 The idea of the text being devalued by superfluous media comes close to the concern 
we have already seen for the 'lost real', the notion that meaning has been lost among a 
ubiquitous, over-abundant proliferation of signifiers. Coover muses: 'this, of course, is 
the constant threat of hypermedia: to suck the substance out of a work of lettered art, 
reduce it to surface spectacle. But, then, nothing is ever mere surface, mere spectacle, 
is it?' (Coover, 1999). 
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as susceptible to the effects of writing in its broad Derridean sense (and so also 
of textuality; they will also invariably be intertextual), as are words in 'the 
phonetic-alphabetical script of Western culture' (Norris, 1991, p. 29). They have 
more relevance and relation to text, then, than at first it might seem.94 (Derrida 
would certainly connect phonocentric forms with the 'systems of clarity and 
coherence' Leishman's work reacts against, since phonocentrism, for Derrida, is 
irrevocably implicated in the larger problem and project of logocentrism: the 
Western metaphysical impulse to rationalise and to posit complete presence.) 
Such hypermedia environments also highlight some significant and now generally 
prevalent cultural practices, particularly the techniques of collage and montage, 
and the mixing of communicative modes. Paulson, in his book Literary Culture ;n 
a World Transformed points out that, 'The technological turn away from print 
and toward electronic textuality, hypermedia, and the audiovisual both 
complements and radicalizes the academic moves away from canonical literature 
and towards recent, popular, and non-print cultural productions' (Paulson, 2001, 
p. 9); the process of looking beyond the strictly textual form is thus not without 
precedent, even within academia. In terms of serious engagement with writing, 
though, we should be aware that all that glitters may not be textual gold: there 
is a real danger that hypermedia environments may privilege style over content, 
slickly offering up little of intellectual value and turning the text into something 
of a spectator sport. Delany and Landow suggest that: 
Hypermedia takes us even closer to the complex interrelatedness of 
everyday consciousness; it extends hypertext by re-integrating our visual 
and auditory faculties into textual experience, linking graphic images, 
sound and video to verbal signs. Hypermedia seeks to approximate the 
way our waking minds always make a synthesis of information received 
from all five senses. Integrating or (re-integrating) touch, taste and smell 
seems the inevitable consummation of the hypermedia concept. 
(Delany and Landow, 1991, p. 7) 
Such a consummation would I think, in terms of any earnest and self-conscious 
encounter with text, be highly dissatisfactory: integrating sensory information 
with text to this extent comes perilously close to the creation of complete 
94 And Gregory Ulmer has argued that Derrida's concept of grammatology may only be 
fully put into practice by admitting non-verbal forms of writing. 'Applied grammatology,' 
he writes, 'will be characterized by a picto-ideo-phonographic Writing that puts speech 




virtual environments or fvirtual reality', and such sensory environments are, as 
will be argued in the next chapter, hostile to the process of active critical 
engagement with text. 
Mixing media will not by itself create such virtual environments though and 
there is much hypertextual evidence to suggest that non-verbal media and 
techniques of collage have been used constructively, in interesting and engaging 
ways. In McLaughlin's hyperfiction Notes Toward Absolute Zero, the reader first 
of all encounters a fFrontispiece', consisting of a collection of images 
representing postage stamps. Clicking on anyone image shows first of all an 
enlarged image of the stamp, which contains visual and verbal information about 
its origin. From this image, which also carries temporal and cultural significance 
(through date or price information or visual iconography: one stamp, for 
example, shows Elvis Presley), the reader can explore a narrative trajectory 
related to the information on the stamp, thus the visual data carries significance 
for the text (in the same way that the visual components of Alasdair Gray's 
fiction are always more than just textual adornment) and indeed helps readers 
gain their bearings (an issue that will be discussed again the next chapter). 
Sunshine f69's use of audio is similarly relevant, apposite to the atmosphere the 
text attempts to create of San Francisco and the music scene in the 1960s. 
Shelley Jackson's Patchwork Girl probably provides to date the best example of 
hyperfictional collage, based on the textual premise of patching together both a 
narrative (from the disparate parts of text or lexia) and a body (from images and 
text of fbody parts'). Jackson's text is influenced by and explicitly draws upon 
the notion of grafting together a corpse from Mary Shelley's Frankenstein while 
engaging the reader in the process of textual graft, such as preoccupied Derrida 
in Glas and Gray in both Poor Things and The Book of Prefaces: fgrafting 
together', with the textual materials at their disposal, reader and writer can 
construct both corpse and textual corpus. The reader can choose to construct 
the text from several angles: fa graveyard'; fa journal'; fa quilt'; fa story' and 
fbroken accents'. The fgraveyard' tells us: fl am buried here. You can resurrect 
me, but only piecemeal. If you want to see the whole, you will have to sew me 
together yourself' (Patchwork Girl). So while in Frankenstein the fmonstrous' 
female is created by Victor Frankenstein, manipulated by his first monstrous 
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creation and ultimately by his author Mary Shelley, and in Poor Things Bella 
Baxter (another monstrous female) is created - grafted together - from the 
remnants of Mary Shelley's text and the mythology accompanying it by Godwin 
Baxter as manipulated by Gray, in Patchwork Girl the reader is explicitly 
implicated - along with 'Shelley' Jackson - in the process of forming the 
'monster' or hybrid (both female and text). The reader must, by this logic, bear 
some responsibility for that which they have helped create. This process of 
textual graft will be returned to once more in Chapter 4. 
The metaphor of the network-structured hypertext as patchwork quilt may be 
an obvious one - exploited also by the Noon Quilt writer's project (see 
http://trace.ntu.ac.uk/quilt! info. htm)95 - but is interesting nevertheless, 
emphasising once again the notion of the text as texture, as fabric, already put 
forth by Barthes, as well as the combinatory possibilities of the hypertext. One 
of Patchwork Girl's 'quilt' lexia entitled 'Research' reads: 
At first I couldn't think what to make her of. I collected bones from 
charnel houses, paragraphs from Heart of Darkness, and disturbed, with 
profane fingers, the tremendous secrets of the human frame, but finally 
in searching through a chest in a solitary chamber, or rather cell, at the 
top of the house, I came across a fabric of relations, an old patchwork 
quilt, which my grandmother once made when she was young. 
(Patchwork Girl) 
Cl icking on this lexia opens another containing the notes to this particular part of 
the text, which indicate that the lexia itself - as with all the other 'quilt' lexias -
is in fact formed like Gray's Book of Prefaces 'by grafting together pieces cut 
from the corpus of other writers' (The Book of Prefaces, dust jacket); in this 
specific instance various textual parts from L. Frank Baum's The Patchwork Girl 
of Oz, Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, Jay David Bolter, Michael Joyce, John B. 
Smith and Mark Bernstein's guide to 'Getting Started with Storyspace' and Jean-
Fran~ois Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition. 
Factual and fictional sources are all fair game for the patchwork text (mixing 
genre as well as media), and the process of textual construction necessary to 
invent or literally fabricate the text is indicative of hypertext's self-reflexive 
95 The website explains: 'N_o_o_n Q.u_U_t is an assemblage of patches submitted by 
writers from around the world. Together they form a fabric of noon-time impressions. 
The quilts were stitched over a period of approximately five months during 1998-1999' 
(http://trace.ntu.ac.uk/ quiltlinfo.htm). 
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structure, since it focuses attention on the work involved in, and the artificial 
process of creating narrative - 'telling stories' - of any kind. Poststructuralist and 
post modernist-influenced writing frequently uses 'factual' historical and 
metafictional material in an endeavour to break down the boundaries between 
fact and fiction, or indeed to show that such boundaries never really existed in 
the first place. 'Facts' can only be 'known' insofar as they are mediated or, 
rather, constructed by signifying systems. As Currie puts it: 'historical sources 
are always textual, ... historical representations are always constrained by the 
conventions of representation in which they operate' (Currie, 1998, p. 68). 
Metafictions or apocrypha can offer textual 'truths' that are as believable as 
'real' ones and the status accorded the 'factual', explanatory and apparently 
rational text is consequently questioned and undermined; language necessarily 
transforms all it touches. Notes Toward Absolute Zero is full of such apocrypha: 
the images of postage stamps; scraps from journals and notebooks; dictionary 
entries; lists of various items and phenomena rSix Failures of Love', relics from 
'the Franklin expedition' and items retrieved from a boat, to give a few 
examples). Patricia Waugh writes of the list device in fiction that: 'the reader ... 
comes to realize that an 'inventory' - a list of items which 'fixes' 'reality' - is 
also an 'inventory': a set of lies, a place where fictions are produced, a 
creation/description paradox' (Waugh, 1984, p. 145). Again, then, attention is 
being brought to bear on the constructed ness of the text's 'factual' evidence. 
The fabrication or 'inventory' of facts in the fictional environment merely 
reflects the real-life status of the fact. Allen confirms Currie's earlier point and 
once again brings into play the problematic position of the textual 'paratext': 
Historical events themselves, we might also remember, only come to the 
historian through what [Linda] Hutcheon, following Genette, calls 
'paratexts'. Whether it be newspaper accounts, diaries, military reports, 
parliamentary documents, private letters, or any of the vast array of 
historical documents the historian must depend upon, history is only 
available to the contemporary historian through a network of prior texts, 
all infused with the traces of prior authors with their own ideological 
agendas, presuppositions and prejudices. History exists as a vast web of 
subjective texts, the new historical account being one more author's 
struggle to negotiate a way through an intertextual network of previous 
forms and representations. 
(Allen, 2000, p.191-192) 
The forms of paratext Allen here refers to - documentation surrounding and 
informing the text such as reports and reviews - Genette describes as 
'epitextual' paratexts, rather than the 'peritextual' elements directly attached 
to the text and considered so far (titles, indices, illustrations and the like). 
Fictional techniques of collage, in collecting such materials and offering them up 
explicitly as part of the fictive work-in-progress, work to assimilate them into 
the text proper. The peritextual 'notes' of Patchwork Girl, too, are as much part 
of the fictional text as the lexias they comment on, as is the case with Gray's 
notes to Lanark, Poor Things and A History Maker. These allegedly factual 
paratextual commentaries are thus doubly ambivalent: they are factual fictions, 
simultaneously inside and outside - beside or in 'para' to - the text, but never 
clearly one or the other (and no longer viably' objective'). 96 As Waugh points 
out: 'the incorporation of any discourse into the literary frame assimilates it to 
the alternative world of fiction and detaches it from normal referential functions 
in the everyday context' (Waugh, 1984, p. 143). 
With network-structured hypertexts such as Notes Toward Absolute Zero and 
Patchwork Girl the art of collage is taken a step further than is possible with 
print since the reader of the text, as with the patchwork girl, if they 'want to 
see the whole ... have to sew [it] together' themselves; they are responsible for 
assembling the parts. The fact that all media, to the computer, are digitally 
'equivalent' also makes it an easy process to collect and display differing media 
types in one place; although images and varied textual genres could be 
incorporated into the printed text, this was not simple to achieve (as Gray's 
consistently expressed gratitude to his printers and typesetters confirms97 ) and 
sound and video could not be included at all. Liest0l writes: 
96 Weishaus's Ins;de the Skull House Similarly highlights the ambiguous role of the 
paratext, each segment of the Brain's narrative being accompanied by an explicit and 
explanatory paratext that stands at once inside and outside the text. The introduction to 
the text is likewise accompanied by its own paratext, thus providing a self-reflexive 
paratext of a paratext (a paratextual structure en-abyme). 
97 In his acknowledgements to UnUkely Stodes Mostly, a particularly demanding text in 
terms of typographical and illustrative content, for example, Gray recognises the 
intransigence of the printed form in adapting to his needs: 'The complicated parts of the 
book were made possible by the exact typing of Donald Goodbrand Saunders and Scott 
Pearson, by the free use of John Mclnespie's photocopying machine, by the bibliographic 
skill of Jim Hutcheson, and the patience of John Hewer, the typesetter' (UnUkely 
Stodes, Mostly, 'Acknowledgements'). The type of time and labour-consuming process 
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Since readers of hypermedia to some extent take up the position of 
authors, the contextual change of the informational elements and the 
types of media becomes of central importance. The computer's digital 
coding of information makes it possible for the traditional media to 
combine in discourse that integrates numbers, words, drawings, graphics, 
photo, audio, and video. The computer has become an inclusive 
supermedium capable of connecting various media independent of the 
institutions in which they usually appear: written language, graphics and 
photography from book and print culture; audio from radio and 
telephone; and video from cinema and television. Various media 
institutions have shaped different forms of expressions but have also 
protected these forms from each other. Hypermedia separates individual 
information technologies from their comprehensive social, technological, 
and economic apparatuses and mixes them in a manner previously 
impossible. This recontextualisation combines older information media 
independent of their previously protecting environments. The direct 
juxtaposition of verbal text and video, for example, makes one 
immediately experience similarities and differences between the two 
types of information .... By changing the relationship between language 
and figurative representation, between text and pictures, hypermedia 
creates new conditions for experiencing information and meaning. 
(Liestl2ll, 1994, p. 115-116) 
Liest0l also points to an argument by Gregory Ulmer that the reflexive structure 
of such hypertexts - the emphasis on textual constructedness and collage - may 
provide the basis of ta discourse of immanent critique ... for an electronic 
rhetoric' (Ulmer, 1991, section 4). Such a critical discourse, Ulmer suggests, may 
be built tby combining the mise en abyme with the two compositional modes 
that have dominated audio-visual texts - montage and mise en scene. The result 
would be a deconstructive writing, deconstruction as an ;nvent;o (rather than as 
a style of book criticism), (jMd.). This of course raises some extremely 
interesting questions that have only been partly addressed by this thesis so far: 
how does electronic writing offer itself up for critique? In what ways can the 
critical methods developed to interrogate print be applied to the electronic text 
(to what extent are they still relevant and where may they be insufficient)? I 
have so far argued that digital text will still be subject to the general conditions 
of textuality or writing as demonstrated by poststructuralist criticism since it is a 
new form of writing. As Ulmer points out, however, hypertextual critique may 
assume reflexive modes largely unavailable to print (montage and m;se en scene) 
that will simultaneously create a hybrid textual form unaddressed by a critique 
of print and enable the print-determined critical toolbox to be augmented in 
Gray describes would be made considerably easier in the malleable digital context of 
hypertext. 
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unforeseen ways. The critical methods needed to apply to the dynamic digital 
word may thus be formed or may evolve, like their hypertextual 'objects' of 
study and like the patchwork girl, through a 'piecemeal' constructive process: 
they too will be hybrid. The form and place of hypertextual critique will be 
returned to again in the remaining chapters, as attention is directed towards the 




Confronting Vitruvius: Or, The Technological Subject Against 
its Limits 
The idea that singular and continuous, or unified versions of history will posit 
similarly stable subjects has already been put forward in Chapter 1, Foucault 
arguing that, fContinuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding 
function of the subject' (Foucault, 1982, p. 12). The purpose of such a 
correlation, Foucault writes, is fto preserve, against all decentrings, the 
sovereignty of the subject, and the twin figures of anthropology and humanism' 
(ibid.). If continuous histories are accepted as positing unified, sovereign 
subjects, then it may also be argued that multiple and discontinuous histories, 
such as hypertextual writing can permit, will confirm subjects that are 
themselves multiple and discontinuous; that are not sovereign but fragmentary 
like the texts they engage with. Sven Birkerts has been one of hypertext's 
harshest critics and is avowedly disaffected with what he sees to be the negative 
implications for the subject of electronic media in general, claiming that: fEvery 
acquiescence to the circuitry is marked by a shrinkage of the sphere of 
autonomous selfhood' (Birkerts, 1995, p. 28). To consider the position of the 
subject in these terms, however, as though individual autonomy has been lost or 
diminished through the subject's engagement with digital rather than tangible, 
printed text is to place (or misplace) faith in the humanist notion that the 
subject really was sovereign and stable in the first place, a notion that has been 
undermined by critical theory, most notably by poststructuralism and 
psychoanalysis. 
Humanism is founded on the premise that human consciousness provides the 
basis for all our thoughts and actions: our internal consciousness - under our own 
sway - confirms our own existence, our own sense of 'self' and determines also 
how we act in the external world. This 'self' -centred philosophy is based largely 
on the Cogito of Descartes' Meditations: the Cartesian Cogito - the thought that 
confirms the existence of the thinker - as the only principle Descartes can accept 
beyond doubt, is taken to be the sole source of existential and epistemological 
proof; human consciousness is thus the logical and final centre of discrimination. 
Allen writes: 
In that phrase ['I think, therefore I am'] the subject combines the 
signifier (thought, speech) with the signified (the existence of the 
thinker) and by so doing proves its ability to produce meaning, and thus 
proves the uniqueness and the presence in the world of its meaning-
making consciousness. Notions of unity, presence, autonomy, originality 
and Being, notions which can apply to the work, the sign and to the 
human speaker/thinker, all depend upon this hierarchy. 
(Allen, 2000, p.64)98 
Psychoanalytic theory, as advanced most compellingly by Freud and Lacan, 
disturbs this stable centring of the 'self' by arguing that the self is not a unified 
or self-present consciousness but is split between consciousness (the 'controlled' 
self) and unconsciousness (the 'uncontrolled' self), though such an idea of 
control is also quickly undermined. Freud used the concepts of the id and the 
ego to distinguish between the unconscious and conscious 'selves' while Lacan, 
98 Nigel Warburton points out that Descartes did not in fact use the phrase 'Cogito ergo 
sum' in his Meditations, though it does sum up his point concisely. Warburton attributes 
Descartes with the following exposition: 'I am, 1 exist, is necessarily true, every time I 
express it or conceive of it in my mind' (Warburton, 1998, p. 50); this I think gives a 
clearer sense that the notion of selfhood is being conSistently reaffirmed, every time the 
thinker has a thought. 
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as has already been outlined, described the splitting of the subject in terms of 
the subject's necessary entrance into language and the fissure between the 
Imaginary (or pre-linguistic) phase of the organism (child or infans) and the 
Symbolic order of adulthood (dependent on linguistic communication). For 
Lacan, the organism or 'hommelette' can only become a 'full' or adult subject 
by entering into linguistic discourse, which, as we have seen, necessitates the 
acquiescence in an order of signification that is not our own but Other (since it is 
comprised of rules that we do not ourselves set out). The subject is forced to 
consciously adopt - or wear - the subject positions available to him or her 
through language (the position of 'I', 'me', 'she', for example) and similarly may 
only express him or herself through recognisable arrangements of pre-existent 
words. Even the way the subject thinks privately about him or herself will be 
linguistically determined. Considering the subject to be in control of the 
'conscious self' is therefore to labour under a misapprehension, both because 
language is not the subject's own and, as Kristeva has already pointed out, 
because the unconscious (Imaginary or semiotic pre-linguistic experience) will 
make itself known through ruptures in the Symbolic or thetic order of discourse. 
The subject can no longer be considered as the unique origin or centre of all it 
thinks, says and does but instead is subject to - as well as a subject in -
language. Andrew Bowie writes: 
The fundamental move in the decentring of the subject takes place, 
then, when the Cartesian 'I', which is supposed to be transparent to 
itself in the immediate act of reflecting upon itself in the cogito, gives 
way to an 'I' that is subjected to its dependence on the language through 
which it speaks. Nietzsche suggested in this connection that the 'subject' 
is really a function of the subject-predicate structure of language itself. 
From Nietzsche to Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Habermas, Derrida, Lacan 
and many others the 'I' is no longer seen as 'present to itself' in relation 
to an opposed world of objects which it attempts to represent, because 
its very status as 'I' depends upon a language which originates in the 
world, not in the interiority of consciousness. 
(Bowie's introduction to Frank, 1997, p. xix) 
Human encounters with technology, as observed in the Introduction, have 
been frequently associated with a process of dehumanisation, with the individual 
becoming less human and more machine-like through both an engagement with 
repetitive work and through living life according to technological rather than 
'natural' or 'human' principles. The consequences of such a shift in principles 
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results, it is suggested, in a loss; in a life deprived of both warmth and 
compassion, governed instead by techno-logic, as in the cases of Gray's narrator 
of 'No Bluebeard' or of the machine-shop workers described as robots by Thaw's 
friend Coulter in Lanark (see Lanark, p. 216 and footnote 41). Digital 
technologies of text are also implicated in this general depiction of 
impoverishment as illustrated by the disputed email message of 'Pillow Talk', 
and what comes across in this story too is the notion that the digital message is 
so abstracted from its sender that the sending subject can no longer be 
considered in any clear way to be its origin. Digital text, it is being suggested, is 
no longer the subject's own. As the consideration of the implications of 
psychoanalytic theory for the subject has indicated, however, this situation is 
not a unique consequence of the subject's engagement with digital text: 
language, such theory argues, was never the subject's own in the first place. 
That digital text may engender feelings in the subject of alienation from their 
words it can be argued simply draws attention to this fact. Bolter in the 
Introduction links this sense of estrangement in particular to the written word, 
to the 'the act of visual representation,' arguing that speech does not 'call forth 
the same sense of estrangement' (Bolter, 1991, p. 212).99 Speech, however, 
since it too consists of words not our own but Other will also be an alien 
discursive form (and although the subject may not experience the sense of visual 
estrangement that the written word creates, a comparable auditory 
estrangement can be experienced by the subject who hears a recording of their 
'own' speech). Lacan describes the child's entering into language as being 'the 
assumption of the armour of an alienating identity' (Lacan, 1977, p. 4). What 
constitutes the identity of the 'human' is just this alien armour; the 'human' can 
only become a full, linguistically recognisable subject by assuming this armour; 
by becoming themselves 'alien' (Other or, it could be argued, inhuman). The 
process of 'dehumanisation' so often connected to the subject's encounter with 
mechanical or digital technology can thus be argued to have begun as soon as the 
99 Nietzsche, in The Gay Science, describes the failure and estrangement of his 'own' 
written words in a 'Sigh': " caught this insight on the way and quickly seized the rather 
poor words that were closest to hand to pin it down lest it flyaway again. And now it has 
died of these arid words and shakes and flaps in them - and' hardly know any more when 
, look at it how' could ever have felt so happy when' caught this bird' (Nietzsche, 1974, 
p. 239). 
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subject enters language. Psychoanalysis, in arguing that the identity of the 
subject is no more than a linguistic construct, both undermines the idea that 
humans have a unified 'self' and suggests the artificiality or Otherness of the 
linguistic identities that we must rather assume. 
Poststructuralism, by demonstrating the indeterminacy of language and the 
lack of direct and complete correspondence between signifier and signified, 
further complicates matters for the subject. If, as psychoanalysis suggests, the 
subject is constructed by language (which is in the first place alien or Other), 
and if that language is both inevitably polysemous and conditioned by 
difterance, then the notion of the subject as being located in a unified and 
stable centre that can be referred to as a 'self' becomes increasingly untenable. 
'Any effort to posit an identity,' as Judith Butler points out, 'whether the 
identity of the linguistic signified or the identity of some historical epoch,' - or 
indeed the identity of the human subject - tis necessarily undermined by the 
difference that conditions such positing' (Butler, 1987, p. 183). Butler writes 
that the subject in fact: 
is itself the fiction of a linguistic practice that seeks to deny the absolute 
difference between sign and signified. Hence, the theory of the 
efficacious sign ... creates the conditions of necessary self-deception .... 
[T]he subject only exists as a user of the referential sign, and the 
critique of referentiality implies that the subject, as a figure of 
autonomy, is itself no longer possible. In effect, the subject becomes 
that conceit of referentiality which language bears, but which is 
dissolved or, rather, deconstructed through a rhetorical analysis that 
reveals the ironic reversals intrinsic to any pursuit of referentiality. The 
subject is a subject to the extent that it effects a relationship to 
exteriority, but once that nonrelationship becomes recognized as the 
constitutive "difference" of aU signification, then the subject is revealed 
as a fiction language gives itself in an effort to conceal its own 
ineradicable structure: it is the myth of reference itself. 
(Butler, 1987, p. 179) 
The subject, then, can be considered as neither unified (because of the 
necessary splitting described by psychoanalytic theory and because the linguistic 
signs that construct it are themselves split and indeterminate) nor autonomous 
(because it is subject to language). The subject, in Butler's terms, is merely 'a 
fictive unity projected in words' (Butler, 1987, p. 185). Any unity that the 
subject may claim lies only in a unity that language might (deceptively) 
construct: language, that is to say, can operate ideologically to create the 
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illusion of unity and stability, as it does through continuous and unified 
narratives. Silvio Gaggi, echoing Foucault, writes: 
Texts that are closed, coherent, and focused, whether visual or verbal, 
tend to elicit mirroring subjects that recognize - or misrecognize -
themselves as separate, unified, and centered. Autonomous texts reflect 
and are reflected by subjects that conceive of themselves as 
autonomous. 
(Gaggi, 1997, p. 101) 
So whilst hypertext might 'tend to elicit' subjects that are decentred or even 
fragmentary - a subject that could well 'conceive of themselves' as less 
autonomous - it is important to recognise that the subject only ever imagined or 
conceived of themselves as centred and autonomous in the first place by virtue 
of linguistic trickery, of linguistic conceit and deceit; considering hypertext as 
diminishing and devaluing the autonomy of the subject, as Birkerts does, either 
wilfully ignores this point or otherwise blissfully swallows the ruse. 
This is not to suggest that the subject as a linguistic construct is completely 
powerless however, lacking any form of agency whatsoever. By exposing the 
constructed ness of the subject, it has been argued, psychoanalysis and 
particularly poststructuralism indicate that the subject is not fixed (given or 
predetermined), but is capable of change and transformation; this in itself is an 
empowering thought. Catherine Belsey writes that: 
One common misreading of poststructuralist theory claims that it 
deprives us of the power to choose or to take action as agents in our own 
lives. This is binary thinking again: if the subject is an effect of meaning, 
if we are not the free, unconstrained origin of our own beliefs and 
values, so the story goes, we must be no better than artificial 
intelligences, programmed outside ourselves to act according to patterns 
determined elsewhere. 
This is not how most poststructuralist thinkers have argued, however. 
Deconstruction implies, on the contrary, that meanings are not given 
unalterably in advance, but can be changed .... Values not only have a 
history, they also differ from themselves. They can therefore be changed 
in the future, if not in the light of a fixed idea (or Idea) of the good, at 
least in the hope that the trace of an alternative inscribed in them might 
one day be realized. Derrida calls this way of thinking 'messianicity': not 
the promise of a specific messiah, who would fulfil an individual 
scripture, Christian, say, or Islamic, but the hope of a different future 
'to come' (avenir, Q venir) . ... Deconstruction, then, is not incompatible 
with moral or political choice. 
(Belsey, 2002, p. 89-91) 
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Subjects will also be able to exert themselves linguistically in that they may 
choose which words to use and in which arrangements (though of course these 
must be choices from among the available and recognisable alternatives which as 
Nietzsche pointed out may often seem insufficient or unsatisfactory). 
Nevertheless, the words a subject chooses to use in differing circumstances will 
obviously affect their lives (and similarly, the choices that the subject makes 
regarding paths through a hypertextual network will also direct and inform their 
reading experience, affecting the construction and outcome of the text); to say 
that the subject is entirely passive or at the mercy of external forces is therefore 
to overstate the case. This said, it should still be recognised that the degree of 
the subject's freedom in using language will itself be liable to manipulation from 
external sources, for the way that subjects relate to language will very much 
depend on the way that language is related to them. As Belsey has elsewhere 
pointed out: 
It is because subjectivity is perpetually in process that literary texts can 
have an important function .... [I]f we accept Lacan's analYSis of the 
importance of language in the construction of the subject it becomes 
apparent that literature as one of the most persuasive uses of language 
may have an important influence on the ways in which people grasp 
themselves and their relation to the real relations in which they live. 
(Belsey, 1980, p. 66) 
The question regarding the type of subject that will be constructed by 
hypertext is therefore still a valid and extremely pertinent one, only it is a 
question that should be asked on the basis of a recognition of the necessary 
construction of the subject through any discursive form, rather than on that of a 
ready-made subject liable to dispersal and loss through an encounter with a 
digital text or network. It should also be pointed out by token of this same 
recognition that different types of hypertexts will construct different types of 
subjects; as observed in the preceding chapter, hypertexts are not by definition 
discontinuous and fragmentary, the digital medium just gives them the potential 
to be so. Some axial-based hypertexts that are structured on the premise of the 
/ digital book' may then operate ideologically in ways very similar to texts of the 
linear printed kind (texts that by pretending autonomy and unity through 
linearity and singularity are likely to construct subjects that presume themselves 
autonomous). Network-structured hypertexts, however, in drawing attention to 
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their own constructed ness cannot posit such 'stable' subjects. The subjects they 
will posit rather are necessarily made aware of the constructedness of narrative 
and thus of its capacity for change; there is no single narrative, but many 
possible alternatives and each alternative narrative construction will be 
inscribed throughout with the palimpsestic traces of the others that may be 
created by following different paths through the constitutive lexias. In this way 
they can be seen to engender Derrida's 'messianicity' as Belsey described it. 
Such hypertexts also explicitly implicate the subject in the process of textual 
construction. If narrative can posit mirroring subjects, then the subjects posited 
by these hypertextual narratives-in-progress are more likely to perceive 
themselves as being 'in progress' or under construction (an idea that has already 
been mooted in Chapter 2 with reference to Kristeva's concept of a text's 
signifiance); although this might seem a little disconcerting, at least it does not 
resort to the type of linguistic or narrative trickery of unified or closed 
narratives which deceive subjects into thinking themselves settled and 'whole'. 
Indeed, that the subject feels disconcerted or unsettled may be a positive effect 
of hypertext as already suggested, for not allowing the subject any comfortable 
notion of a single and stable story will promote a sense of vigilance and self-
consciousness in constructing the narrative - and in donning the linguistic and 
alien armour of the 'self' - that can be considered an empowerment rather than 
a diminution. 
The question or questions articulated by Foucault in 'What is an Author?' still 
have relevance for a consideration of hypertext - and of the implications for the 
subject who engages with this textual technology - and are questions that can 
best be addressed, as Foucault suggests, by taking a closer look at the conditions 
of subjectivity: 
It would seem that one could also ... re-examine the privileges of the 
subject. I realize that in undertaking the internal and architectonic 
analysiS of a work (be it a literary text, philosophical system, or 
scientific work), in setting aside biographical and psychological 
references, one has already called back into question the absolute 
character and founding role of the subject. Still, perhaps one must 
return to this question, not in order to re-establish the theme of an 
Originating subject, but to grasp the subject's points of insertion, modes 
of functioning, and system of dependencies. Doing so means overturning 
the traditional problem, no longer raising the questions "How can a free 
subject penetrate the substance of things and give it meaning? How can 
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it activate the rules of a language from within and thus give rise to the 
designs which are properly its own?" Instead, these questions will be 
raised: "How, under what conditions and in what forms can something 
like a subject appear in the order of discourse? What place can it occupy 
in each type of discourse, what functions can it assume, and by obeying 
what rules?" In short, it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its 
substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a 
variable and complex function of discourse. 
(Foucault, 1979, p.158) 
The place that the subject may occupy in discourse, as well as the functions it 
can assume, will of course depend to a large degree on the places and functions 
that language operating ideologically - and thus politically - offers or presents to 
the subject as available, believable and, sometimes, acceptable options; that 
the subject is constructed in and by language means that it is of course highly 
vulnerable to the consequences of linguistic manipulation. The 'subjection' of 
the organism to the rules or 'order' of linguistic discourse is metonymic in the 
sense that it is representative of the subject's subjection at yet another level: 
the political level of the State. In the same way as the subject entering discourse 
must accept the rules of the linguistic Other and thus of adult life, so too does 
the individual who lives in society tacitly agree to be 'bound' by societal rules. 
Anyone disagreeing with or breaking these rules may be subject to censure or 
punishment of varying degrees (depending on the permissiveness of the society), 
which Louis Althusser has argued is the responsibility of those bodies 
(Government, Army, Police, Courts, Prisons etc.) comprising what he calls the 
'Repressive State Apparatus' (see Althusser, 1992, p. 55). Even in so-called 
representative democracies the subject, by electing someone else to represent 
their interests politically (from among a limited number of choices it might be 
added), is willingly submitting to a form of societal control by proxy. The term 
'subject' - as opposed to 'self' - therefore incorporates the notions of 
simultaneously occupying a subject-position in language CI', 'me' etc.), and of 
being subject(ed) to language and to the external and political systems of 
government in society (which in their own turn will use language as an 
ideological tool of manipulation and subjugation). 
In order for subjects to 'behave' in society, Althusser argues, it is necessary 
that they believe in their own autonomy rather than be faced with the conditions 
of their own subjectivity and subjection. Language, then, functions ideologically 
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(through its use by Ideological State Apparatuses such as academic institutions or 
churches) to confirm or interpellate them as 'free' individuals: 
the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall 
submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he 
shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the 
gestures and actions of his subjection 'all by himself'. There are no 
subjects except by and for their subjection. That is why they 'work all by 
themselves' . 
(Althusser, 1992, p. 62) 
Hence the preference for grand and explanatory narratives such as those 
outlined in A History Maker and discussed in Chapter 1 (and including the 
narrative of Marxism to which Althusser contributes), all of which enable 
subjects to believe that they 'work all by themselves' as unified individuals 
within a rationally structured society and historical epoch. Grand narratives 
function as the sort of unified art forms that Marcuse suggests enchant subjects 
to such a degree that they do not question the conditions of their own lives. He 
writes that the bourgeois epoch generated the 'affirmative character of culture', 
a 'culture' that interpellates and binds: 
the beauty of a work of art should appeal to everyone, relate to 
everyone, be binding upon everyone. Without distinction of sex or birth, 
regardless of their position in the process of production, individuals must 
subordinate themselves to cultural values. They must absorb them into 
their lives and let their existence be permeated and transfigured by 
them. "Civilization" is animated and inspired by "culture." ... Its decisive 
characteristic is the assertion of a universally obligatory, eternally better 
and more valuable world that must be unconditionally affirmed: a world 
essentially different from the factual world of the daily struggle for 
existence, yet realizable by every individual for himself "from within," 
without any transformation of the state of fact .... "Civilization and 
culture" is not simply a translation of the ancient relation of purposeful 
and purposeless, necessary and beautiful. As the purposeless and 
beautiful were internalized and, along with the qualities of binding 
universal validity and sublime beauty, made into the cultural values of 
the bourgeOisie, a realm of apparent unity and apparent freedom was 
constructed within culture in which the antagonistic relations of 
existence were supposed to be stabilized and pacified .... By exhibiting 
the beautiful as present, art pacifies rebellious desire. Together with the 
other cultural areas it has contributed to the great educational 
achievement of so disciplining the liberated individual, for whom the 
new freedom has brought a new form of bondage, that he tolerates the 
unfreedom of social existence. 
(Marcuse, 1968, pp. 94, 95, 95-96,121) 
The concept of the subject as 'bound' in this manner is one that is hugely 
relevant to any consideration of the fiction of Alasdair Gray, for the condition of 
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the human in bondage is one of its primary preoccupations. Gray's redrawing of 
the classic image from Hobbes's Leviathan, which appears in both Lanark and in 
Unlikely Stories, Mostly (and at the beginning of this chapter) appropriately 
illustrates the point: it depicts the State as a giant man or supreme being 
wielding the sword of 'Force' (the Repressive State Apparatus) and the mace of 
'Persuasion' (the Ideological State Apparatus) and being constituted bodily 
entirely by rows upon rows of little people - subjects - all working 'by 
themselves' within the social formation. The title illustration for the story 
'Prometheus' in Unlikely Stories, Mostly (which also appears on the cover of 
1982 Janine) is similarly significant, redepicting Da Vinci's famous drawing of 
'Vitruvian Man', showing man encircled and thus inhibited by the perfect 
symmetry of the sphere surrounding him (see Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 below) . 
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Fig. 3.1 Da Vinci's 'Vitruvian Man' Fig. 3.2 Gray's 'Vitruvian Man' 
Gray's 'Prometheus' implicitly nods both at Freud's theory of the Oedipus 
complex and at Lacan's theory of the hommelette's progression from the 
Imaginary pre-linguistic realm to the Symbolic order of language: 
My infancy resembled that of God, my ancestor. I only dimly recall the 
dark time before I screamed into light, but I was in that dark, like all of 
us, and I screamed, and there was light. I may have found the light 
emptier than most. My mother once told me, in an amused voice, that as 
a baby I screamed continually until one day they sent for a doctor. He 
examined me minutely then said, "Madam, what you have here is a 
screaming baby." Clearly she had never wondered what I was screaming 
for. Herself, probably. But soon my vocal chaos acquired the rhythm and 
colours of articulate speech and I named and commanded a child's small 
universe. My command was not absolute. 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 201 -202) 
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The need to work balanced against the desire for freedom has already been 
discussed briefly in Chapter 1 with reference to Lanark and the theme appears 
again in 'Prometheus' as the death of the narrator's father - satisfying the 
Oedipal urge in this respect - leaves him with enough of an income that he is not 
forced to work for money. His Imaginary or semiotic impulses, however, drive 
him to work creatively. 'It is the drama of infancy which makes men poets,' he 
states (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 202; the Imaginary therefore makes itself 
known through the Symbolic, or in Kristeva's terms the genotext disrupts the 
phenotext), and he does not fully believe he need fconform' to societal 
expectations through writing: 
Paul Cezanne once said, ftMy father was the real genius. He left me a 
million francs." Father Pollard was not such a genius as Father Cezanne, 
but in my eighteenth year he freed me from himself and the curse of 
earning my bread by succumbing to cancer of the spleen. The consequent 
income did not permit me to marry, or support a housekeeper, or to 
frequent respectable brothels; but I silenced the desperate hunger in my 
young heart by studying it, and the world containing it, and by learning 
to read all the great sacred books in their original tongues. And I 
depressed my professors at the Sorbonne by finally submitting no thesis. 
A poet need not truck with bureaucrats. 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 202)100 
100 The role of the father here is that of male authority figure acting as a substitute for 
God the Father and being responsible for guidance and, importantly, discipline, as the 
male Obermensch figure of Gray's Leviathan illustration indicates (the figure of the 
authoritative and disciplining father has already been discussed in Chapter 1 with 
reference to the figure of Father Time and Jock McLeish's father in 1982 Janine (see 
footnotes 22 and 24)). In psychoanalytic terms, the father represents the source of 
prohibition against the incestual taboo, responsible for ensuring that the love of the child 
for its mother cannot be carried on inappropriately into adulthood (either linguistically 
or sexually). The prohibition of this initial desire for the mother within the Imaginary 
realm of the infans has been held by Lacan to constitute part of the indescribable 'real' 
that is lost when the subject enters into language and which subsequently manifests 
itself, as desire, through slippages and ruptures within the Symbolic order. Butler writes: 
'Lacan accounts for this split [between signifier and subject] in terms of the repression 
of oedipal desires, a founding prohibition, which survives in desire as the Law of the 
Signifier and conditions the individuation of the subject. This primary repression also 
constitutes desire as a lack, a response to an originary separation which is less the 
separation of birth than the result of prohibited incestuous union. For Lacan, desire is a 
ftwant-to-be," a manque-a-etre (FFCP [The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis] 29), which is perpetually frustrated because of its subjection to the Law 
of the Signifier, i.e., because it is in language but, therefore, only obliquely present; 
hence, desire appears together with its prohibition, and so takes the form of a necessary 
ambivalence' (Butler, 1987, p. 191). This concept of desire will be discussed again 
shortly. Barthes, in 'The Death of the Author' claims that the hypostases of God are 
'reason, science, law' (Barthes, 1977, p. 147), and these must also be the bases of 
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His father's money enables him to work (freely) for himself instead of for others 
and, importantly, buys him the time that is necessary to learn about the world 
from a concerted and first-hand engagement with books (rather than through 
hasty encounters with Little books, Nutshell books or Short Histories of Nearly 
Everything), a privilege that most working folk don't have. They are commonly 
obliged, rather (through the pressures of money and time exerted by the process 
of holding down a job), to truck with the bureaucrats, even when engaged in the 
creative work of writing and research. 
Despite this apparent freedom, however, the narrator is still bound by the 
general conditions of subjectivity; his 'freedom' is only economic (though it 
affords him a greater degree of autonomy in choosing his lifestyle than most). 
The 'desperate hunger in my young heart' that he describes corresponds to the 
desire that is generated upon entry into the Symbolic or thetic order, a desire 
that, ironically, can never be satisfied once the subject has entered into 
language. The desirous bind of the subject can be explained thus: once the child 
in the Imaginary stage sees itself in a mirror, according to Lacan, it recognises 
itself and wants to know its identity. The child can only find this out by entering 
into the Symbolic order and learning its name and linguistic subject positions, 
thus it initially desires to gain knowledge via entry into language, which in turn 
creates a new and insatiable desire. 101 This new desire - which can be articulated 
very basically as the desire for an identity that is unified or 'whole' (though 
Lacan would argue that it cannot be articulated symbolically at all) - can never 
be satisfied since the subject of language is both irrevocably split from the 
paternal responsibility if we take God to be the ultimate Father. The domestic Father 
Pollard in 'Prometheus' as well as the State Father of the Leviathan illustration must use 
the joint tactics of Reason (through linguistic prohibitions or language functioning 
ideologically as 'Persuasion') and Law (through physical prohibitions or 'Force'; Father 
Pollard, his son recalls, was 'hard to live with. His fits of blinding rage destroyed a great 
deal of furniture and did not always spare the human body' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 
202)) to discipline their children or subjects; SCience, as shall soon be explained, has 
been employed in the services of both. 
101 The experience of the so-called 'mirror stage' therefore prefigures the entry into 
language. Lacan writes: 'This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at 
the infans stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem 
to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in 
a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the 
other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject' 
(Lacan, 1977, p. 2). 
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Imaginary phase (which involved, in part, unrivalled maternal love and now 
becomes the 'lost real') and constructed by linguistic signs which are themselves 
irreconcilably split; the very condition that creates desire, therefore, 
simultaneously precludes its satisfaction. In light of this, the desire of subjects 
to believe themselves unified and autonomous Cwhole') and so (consciously or 
unconsciously) to desire unified (hi)stories that seem to posit them as such is 
more than understandable, though the sense of satisfaction that such stories may 
bring can be no more than ideological and illusory.102 
Desire, which must accompany subjects throughout their lives, is liable to be 
pinned onto objects in the world - material objects as directed by consumer 
capitalism, for example, but most directly human objects of romantic love - in 
the hope that the subject may by obtaining these objects (or at least by 
obtaining their affection) feel satisfied or 'whole'. Catherine Belsey writes: 
102 And as Althusser points out, ideology relies upon illusions which seem to correspond 
with or which in any case allude to reality (even if we don't believe them and perceive 
them as illusions). He writes: 'Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence' (Althusser, 1992, p. 56). Describing 
religion, ethiCS, politics as different forms of ideology or 'world outlooks' which do not 
correspond directly to reality, he continues: 'However, while admitting that they do not 
correspond to reality, i.e. that they constitute an illuSion, we admit that they do make 
allusion to reality, and that they need only be 'interpreted' to discover the reality of the 
world behind their imaginary representation of that world (ideology = illusion/ allusion)' 
(ibid.). Specific ideologies will present their own singular versions of history, or illusions 
that are also alluSions, wherein subjects may misrecognise themselves as being fulfilled, 
or at least as being on their way to fulfilment. The ideology of capitalism offers the 
subject an extremely tempting and allegedly satisfying version of reality, where the 
subject by participating in the capitalist 'dream' of material wealth will be willing to 
consume products to the extent required to sustain a booming economy. Capitalism thus 
posits the subject as a consumer; the subject continues to consume, to use money to buy 
commodities, in the belief that these commodities are both necessary and will eventually 
make them happy or 'whole'. This is of course the capitalist myth: that money can, in 
the end, buy happiness. Since accumulating commodities in this way never brings the 
sense of complete satisfaction that the subject is striving for, the subject simply keeps 
consuming in the hope and belief that satisfaction will be just around the corner (or in 
the next purchase). Of course it never is. The subject's desire therefore, is continually 
frustrated and manipulated by capitalist ideology; the subject is, as Baker argued in the 
preceding chapter, deliberately kept in a state of perpetual longing. In Alasdair Gray's 
fiction this perpetual longing - being simply the bind of the subject in desire of an 
alternative state of being - is often signified by the sexual desire of his fictional subjects 
who are literally in bondage (as is the case with so many of Jock McLeish's fantasy 
women in 1982 Janine and with the SaM 'games' of Donalda, Senga, Harry and June in 
Something Leather). 
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The general effect of the lost but inescapable real of our organic being is 
a dissatisfaction we cannot specify. A gap now exists between the 
organism and the signifying subject, and in that gap desire is born. 
Desire, Lacan says, is for nothing nameable, since it is unconscious, not 
part of the consciousness language gives us. But it is structural, the 
consequence of the gap that marks the loss of the real, and thus a 
perpetual condition. Although desire is unconscious, most of us find a 
succession of love-objects, and fasten our desire onto them, as if they 
could make us whole again, heal the rift between the subject and the 
lost real. In the end, they can't - though, of course, it's possible to have 
a good time in the process of finding that out. 
(Belsey, 2002, p. 58-59) 
The narrator of 'Prometheus' is no different to the rest of us in this respect, for 
he too focuses his desire on a human love-object, though he recognises the 
substitutability of that 'object': 'Lucie, you have made me need you, or if not 
you, someone' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 232). He has already described his 
birth as 'the dark time before I screamed into light' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 
201), and this 'dark time' can also be considered as the Imaginary realm of the 
infans (associated with maternal love but also with a desire to know one's own 
identity) before linguistic discourse brings enlightenment through symbolic 
knowledge. The primordial Imaginary phase is described as an existential state of 
darkness yearning for light: 
First, then, black void, pure and unflawed by sensations. No heat, no 
cold, no pressure, no extent. What is there to do? Be. Being is all that 
can be done. But gradually a sensation does occur, the sensation of 
duration. We perceive that we have been for a long time, that we will be 
forever in this darkness unless we do something. The more we endure of 
our dark self the less we can bear it. We move from boredom to unease 
and then to panic-horror of an eternity like this. We are in Hell. So the 
cry "Let there be light" is not an order but a desperate prayer to our own 
unknown powers. It is also a scream rejecting everything we know by 
committing us to an unimaginable opposite. 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 200) 
This act of volition on the part of the organism-in-darkness - the 'scream' into 
light - provides an ironic reversal, for in acting to enter language the organism 
acts as agent of its own subjection to the 'unimaginable opposite' of the 
Symbolic order (i.e. we control our own decision to be constructed or 
'controlled' by language).103 
103 Although language does not control us entirely. As already pointed out we are not left 
altogether powerless: we can still make meaningful linguistic choices, though we may be 
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The narrator begs the love of Lucie to save him from marriage to another 
woman, the matronly manageress of a cafe he frequents who clearly represents 
a return to the maternal bosom, and hence to the primordial state of 
unenlightenment. After a night of too much wine (and an accompanying loss of 
freason') he describes waking up, fwith a bad headache, in darkness, beside a 
great soft cleft cliff: the bum of my manageress' (UnUkely Stories, Mostly, p. 
231). He beseeches Lucie: fLucie, if you do not return I must fall forever into her 
abyss. Lucie, she makes me completely happy, but only in the dark. Oh Lucie 
Lucie Lucie save me from her' (UnUkely Stories, Mostly, p. 232). Lucie, as a poet 
and intellectual who challenges the narrator's own academic writings, represents 
(nominally as well as metaphorically) the notion of enlightenment through 
discourse, yet Lucie, as a subject in desire herself, realises that words, although 
initially seeming to satisfy the organism's desire for knowledge ultimately prove 
unfulfilling (they can neither provide unmediated and complete knowledge 
beyond doubt - can never reach the transcendental signified - nor satisfy the 
newly created and unconscious desire for unity of identity). She therefore 
decides to try to express herself through actions rather than words in the hope 
that this may prove a more fulfilling course of action (thus displacing the focus 
of her desire, while also attempting to remove herself from language). She 
writes in a letter to the narrator: 
I no longer wish to be a poet. It requires an obsessional balancing of tiny 
phrases and meanings, an immersion in language which seems to me a 
kind of cowardice . ... it is a waste of time making signboards pointing to 
the good and bad things in life. If we do not personally struggle towards 
good and fight the bad, people will merely praise or denounce our signs 
and go on living as usual. I must make my own life the book where 
people read what I believe. I decided this years ago when I became a 
socialist, but I still grasped, like a cuddly toy, my wish to be a poet. 
That wish came from the dwarfish part of me, the frightened lonely 
chi ld who hoped that a DECLARATION would bring the love of mother 
earth, the respect of daddy god, the admiration of the million sisters 
and brothers who normally do not care if I live or die. Your critical 
letter had an effect you did not intend. It showed me that my 
conscious of language's role in our subjectivity. The notion of choice as being connected 
to autonomy is also one that is liable to manipulation, consumer 'choice' being integral 
to consumer capitalism which tries to posit us as free individuals capable of exercising 
choice in a free market (a point that will be returned to with reference to the available 
choices in hypertext). 
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declarations are futile. It has taken a while for the message to sink in. I 
am grateful to you, but also very bitter. I cannot be completely logical. 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 228-229) 
Lucie is also aware of the sense in which her words are not her own but are 
Other (estranged and alien to her); her tinhuman' words posit her town' identity, 
but it is an identity she does not recognise (and does not recognise as human). 
She writes: t I am a monster. The cutting words I write cut my heart too' 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 230); the cutting words that feel as though they cut 
her physically can be read interestingly in light of the earlier discussion of 
textual and corporal surgery played with by Derrida in Glas, Gray in Poor Things 
and The Book of Prefaces and Jackson in Patchwork Girl. In all cases the process 
of incision (cutting) and graft - of thuman' and textual corpus - creates a new 
(and monstrous) text and identity. The idea that we as subjects are both human 
and yet also inhuman, involved always in the process of grafting together an 
identity (or a set of alien armour) through language is one that has already been 
suggested and that will be developed further in Chapter 4. Lucie does in the end 
enlighten the narrator, ironically, to the inadequacy of language and the 
impossibllity of linguistic enlightenment: language is not self-sufficient or 
transparent and as such cannot be used either to unify the subject or to grasp 
the truth (despite the logocentric claims of Western metaphysical and 
philosophical rationalism, based on the logic and reasoning which Lucie here 
explicitly rejects).104 The narrator, who had previously admitted, tl am a close 
104 Western metaphysics can be understood in terms of the Platonic 'Ideal', the ideal and 
essential form of which objects in the world are mere copies or simulacra; this ideal 
form - which can only be held in thought and therefore 'exists' as the signified - is held 
to pre-exist its representations and can be thought of basically as 'truth' itself. This 
generates the logocentric desire to 'reveal' this underlying truth and explains why Plato 
privileged thought above discourse and speech above writing; thought, for Plato, gave 
immediate and transparent access to truth (and speech was considered more immediate 
to thought than writing in its narrow inscriptional sense). Gregory Ulmer states the case 
with reference to the physical object of the book and Derrida's Of Grammatology: 'The 
idea of a uniHed totality upon which the concept of the book depends is the notion that 
a totality of the signified preexists the totality of the signifier, "supervises its 
inscriptions and its signs, and is independent of it in its ideality" (Grammatology, 18). In 
the metaphysical tradition, in spite of the fact that it served as a metaphor for the soul 
and the divine, the book as a written space had no intrinsic value. Rather, the "Platonic" 
book records a discourse that has already taken place (the voice of thought in dialogue 
with itself - self-presence) and therefore is testable in terms of truth - the resemblance 
to what is "engraved on the psychic surface" - intention' (Ulmer, 1985, p. 16). This 
logocentrism is precisely what psychoanalysis and poststructuralism attempt to unravel, 
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reasoner, and love language' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 202), now despairs at 
its opacity and regresses from the discursive order: 'I quoted Marx to support de 
Gaulle and Lenin to condemn the students. The uselessness of discourse became 
so evident that at last I merely howled like a dog and grew unconscious' 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 231). 
If the narrator is to give up on language, he will give up on his 'last and 
greatest work,' the long-running and unfinished Prometheus Unbound (Unlikely 
Stories, Mostly, p. 214). This is an intended textual response to Aeschylus's 
Classical text Prometheus Bound, which depicts the mythological figure of 
Prometheus chained to a rock for his defiance of Zeus (the Olympian patriarch 
who uses Force to discipline his unruly subject). The Oxford Dictionary of 
Classical Myth and Religion states that: 
Prometheus' defiance of the gods captured the romantic imagination and 
has profoundly influenced most modern artistic and literary genres, 
notably because of the monumental nobility in the Prometheus Bound of 
Prometheus chained to the rock, hurling defiance at Zeus, and despising 
mere thunderbolts. 
(The Oxford Dictionary of Classical Myth and Religion, p. 453) 
The figure of Prometheus (although himself a divine figure, a titan who defected 
to join the gods) highlights the paradox of determinism as it affects the mortal 
world of men: man is both determined in the sense of being controlled by 
external forces (in Prometheus's case the god Zeus, who is representative of 
paternal and State law), and determined in the sense of wishing (freely) to be 
free (he thereby exerts his free will); the condition of humanity in these terms is 
as bound yet continually striving for - or in desire of - freedom. According to 
Hesiod's Theogeny (which precedes Prometheus Bound), Prometheus is punished 
by Zeus for stealing fire and giving it to men to use in their war against the gods. 
He is bound to a pillar and has his liver eaten daily by an eagle (and renewed 
every night) until eventually being freed by Heracles (who is performing one of 
his Labours).105 Hesiod associates the name Prometheus with 'foresight': 
by illustrating that conscious thought is not self-present but is linguistically determined, 
always already mediated. 
105 As additional punishment to all men for their defiance, Zeus orders Hephaestus the 
smith (and Greek god of the fire that Prometheus stole) to create a woman from clay. 
This first woman was Pandora, who was sent as a 'gift' to Epimetheus, Prometheus's 
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Prometheus may then be viewed as having the foresight to steal fire and give it 
to men in order that they can use it skilfully against the gods and forge weapons 
with it. He is therefore representative of the introduction to men of technology 
in its most basic forms: he lends them both the benefits of his foresight - mental 
craft, intellectual cunning or freason' - and the means (fire) to employ this craft 
physically. 106 
The Oxford Dictionary of Classical Myth and Religion describes how 
Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound makes the figure of Prometheus fyet more of a 
culture hero, responsible for man's skills and sciences. There is also a persistent 
tradition that Prometheus created man from clay' (p. 453).107 This is the version 
of Prometheus that the narrator of Gray's tale uses. Explaining the name 
Prometheus to mean both fforesight' and ftorch', he tells Lucie, fHe was a 
craftsman, and moulded men from the dust of his mother's body' (Unlikely 
Stories, Mostly, p. 214). He also attributes Prometheus with recognising through 
his foresight that the gods, in the earlier cataclysmic battle with their forebears 
the titans, would outwit them; that fcunning would replace strength as master 
of the universe' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 215). Prometheus, as metaphorical 
ftorch' (or fire-bearer), can also then be considered to represent illumination 
and enlightenment: reason and science are his gifts to enlighten - and 
purportedly to free - mankind. The irony, however, lies in the fact that the 
enlightenment of reason, as Gray's narrator finds out to his distress, cannot 
brother. She opens her famous box and releases evil into the world of men in all its 
multifarious forms; the female is thus sent to deliver perpetual torment to the male. 
(Source of the foregoing: Simon Price and Emily Kearns (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of 
Classical Myth and Religion.) The only thing men can use to counteract these evils is 
Hope, which Prometheus provides, according to the narrator of Gray's story: 
'Prometheus saved us by giving us hope (which allows us to despise death) and fire 
(which the gods wanted to keep to themselves)' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly,p. 216). This 
notion of hope as a persistent quality in men may usefully be compared with the concept 
of desire already discussed: hope and desire, as perpetual conditions suggesting the 
possibility of some other state of being (though no other state may in fact be possible) 
are both necessary to existence yet also liable to ideological manipulation, as has 
already been suggested. 
106 This is in line with Bolter's earlier definition of techne, that 'the craftsman must 
develop a skill; a technical state of mind in using tools and materials' (Bolter, 1991, p. 
35). 
107 The Dictionary also points out that this tradition might underlie Hesiod's depiction of 
Hephaestus's creation of woman (The Oxford Dictionary of Classical Myth and Religion, 
p.453). 
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finally free the human subject from the conditions of subjectivity; it will, rather, 
condemn the subject to a perpetual state of desire. The gift of science is 
likewise an ambivalent blessing. Although many advocates of science argue its 
particular contribution to bringing humankind nearer to a much sought-after 
state of ffreedom' - Vannevar Bush, for example, writes: 
Of what lasting benefit has been man's use of science and of the new 
instruments which his research brought into existence? First, they have 
increased his control of his material environment. They have improved 
his food, his clothing, his shelter; they have increased his security and 
released him partly from the bondage of a bare existence. [My emphasis] 
(Bush, 1945, p. 6) 
- according to the Prometheus myth science is in the first place used by men to 
create weapons of war, setting a precedent perhaps for the misuse of technology 
in civilisations to come. It has also, as observed in the Introduction, been 
appropriated as a tool of rationalism and de mystification, as part of a specific 
historical and technological fproject', as Marcuse put it, of human domination 
over nature through knowledge (as indicated by Bush's enthusiastic claim of 
increased fcontrol' over the fmaterial environment'); as a means of achieving 
freedom through enlightenment then, science - like the principles of freason' it 
serves - must also fail. 
Although the Theogeny cites Prometheus as being set free from his bondage 
by Heracles, Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound does not. According to the narrator 
of Gray's story, fPrometheus prophesies that one day he will be released, and 
tyranny cast down, and men will see their future clear. Aeschylus wrote a 
sequel, Prometheus Unbound, describing that event. It was lost' (UnUkely 
Stories, Mostly, p. 218). Prometheus, then, remains bound, but in a state of 
hope - or desire - that corresponds to the state of the human subject. His 
release, which the narrator has envisioned for the ending of his own Prometheus 
Unbound, like that of the human subject cannot come about through language, 
for, the narrator concedes: fl lack the knowledge to complete it myself' 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 214); he cannot write Prometheus out of his bind. 
This lack of complete knowledge, or failure of enlightenment - as the narrator 
suggested in earlier describing his infancy he has indeed ffound the light emptier 
than most' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 201) - leaves both Prometheus bound 
and the narrator ultimately lamenting his own subjectivity (and subjection) 
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which is comparable to the lonely condition of the suffering Prometheus on the 
rock. Indeed, the two are explicitly equated: the narrator writes at the end, 
'The one word this poem exists to clarify is lonely. I am Prometheus. I am lonely' 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 232).108 
Prometheus, as the supplier of 'skills and science' to man gives them the tools 
of applied reason. As already indicated, scientific and technological skills and 
principles have been employed in service of the metaphysical quest for truth 
(through rational and scientific 'discovery' or 'revelation'), though any such 
quest (for complete knowledge, subjective unity or freedom) will not ultimately 
succeed for scientific knowledge depends itself on language, which will always 
undo any attempt to posit complete knowledge, presence or 'truth'. The skills 
that the subject must use to apply science will depend as Bolter has said upon 'a 
technical state of mind', a mind that is already 'written on' or mediated by 
writing in its broad sense (Bolter, 1991, p. 35). Writing in this broad sense, as 
has already been stressed, is itself tekhne and as such is really the first and 
greatest technological leap of all; subjects that are in the Symbolic order of 
language are thus not only in and bound by language as suggested by Lacan's 
psychoanalytic theory, they are also in and bound by technology. They have 
assumed a technological state of mind (a state which is not their 'own' but 
which constitutes them as subjects; they cannot be subjects without it). 
Considering the implications for the subject of any technology - including the 
digital technology of hypertext, which is especially interesting since it involves a 
108 And there is evidence in the text to suggest that the equation between the human 
protagonist and the divine Prometheus is more than metaphorical. The narrator in 
describing his infancy has said that it 'resembled that of God, my ancestor' (Unlikely 
Stories, Mostly, p. 201), thus associating himself with the divine, and his predicted 
dissatisfaction with 'the light' exhibits the Promethean quality of foresight, the ability to 
'see [his] future clear' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 218), although this foresight is not 
enough to free him. In this Prometheus is domestic man, who can use his intellectual 
powers but cannot in the end use them to free himself. The divine figure of Prometheus 
has manifested himself in the form of a human mortal - the narrator - in order to 
illustrate that their conditions of subjectivity are identical (to one another) but also 
irreconcilable (in themselves). Prometheus is then a general evocation of the particular 
condition of man. This idea is in itself bound to a notion of being able to achieve a 
general (or abstract) and particular (or involved) perspective on the conditions of 
existence and subjectivity, a notion which again permeates Gray's oeuvre and is crucial 
to a consideration of the subject who wishes to engage critically with text. It will be 
discussed again towards the end of this chapter. 
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redoubling, a technological mediation of the written word - must then always 
come back to this point. The image of 'Vitruvian Man' is particularly relevant to 
the concept of the subject as bound by technology. In this instance the subject is 
encircled by technical principles of symmetry he can neither exceed nor escape, 
and is himself also perfectly symmetrical: he is thus both in (a subject of) and 
bound by (subject to) technology. 109 The subtitle of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein -
a text that has already been of considerable interest in this thesis so far - is The 
Modern Prometheus: Victor Frankenstein, too, is bound and conditioned by the 
technology which, as in the popular myth of Prometheus, enables him to create 
or fashion a man. And as Frankenstein's folly has already made clear (along with 
that of the risible Vague McMenamy), the employment of technology for vain or 
dubious ends is likely to be destructive rather than enlightening. 
Such vanity is referred to in Gray's Leviathan illustration of Unlikely Stories, 
Mostly. It contains the message: 'By Arts Is Formed That Great Mechanical Man 
Called A State: Foremost of the Beasts of the Earth For Pride.' The implication of 
the illustration is that pride on a powerful scale can quickly become tyranny (for 
power corrupts). The State is here referred to as a 'Beast' and in Lanark it is 
known as the 'Creature'; as with Frankenstein's 'creature' (and with Bella 
Baxter) what has been created has the potential for unruly and unforeseen 
109 Da Vinci drew his 'Vitruvian Man' using the principles outlined by Vitruvius, an 
engineer and architect who suggested that temples could be built based on the relative 
compositional proportions of the human body, which he considered to be perfectly 
proportional. Thus a process of rationalism and reason is applied even to a consideration 
of the human form (see www.aiwaz.net!modules. php?name=News&file=article&sid=24 
for further consideration). This links Vitruvius or 'Vitruvian Man' to Prometheus (the 
context in which Gray uses the drawing) in that both are concerned with reason, science 
and metaphysical rationalism. (There may also be a further link between the two as 
Vitruvius was interested in the liver function of animals and recognised the importance 
of this organ for an animal's health; this ties in both with modern knowledge of the 
liver's capacity for regeneration and with Prometheus's own regenerating liver. See 
www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Med.htm). Gray's redepiction of 'Vitruvian Man' sees him 
assume the visual position of Christ on the cross (arms outstretched, feet pointing 
straight downwards), thus associating him with Christ's suffering and connecting this 
with Zeus's 'crucifixion' of Prometheus on the rock (the narrator of 'Prometheus' relates 
that 'Zeus punished Prometheus by crucifying him on a granite cliff' (Unlikely Stories, 
Mostly, p. 216) and later describes God in his Prometheus Unbound as standing 'on the 
height with his arms flung sideways in a gesture which resembles the crucified 
Prometheus' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 224)): both iconographies (Christ and 
Prometheus) are representative of the suffering and bound condition of the human 
subject. 
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behaviour, beyond the control of the subjects who have created or who 
constitute it. And technology is in all cases heavily involved. What is suggested is 
that hand in hand with vanity, technology can create monsters. 110 The 'Great 
Mechanical Man' of the State as already noted has the instruments of Force and 
Persuasion at his disposal and may use them together to discipline his subjects 
and make sure they obediently 'work by themselves'. The creation of States and 
subjugation of subjects depends on both forcible repression and ideological 
persuasion; the narrator of 'Prometheus' argues that, 'states are also formed 
through warfare. They are managed by winners who enrich themselves at the 
expense of the rest and pretend their advantages are as natural as the seasons, 
their mismanagement as inevitable as bad weather' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 
216).111 Both forms of power consolidation or 'management' are supported by 
110 Bernstein, writing of Poor Things comments: 'In choosing Frankenstein as the central 
foundation on which to construct his own text, Gray selects a formidable myth. Shelley's 
tale of the Swiss student who follows his curiosity and vanity into a perverse blend of 
science old and new haunted the Victorian era with its accelerated scientific and 
technological development. The key fear that Shelley's novel arouses is that of the 
monstrosity reSUlting from ethical abandonment' (Bernstein, 1999, p. 112). 
111 This persuasion of subjects regarding the inevitability of their situation (which will 
function to defuse any politic impetus for change) is reminiscent of the political 
manipulation of 'history' already witnessed in 'Five Letters from an Eastern Empire', 
where Bohu's poem is taken to justify the emperor by presenting him as 'a final, 
competent, all-embracing force, as unarguable as the weather, as inevitable as death' 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly p. 132). The sword of Force in that story belongs ultimately to 
the 'emperor', but is the responsibility of Fieldmarshal Ko, 'who commands all imperial 
armies and police and defeats all imperial enemies' (Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 107); 
the mace of Persuasion falls under the auspices of the imperial headmaster of literature, 
as has already been exemplified in the discussion of his role in Chapter 1. The capacity 
for language both to construct the subject and to be used persuasively to shore up 
corrupt regimes is covered by Gaggi in his discussion of subjectivity in Conrad's Heart of 
Darkness. He writes of Kurtz's involvement in the unethical project of colonialism in 
Africa: 'Kurtz's voice produces an expanding aura that seems to originate in a 
transcendental subject - a genuinely remarkable man with immense power to do good 
and evil. But in fact there is no Kurtz behind the voice. His language is not the product of 
his subjectivity and power, but his subjectivity and power are the products of his 
language. Language is an instrument of politics rather than ontology. And Kurtz's 
language represents the power of discourse to do violence' (Gaggi, 1997, p. 36). 
Evidence of language being manipulated pOlitically and used as a tool of subjection can 
be found in countless examples throughout the fiction of Alasdair Gray: Bohu's poem is 
an instance already discussed, and the advertising slogans of Lanark, too, have been seen 
to self-consciously 'overstimulate', 'misinform' and 'corrupt' (see footnote 4 and 
Lanark, p. 434). Frequently, those subjected by discourse in Gray's fiction are Scots who 
feel subjugated by the confident language employed by those speaking with Southern 
English voices (representative of the distribution of political power in the UK). These 
confident speakers need not necessarily come from Southern England, as Gray points out 
1 ()) 
technology: Force by repressive and military technologies (the Repressive State 
in Why Scots Should Rule Scotland 1997, but speaking with such an accent and speaking 
with authority, Gray suggests, confers power: 'In the first decades after parliamentary 
union many Scots lords, landed and legal, took pride in talking the speech of the 
commoners, which had also been the speech of the royal Stuarts before they travelled 
south. With every generation since then the speech difference increased until now the 
voices of the Scottish ruling class sound exactly like those of the English. The noise of 
such voices braying in parliament (for dominating accents are as liable to bray as lower-
class voices to mumble) gives a majority of Scots the sensation of living under a foreign 
occupation; but I am sure many English feel that way too' (Why Scots Should Rule 
Scotland 1997, p. 56). The same pOint is made by a member of the English theatre 
company Jock McLeish encounters in 1982 Janine, who makes the comment that, 
"Bluster has no effect on the British public when uttered with a regional accent. You've 
got to be damned hard and dry and incisive. Use an Anglo-Scots accent. The Scotch do 
change their accents when they get into positions of power" (1982 Janine, p. 248). 
Subjects who speak in a regional accent and without sufficient assertiveness, it is 
suggested, will be unlikely to have their voices heard. McLeish imagines lecturing to his 
girlfriend Denny, in a monologue that highlights her subjection and bondage at the level 
of work as well as language (and manipulation by the educational Ideological State 
Apparatus): "if you go on strike and demonstrate for better wages (you won't, you have 
no union, but if you do) then cabinet ministers drawing salaries of twenty-nine-thousand-
nine-hundred-and-fifty-a-year (on top of interest on private investments) will appear on 
television to explain in brave, loud, haw-haw voices that there is not enough money to 
help you, that your selfish greed is the thing which has reduced Britain to its present 
deplorable plight. And if you are asked to say something in your own defence, Denny, 
your voice over the wireless waves will sound stupid and funny because you don't know 
how to address the public. Your school did not teach you to speak or think, it taught you 
to sit in rows and be quiet under strong teachers or rowdy under weak ones. The people 
who manage you, Denny, have been taught to make brazen speeches in firm clear voices, 
THAT is FAR more important than geography or technology, because RHETORIC RULES, 
O.K.?" (1982 Janine, p. 215). The RHETORIC that rules Denny can also (as with Lanark's 
advertisements) be seen to be (literally) capitalist: capitalism, as the dominant political 
ideology in the UK in 1982, as now, functions through the apparatuses of the State and 
through the corporations that support (some would say run) it (see Monbiot, 2000) and 
provide work for its subjects. Jock's imagined lecturing of Denny is somewhat ironic 
considering both that Jock's monologue tells Denny that she is being dictated to by itself 
taking the form of dictation and also because Jock himself is interpellated as an ideal 
capitalist subject: he voted for Thatcher's government and as such has supported the 
very system - and erosion of the labour unions - he would denounce to Denny, although 
Jock's political conscience does not let him off easily for such hypocrisy. 'I am very sorry 
God,' he says in one of his frequent mental conversations with the deity, 'I would like to 
ignore politics but POLITICS WILL NOT LET ME ALONE' (1982 Janine, p. 231-232). Jock's 
capitalist politics continually come back to haunt him: 'Scotland is fucked,' his 
conscience forces him to concede, 'and I am one of the fuckers who fucked her' (1982 
Janine, p. 136), though he still tries hard (rather unconvincingly) to convince himself 
that his complicity was merely small-scale: 'I REFUSE TO FEEL BIITER OR GUlL TV ABOUT 
THIS. I am not a gigantically horrible fucker. I'm an ordinary fucker. And no hypocrite. I 
refuse to deplore a process which has helped me become the sort of man I want to be: a 
selfish shit but a comfortable selfish shit, like everyone I meet nowadays' (1982 Janine, 
p. 136-137). Jock doth, however, protest too much: far from becoming 'the sort of man' 
he wanted, he has become a sad and lonely alcoholic, so tortured by his own thoughts 
that he must resort to fantasies and booze to try to stifle them. 
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Apparatus); Persuasion by the technology of language (as it is used by the 
Ideological State Apparatuses) and, more recently, by the technologies of the 
communications media. 
The power of the media to focus people's attention upon certain aspects of 
their lives while distracting it from others (usually more pressing and sinister), is 
well depicted in Gray's short story 'Moral Philosophy Exam', where the media 
function ideologically to confirm capitalism: 
A big television company regularly broadcast a news programme 
informing the viewers of bad deeds: not the bad deeds of corporations 
who might withdraw advertising revenues, or the bad deeds of big 
businessmen and government officials who could afford to bring strong 
libel actions, but the exploitive practices of small private landlords, 
tradesmen and moneylenders. This did some social good and entertained 
viewers, who were also encouraged to help the programme by supplying 
it with evidence of scandalous instances. 
(The Ends of Our Tethers, p. 63) 
Whilst the 'public interest' programme here described admittedly does 'some 
social good', by focussing on small-scale and domestic crimes it serves to deflect 
attention away from crimes of a larger scale (at corporate or governmental 
level) and ensures that subjects go on working happily 'by themselves' -
oblivious to the manipulation that is taking place - supplying the makers of the 
programme with stories in the thought that they are acting for the social good. 
This action in turn keeps them from acting in directions where it would really 
matter and where it might threaten to upset the political status quo. In effect, it 
ensures that subjects quarrel amongst themselves rather than quarrelling with 
the State and its Apparatuses or with large corporations (and as suggested in the 
last footnote - (111) - under capitalism the interests of big business and those of 
the State cannot be separated easily, if at all). 
Jean Baudrillard in typically apocalyptic style suggests that 'we will never in 
future be able to separate reality from its statistical, simulative projection in 
the media' (Baudrillard, 1989, p. 210), and while this statement is grounded in 
the postmodernist claim that reality must always be mediated, that historical 
'facts' come to us of necessity through representative constructions that cannot 
be clearly or finally distinguished from fictions, for Baudrillard, the 
consequences for the subject are fairly drastic; the subject, he suggests, will be 
unable to exert themselves or act meaningfully in the face of these media 
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representations or simulations of 'reality'. The subject instead becomes 
powerless, a passive recipient (an object rather than a subject) of what he terms 
'hyperreality' .112 The media and the media technology which enable it to be such 
a ubiquitous presence in the lives of subjects, for Baudrillard also functions 
(ideologically) to blind them to reality, to obscure their real conditions of 
existence by making 'reality' indistinguishable from its media projection. And 
since language constructs the subject and language is frequently related to the 
subject via the media, Gaggi asks whether the media may not therefore 
construct and interpellate the subject on its own terms: 
[I]f the subject is wholly a construction, what ethical constraints on that 
construction could be possible? In an age characterized by the ubiquity of 
mass media representations and by the unprecedented cultural power of 
those representations, might the deconstruction of the subject, 
regardless of the ethics and politics of those who theorize the subject, 
license the construction of social subjects who behave and consume in 
ways most beneficial to those who control representation? Given the 
power of the media, the subject deconstructed inevitably will be 
reconstructed in some form, old or new, and if so, on what basis shall 
that reconstruction be conducted? 
(Gaggi, 1997, p. xi) 
Against this background of such heavy implication in the subjection of the 
subject at the levels of both force and persuasion, and suspicion at the ways in 
which technologies of the media may be used to construct passive and powerless 
subjects or consumers it can be difficult to see how technology may be 
extricated from these uses and applied in more positive ways, or indeed how 
hypertext as an advanced technology of language or writing can fail to be 
complicit in the technological 'project'. But the implication of technology in the 
subjection of the subject is not merely a consequence of its being deliberately 
employed by those in power and used in the service of force and ideology: as has 
already been argued, subjects are already in technology when they enter into 
language. We cannot, then, simply do without technology or regress from its use. 
But as with language this should not leave us as subjects completely powerless; 
there are still decisions to be made regarding exactly how technology is to be 
used (just as there are lingUistic choices to be made), and if we cannot always 
112 Although he also goes on to argue that this passivity is not without some form of 
agency, that it in fact constitutes a strategy on the part of the subject, albeit a negative 
one (see 'The Masses: The Implosion of the Social in the Media' in Baudrillard, 1989). 
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make these decisions on an individual basis, we may at least attempt collectively 
to influence how they are made at governmental level (through political protest, 
for example, as has been the case for many years with the work of the Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament whose presence at the Faslane nuclear base in 
Scotland, incidentally, has frequently over the years been supported by Alasdair 
Gray). 
The narrator of Gray's story 'Wellbeing' in The Ends of Our Tethers describes 
a dream he has in which advanced technological devices are used to protect the 
wealthy and powerful and to repress anyone else: 
I dreamed of a future state in which human police had disappeared 
because the rich no longer needed them. The rich never left their 
luxurious, well-defended homes except when visiting each other in 
vehicles moving at the speed of light. Each home was protected by a 
metallic creature the size of a kitten and resembling a cockroach. It hid 
under chairs and sideboards and was programmed to kill intruders. 
(The Ends of Our Tethers, p. 165) 
The Ends of Our Tethers is Gray's most recent fictional collection and displays a 
marked and grown sense of anger and frustration at the misuse of technology in 
general, at its implication in such destructive purposes as those imagined in 
'Wellbeing' (and at its perceived negative effect on the private lives of 
individuals as already witnessed in 'Pillow Talk' and 'No Bluebeard'). Although 
'Wellbeing' is not itself a new story it fits well with the agitated mood of the 
rest of the collection. Gray does indeed appear to be at the end of his tether, 
losing patience and faith that humans might work together and employ 
technology wisely for the common good. 113 That this could be possible is 
suggested earlier in 'Wellbeing': 
I used to have several friends with homes and visited each of them once 
a fortnight. They gave me food and a bed for the night and put my 
clothes through a machine. Modern machines do not only wash, dry and 
iron, they remove stains, mend holes, replace lost buttons and re-dye 
faded fabric to look like new. Or am I dreaming that? If I am dreaming 
113 The notion of humans as bound or tethered is reflected in both the title and cover art 
of this collection, which depicts a naked man (Prometheus again perhaps, a little older 
than before?) with ropes around his neck and waist being pulled in opposite directions by 
two monstrous skulls who hold the ropes with their teeth. That these monstrous skulls 
may represent humans made monstrous by technology fits in with some of the ideas 
already suggested in this chapter· that technology both dehumanises and creates 
monsters - that will be explored further in the next. 
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such a machine it is certainly possible because, as William Blake said, 
nothing exists which was not first dreamed. 
(The Ends of Our Tethers, p. 163)114 
114 This idea that positive change is something that needs first to be imagined is one that 
is familiar from other encounters with Gray's fiction. In Lanark, for example, Duncan 
Thaw explains to his friend Kenneth McAlpin that Glasgow is not being improved because 
no one imagines its improvement: "'Glasgow is a magnificent city," said McAlpin. "Why 
do we hardly ever notice that?" "Because nobody imagines living here," said Thaw .... 
"think of Florence, Paris, London, New York. Nobody visiting them for the first time is a 
stranger because he's already visited them in paintings, novels, history books and films. 
But if a city hasn't been used by an artist not even the inhabitants live there 
imaginatively. What is Glasgow to most of us? A house, the place we work, a football 
park or golf course, some pubs and connecting streets. That's all. No, I'm wrong, there's 
also the cinema and library. And when our imagination needs exercise we use these to 
visit London, Paris, Rome under the Caesars, the American West at the turn of the 
century, anywhere but here and now. Imaginatively Glasgow exists as a music-hall song 
and a few bad novels. That's all we've given to the world outside. It's all we've given to 
ourselves'" (Lanark, p. 243). Glasgow, Thaw suggests, has not yet been imaginatively 
transformed by art and as such its inhabitants are unable to conceive of Glasgow as a city 
that can change, that can become more than just the sum of a house, place of work, 
football park etc. In this can be seen Gray's own sense of responsibility as an artist (as a 
writer of books for the public and a painter of portraits and murals for the public) to 
creatively transform Glasgow and indeed Scotland, as he does in his own work. Thaw's 
view of his function as artist links the notion of the artist's creative responsibility with 
the concept of the need for 'work' that has already been discussed; the nobility of the 
idea that the artist is in some way a martyr to his work, burdened by it and by the sense 
that it should be shared in a socially responsible way is undercut by the less flattering 
but equally plausible idea that the artist simply functions out of the selfish need for work 
and purpose: 'After a moment McAlpin said, "So you paint to give Glasgow a more 
imaginative life?",' to which Thaw responds, "No. That's my excuse. I paint because I 
feel cheap and purposeless when I don't" (Lanark, p. 244). The tradition of the artist's 
role as dreamer, responsible for imaginative transformations which may point to the 
possibility of real political change harks back to William Blake's visionary dream 
tradition, as Gray points out. That Gray's 'work' follows in the tradition of Blake will be 
suggested again in the next chapter. Gray's seeming frustration with technology may also 
be compared with Blake's. J. Bronowski writes that Blake's 'prejudices against some 
kinds of painting and many kinds of science grew stronger, for the failure of his Radical 
hopes now made him suspicious of rational and material plans for human betterment' 
(from the introduction to William Blake: A Selection of Poems and Letters, p. 10). The 
artist, to Blake and to Gray can be seen to be a creative agent for change, and the 
concepts of agency and responsibility can be contrasted with the view of the human 
subject as subjugated and determined by external forces. It is interesting to note that in 
'Five Letters from an Eastern Empire' the agency of the artist or tragic poet Bohu in 
creating a poem that condemns the emperor (and is imaginatively and politically 
volatile) is wholly undermined by the creative transformations of the headmaster of 
literature. The free will of the artist is thus crushed - or at least manipulated in ways 
intended to function ideologically and politically conservatively - by the external forces 
of the State or in this case empire. What is noticeable is that the artist in this situation 
retains complete integrity, though his words have been used against his wishes; this may 
help to explain Gray's often scarcely veiled contempt for the critics and academics who 
can twist words to suit themselves, disregarding what the artist may claim to be the 
work's 'intendon'. (Gray's own tendency to want to control the way his work is received 
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This dream of the possibilities for technology may seem rather prosaic, but 
technological innovations can here be seen to improve the conditions of 
everyday life in ways that would benefit most working folk by easing their 
domestic workload; it is certainly a more optimistic dream of technology than 
that expressed formerly and highlights the point made in the Introduction that it 
is not technology by itself that does damage, but technology as it is manipulated 
politically, often destructively. As Gray's narrator here points out, the very act 
of imagining such positively useful implementations of technology should serve 
to instate them as real possibilities. 115 
will be discussed again in the following chapter.) In 'Prometheus' Lucie tells the 
narrator: "At university you were my special study. Do you know how the professors use 
you? Not to free, but to bind. You are understood to support their systems. The students 
study commentaries on your book, not the book itself. I defended your assertion of the 
radical, sensual monosyllable. I was not allowed to complete the course" (Unlikely 
Stories, Mostly, p. 212): Academia, here as in Bohu's empire, is shown to function as an 
Ideological State Apparatus; one that all the while binds as it pretends to enlighten. 
115 Though one must be careful not to suggest that technology can simply be extracted 
from its negative uses and put to purely positive ones, for inherent in such a simplistic 
view is the belief again that technology could always be used to free rather than to bind 
human subjects (thus merely restating the object of the so-called technological 
'project', which is to create some sort of rational Utopia such as that envisioned by 
Vannevar Bush and others). As has already been pointed out, technology is already 
complicit in conditioning subjectivity - it always already binds - and cannot therefore 
ever be used to attain complete freedom (though this does not of course mean that it 
cannot be used positively, just that this should not be equated with or mistaken for the 
path to liberation). Kitwood, though his argument seems well enough motivated, misses 
this point and thus argues naiVely for something that is impossible: a conscious return to 
an unconscious (and so pre-linguistic) state and for a regression from and re-
appropriation of technology. He writes that, 'every advance in consciousness, through 
education, the arts, all efforts at 'consciousness-raising', needs to be accompanied by a 
parallel return to the unconscious, a renewal of contact with the world of phantasy 
which is present in all persons but denied by most. And this, not in quietism or pietism, 
but in the midst of current struggles and projects. For here lies the source of energy, the 
fertile soil of new vision. So we look for a culture in which, eventually, the Western 
'error' of forcing a division between conscious and unconscious - that error established 
by the 'scientific revolution' and 'corrected for' by psychoanalysis - is transcended. And 
we look, eventually, for new forms of scientific and technical practice, integrated into 
genuinely human concerns, the material basis for the freedom and well-being of all' 
(Kitwood, 1984, p.104). Better, I think (or more measured), to take Nietzsche's view of 
The Gay Science that one form of technological employment will not necessarily preclude 
another (one 'bad' use being the binary opposite of the 'good' other), but rather that 
one may contain the possibilities (trace or inscription) of alternative others. 
Technological 'freedom' or progress, then, will be inevitably accompanied by 
technological bondage. Nietzsche writes: 'The aim of science should be to give men as 
much pleasure and as little displeasure as possible? But what if pleasure and displeasure 
were so tied together that whoever wanted to have as much as possible of one must also 
have as much as possible of the other - that whoever wanted to learn to "jubilate up to 
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It can also be argued that the two dreams display differing views on the 
relationship between technology and the political economy of capitalism. In the 
first dream here described, technology reinforces the conditions of capitalism by 
protecting only the wealthy and ensuring that anyone who 'intrudes' upon or 
challenges the capitalist order will be punished. In the second dream, technology 
can be viewed as subverting capitalism through the machines that mend clothes 
and make them look new again; this will mean that people need not always buy 
new clothes, thus ensuring that they do not consume in the ways necessary for 
capitalism to thrive. Michael Thompson in his book Rubbish Theory suggests that 
goods and objects in the world can be divided into three categories: durable 
(objects like antiques, for example, that are unlikely to need replaced in a 
lifetime); transient (objects that will depreciate in value and deteriorate in a 
relatively short period of time, like clothes and cars and foodstuffs); and rubbish 
(objects of no value). These categories are tied to the normal conditions of 
production and consumption. Very basically speaking, the capitalist rules of 
production and consumption depend on transient objects being consumed at a 
rate that will require continual reproduction. Durable objects, too, will 
eventually need to be replaced. Rubbish, being of no value, does not really 
interfere with these economic rules; rubbish, rather, is taken as the rather 
unpleasant but necessary result or by-product of objects from the durable and 
transient categories losing their use-value (by being worn out or broken, for 
example). So durable and transient items, in the normal order of things, can slip 
into the rubbish category through time, from whence they will largely be 
ignored. Rubbish, Thompson argues, is a covert category that people do not in 
general like to acknowledge: rubbish, including bodily waste, is rather to be 
quickly disposed of (and dealt with or consumed by refuse disposal services) or 
placed out of sight and ignored. Items in the rubbish category are destined to 
stay there and cannot make the transition back to transience or the leap to 
durability (with the exception of some art objects, like Marcel Duchamp's 
the heavens" would also have to be prepared for "depression unto death"? And that is 
how things may well be .... So far [science] may still be better known for its power of 
depriving man of his joys and making him colder, more like a statue, more stoic. But it 
might yet be found to be the great dispenser of pain. And then its counterforce might be 
found at the same time: its immense capacity for making new galaxies of joy flare up' 
(Nietzsche, 1974, p. 85-86). 
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famous urinal or some of Damien Hirst's formaldehyde creations, which make art 
out of waste and thus transfer it as art object to the durable category. This type 
of transference, Thompson points out, is closely connected to social class since 
those who decide that a particular item of rubbish warrants the title of art are 
unlikely to be members of the working class who have found a decomposing 
animal in their back garden and decided it ought to be worth some money and 
critical attention. Only those in the upper social classes may confer value on the 
valueless in this way116). The clothes-mending machines that Gray's narrator 
describes in his dream upset the normal movements between Thompson's 
categories and the production/consumption ratio that sustains capitalism by 
enabling working class people to use the machines to make worn-out (and 
valueless) clothes wearable (and valuable) again and allowing the (hitherto 
impossible) transfer from the covert category of rubbish back to the overt 
category of transient (or perhaps even durable) object. 117 
116 Illustrating this point well is the piece of art entitled 'bum garden' in Gray's 
Something Leather. The bum garden is a piece of 'conceptual art' made by public 
schoolgirl Harry when she is just seven years old. Because of Harry's elite social status 
her childish bum garden is taken seriously by the art world, or, specifically, by the media 
who control it: 'Since Harry is splendidly gaunt, related to royalty and makes weirdly 
fashionable objects she is photographed for glossy publications financed by art and 
property manipulators' (Something Leather, p. 145). 
117 This hugely oversimplifies Thompson's complex and fascinating study (see Thompson, 
1979). Thompson argues that recycling of waste - and the clothes-mending machines of 
the narrator's dream in 'Wellbeing' may be viewed as recycling machines - is a 
potentially subversive activity involving individuals in the consumption of rubbish 
(normally left to refuse disposal services and generally thought of with revulsion) and the 
transformation (or reproduction) of rubbish back to something of value (though he 
associates recycling explicitly with the middle classes, which restricts its force or 
potency in this sense). He writes of the recycling phenomenon: 'Since the 'production to 
transient to consumption' sequence provides the norm, and since the rubbish category is 
also covert, there is a tendency to ignore, and even deliberately to deny, the existence 
of this consumption of rubbish. Consumption is normally assumed to mean the 
consumption of valuable things and, in consequence, a person's level of consumption 
provides an indication of his status and power. The overt inclusion of the transfer 
'rubbish to consumption' would play havoc with keeping up with the Joneses. After all, 
the his-and-her-Jensen-Interceptor family is hardly likely to be outfaced by the ardent 
composters next door. But perhaps this is not so ridiculous as it sounds. If one accepts 
the consumption of rubbish as part of consumption - that is, if one makes rubbish overt 
rather than covert - then the compost heap becomes a powerful status symbol. The 
growing concern with ecology, pollution, and conservation inevitably makes rubbish overt 
and allows the development of that most prestigious of all consumption activities, 
conspicuous non-consumption. Hence the compost heaps, the macrobiotic food, the little 
French cars, the dendrophilia, and the country cottages of those whose income and 
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Both dreams in fWellbeing' are equal technological possibilities, but 
capitalism, as an economic system based around the creation and preservation of 
monetary wealth in a competitive market, may be more likely to realise the 
dream - or nightmare - where technology merely protects wealth. Technology in 
this case, in serving to protect the wealthy physically with light-speed vehicles 
and home protection devices would also shield them from the evidence of life 
outside their own environment, which will not likely be so comfortable. Such a 
notion of technology has been explored by Gray before. In fThe Trendelenburg 
Position', technology in the form of fvirtual reality' helmets (and even complete 
suits) enables individuals to protect or certainly distract themselves from the life 
that goes on in the world of real reality beyond the virtual environment. The 
subject can again retreat from the world of (necessary) political action - to a 
safe, virtual world, one in which they need not be faced with any difficult or 
serious decisions and choices. fThe Trendelenburg Position' sees a dentist talk to 
a patient about his opinions on the world, including his view of virtual reality. 
The patient, reclining in a chair in the so-called Trendelenburg position, is kept 
in this position from which she is told she is in no danger of losing consciousness, 
yet from which she cannot easily move while the dentist works on her and talks 
to her: 
I am starting the motor - which lowers and tilts the chair - so easily and 
smoothly that your heart and semi-circular canals have suffered no shock 
or disturbance. The Trendelenburg Position - that is what we call the 
position you are in, Mrs Chigwell. This chair gets you into it, and out of 
it, in a manner which ensures you cannot possibly faint. 
(Ten Tales Tall 8: True, p. 102-103) 
The position, along with the fact that the dentist is working on her mouth so that 
she may not speak also ensures that Mrs Chigwell must endure the banal chatter 
of the dentist without being able either to get away or contribute to the 
conversation herself. Simply speaking, the dentist can keep her where he wants 
her and she has no recourse to complaint or escape. Since Mrs Chigwell cannot 
answer for herself, the dentist simply answers his own questions for her: fOO I 
educational status are such that never for one moment could we confuse them with rude 
peasants so poor as to be unable to afford chemical fertilizers, fresh meat and Mother's 
Pride bread, chain saws, and proper vehicles' (Thompson, 1979, p. 117). The notion of 
the subversive nature of recycling will be discussed again in Chapter 4 with relation to 
the recycling of texts. 
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bother you, talking away like this? No? Good. You probably realize I do it to stop 
your imagination wandering, as it would tend to do if I worked in perfect silence' 
(Ten Tales Tall Et True, p. 103). He here not only talks on her behalf, he also 
presumes to tell her what she thinks or treatises' and does it deliberately to stop 
her thinking for herself, as she may do if her imagination has the chance to 
wander. In effect, the Trendelenburg position keeps Mrs Chigwell in the same 
state as someone wearing one of the virtual reality suits the dentist describes to 
her, a state wherein the virtual reality environment surrounding them both keeps 
and distracts subjects from questioning or complaining about their position in the 
outside world. 
He describes to Mrs Chigwell the benefits of virtual reality helmets: 
by the end of the century everybody will have headgear. Their sanity will 
depend on it. Am I boring you? Shall I change the subject? Would you like 
to suggest another topic of conversation? No? Rinse your mouth out all 
the same. 
The hat of the future - in my opinion - will ... have a visor like old 
suits of armour or modern welders have, but when pulled down over your 
face the inside works as a telly screen .... The difference between one 
hat and another will be the number of different channels you can afford. 
The wealthy will have no limit to them, but the homeless and 
unemployed will benefit too. I am not one of these heartless people who 
despise the unemployed for watching television all day. Without some 
entertainment they would turn to drugs, crime and suidde even more 
than they're doing already. 
(Ten Tales Tall a True, p. 106-107) 
Virtual reality from this perspective simply becomes the new opiate of the 
masses, replacing television as the broadcast media form that keeps subjects 
viewing passively and so diverts them from alternative action. It also confirms 
social inequalities by enabling the wealthy to exercise a greater degree of choice 
in deciding which virtual realities to tparticipate' in. In all cases, however, the 
real conditions of existence (and subjection) are being ignored. As the marginal 
comment suggests, virtual reality is taken to provide THE ANTIDOTE FOR 
EVERYTHING' (Ten Tales Tall Et True, p. 109) and protects subjects from what 
they would rather not see: tThe hat of tomorrow - an audio-visual helmet with or 
without the suit - will not only release you into an exciting world of your own 
choice; it will shut out the dirty, unpleasant future my wife keeps worrying 
about' (Ten Tales Tall Et True, p. 108-109). This tdirty, unpleasant future' 
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includes extreme poverty and homelessness yet virtual reality, the dentist 
maintains, would distract thought from even these: 
In tropical countries, like India, homeless people live and sleep quite 
comfortably in the streets .... Why not add Virtual Reality visors and 
pressure pads to ... suits and give them to our paupers? Tune them into a 
channel of a warm Samoan beach under the stars with the partner of 
their choice and they'll happily pass a rainy night in the rubble of a 
burnt-out housing scheme and please rinse your mouth out. 
(Ten Tales Tall a: True, p. 109-110) 
Virtual reality as a use of technology, then, instead of addressing social problems 
and attempting to redress inequalities functions simply to direct attention away 
from them. Subjects engaged in virtual reality are kept - like Mrs Chigwell in the 
dentist's chair - entirely prone and subdued. 
As argued in the preceding chapter there is a danger that authors of 
hypermedia may attempt to create similar such sensory virtual environments, 
environments that fuse audio-visual data (and in the future, as Delany and 
Landow enthusiastically suggested, may include other sensory data of smell and 
touch) in an aim to represent tthe complex interrelatedness of everyday 
consciousness' (Delany and Landow, 1991, p. 7). Such hypermedia applications 
may offer little more than passive entertainment: visually impressive 
environments that absorb attention but do not really engage the subject in the 
work of constructive thought or decision-making. Bolter writes of the 
possibilities for a hypermedia encyclopaedia: 
In more than one proposal for the encyclopedia of the future, the 
pictures, sounds, and even smells and tastes seem to overwhelm and 
replace verbal text. The result would not be principally a hypertext, but 
instead a multimedia presentation in which the computer addresses all 
the reader's senses and puts the reader into the situation described. 
Readers do not read about the French Revolution; they visit Paris in 
1789. They do not read about the chemistry of rubber; they take part in 
an experiment. They do not read about Jupiter, but instead board a 
simulated spacecraft heading for the planet. 
Such multimedia displays would seem to expand the range and the 
power of the encyclopedia, to be the computer's equivalent to the 
diagrams or pictures common in printed encyclopedias since the 18th 
century .... But there is a danger in such an encyclopedia of losing the 
symbolic character of reading and writing. As an encyclopedic computer 
program grows more elaborate, it may make more decisions for the 
reader and present these decisions in a perceptual, rather than symbolic 
form. The reader becomes a mere viewer, and the encyclopedia becomes 
interactive television, or what is now sometimes called "virtual reality." 
... [C]omputerized simulated environments are in general anti-books. 
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Entering into an environment is the antithesis of reading, because in 
place of a symbolic structure of words, equations, graphs, and images, 
the program offers the user the illusion of perceptual experience. An 
encounter with texts is replaced by perceptions, and the distancing and 
abstracting quality of text is lost. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 97_99)118 
Many examples of hypermedia, Coover argues, lack genuine interactivity. 
Instead, he writes, 'the reader is commonly obliged ... to enter the media-rich 
but ineluctable flow as directed by the author or authors: In a sense, it's back to 
the movies again, that most passive and imperious of forms' (Coover, 1999). That 
hypermedia may be manipulated to the same 'realistic' ends as cinema - as a 
media form that simply seems to present or represent alternative 'realities' and 
as such functions to provide the sort of cinematic escapism Thaw described to 
McAlpin in Lanark - is one that Ulmer, too, has suggested: 
The same drive of realism that led in cinema to the "invisible style" of 
Hollywood narrative films, and to the occultation of the production 
process in favor of a consumption of the product as if it were "natural," 
is at work again in computing. Articles published in computer magazines 
declare that "the ultimate goal of computer technology is to make the 
computer disappear, that the technology should be so transparent, so 
invisible to the user, that for practical purposes the computer does not 
exist. In its perfect form, the computer and its application stand outside 
data content so that the user may be completely absorbed in the subject 
matter - it allows a person to interact with the computer just as if the 
computer were itself human" (Macuser, March, 1989). It was clear that 
the efforts of critique to expose the oppressive effects of "the suture" in 
cinema (the effect binding the spectator to the illusion of a complete 
reality) had made no impression on the computer industry, whose 
professionals (including many academics) are in the process of designing 
"seamless" information environments for hypermedia applications. 
(Ulmer, 1991, section 1) 
Such environments would function as 'virtual reality': a reality that is only 
illusory but which is at the same time realistic enough to keep subjects 
118 Although Bolter describes such simulated hypermedia environments as anti-books, he 
also points out that books themselves - and in particular genre fiction like science fiction 
or romance - can be gUilty of keeping their readers passive. In the case of reading such 
fiction, he argues, as with watching television, 'the reader or viewer assumes a passive 
role, enters into the text, and loses any real critical distance. In fact, passive reading, 
the desire to be surrounded by the text, is as close as reading can come to being a 
perceptual rather than a semiotic experience .... [T]he passive role of the genre reader is 
a way of watching a book as if it were television. The goal of passive reading is to forget 
oneself by identifying with the narrative world presented' (Bolter, 1991, p. 228). This 
question of the possibility of the reader attaining a 'critical distance' from text will be 
looked at again shortly. 
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distracted from the serious business of real life (and Joyce points out that 
hypertext author Stuart Moulthrop 'has argued that hypertext could be pre-
empted by the "military infotainment establishment" or offered as a diversion to 
a dissatisfied society in lieu of real access or power' (Joyce, 1996a, p. 26)). 
This of course is a possibility, that hypermedia too will function ideologically, 
creating an illusion (,virtual reality') that is an allusion but which is affirmative 
in the way Marcuse suggests of culture, creating an alternative environment that 
would seem to offer an 'interactive' reading experience - thus pacifying the 
subject's desire for participation, to exert themselves as 'autonomous' agents -
but that either directs them as Coover suggests according to the author's wishes 
or offers them choices that are of little or no constructive value. Hypertext does 
set itself up as an interactive antidote to the 'passive' consumption of texts; 
readers must not only read hypertexts, they must make choices regarding which 
links to follow and this it is argued will empower the reader. Such an equation of 
choice with empowerment is a common stratagem of capitalist ideology in 
interpellating subjects that believe themselves autonomous. Belsey writes: 'It is 
in the epoch of capitalism that ideology emphasizes the value of individual 
freedom, freedom of conscience and, of course, consumer choice in all the 
multiplicity of its forms' (Belsey, 1980, p. 67). Such a prizing of the concept of 
choice has led, for example, to the large numbers of television channels 
available for viewers to choose between (supported by digital technology, which 
also now facilitates 'interactive' TV) or the array of products that line the 
shelves of supermarket chains, but as George Monbiot argues (and as Gaggi has 
also recognised) these choices are quantitative rather than qualitative (due 
largely to the consolidation of big businesses in global capitalism; the 
consolidation of the Sky television companies is a case in point). Monbiot writes: 
One result of this consolidation is that we are faced with a profusion of 
minor choices and a dearth of major choices. We can enter a superstore 
and choose between twenty different brands of margarine, but many of 
us have no choice but to enter the superstore. Were we to tell the 
corporations dominating some sectors that, dissatisfied with their 
services, we shall take our custom elsewhere, they would ask us which 
planet we had in mind. 
(Monbiot, 2000, p. 16) 
The wealthier subjects described in the dentist's virtual reality future of 'The 
Trendelenburg Position', though they may have access to a greater number of 
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available choices regarding which virtual reality environments to enter are still 
at the end of the day duped by this erroneous equation of choice with freedom, 
for their choices are still only of the minor type that Monbiot describes and will 
not change the circumstances of their lives beyond the illusory, virtual level. The 
problems of their realities will still exist if they can only take off their virtual 
reality helmets long enough to see them. The notion and stratagem of choice, 
then, functions simply as a palliative, to placate and interpellate subjects that 
(mis)recognise themselves as autonomous, as free to choose. As such we ought to 
be wary as readers of hypertext that we are not seduced simply by the number 
of textual choices hypertext gives us, for these choices may too be of the minor 
variety. Joyce has already complained that the proliferation of Hypercard 
applications of the 1980s and 1990s used hypertextual features in often 
irrelevant ways, adorning texts with 'hypertextual' bells and whistles that did 
little to engage readers constructively and rather forced them along textual 
paths determined by the software's author or authors (see footnote 70). For 
hypertext to live up to its potential as a truly interactive textual form it must 
therefore offer textual choices that are genuinely constructive rather than trivial 
or pointless. As Gaggi states, confirming Monbiot's earlier point: 
[T]he choices available in hypertext· the texts included and the links 
among them· must be significant. Hypertext, huge as it may be, cannot 
be total, cannot contain all texts ever produced by humans. Therefore, 
those texts that are made available must be made meaningful. In 
television it is the proliferation of irrelevant choices that produces a 
specious freedom that obscures increasingly powerful constraints on 
imaginable possibilities. Ninety cable channels might broadcast shows 
that entertain but none of which contain serious sodal or political 
analysis. Thus, viewers are provided with an illusion of freedom that is 
really equivalent to a grocery aisle filled with different brands of laundry 
detergent. They can point to all kinds of objectively real choices that 
provide evidence for an unprecedented freedom they seem to possess, at 
the same time that their lives are increasingly constrained ideologically 
by sophisticated commercials and entertainment shows that construct 
consumer subjects. Incapable of conceiving things or themselves 
differently, convinced that the choices they are presented with are the 
most anyone can reasonably expect, viewers are impotent to affect 
things that touch them in important ways. '" If hypertext also comes to 
be dominated by the interactive equivalents of sitcoms or home 
shopping, not much will really be gained and the interaction will be 
meaningless. What is worse is that, because it will present itself as an 
enlargement of choices but limit those choices to the trivial, it will really 
be a means of control disguising itself as freedom. 
(Gaggi, 1997, p. 121) 
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Network-structured hypertexts or hypermedia may offer the subject the best 
chance of making meaningful choices, for the choices made regarding which links 
to follow will directly affect the way the text is constructed from its composite 
parts or lexias. Because the hypertext exists only as a collection of lexias and 
does not have a prearranged narrative order, the active participation of the 
reader is required to stitch together the disparate patchwork parts (which may 
include image or audio components as well as text), to create a new - and 
always malleable - narrative path. This narrative flexibility as already pointed 
out stresses the hypertext's own status as constructed textual entity or, rather, 
as text under construction: it is not fixed or given, but talways-to-be-validated,' 
a phrase Christopher Norris has used to refer to Nietzsche's philosophical 
methods that seems appropriate here (Norris, 1991, p. 83). Network-structured 
hypertexts, in appearing as sets of lexias tto-be-validated' or made into 
narrative direct attention towards the text's own artifice and architecture, 
especially in environments like Storyspace where lexias may be viewed onscreen 
alongside map windows showing diagrammatic and structural representations of 
the relationships between them as already illustrated in the preceding chapter 
(see Fig. 2.1). In these cases the hypertextual scene is obviously artificial yet 
still visually engaging: it is theatrical rather than cinematic and requires that the 
reader as well as the text tperform'. Such hypertexts do not attempt to present 
themselves as transparent in the realistic and cinematic tseamless' mode Ulmer 
suggests is elsewhere prevalent in computer and hypermedia applications and do 
not therefore allow the reader to slip easily into the passive role of spectator. 
Since the reader is implicated in the process of the text's construction this 
narrative building work becomes a self-conscious undertaking. As such the reader 
is less likely to become completely absorbed or tlost' in the text in the way that 
virtual reality environments - or genre fiction as Bolter observed - may absorb 
and engross subjects. The reader rather remains conscious of his or her role in 
the performance or work of narrative accretion and conscious also of the 
technological mediation that is taking place: what is offered is not an escape 
from reality into a seamless media environment, but an insight into the way that 
technology (in this case the technological apparatus of the computer) and the 
technologies of writing can be used to construct alternative - and artificial -
narrative realities. 
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Such an emphasis on textual architecture and narrative device has already 
been witnessed in many of the printed texts mentioned in Chapter 1, including 
those of Alasdair Gray, paratextual infringements on the 'main' body of text, 
'authorial' intrusions and the like consistently reminding the reader of the 
textual fabrication that is in process. And as with an awareness of the 
constructed ness of the 'self' , this can underline the possibilities for change, for 
the realisation of imaginative transformation: 'self' and 'story', those two 
fundamentally interdependent concepts, are not fixed or given but in process or 
'always-to-be-validated' (and the subject, though not wholly autonomous, is not 
entirely powerless either and as such can play an active role in proceedings). 
From the prescription of the narrator in Flann O'Brien's At Swim-Two-Birds that 
, a satisfactory novel should be a self-evident sham to which the reader could 
regulate at will the degree of his credulity' (At Swim-Two-Birds, p. 25) to the 
revelation of the 'damned conjuror' Nastler to Lanark that his entire reality "is 
made of one thing .... Print" (Lanark, pp. 484 and 485), the reader is confronted 
with a deliberate exposition of the mechanisms of narrative. Whilst the 
disarming effect of device foregrounding has been dissipated somewhat by the 
use of such 'postmodern' techniques for mainstream and commercial purposes -
Currie, for example, points out that subjects may now be interpellated ironically 
as 'self-conscious' consumers119 - there is a difference between the type of 
passive cynicism produced or confirmed by television and advertising and the 
vigilance of the reader of print or hypertext encouraged to think that they can 
actively engage in the positive work of narrative construction. 
That postmodernism has been taken by some critics, Jameson among them, to 
remove the individual from the possibility of (responsible and political) action is 
a point that has been touched upon briefly in Chapter 1. Postmodernism, for 
119 He writes: 'There is an atmosphere of spoofery [in TV advertisements], of ironic self-
distance, sometimes of ideological candour which reproduces the experimental 
techniques of postmodern fictional narratives as if this kind of knowingness were the only 
remaining mode of narrative persuasion. The narrative of a television advertisement 
often has to distance itself from the product, or from conventional marketing rhetoric, 
to sell it, creating a complicity between the narrative and its suspicious, resistant 
viewers through the device of bearing the device. If the process of interpellation as 
Althusser described it was the process of positioning a reader within the narrative 
through identification, this new kind of interpellation seems to hail the reader into a 
position of narratological distrust' (Currie, 1998, p. 99). 
P9 
Jameson, confirms what Guy Debord termed a 'society of the spectacle': a 
society of passive subjects - or consumers - hypnotised by and subjected to the 
spectacle of mass media representations. Jameson writes that postmodernism is: 
a periodizing concept whose function is to correlate the emergence of 
new formal features in culture with the emergence of a new type of 
sodal life and a new economic order - what is often euphemistically 
called modernization, postindustrial or consumer sodety, the sodety of 
the media or the spectacle, or multinational capitalism. 
(Jameson, 1985, p.113) 
Postmodernism's concern for surfaces and for the ubiquity of media 
representations should not be taken wholly as vacuous unconcern for the 
conditions of reality though: post modernism - like poststructuralism in this sense 
- just stresses the impossibility of dispensing altogether with representation and 
'revealing' (as part of any project of enlightenment) some depth or truth below 
the surfaces (the noumena below the phenomena, to use Kantian terms). This 
aspect of postmodern theory may be defended in a similar way to 
poststructuralism (see footnote 88), for to claim that truth and reality cannot be 
separated from representation is not the same thing as to claim that truth and 
reality do not exist and that it would thus be pointless for subjects to try to 
change or engage with them, to act politically and responsibly. Truth and 
reality, always caught up in their subjective representations, simply cannot be 
objectively identified; they always come to the subject via some form of 
mediation and as such, postmodernist thought reminds us, we should be 
conscious of that (and self-conscious about the ways we are manipulated and 
constructed as subjects as a result). 
Whilst popular culture is by now completely saturated with evidence of 
'postmodern' thought and technique - indeed pop culture is in itself evidence of 
a condition of postmodernity that rejects boundaries between thigh' and flow' 
culture; it is perhaps wrong therefore to suggest that culture and postmodernity 
are actually distinguishable - and consequently some post modernist effects like 
pastiche, collage and device exposition may seem to have lost much of their 
novelty and force, some of the concerns of post modernism still hold fast and can 
still offer useful critical and discursive modes. All critical movements have their 
day and although postmodernism's star has waned it ought to be considered that 
many of the techniques commonly associated with post modernism have in fact 
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been around far longer than the term that came to be applied to them and will 
therefore have the potential to outlive it. Sterne's Tristram Shandy, for 
example, the novel that so influenced B.S. Johnson, and O'Brien's At Swim-Two-
Birds, a book that has been referred to many times in this thesis and that has a 
bearing on so much of Alasdair Gray's fiction (not least Something Leather which 
uses a quote from it as an epigraph)120 could both be argued with justification to 
be Ipostmodern' (on some levels at least), though they were written before 
(centuries before in the case of Tristram Shandy) postmodernism became the 
cultural dominant. Some of postmodernism's favoured narrative techniques, 
then, have been and will continue to be relevant far beyond the shelve-life of 
critical fashion. And they may also be used not to dispel agency or political 
responsibility on the part of the subject - or consumer within the culture of 
consumer capitalism - but to encourage it, as Randall Stevenson suggests is the 
case in Gray's fiction. He writes: 
Postmodernism may have lost its inherent radicalism, but there are still 
radical ends it can be used to achieve. Gray's insistence on his work as a 
constructed artefact, for example, is in certain ways as much an act of 
responsibility as of indulgence. Lanark, in particular, illustrates the 
paradox that the most transparently, ostentatiously artificial texts may 
be the ones most likely to redirect their readers' attention upon reality: 
as Bertolt Brecht showed, an undermining of seductive, secure 
containment within illusion encourages spectators to take responsibility 
for reshaping the world beyond the stage .... The real achievement of 
Lanark is not in seducing readers with illusion, but in allowing them to 
escape from it; in forcing them to consider conjuring and to examine and 
experience imagination as process rather than securely finished product . 
... Whatever IIgames" may be going on in Gray's texts tend, on balance, 
not to diminish but to add to the satiric, political directions which are a 
central feature of his work. 
(Stevenson, 1991, p. 60-61) 
Baudrillard's critique of the hyperreal and the passive subjects it constructs 
(subjects that are merely Ipure screen[s] ... switching center[s] for all the 
networks of influence' (Baudrillard, 1985, p. 133)) is also the product of a view 
of postmodernism wherein subjects no longer engage actively or politically with 
the world - or its representations - around them. He directly associates the 
passivity of the subject in the face of the hyperreal (even although this passivity 
120 And see Stevenson, 1991, p. 55ff. for further discussion of the influence of O'Brien's 
text on Gray. 
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is the subject's ironic strategy) as a turning away from (political) responsibility. 
The subjects of hyperreality simply disappear, just as the passive and miserable 
subjects in Lanark's Unthank - those unable to engage in meaningful work or to 
exert themselves creatively - r disappear' or are swallowed by the gaping mouth 
of the Creature. Baudrillard writes that: 
What characterizes the mass media is that they are opposed to 
mediation, intransitive, that they fabricate non communication - if one 
accepts the definition of communication as an exchange, as the 
reciprocal space of speech and response, and thus of responsibility. In 
other words, if one defines it as anything other than the simple 
emission/reception of information. 
(Baudrillard, 1989, p. 207) 
Intransitive media forms, for Baudrillard, leave subjects without means of 
communication or meaningful informational exchange, and consequently exempt 
or excluded from responsibility. The suggestion of alternative - and transitive -
media possibilities may again be found in the writings of Bertolt Brecht. As Dean 
Blobaum points out, referring to Brecht's definition of the apparatus of the radio 
as an intransitive media form, the digital technology of the computer - and 
particularly that of the computer network - can facilitate genuine information 
exchange, as well as its simple remission/reception': 
The difference between broadcast and interactive media is fundamental 
and no computer experience is required to understand it. In 1932 Bertolt 
Brecht, writing about a new technology that was quickly becoming a 
mass media, said ..... radio is one-sided when it should be two. It is purely 
an apparatus for distribution, for mere sharing out. So here is a positive 
suggestion: change this apparatus over from distribution to 
communication. The radio would be the finest possible communication 
apparatus in public life, a vast network of pipes. That is to say, it would 
be if it knew how to receive as well as transmit, how to let the listener 
speak as well as hear, how to bring him into a relationship rather than 
isolating him. On this principle the radio should step out of the supply 
business and organize its listeners as suppliers." [From 'The Radio as an 
Apparatus of Communication,' see The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, 
page 616.] It may have taken sixty years for that "vast network of pipes" 
to finally appear, and it may turn out to be pipes for the transmission of 
the written word rather than the spoken, but Brecht states succinctly the 
difference between broadcast and interactive media. 
(Blobaum, 1995) 
If political responsibility is to be associated with interaction and informational 
engagement, it could be that the digital computer is the apparatus to 
circumvent the hyperreal, if, as already stressed, it can foster interactivity at 
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meaningful levels and offer major rather than only a proliferation of minor 
choices. 121 
And even if the choices available are qualitative ones, it has been argued that 
too many choices might have a paralysing effect on the subject. Like the 
Kierkegaardian concept of dread or angst, it is suggested that subjects may be so 
alarmed at the possibility of being able to choose - at being confronted with an 
element of free will - that they are rendered immobile, so fearful of the 
consequences that they are incapable of positive action. Jock McLeish tells 
Denny that she is taught in school only to be obedient and not to think for 
herself (or to think herself capable of exercising choice) and this is a sentiment 
echoed elsewhere in Gray's fiction. In The Fall of Kelv;n Walker, Jake comments 
that, 'most people are so afraid of running their own lives that they feel 
frightened when there's no-one to bully them' (The Fall of KeMn Walker, p. 57) 
and in Mav;s Belfrage the university lecturer Colin, as Bernstein has pointed out, 
pointedly eschews Rousseau's philosophy of choice or decision-taking, preferring 
rather the Platonic model of obedience. He refuses, as one of his students tells 
him, 'to admit that choice is necessary' (Mav;s Belfrage, p. 12).122 Baudrillard 
writes: 
Choice is a strange imperative. Any philosophy which assigns man to the 
exerdse of his will can only plunge him in despair. For if nothing is more 
flattering to consciousness than to know what it wants, on the contrary 
nothing is more seductive to the other consciousness (the unconsdous?) -
the obscure and vital one which makes happiness depend on the despair 
of will - than not to know what it wants, to be relieved of choice and 
diverted from its own objective will. It is much better to rely on some 
insignificant or powerful instance than to be dependent on one's own will 
or the necessity of choice. 
(Baudrillard, 1989, p. 216) 
For Baudrillard then, the subject may be compelled to avo;d making choices 
rather than to actively pursue them. The subject, instead of feeling empowered 
by the large number of available choices, experiences: 
121 And interactivity must be accompanied by self-consdousness about how discourse is 
conducted in the electronic medium: Mark Poster points out that Oerrida, in a 
conference entitled Etats generaux de La philosophie called for • "vigilance" at a time 
when the media threaten to undermine "critical capadties for evaluation" by the 
"control, manipulation, diversion or cooptation of discourse'" (Poster, 1990, p. 100). 
122 See Mavis BeLfrage, pp. 11-13 for the debate on choice and Bernstein, 2002, p. 158ff. 
for further discussion. 
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a state of stupor ... a radical uncertainty as to our own desire, our own 
choice, our own opinion, our own will ... it is a question here of a 
completely new species of uncertainty, which results not from the lack of 
information but from information itself and even from an excess of 
information. It is information itself which produces uncertainty, and so 
this uncertainty, unlike the traditional uncertainty which could always be 
resolved, is irreparable. 
(Baudrillard, 1989, p. 209-210) 
The subject, that is to say, has too many choices, and since they render him or 
her powerless, the subject may as well - and indeed may rather - have none at 
all. 123 
While it is true that hypertext presents the reader with many alternatives 
regarding their path through the text (and certainly with many more alternatives 
than can be offered in the medium of print), these possibilities need not 
overwhelm the reader in the manner Baudrillard describes. With network-
structured hypertexts in particular the number of choices offered at one time 
can be relatively small; the reader encounters only one lexia at a time, which 
may yield to only one or to several other possible lexias. Since each lexia is 
normally only the size of a paragraph, there is little chance of the reader feeling 
stupefied by choice. The reader simply makes decisions - in the same way that 
the text is constructed - in a piecemeal fashion, incrementally from one lexia to 
the next; that the number of choices is manageable should encourage the reader 
to make decisions rather than put them off. And as has already been argued, the 
notion of choice - and of linguistic choice - offers the subject the possibility of 
some form of agency (and of taking part in the construction of their own 
subjectivities): it is the element of free will that counters the determining 
conditions of subjectivity. As such, a degree of choice should appeal to the 
123 And Gleick, too, has commented that the excess of choices to be made in our 
everyday lives, rather than empowering us, in fact robs us of time, that most precious of 
commodities. He writes: 'The very variety of experience attacks our leisure as it 
attempts to satiate us. We work for our amusement. Five hundred channels became a 
watchword of the nineties even before, strictly speaking, it became a reality. It denotes 
too much to choose from. And not just channels: coffees, magazines and on-line 'zines, 
mustards and olive oils, celebrity perfumes and celebrity rumors, fissioning musical 
styles and digitized recordings of more different performances of Beethoven's Fifth 
Symphony than Beethoven could have heard in his lifetime .... What is true is that we are 
awash in things, in information, in news, in the old rubble and shiny new toys of our 
complex Civilization, and - strange, perhaps - stuff means speed. The wave patterns of 
all these facts and choices flow and crash about us at a heightened frequency. We live in 
the buzz' (Gleick, 2000, p. 10). 
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subject (as the capitalist stratagem of consumer choice recognises and exploits): 
it is the subject's opportunity to exert themselves in the face of external forces. 
And while choice cannot ultimately lead to freedom, happiness or unity of 
identity, as consumer capitalism would have us believe, it can - if the choices 
available are meaningful enough - involve us in the responsible process of 
constructing our own linguistic and political identities and narratives. 124 
Although Baudrillard argues that the subject may unconsciously desire to be 
relieved of responsibility, his argument depends very much on the ways in which 
choices are presented to the subject, i.e. through the excessive informational 
sources of the mass media and in terms of quantity rather than quality.125 The 
124 Such a notion of free will as consisting of responsible decisions regarding the 
(external) forces which are recognised to condition subjectivity finds source in the Ethics 
of Spinoza. Spinoza argued that although subjects were bound, like Prometheus, by 
external or alien forces they could, by self-consciously recognising themselves as bound 
and attempting to understand the conditions of bondage, internalise the causes of their 
actions. Thus they could act from internal rather than purely external sources. This does 
not free the subject, but does offer a limited form of agency and thus a limited degree 
of freedom. Spinoza's philosophy of the subject who can exert free will whilst remaining 
bound reappears in poststructuralism and poststructuralist theories of the subject: the 
poststructuralist subject is capable of making choices whilst being conscious of 
conditioning forces and may therefore be a responsible (and political) agent of change. 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari contend that this free will on the part of the subject, 
which arises from desire, but desire in a multiplicity of forms rather than simply the form 
of the manque or lack defined by psychoanalysis, can in fact be revolutionary (and 
indeed is involuntarily so). They write that a subject's desire is not only 'a desire for the 
mother or for the death of the father; on the contrary, desire becomes that only because 
it is repressed, it takes that mask on under the reign of the repression that models the 
mask for it and plasters it on its face .... If desire is repressed, it is because every 
position of deSire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into question the 
established order of a society: not that desire is asocial, on the contrary. But it is 
explosive; there is no desiring-machine capable of being assembled without demolishing 
entire social sectors. Despite what some revolutionaries think about this, desire is 
revolutionary in its essence' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p. 116). That the human being 
is conceived of as an assemblage of desiring-machines (grafted onto a body (without 
organs)) is particularly pertinent in the context of the human who, through technology, 
becomes a cyborg, a theory that has already been hinted at and that wilt be explored 
again in the concluding chapter. Spinoza's notion of ethics, as Brian Massumi points out, 
also has a bearing on Nietzsche's philosophy of 'gay science' and on the 'nomad thought' 
of Deleuze and Guattari, which is relevant to the condition of the subjects of hypertext 
who must construct narrative - and thought - as they go (an idea that will also be 
returned to. See Massumi, 1992, p. 6ff.). 
125 Poster agrees that Baudrillard's arguments are reliant on particular informational 
circumstances. He writes: 'The generalization of the concept of the hyperreal from 
specific communications practices to the social totality is the problematic element in 
Baudrillard's discourse, the aspect of his position that the critical theory of the mode of 
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challenge for hypertext and hypermedia, as has already been outlined, is to offer 
the subject qualitative and manageable - and so desirable - choices. 
The type of paralysis that Baudrillard has described is a result of the subject's 
encounter with hyperreality, with an over-abundance of media representations 
or simulacra. The subject, in consequence, is not merely incapable of action but 
is also in a position where all that can be conceived is the immediacy of the 
present moment, a cultural condition commonly defined as fschizophrenia'. 
Baudrillard writes that: 
we are now in a new form of schizophrenia. No more hysteria, no more 
projective paranoia, properly speaking, but this state of terror proper to 
the schizophrenic: too great a proximity of everything, the unclean 
promiscuity of everything which touches, invests and penetrates without 
resistance, with no halo of private protection, not even his own body, to 
protect him anymore. 
The schizo is bereft of every scene, open to everything in spite of 
himself, living in the greatest confusion. He is himself obscene, the 
obscene prey of the world's obscenity. What characterizes him is less the 
loss of the real, the light years of estrangement from the real, the pathos 
of distance and radical separation, as is commonly said: but, very much 
to the contrary, the absolute proximity, the total instantaneity of things, 
the feeling of no defense, no retreat. It is the end of interiority and 
intimacy, the overexposure and transparence of the world which 
traverses him without obstacle. 
(Baudrillard, 1985, p.132-133) 
The confusion of the schizophrenic, as Baudrillard describes it, arises from his or 
her inability to comprehend existence or freality' beyond the immediacy of its 
representations. Any actions that the schizophrenic subject may make (contrary 
to Baudrillard's assertion of their passivity) will thus be consequential only in 
terms of the media moment (image or sound-bite). This is the condition of Wat's 
rational Utopia in A History Maker. Since Utopia has allegedly been reached in 
this futuristic vision of Scotland, the clans of the emergent society find they 
have little else to do other than organise battles between themselves. They need 
no longer work for a living, since the powerplants that can synthesise any object 
on demand have dispelled material want, so instead they fight amongst 
themselves for pride and to give their lives a sense of purpose. And their battles 
provide compelling images for the communications media that broadcast them 
information must reject. '" in Baudrillard's position a differential analysis of a set of 
discourses/practices recedes in favor of global statements' (Poster, 1990, p. 63-64). 
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courtesy of the 'public eye', the ever-present global surveillance network. The 
public eye - precisely as Baudrillard described - invades the lives of the subjects 
of A History Maker, leaving them 'no halo of private protection ... no defense, no 
retreat.' Their deaths become part of what Baudrillard contends has gone 
beyond the realm of the spectacle to that of 'obscenity', played out on 
television screens across the globe. 126 General Craig Douglas, head of Wat's 
Ettrick clan, urges his warriors to 'perform' for their viewing public, to provide a 
momentous image in death: 
He points upward at the public eye which floats round the standard 
between him and his crescent of soldiers, but he looks to them as he 
declares, ItThere is the eye which will show the world how the Ettrick 
clan will die, will show your sweethearts and aunts how their men can 
diel I ask you to die with me so that our death will be viewed and viewed 
again to the last days of mankind and television and time!" 
(A History Maker, p. 9-10) 
That the warriors' deaths seem only to have the consequence of creating a 
media moment is indicative of the temporal dislocation of Wat's society: they no 
longer conceive of time duratively, in terms of past and future, but focus only on 
the present, the immediacy of the image that can be played over and over again. 
Such disregard for past or future, for the causes and consequences of actions, 
constitutes cultural schizophrenia and Jameson sees this as the condition of our 
current society, which he fears 'has become incapable of dealing with time and 
history' (Jameson, 1985, p. 117). The schizophrenic 'perpetual present' that 
Jameson writes of is a common condition in Gray's fiction (Jameson, 1985, p. 
119); it has already been seen how Jock McLeish is stuck 'travelling in a circle 
again' (1982 Janine, p. 194), 'incapable of dealing with [his own] time and 
history' and how he turns to fantasy to avoid it. The female subjects of his 
fantasies are frequently ensnared in situations from which they cannot escape, 
and their bondage - like the SaM bondage of June in Something Leather - keeps 
them too in a perpetual present, as well as a perpetual state of (erotic) desire. 
The schizophrenic 'instant' and the inability of the subject to comprehend time 
linearly is captured perfectly in Gray's story 'Near the Driver', where the 
126 Baudrillard writes: 'Obscenity begins precisely when there is no more spectacle, no 
more scene, when all becomes transparence and immediate visibility, when everything is 
exposed to the harsh and inexorable light of information and communication' 
(Baudrillard, 1985, p. 130). 
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complicity of technology - and particularly digital technology - in the culture of 
schizophrenia is made explicit. The story recounts a conversation on a train 
where some passengers, including a young child, an old man and a schoolteacher 
discuss what time it is. The old man tells the time in terms of the twelve-hour 
clock as half past eleven, to which the child and the teacher respond in differing 
ways: 
"No no no!" cries the child excitedly, "Our headmaster says we shouldn't 
think about time in twelves because of computers and decimals." '" the 
teacher merely sighs. Then says, "I wish they had let us keep the old 
noon with the twelve hours before and after it. But even the station 
clocks have changed. Instead of a circular face with all the hours and 
minutes marked around the edge, past AND future, we have a square 
panel with nothing in it but the minute we're at now. Nothing eight 
hours twenty minutes, then flick! - it's nothing eight hours twenty-one. 
That makes me feel trapped. Trapped, yet pushed at the same time." 
(Ten Tales Tall 8: True, p. 132-133) 
Like Jock McLeish and his fantasy women, like June, Lanark and Rima, the 
schoolteacher is stuck in the moment, unable to identify past or future, yet she 
is still conscious and resentful of the compelling force of fthat little flick when 
one minute becomes the next' (Ten Tales Tall Et True, p. 133): as pointed out by 
Gleick in Chapter 1, digital timekeeping is responsible not just for improved 
accuracy but for the growing - or impending - sense of acceleration in everyday 
life. 
The perpetual present of the schizophrenic also constitutes a crisis of 
identity, for as Jameson points out (referring to Lacan's definition of clinical 
schizophrenia as a largely linguistic condition), identity - which has been seen to 
be linguistically constructed - depends on a durative reckoning of time. 
For Lacan, the experience of temporality, human time, past, present, 
memory, the persistence of personal identity over months and years -
this existential or experiential feeling of time itself - is also an effect of 
language. It is because language has a past and a future, because the 
sentence moves in time, that we can have what seems to us a concrete 
or lived experience of time. But since the schizophrenic does not know 
language articulation in that way, he or she does not have our experience 
of temporal continuity either, but is condemned to live in a perpetual 
present with which the various moments of his or her past have little 
connection and for which there is no conceivable future on the horizon. 
In other words, schizophrenic experience is an experience of isolated, 
disconnected, discontinuous material signifiers which fail to link up into 
a coherent sequence. The schizophrenic thus does not know personal 
identity in our sense, since our feeling of identity depends on our sense 
of the persistence of the "I" and the "me" over time. 
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(Jameson, 1985, p.119) 
If subjectivity is constructed by language over time and if in the culture of 
postmodernity the dimension of time has been shattered as Calvi no suggests (see 
If on a winter's night a traveller, p. 8), then the postmodern subject will be 
necessarily schizophrenic (if they cannot relate the fragments of time into a 
coherent patterning of past, present and future). This difficulty in piecing 
together identity through narrative is precisely what troubles Jock McLeish, what 
gives him in his own words 'vertigo': 
I can put up with a lot of present misery if it is solidly based, but if I am 
wrong about my past WHO AM I? If the reality I believed in is wrong, how 
can I right it? What solid truth can we find in our mistaken heads? My 
head is a windy cave, a narrow but bottomless pit where true and false 
memories, hopes, dreams and information blow up and down like dust in 
a draught. Vertigo. No go. 
(1982 Janine, p. 329)127 
McLeish's questioning of identity is replicated in the inner cover illustration of 
The Book of Prefaces - 'Who am I? How did I get here? Where am I going? What 
should I do?' - and the spatial as well as temporal confusion of this interrogative 
voice, along with Jock's description of his head as 'a windy cave,' is reminiscent 
of Lanark and Rima's groundless experience of time-space compression in the 
intercalendrical zone. Such spatial dislocation is also typical of post modern 
schizophrenia. The instantaneity of the media image and eradication of distance 
through global travel as well as through communications networks has been 
reflected in contemporary architecture, as Jameson points out, and has seen the 
creation of post modern spaces wherein it is difficult for the subject to orient 
him or herself. Jameson writes: 
The new space that thereby emerges involves the suppression of distance 
... and the relentless saturation of any remaining voids and empty places, 
to the point where the postmodern body - whether wandering through a 
postmodern hotel, locked into rock sound by means of headphones, or 
127 A more commonplace notion of schizophrenia is that of the split personality, a 
condition that permeates Scottish fiction from Hogg through Stevenson to Gray (his short 
story 'The Spread of Ian Nicol', as well as the doubling of Thaw ILanark and 
BellalVictoria offering ample evidence to this end). For Bella Baxter, her schizophrenia 
is also a consequence of her amnesia and struggle to construct identity, to find a past for 
herself that she can believe in and build upon. Bernstein comments that: 'Like Lanark or 
Jock McLeish, she must struggle to integrate two parts of a damaged life in an effort to 
attain a cohesive identity' (Bernstein, 1999, p. 129). 
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undergoing the multiple shocks and bombardments of the Vietnam war as 
Michael Herr conveys it to us - is now exposed to a perceptual barrage of 
immediacy from which all sheltering layers and intervening mediations 
have been removed .... 
I take such spatial peculiarities of postmodernism as symptoms and 
expressions of a new and historically original dilemma, one that involves 
our insertion as individual subjects into a multidimensional set of 
radically discontinuous realities, whose frames range from the still 
surviving spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to the unimaginable 
decentering of global capital itself. Not even Einsteinian relativity, or the 
multiple subjective worlds of the older modernists, is capable of giving 
any kind of adequate figuration to this process, which in lived experience 
makes itself felt by the so-called death of the subject, or, more exactly, 
the fragmented and schizophrenic decentering and dispersion of this last. 
(Jameson, 1991, p. 412-413) 
The problem for the subject in such spaces, as with the intercalendrical zone, 
lies in the inability to find spatial coordinates, landmarks with which subjects 
may gain their bearings, or as Jameson puts it, 'cognitively map' their 
surroundings (Jameson, 1991, p. 44). And the most disorienting of all postmodern 
spaces, he asserts, is that of digital computer networks, or 'hyperspace': 
this latest mutation in space - postmodern hyperspace- has finally 
succeeded in transcending the capadties of the individual human body to 
locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and 
cognitively to map its position in a mappable external world. It may now 
be suggested that this alarming disjunction point between the body and 
its built environment ... can itself stand as the symbol and analogon of 
that even sharper dilemma which is the incapadty of our minds, at least 
at present, to map the great global multinational and decentered 
communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual 
subjects. 
(Jameson, 1991, p. 44) 
For Jameson, the notion of cognitive mapping is crucial for it can enable the 
subject to comprehend their spatial location in relative terms: they know where 
they are in relation to other objects around them and this knowledge provides 
some stable ground and the basis for purposeful spatial traversal. As Denny tells 
Jock in 1982 Janine, 'geography is the most important thing ... Because if you 
don't know geography you don't know where you are, so everything you think is 
wrong' (1982 Janine, p. 214).128 Jameson argues that being able to construct 
128 Jock, however, sees that globalisation, which has eradicated distance, undermines 
geography in the way that Jameson suggests: 'I could tell Denny now,' he later realises, 
"Geography no longer matters because there is no near or far, the monetary sheath 
enclosing the globe has destroyed the geography of distances" (1982 janine, p. 214). 
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cognitive maps is essential if subjects are to be able to act (politically and 
responsibly), in the same way as subjects need maps to find their way around 
places, especially in city environments. He writes: fthe incapacity to map 
spatially is as crippling to political experience as the analogous incapacity to 
map spatially is for urban experience' (Jameson, 1991, p. 416). 
And while Jameson does not explicitly extend his notion of cognitive mapping 
to include mapping of the temporal environment, or situation in history, the 
cognate issues of temporal and spatial dislocation can be viewed as presenting 
similar types of problems for the subject. In order that human experience be 
meaningful, it is argued, subjects must be able to conceive of their present 
fselves' in relation to both their past and future. Such stable grounding or 
centring of the subject in time as well as in space would arguably also provide a 
basis for action in the way Jameson suggests. Subjects measure their lives 
through the measurement of time: if time cannot be measured, the 
meaningfulness of life is diminished. Lanark's persistent search for daylight is 
evidence of this need to measure time, for in Unthank - as in Thaw's Glasgow -
clocks no longer function reliably. At his friend Drummond's house, Thaw asks 
the time (the enquiry into time paralleling that of fNear the Driver'). 
Drummond's father lifts up a nearby alarm clock and says with some regret: ffThe 
hands have ceased to go round and round, and no trust whatever can be placed 
in it .... We are in the region of midnight" (Lanark, p. 273). The metaphorical 
darkness of Thaw's Glasgow (which can be compared to Gray's depiction of the 
effects of postmodernism in Sixteen Occasional Poems 1990-2000: fdarkness 
lectures to darkness on darkness/ and the darkness sees it is good' (Sixteen 
Occasional Poems 1990-2000, 5. fPostmodernism')) is reproduced literally in 
Unthank, where sunlight - signifying time - is a precious rarity. Since clocks have 
ceased to be useful, Lanark must revert to other methods of telling the time. In 
Glasgow Drummond tells Thaw, fflt's a pity Ma isn't here. She could estimate the 
time by things like passing aeroplanes" (Lanark, p. 273). Drummond's father 
confirms: 
"Oh, aye. She would shake my shoulders in bed in the morning. fHectorl 
Hectorl It's ten past four. There's Mrs. Stewart going to her work in the 
bakery - I'd know her step anywhere.' Or it would be fit's a quarter to 
eight - I can hear the horse of Eliot's milk cart two streets away.' " 
(Lanark, p. 273) 
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For Lanark in Unthank, however, there are no such dependable temporal clues or 
coordinates, for people in general no longer follow regular routines of work and 
activity. Lanark instead can only look to the sky and regularly sits on the balcony 
of the Elite Cafe to do just that. He likes daylight, so he tells Sludden, because: 
"I can measure time with it. I've counted thirty days since coming here, 
maybe I've missed a few by sleeping or drinking coffee, but when I 
remember something I can say, 'It happened two days ago,' or ten, or 
twenty. This gives my life a feeling of order." 
(Lanark, p. 273) 
Where Lanark feels the need for daylight and to measure the passing of time, 
Sludden and his clique disregard time almost completely. Sludden views time as 
restrictive, even sedative, telling Lanark: 
"No wonder you've a morbid obsession with daylight. Instead of visiting 
ten parties since you came here, laying ten women and getting drunk ten 
times, you've watched thirty days go by. Instead of making life a 
continual feast you chop it into days and swallow them regularly, like 
pills." 
(Lanark, p. 5) 
Sludden and the clique of the Elite embody what Gray depicts as the 
unenlightenment of postmodernism, for they too are happy in the darkness. Gay, 
Sludden's pitiful girlfriend, invites Lanark to sit with them in the Elite: 
She pointed to a thick red curtain which Lanark had thought covered a 
door to the cinema. She pulled it aside slightly, saying, "Come and join 
us. All the old gang are here." 
Beyond the curtain was perfect blackness. Lanark said, "There's no light 
here at all." 
"Yes there is, but your eyes take a while to get used to it." 
(Lanark, p. 44) 
What Gray considers the vacuity of postmodern life, life without substance or 
structure, is summed up by the lack of authenticity in Sludden's gang: the gang 
members are simply a group of hangers-on, followers of they know not what. Gay 
in particular is nothing but a postmodern surface or pastiche, a puppet-like body 
(without organs) that has the mouth of Sludden grafted onto the palm of its 
hand, a mouth that mocks Lanark's old-fashioned attempts to make sense of or 
measure things: 
All he could see was a perfectly shaped white little hand, the fingers 
lightly clenched, until she unclenched them to show the palm. He took a 
moment to recognize what lay on it. A mouth lay on it, grinning 
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sarcastically. It opened and said in a tiny voice, "You're trying to 
understand things, and that interests me." 
(Lanark, p. 45) 
The horror of this sight drives Lanark to the brink of suicide: to the mouth of the 
Creature that will swallow him. Standing at the edge of the pit 'He remembered 
the mouth in Gay's hand which had nothing behind it but a cold man being nasty 
to people in a dark room' (Lanark, p. 47); for Lanark, living this life bereft of 
structure and meaning is like living in the abyss - "Oh! Oh!" he exclaims on 
seeing Gay's hand, ttThis is hell!" (Lanark, p. 46) - and as such even the gaping 
jaws of the pit offer a preferable escape. 129 
Living hell, it is suggested, might be avoided if subjects could obtain a firm 
grasp or cognitive map of their spatio-temporal environments, thus providing a 
stable ground from whence to act. Such is also the conclusion of Jock McLeish, 
who realises that he may only progress from his present situation by cognitively 
engaging with his past, learning from his mistakes and thus using his history and 
memories to inform his future. What Jock feels he needs is a linear narrative, 
one that will provide him with a past and a future, and as such will function to 
posit him (though falsely, as we have seen) as a stable subject. As the narrative 
of 1982 Janine shifts from that of disjointed fantasy and fragmentary memory to 
that of bildungsroman, Jock explains: 
I am postponing the moment when I start telling my story in the difficult 
oldfashioned way, placing events in the order they befell so that I recall 
the purchase of my new suit before, and not after, I seduce Denny in it. 
This had better be done, though it will be hard. When we cannot see our 
way in the world of course we circle circle circle until we stumble on a 
straight stretch of it, but then, even though that stretch was left behind 
years ago, let us use it to go forward for a change. Straight movement 
leads to pain, of course. 
(1982 Janine, p. 192) 
129 Lanark's horror at discovering Gay is nothing but a voice, a superficial surface, finds 
parallels elsewhere in Gray's work, notably in Lanark's discovery that Nastler is no more 
than a Wizard of Oz-like conjuror and the similar revelation that the emperor in 'Five 
Letters from an Eastern Empire' is only a puppet. It echoes Marlowe's horror in Conrad's 
Heart of Darkness on finally 'discovering' that Kurtz, for all his projected aura, is just 
that: a projection, an aura created by words. Sludden, the 'cold man being nasty to 
people in a dark room,' finds his antecedent in Kurtz, who hides 'in the magnificent folds 
of eloquence the barren darkness of his heart' (Heart of Darkness, p. 98). 
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What Jock feels he needs is the same thing that the readers (inscribed and by 
implication real) of If on a winter's night a traveller feel that they too are in 
need of and consequently search for: a conventional story with a beginning, a 
middle and an end. Lamont, one of Dermot Trellis's characters in At Swim-Two-
Birds maintains: 
whether a yarn is tall or small I like to hear it well told. I like to meet a 
man that can take in hand to tell a story and not make a balls of it while 
he's at it. I like to know where I am, do you know. Everything has a 
beginning and an end. 
(At Swim-Two-Birds, p. 63) 
This need for a unified story has been theorised by Frank Kermode in his 
seminal book The Sense of an Ending. He writes that: 
it makes little difference - though it makes some - whether you believe 
in the age of the world to be six thousand years or five thousand million 
years, whether you think time will have a stop or that the world is 
eternal; there is still a need to speak humanly of a life's importance in 
relation to it - a need in the moment of existence to belong, to be 
related to a beginning and to an end. 
(Kermode, 1967, p. 3-4) 
As such, unified narratives - like the Bible - such as give shape to existence by 
projecting unity onto beginnings, middles and endings, follow a winning formula. 
The Bible in particular is especially appealing in that its unity is projected onto 
an end even beyond death (and onto its origins or genesis aeons before the 
historical 'moment' of an individual subject): the end of life, then, need not be 
the end of all things, a comforting thought for the humans stuck struggling in the 
present, and perhaps fearful of the end that they cannot see: 
Men, like poets, rush 'into the middest,' in medias res, when they are 
born; they also die in mediis rebus, and to make sense of their span they 
need fictive concords with origins and ends, such as give meaning to lives 
and to poems. The End they imagine will reflect their irreducibly 
intermediary preoccupations .... We project ourselves - a small, humble 
elect, perhaps - past the End, so as to see the structure whole, a thing 
we cannot do from our spot of time in the middle. 
(Kermode, p. 7-8) 
Hypertext, as an open and potentially fragmentary narrative form, lacks such 
projected unity. Indeed it can be argued that hypertext is more likely to 
contribute to the condition of schizophrenia. With network-structured hypertexts 
in particular the subject loses the sense of progressing through the hypertextual 
narrative from beginning to end and instead simply moves among a collection of 
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lexias. The 'present' lexia is exactly that, the present narrative moment - or 
'spot of time in the middle' - seemingly disconnected from any past or future, 
like the digital clock-face of 'Near the Driver' .130 Like the postmodern city space, 
the hypertextual space may too seem disorienting since the reader has no 
immediate idea of where they are in the text, how far through it they might be 
and how many new lexias remain to be traversed (and with hypertexts in the 
hyperspace of the web, the untraversed textual spaces may seem infinite). Gaggi 
writes: 
Individuals can access a horizon less textual space ... But in that space 
there are no clear axes or established directions, no vanishing points to 
help the subject position his or her self. The subject, physically seated in 
front of a networked computer and monitor, is in effect "everywhere and 
nowhere," conceptually occupying a virtual space that cannot be grasped 
the way streets, rooms, and natural landscapes can be grasped .... The 
groundless, shifting subject articulated by poststructuralist theory and 
represented in postmodern art and literature is actualized in the virtual 
space of hypertext. 
(Gaggi, 1999, p. 114-115) 
Attempting to cognitively map such 'horizonless' spaces is likely to prove a 
major headache for the subject. 
The problem with Jameson's argument of the need for cognitive mapping, 
however, is that imposing or projecting some conceptually unified map upon the 
130 Such an idea of a disconnected narrative moment will be undone, however, as Mark 
Currie points out with reference to Derrida, by the logic of the trace. He writes: 'there 
can be no such thing as a moment. A moment, like a word, only comes into being as a 
structure of exclusion or an undivided presence. A moment can only be present when it 
is not yet in the past and no longer in the future. But any definition of what a moment is, 
any attempt to cleanse the moment of the trace of past and future and see it as pure 
presence, will be forced to impose arbitrary boundaries which mark off the present from 
past and future. As with any structure of exclusion, the moment then becomes an entity 
in its own right but only by virtue of the fact that it has arbitrarily excluded the relations 
that constitute it. One is hard pushed to explain what one means by a moment without 
reference to the past and future because it is structured by their exclusion. According to 
Derrida, the elusive nature of the moment is like the elusive nature of undivided 
presence in general. Its autonomy or pUrity is mythical. It is a desire rather than an 
actuality. One reason that undivided presence can be understood as a desire is that it 
helps to bring the explanation of something to rest on something stable, something no 
longer in motion, no longer referring backwards or waiting to be altered' (Currie, 1998, 
p.81 - 82). I hope that the relevance of this statement to the 'individual' or 'momentary' 
hypertext lexia will be clear: though each lexia may seem disconnected, a separate 
entity (or schizophrenic 'moment') in its own right, it is only 'present' by virtue of its 
being linked to by other lexias (its lexical 'past' one might say). It also bears the traces 
of lexias still to come. The links or yielding spaces in hypertext, then, are the visible 
marks of the trace at play. 
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experience of time and space amounts to an attempt to totalise, to view the 
space to be mapped as a totality that can in fact be mapped, cognitively if not 
representatively. As such, cognitive mapping purports to construct in the mind 
another grand or explanatory narrative, one of spatio-temporal rationalisation. 131 
To conceive of time in terms of a linear 'map' of present and future will, as has 
already been discussed, be necessarily reductive, suppressing the difference that 
fragmentary or in any case multilinear accounts of history and of experience can 
allow to flourish. While Jock McLeish decides to tell his story linearly, in 'the 
difficult oldfashioned way' (1982 Janine, p. 192), this is not the only way to tell 
stories. That Something Leather takes the form of a series of interrelated and 
fragmentary tales suggests as much, based as it is on the premise of At Swim-
Two-Birds that: 
One beginning and one ending for a book was a thing I did not agree 
with. A good book may have three openings entirely dissimilar and inter-
related only in the prescience of the author, or for that matter one 
hundred times as many endings. 
(At Swim-Two-Birds, p. 9 and epigraph to Something Leather) 
In both texts, however, the need for unification persists in the notion of 'the 
prescience of the author,' for the author makes the story fragments cohere. 
Barthes's essay 'The Death of the Author', whilst dismantling such a privileged 
notion of the author as prescient source or unifying presence, still displays a 
residual thinking of textual unity as necessary, though the agent of unity 
becomes the reader rather than the author: 
a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and 
entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but 
there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the 
reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. The reader is the space on 
which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any 
131 And it would be a metanarrative relying once more upon the idea and promise of 
rational enlightenment. Christopher Norris points out that Marxist theory frequently uses 
visual and spatial metaphors to describe what it sees to be the necessary task of 
discursive criticism: to illuminate and give shape to the disorder of life (see Norris, 1991, 
p. 74ff.). Jameson's cognitive maps follow this same metaphorical tradition. Such 
metaphors also predominate in Gray's fiction: Lanark's real and figurative search for 
light to counter darkness is one example; the recurrent theme of subjects who seek 
elevated vantage points from which to surveyor topographically map their environments 
also fall into this category. Further discussion of the importance of topography in Gray's 
work can be found throughout Bernstein, 1999 as well as in Craig, 1991 (see especially 
pp. 103-107). 
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of them being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its 
destination. 
(Barthes, 1977, p. 148) 
Any notion of a text's unity must though carry some implication of its closure 
and completion, for if discontinuity can be resolved by the reader, then the 
reader will again feel stable and centred, fixed through the fixing or synthesising 
of disparate elements into a finally unified whole. 
This tends against the idea of the open-ended ness of texts and particularly of 
hypertexts, which have no 'final cut' but which are continually in process. It is 
worth remembering that both text and subject are involved in the work of 
productivity - signi/iance - rather than production. Gray's texts locate 
themselves somewhat ambivalently with relation to the notion of unity, on the 
one hand mourning lost unity in 'Wellbeing' and replicating the premise of At 
Swim-Two-Birds that the author can function to unify the text in Something 
Leather, and on the other undermining the idea that unity has been or can in 
fact be achieved at all by ending his work in what can be construed as an 
arbitrary fashion. Each printed text of Gray's end with the final flourish: 
'GOODBYE', and while this certainly signifies a departure, it is I think more 
representative of the need to bring the text to a conclusion - a task incumbent 
upon any writer, not least the writer of the present thesis - rather than of a 
feeling that the text has been finally resolved (has achieved closure in the 
traditional sense). His visual art, too, displays some evidence of this suggestion 
that the work is not closed, but has merely - and perhaps temporarily - been left 
off; his mural at the Abbot House in Dunfermline exhibits the statement 'Begun 
July 1994, Almost Finished 4.1.1996' as well as the incomplete signature, 
'Alasdair Gr', partially effacing his own role as 'author' or unifying designer and 
signalling his difficulty in considering his work finished (see Fig. 3.3 below. 
Unfortunately the dates are not legible in this image). 
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Fig. 3.3 Part of Gray's mural at the Abbot House, Dunfermline 
Gray's work, then, displays evidence of its own open-ended ness, of its status as 
work in progress as much as finished product, while still maintaining a 
relationship with traditional notions of beauty through unity by the aesthetic 
presentation of his books as discrete and individually crafted objects of art. 
That hypertexts can be open rather than closed (and again it should be 
stressed that not all hypertexts will necessarily exhibit the openness that their 
medium permits) does not mean that they lack any form of coherence 
whatsoever. Although they may not be subject to an overall unity, they may still 
display evidence of patterning, multiple layers of coherence, as with the notion 
of the hypertextual fugue discussed in Chapter 2. Bolter writes: 
An electronic book is a fragmentary and potential text, a series of self-
contained units rather than an organic, developing whole. But 
fragmentation does not imply mere disintegration. Elements in the 
electronic writing space are not simply chaotic; they are instead in a 
perpetual state of reorganization. They form patterns, constellations, 
which are in constant danger of breaking down and combining into new 
patterns. This tension leads to a new definition of unity in writing, one 
that may replace or supplement our traditional notions of the unity of 
voice and of analytic argument. The unity or coherence of an electronic 
text derives from the perpetually shifting relationship among all its 
verbal elements. 
(Bolter, 1991, p. 8-9) 
Hypertexts, and particularly network-structured hypertexts, can therefore 
encourage the idea not that narrative or story is redundant or that information 
should be reduced to incoherent fragments of textual rubble, just that story 
need not be organised in a singularly linear manner. In short, hypertext 
encourages little narratives instead of grand ones. 
Hypertexts are also not without the possibility of a degree of mapping, since 
as already indicated many hypertexts have paratextual features like the map 
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windows of Storyspace to enable the reader to orient him or herself within the 
textual network. 132 And some form of orientation is necessary to give readers the 
sense that their traversal of the hypertextual space follows some sort of pattern 
rather than being entirely random. What is notable about these hypertextual 
maps is that they are not fixed or static: the links between lexias displayed are 
dynamic paths that may not always be taken or available, depending on how the 
hypertext is being constructed, and the reader, too, may add new levels of 
movement by creating new links. The hypertextual map, then, like text and 
reader, is a productivity rather than a totality.133 Whilst a degree of mapping is 
necessary, the maps formed must always be only tentative and subject to change 
and augmentation - they must admit the possibility of difference - in order to 
avoid presenting a closed or purportedly total system. Disorientation in itself is 
also a negative term, and as ever there is another side to the coin, the trace of 
an alternative possibility. Espen J. Aarseth points to Vannevar Bush, commenting 
that in Bush's 'fascinating vision - his poetics - nonlinearity is as much a problem 
(the ttmaze") as a solution (the "trail")' (Aarseth, 1994, p. 68), and the converse 
of this statement will be equally true. Where some see a maze, a labyrinth of 
potential textual anxiety, others will see trails, the potential for alternative 
textual possibilities. Instead of thinking solely in terms of disorientation or 
spatial dislocation, then, the shifting space of hypertext might instead be viewed 
more positively as facilitating decentred textual traversal and discourse, 
enabling the reader to freely construct his or her own textual path instead of 
being forced a single predetermined one. Marginal discourses or stories will also 
be enabled to move, albeit temporarily, to the centre. Lanham comments: 'The 
norms of electronic art will be so volatile that the volatility of a nonexclusive 
132 With Storyspace, readers may switch between the diagrammatic spatial maps such as 
that illustrated in Fig. 2.1 of the preceding chapter, a hierarchical chart view or an 
indented outline view of the spaces in the map window; these features assist the reader 
in navigating through the hypertextual space. 
133 Though Jameson does seem to argue for an element of flexibility or dynamism in his 
conception of the global cognitive map, which he maintains may be continually 
remapped depending on changing routes: 'Oisalienation in the traditional city, then, 
involves the practical reconquest of a sense of place and the construction or 
reconstruction of an articulated ensemble which can be retained in memory and which 
the individual subject can map and remap along the moments of mobile, alternative 
trajectories' (Jameson, 1991, p. 51). 
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matrix will be the only norm; it will prove a great exposer of pontificating ukase' 
(Lanham, 1988, p. 278). 
As well as recentring the subject, the activity of projecting unitary schema 
onto the fluidity and difference of experience privileges the actual process of 
unification. Jameson, in stressing that time and space should be mapped or 
structured inadvertently gives false privilege to the method of structuring itself: 
cognitive mapping thus takes the form of a metalanguage, a privileged discourse 
that can organise chaos but considers itself impervious to the chaotic. This is the 
limit that all rational philosophies must finally come up against: any attempt to 
impose structure upon experience, through a process of cognitive mapping or any 
other such form of homogenisation can never be complete since to achieve 
totality it would need also to include itself. This will lead to the type of infinite 
regression witnessed in Borges's 'Library of Babel', where explanatory books of 
explanatory books proliferate, highlighting the futility of the attempt to contain 
or fix knowledge in metanarrative. Norris writes of Jameson that he: 
pins his theory to a faith that method can retain some absolute validity 
even when history and meaning have been reduced to a constantly 
shifting interplay of tropes. He sides, in other words, with that element 
of Levi-Strauss's thinking which seeks to preserve 'structure' as a mode 
of intelligibility immune to the assaults of sceptical doubt. 
(NorriS, 1991, p. 79) 
Jameson writes of the possibility of achieving 'critical distance', of obtaining an 
abstract vantage point that could provide the basis for critique. He states: 
No theory of cultural politics current on the Left today has been able to 
do without one notion or another of a certain minimal aesthetic distance, 
of the possibility of the positioning of the cultural act outside the 
massive Being of capital, from which to assault this last. What the 
burden of our preceding demonstration suggests, however, is that 
distance in general (including "critical distance" in particular) has very 
preCisely been abolished in the new space of postmodernism. We are 
submerged in its henceforth filled and suffused volumes to the point 
where our now postmodern bodies are bereft of spatial coordinates and 
practically (let alone theoretically) incapable of distantiation. 
(Jameson, 1991, p.48-49) 
Such critical distance as Jameson laments the loss of is in fact an unachievable 
ideal. It is impossible for critique to step outside of the economies of the text or 
of writing. Criticism must always be subject to writing's figurative tropes and 
rhetorical devices and as such there can be no privileged place, no 
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transcendental status for critical discourse or metalanguage. As a character in 
J.M. Coetzee's The Uves of Animals basically puts it, ffThere is no position 
outside of reason where you can stand and lecture about reason and pass 
judgement on reason" (The Uves of Animals, p. 80). 
The search for elevated perspectives that recurs throughout Gray's fiction 
inevitably addresses the same problem: it is impossible to achieve an abstract 
perspective on life while involved in the business of living. This paradox is 
highlighted in fPrometheus', where the mythical figure of Prometheus is evoked 
both generally, in the form of the divine hero with the abstract perspective and 
particularly, as the domestic man M. Pollard, a French dwarf with the involved 
(and in his case particularly lowly) view. One of the books Pollard publishes, A 
Child's Plainchant Dictionary of Abstractions itself attempts to resolve the two 
irresolvable perspectives. The book, he relates: 
was thought an inept satire against dictionaries and final proof that I was 
not a serious thinker. Twelve years later a disciple of Levi-Strauss 
discovered that, though printed as prose, each definition in my 
dictionary was a pattern of assonance, dissonance, half-rhyme and 
alliteration invoking the emotions upon which words like truth, greed, 
government, distaste and freedom depend for their meanings .... This 
realization brought me the reverence of the structuralists who now used 
my dictionary as a text in three universities. 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 204-205) 
The Dictionary of Abstractions therefore functions as metanarrative and aligns 
itself perfectly with the structuralism of Levi-Strauss, which as Norris already 
pointed out fseeks to preserve fstructure' as a mode of intelligibility immune to 
the assaults of sceptical doubt' (Norris, 1991, p. 79). Pollard/Prometheus cannot 
in the end though achieve a transcendent discursive mode while bound by the 
limits of discourse; as has already been seen he cannot gain complete (or 
unmediated) knowledge through language for such an attempt will always be 
undermined by its play: 
This story is a poem, a wordgame. I am not a highly literate French 
dwarf, my lost woman is not a revolutionary writer manque, my details 
are fictions, only my meaning is true and I must make that meaning clear 
by playing the wordgame to the bitter end. 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 231) 
Prometheus, that is to say, beyond the fictional details of Pollard, is bound and 
lonely, but can only express his condition locally (particularly) and 
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representatively through these very fictions, which bind as they aim to 
enlighten. 
Some form of resolution between the two perspectives is here, as elsewhere 
in Gray's fiction, seen to be desirable, for it would enable subjects entrenched 
in their day-to-day lives, bound to the yoke of necessity, to perceive the 
conditions of their lives - and of their subjectivity - a little more clearly.134 What 
is needed is not the either/or binary logic of abstract or involved perspective, 
but a recognition of the necessity of both, even although the two would seem to 
be mutually exclusive. Such is the nature of the paradox. And while Pollard 
desires transcendence, Prometheus desires the passions of everyday life (a 
theme also explored in the Wim Wenders film Wings of Desire, where an angel 
desires to become a mortal).135 Prometheus/Pollard sorrowfully states that: 
the writers of the greatest divine and human comedies are men of the 
world, they discover and represent that drama in commonplace streets, 
bedrooms and battlefields. I can only represent Gods, and lonely 
intelligences, and multitudes viewed from a very great distance. I will 
never be popular. 
(Unlikely Stories Mostly, p. 202) 
Gray's texts indicate that artists may offer the best chance of achieving some 
critical distance: through the work of the artist, it is suggested, subjects may be 
able to see things more clearly. This is certainly the case in the two Axletree 
stories of Unlikely Stories, Mostly, where subjects instructed to build a Babel-
like structure up to the heavens are forbidden from calling it a tower and must 
instead refer to it as an axletree. It is left to the poet (as with Bohu in 'Five 
Letters') to denounce the folly of the vain project - along with the 
mismanagement of the State - and to show things as they really are: 
134 Bernstein points to a pertinent example in terms of evoking this particular problem, a 
poem from Gray's verse collection Old Negatives entitled 'Both Perspectives' (see 
Bernstein, 1999, p. 37). And Jameson has pOinted to Frank Gehry's attempts to resolve 
the two positions in his architecture. He writes: 'The problem ... which the Gehry house 
tries to think is the relationship between that abstract knowledge and conviction or 
belief about the superstate and the existential daily life of people in their traditional 
rooms and tract houses. There must be a relationship between those two realms or 
dimensions of reality or we are altogether within science fiction without realizing it. But 
the nature of that relationship eludes the mind. The building then tries to think through 
this spatial problem in spatial terms' (Jameson, 1991, p. 128). 
135 Harvey devotes a chapter to the postmodern ideas developed in this film, along with 
Ridley Scott's Blade Runner. See Harvey, 1990, p. 308-323. 
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"But we are using our surplus to organize disasters!" said the poet. "If 
those who have grabbed more food and space and material than they 
need would share it, instead of bribing and threatening the rest with it, 
the world could become a splendid garden where many plants will grow 
beside this damned, prickly, many-headed, bloodstained cactus of a 
poisoned and poisoning TOWER. " 
"Strike that word from the minutes!" said the president swiftly. 
(Unlikely Stories, Mostly, p. 259) 
The poet in this case exposes the truth that others too caught up in the project 
of the axletree either cannot see for themselves or do not want to admit. But 
positioning the artist in such a privileged position is itself problematic, for art 
cannot achieve a transcendental status outside of systems of representation 
either (and nor can the aesthetic sphere be separated entirely from the 
economic sphere, a point made earlier in Chapter 2 and the subject of the 
tCulture Capitalism' chapter of Something Leather). The artist's version of the 
ttruth' is just that, and as such must be open to critique. 136 
Jameson sees the subject's inability to obtain a critical and panoptic 
overview as precluding the possibility of action. He writes that our tcapacity to 
act and struggle ... is at present neutralized by our spatial as well as our social 
confusion' (Jameson, 1991, p. 54). But abstraction may not provide the only 
opportunity for action or critical practice; as already outlined what is required is 
rather that subjects attain the contradictory - and seemingly impossible -
position of being both inside and outside at the same time. As Donna Haraway 
points out: tlrony is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, 
even dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible things together 
because both or all are necessary and true' (Haraway, 1991, p. 149). And 
abstraction may itself at times preclude action: Prometheus, as has been seen, 
feels he is not part of the tdrama in commonplace streets, bedrooms and 
battlefields,' and Lanark, too, in striving always for a bird's-eye view may 
neglect action at ground level. tttell me, Dr. Lanark," Munro asks him in the 
Institute, ttis there a connection between your love of vast panorama and your 
136 Though Gray's attitude to criticism is ambivalent (a point that will be taken up again 
in Chapter 4): the persistent baiting and evading of critics that explicitly occurs in his 
texts could, for example, be construed as evidence that in trying to pre-empt and 
deflect criticism he is attempting to place his own work beyond critique. This is perhaps 
rather an extreme position, and not one I wish to take, yet it is not beyond the bounds of 
possibility. 
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distaste for human problems?" (Lanark, p. 64). So while abstraction can be 
viewed on one hand to be necessary and desirable, on the other it may be seen 
negatively as putting too much distance between humans and their reality. 
Indeed that the abstract perspective is normally reserved for the gods is 
indicative of its inhumanity.137 
Which brings us back to the condition of the schizophrenic. The schizophrenic, 
it is alleged, can have no critical distance, cannot step back from the barrage of 
immediacy with which s/he is faced. Yet the schizophrenic is also decentred, is 
not located inside the centre of a stable subject (or at least inside the 
conception or projection of a stable subject), for the schizophrenic is unable to 
construct identity but operates instead on the margins of subjectivity or identity. 
Deleuze and Guattari comment: 'This subject itself is not at the center, which is 
occupied by the machine, but on the periphery, with no fixed identity, forever 
decentred, defined by the states through which it passes' (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1984, p. 20). As Currie recognises, Deleuze and Guattari also observe that the 
(clinical) schizophrenic will often use third person pronouns rather than the first 
person when referring to him or herself and as such the schizophrenic can be 
seen to be both inside and outside the 'self', human and inhuman at the same 
time. The desiring-machines that together constitute or assemble the subject in 
desire and the 'outside' self, the body without organs that is not the real human 
body but its abstract body or 'self', are grafted together so there is no longer 
any clear or separate inside or outside. Deleuze and Guattari write: 
There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that 
produces the one within the other and couples the machines together. 
Producing machines, desiring-machines everywhere, schizophrenic 
machines, all of species life: the self and the non-self, outside and 
inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p. 2) 
To some extent, then, the schizophrenic may be seen to resolve, or at least to 
hold or graft together, the two contradictory positions. And for Deleuze and 
137 Lyotard comments that artists, in attempting to attain an abstract perspective, or 
'critical distance' strive towards the inhuman. He observes: 'I am not dreaming: the aim 
of the avant-gardes ... is something that they declared on numerous occasions. In 1913, 
Apollinaire wrote ingenuously: 'More than anything, artists are men who want to become 
inhuman.' And in 1969, Adorno again, more prudently: 'Art remains loyal to humankind 
uniquely through its inhumanity in regard to it" (Lyotard, 1991, p. 2). 
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Guattari the subject's condition of schizophrenia will actually induce rather than 
prevent action; the schizophrenic is potentially revolutionary, a far cry from 
Jameson's schizophrenic who has lost the capacity to act and struggle. The 
activism of the schizophrenic comes from seeing that things in the world -
identity, story, stories of identity - are not fixed but subject always to change 
and transformation; they exist as assemblages rather than seamless 
constructions. Deleuze and Guattari write that the schizophrenic experiences 
tnature as a process of production' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p. 3) and that 
tThe schizophrenic is the universal producer' (ibid., p. 7); such notions are 
empowering rather than paralysing or enfeebling. 
The productive position of the schizophrenic - the decentred subject ton the 
periphery, with no fixed identity' yet who is still able to effect transformation -
perhaps indicates that there are alternative bases for action and critique that do 
not depend on a capacity to totalise or to construct cognitive maps. The inability 
to achieve transcendence through discourse - or to attain the enlightenment of 
the abstract perspective - should not as a consequence make discursive activity 
worthless. Critical discourse is still of value but must always be subject to 
further critique, the type of edifying discourse urged by Rorty and practised by 
poststructuralists. Metanarratives, by trying to explain and homogenise 
difference (and cognitive maps are a form of conceptual meta narrative, as 
already discussed), function rather to close off discourse, and in this can be seen 
the positive contribution hypertext may make to the critical process through its 
resistance to structures of closure and totality. Subjects cannot escape or 
exceed the limits of discourse (and this must necessarily include technological 
discourse, since all discourse is finally technological), yet they may still use 
discourse productively - critically and analytically. They can also use it self-
consciously, aware of the necessary limits of the critical methods being formed. 
Hypertextual critique can also situate itself self-consciously in this way. The 
schizophrenic reader of the schizophrenic text should not be the passive 
recipient of a barrage of information, nor the subject of an absorbing virtual 
reality, but the active participant in the assemblage or construction of text - or 
story - that is always tentative, never final, but still subject to pattern and 
production of meaning. Hypertextual critique must display the contradictions of 
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the form, not from the outside, from singular narratives of explanation -
including this one - which inadequately attempt to rationalise and so subdue the 
potential difference of the form, or to achieve some sort of objective 
perspective, but from a position on the inside, the decentred position of 
hypertext itself. Hypertextual criticism can of course still take place in the 
medium of print; I am just suggesting that printed criticism will naturally tend 
towards linearity and singularity and as such will tame the radical critical 
potential of the fragmentary and schizophrenic digital form. It will also, in most 
cases, be inadequate to the task of demonstrating more than precursorily some 
of the problematic possibilities of hypertext, for it cannot re-enact these 
problems in the fixed medium of print (in the way, for example that printed 
texts may display the limitations of print, as in the case of those texts discussed 
in Chapter 1. Printed texts cannot engage with the limitations of digital ones in 
this way). 138 Hypertextual critique performed within the electronic medium may 
display the contradictions of hypertext by writing or enacting them reflexively, 
using the means and tools that themselves recreate the conditions being 
criticised, which is what Ulmer argues for as part of his Applied Grammatology 
and attempts to do in his 'Grammatology (In The Stacks) of Hypermedia' project. 
He is attempting to construct, as already outlined in Chapter 2, 'a discourse of 
immanent critique' (Ulmer, 1991, section 4).139 Such critique may assume any or 
all of the forms available in the hypertextual mode: multilinear, patchwork 
138 And the converse of this is that the digital media should be used in self-relevant 
ways, rather than in ways harking back to the methods and problems of print (digital 
'books' would fall into this category). Ulmer writes: 'the new media should not be used 
(or are ineffective when used) for purposes originally derived for other media. Rather, 
new ends that exploit the strengths of the new media should be developed' (Ulmer, 
1985, p. 305). 
139 Jameson describes such reflexive and self-conscious technique as the 'homeopathic 
strategy'. He writes: 'The more properly postmodern political aesthetic - which would 
confront the structure of image society as such head-on and undermine it from within ... 
might be termed the homeopathic strategy, most dramatically and paradigmatically 
exemplified in our time by Hans Haacke's installations, which turn institutional space 
inside out by drawing the museum in which they are technically contained into 
themselves, as part of their thematics and subject matter: invisible spiders, whose net 
contains their own containers and turns the private property of social space inside out 
like a glove. Formally, however, .. , Haacke ... seems intent on undermining the image by 
way of the image itself, and planning the implosion of the logic of the simulacrum by 
dint of every [sic] greater doses of simulcra' [sic] (Jameson, 1991, p. 409). 
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criticism that involves the reader as much as the author in the process of its 
construction and that can also include image, audio and video data. 
Aside from the issue of reflexivity, it is also important that hypertextual 
critique take place in the digital medium in order that hypertext becomes 
neither a marginalised type of textual ghetto nor the exclusive domain of 
computer programmers, profiting at the expense of the technophobes; the 
digital domain must remain democratic and should not be allowed to lapse - or 
progress - into the realm of complete science fiction. No textual form should be 
able to operate beyond critique, lest we truly come up against an unruly 
monster. It is important that subjects engage critically with the digital 
technology of writing, that they exert themselves in this direction, artistically 
and creatively, so that this technology, like that of earlier written forms, 
remains comprehensible. Whilst the subject has been shown to be inevitably 
bound by technology and by the technology of language, the subject can still 
exert themselves against their limits by exercising choice in the ways they 
employ their linguistic and other technologies. If the subject does not engage 
with the technology of digital text in this way it is likely to be to the detriment 
of both subject and text, for we are more likely to be repressed by what we do 
not understand and cannot contribute to, and hypertext will have lost its radical 
potential. While the binary code that intervenes between the subject and the 
text is not the subject's own, neither is language, and the abstracted ness of the 
digital text should serve to focus attention upon the artificial process that is 
underway whenever the subject attempts to construct narrative. In this way 
digital text should not render the subject powerless but should bring into relief 
the possibilities for transformative textual construction. It has already been seen 
how hypertexts lend themselves to notions of textual productivity and open-
ended ness, what Ulmer describes as inventio, and this continual creativity, the 
generation and synthesis of story, self, and of new forms of both is the textual 
work of the final chapter. 
701 
Chapter 4. 
From Text to Graft: Baring the Sutures 
The work of narrative production or synthesis can take place in hypertext, or at 
least in network-structured hypertexts, through the grafting together of the 
hypertextual fragments, and as already described, the process will be carried 
out in a piecemeal fashion, fabricating a text that will never be a complete or 
unified whole but will always be a work in progress, a patchwork text that can 
be rearranged and perhaps even augmented as the reader chooses. 14o Deleuze 
and Guattari write: 
We live today in the age of partial objects, bricks that have been 
shattered to bits, and leftovers. We no longer believe in the myth of the 
existence of fragments that, like pieces of an antique statue, are merely 
waiting for the last one to be turned up, so that they may all be glued 
back together to create a unity that is predsely the same as the original 
unity .... We believe only in totalities that are peripheral. And if we 
discover such a totality alongside various separate parts, it is a whole of 
these particular parts but does not totalize them; it is a unity of all of 
these particular parts but does not unify them; rather, it is added to 
them as a new part fabricated separately. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p. 42) 
As already outlined, the parts that are grafted together to construct the 
temporary hypertextual whole can consist of multiple forms: image, audio and 
video, as well as fragments from different textual genres may all be collected 
together in the hypertextual montage, as is the case in Jackson's Patchwork Girl 
140This process of textual construction can be compared with the nomad thought of 
Deleuze and Guattari, an open approach to discursive activity (Similar to the methods of 
Nietzsche) that encourages readers to think of the text as an assemblage of thoughts 
(subject to rearrangement) rather than as a unified whole. Brian Massumi writes that 
nomad thought 'synthesizes a multiplidty of elements without effadng their 
heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging' (Massumi, 1992, p. 6). 
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which as has been seen explicitly borrows or grafts from existing fictional and 
non-fictional texts to create a hybrid - or monstrous - textual form. 
As such the hypertext can be viewed as a form of recycling, enabling textual 
parts to be creatively transformed or regenerated in potentially subversive ways 
(the subversive potential of recycling has already been mentioned in Chapter 3 
with reference to the clothes-mending machines of Gray's fWellbeing' and 
Thompson's Rubbish Theory). Gray is not averse to the notion of recycling 
himself: Poor Things and The Book of Prefaces in particular are grafted from 
their textual antecedents. That the process of recycling can become an art form 
is alluded to in Don De Lillo's Underworld, where the ritual of waste disposal 
echoes through the text, forming a textual pattern: 
At home we separated our waste into glass and cans and paper products. 
Then we did clear glass versus coloured glass. Then we did tin versus 
aluminium. We did plastic containers, without caps or lids, on Tuesdays 
only. Then we did yard waste. Then we did newspapers including glossy 
inserts but were careful not to tie the bundles in twine, which is always 
the temptation. 
(Underworld, p. 89) 
Variations - or recyclings - of this pattern appear throughout the text (see pp. 
102-103, 803-804 and 807). The function of this ritual is the positive textual 
transformation of waste, the creation of something meaningful (also valuable in 
terms of its recycling potential) and even aesthetically pleasing from what would 
otherwise be seen as rubbish. Such is the case with hypertext, where the textual 
fragments, meaningless by themselves, can be patterned and re-patterned, and 
where the reader is called upon to carry out the creative work. The recycling of 
textual remnants that occurs in Glas, The Book of Prefaces and Patchwork Girl 
and which may be considered a paradigm for the hypertextual form may also be 
viewed as offsetting in some way the idea that the past or history has been 
completely jettisoned in our current culture of late or post- post modernity, that 
the schizophrenic subject engaging with the schizophrenic text has fbecome 
incapable of dealing with time and history,' as Jameson suggested (Jameson, 
1985, p. 117). As already pointed out in a preceding footnote (see footnote 130), 
there can in fact be no such thing as a detached or self-sufficient moment in 
time, a moment completely cut off from the past and future (for they serve to 
constitute it precisely as the present). Culturally, then, complete schizophrenia 
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is not really possible (though of course the clinical condition is more than real). 
The process of recycling ensures that debris from the past is not ignored, but is 
used or regenerated in a positive way, to inform the present through the act of 
creative transformation. 
If the recycling of household rubbish can create patterns that are 
aesthetically pleasing then the recycling of texts can surely do the same. In 
terms of the appearance of the text, hypertext may by grafting together 
differing textual genres and particularly by accommodating non-verbal forms of 
writing come close in some ways to the aesthetic result of mediaeval texts, as 
already suggested in Chapter 1. Mediaeval manuscripts were less restricted in 
terms of visual content than printed texts and 'marginal' or paratextual 
manuscript commentaries could work their way into the inscription of the text 
proper more readily than is possible with print. The notion of the hypertext as a 
'present tense palimpsest' as put forward by Joyce also bears some relevance 
here, since the mediaeval text was so often inscribed over and across the traces 
of other, faded and perhaps forgotten stories. (In the case of these 'past tense' 
palimpsests though, unlike in the hypertextual matrix, the other stories can less 
easily be retrieved and will often be lost entirely.) Comparing hypertext to the 
mediaeval manuscript is interesting in that, on the face of it, it would seem such 
an unlikely comparison. Hypertexts, after all, are not tangible aesthetic objects, 
while the beauty and appeal of the mediaeval text lies very much in its status as 
object, and, more specifically, as object of labour, founded on the artistic work 
of those involved in its production. It is this reverence of the object of the book -
or the notion of an artistic labour of love - that Gray, following in the creative 
tradition of Blake and Ruskin, is so keen to preserve (or consecrate) through his 
printed texts. 141 'The book,' writes S.B. Kelly, 'has always had a totemic, 
material existence in Gray's work; from the postmodernist erratum slip to the 
coded messages beneath the dust-cover' (Kelly, 2002, p. 68). 
141 And Blake considered that technology in many ways put paid to such creative labour. 
Bronowski comments that Blake saw the machinery of the Industrial Revolution 'grow 
round him and wrote about it and feared it; his own craft of engraving in the end was 
destroyed by the Industrial Revolution' (from the introduction to William Blake: A 
Selection of Poems and Letters, p. 12). 
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Gray's texts, as textual objects painstakingly measured and controlled in their 
production down to the smallest aesthetic detail, are still bound to the concept 
of the text as twork', which in turn will always tie them to their author, 
implicating them in what Barthes called 'the myth of filiation' (Barthes, 1977, p. 
160). According to this myth, Barthes writes, tThe Author is thought to nourish 
the book, which is to say that he exists before it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in 
the same relation of antecedence to his work as a father to his child' (Barthes, 
1977, p. 145). Gray's particular attention to paratextual detail serves as much as 
can be possible to ensure that these paratexts tpresent' or tobjectify' his text 
according to his own wishes for and vision of the book. The recent Artworks 
Scotland BBC television programme marking Gray's 70th birthday, Gray at 70, 
lends support to the textual hints that Gray may be something of a control freak. 
It took the form of an interview with Gray conducted by someone termed this 
own harshest critic': himself. This comment is not intended ungenerously, for 
Gray is here as elsewhere characteristically self-deprecating and unafraid to 
openly and honestly criticise himself (he may well be his own harshest critic in 
many respects); nonetheless, the format conveniently enables him to remain in 
complete control of what he asks and answers. 142 Gray does seem to appreciate 
this and the irony of the following exchange between himself and himself rather 
nicely confirms the point: 
[Gray the interviewer]: flSo you're a control freak? Your friend, the poet 
Tom Leonard once said that working with Alasdair Gray was like a 
sandcastle working with the sea." 
[Gray the interviewee]: "I'm certainly the kind of artist who wants to 
control as much as I can the appearance of the work I do in writing and in 
painting and how it's produced." 
(Gray at 70, Artworks Scotland programme for BBG, broadcast 
on 14.11.2004) 
Frequent inclusion of what he terms 'Critic Fuel' and the autographic reviews 
and blurb accompanying his texts would also suggest that Gray, in pre-emptively 
attempting to deflect or perhaps to assimilate criticism, is going out of his way 
to direct not just the presentation of his texts but their reception too. The 
142 This 'interview' technique, like the Socratic or Platonic dialogue, can allow an 
argument to follow a precise - and seemingly very logical - pattern, and as such often 
takes the form of polemic, as is the case with Gray's Why Scots Should Rule Scotland 
1997 and its 'dialogue' between the author and interlocutory 'publisher'. It can, then, be 
a very effective means of persuasion. 
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flyleaves of The Book of Prefaces contain 'Author's Blurb' and 'Publisher's Blurb' 
entitled lOur Editor Confronts Critics' and lOur Editor Evades Critics' and here 
Gray writes the text for the roles of author, publisher and editor alike. Fond of 
populating his textual cast-list with literal and metaphorical puppets 
manipulated by often unscrupulous puppet-masters (the papier mac he emperor 
of 'Five Letters from an Eastern Empire', Lanark's Nastler or Jock McLeish with 
his fantastical and cruel teasing of Janine, to give a few immediate examples), 
Gray himself would like perhaps to remain finally in control of the strings. 
Evading critics in The Book of Prefaces he writes emphatically: 
This book is NOT a monster created by a literary Baron Frankenstein, but 
a unique history of how literature spread and developed through three 
British nations and most North American states. 
The result of a lifetime's reading and creative labour, intellectual and 
artistic, it will delight, amaze and inform both casual browsers and 
students. Its like will not be seen again for at least another millennium. 
A copy of The Book of Prefaces should be found in every household and 
hotel bedroom. 
(The Book of Prefaces, dust jacket) 
The emphasis here is clearly upon the importance of the author as the 
inspirational source of 'the work': the book is not merely a compilation or 
combination of other people's writing but is the unique product of 'a lifetime's 
reading and creative labour, intellectual and artistic', and specifically it is the 
product of the creative labour of its author, Alasdair Gray. Or so, Gray's words 
suggest, the publishers would like us to think, for this text is part of the 
'Publisher's Blurb'. This situates the premise of these words in a typically 
ambivalent position, for they are and are not Gray's words, and they in fact 
contradict the I Author's Blurb' of the other flyleaf, which in the self-effacing 
manner of Gray attempts rather to diminish any sense of the author's 
importance or creative uniqueness: ITo every generation appears an ageing 
writer who, with some published work behind him and no ideas for more, decides 
to produce THE BOOK OF BOOKS by grafting together pieces cut from the corpus 
of other writers' (The Book of Prefaces, dust jacket). According to the author 
(officially), then, the book may well be 'a monster created by a literary Baron 
Frankenstein', while according to the publisher and to the author (unofficially) it 
most certainly is not. By supplying text for both perspectives - with a tongue-in-
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cheek element to both - Gray once again asks and answers his own questions and 
in so doing craftily ensures that his critics cannot pin him down. 
The conflicting bits of blurb also focus attention on the differing concepts of 
'work'. On the one hand, 'the work' belongs to the author, it is the consequence 
of his own imaginative labour; an individual's work, from this perspective, is thus 
valuable and culminates in something - 'the work' - that the individual can be 
both responsible for and proud of. On the other hand, the 'Author's Blurb' 
argues, 'the work' in question exists only by virtue of the labour of other writers 
and from this perspective it could be argued that Gray is taking another side-
swipe at postmodernism and at what he considers to be its devaluing of the work 
of the individual and, concomitantly, of the result or product of this effort ('the 
work'). Postmodern theory (following poststructuralist theory in this respect) has 
suggested that the text should be viewed not so much as the original work of an 
author but rather as a rearrangement (whether more or less explicit) of pre-
existing texts: where poststructuralism and psychoanalysis stress that words and 
text can never really be 'our own', since they belong instead to the rule-set of 
the Symbolic or thetic Other, postmodernism further challenges any concept of 
originality (of our 'selves' as being the origin of our words or artistic endeavours) 
by favouring techniques like collage and montage, which are self-consciously 
derivative. As such, the 'creative labour' of the individual might seem to be 
worth less - or even worthless - and if this is the case there would be little 
incentive in trying to labour creatively at all. If 'the work' cannot be attached to 
the author, then consequently the author wilt not be responsible for his or her 
work, and irresponsible authors will not endeavour to transform the real world 
imaginatively, a social duty that Gray, through his emphasis on public rather 
than private art has never shirked (his portraits for the People's Palace, murals 
in churches, restaurants and community museums, in addition to his invariably 
political fiction and non-fiction provide the evidence to support the pOint).143 In 
Kittock's notes of A History Maker Gray writes of postmodernism: 
143 This notion of the artist's social responsibility which has been briefly touched upon in 
Chapter 3 is one that is looked at closely - and very critically - in the chapter entitled 
'Culture Capitalism' in Something Leather (the chapter is in fact a scathing critique of 
the commodification of art in general and in particular of its appropriation by the upper 
echelons of society). Here Harry's piece of concept art - the 'bum garden' - is to be used 
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[The] indifference to most people's wellbeing and taste appeared in the 
fashionable art of the wealthy. Critics called their period postmodern to 
separate it from the modern world begun by the Renaissance when most 
creative thinkers believed they could improve their community. 
Postmodernists had no interest in the future, which they expected to be 
an amusing rearrangement of things they already knew. Postmodernism 
did not survive disasters caused by "competitive exploitation of human 
and natural resources" in the twenty-first century. 
(A History Maker, p. 202-203) 
For Gray, then, postmodernism devalues the work of the artist. 
The digital computer further complicates the subject's relationship to their 
work by adding intervening layers of abstraction. Mark Poster comments that: 
Artisans and assembly-line workers, whatever their differences, had an 
active, "hands-on" relation to the materials used in production. Their 
bodies engaged directly the transformation of raw materials into the 
finished product. The senses, minds, and muscles of the worker were 
deployed in a unified effort of mastery and skill .... Now, since the 
introduction of computers in the workplace, a new worker is being 
produced, one who sits, away from the place of production, in front of 
monitors, switches, lights, an interpreter of information. 
(Poster, 1990, p. 129) 
But while the focus here is upon the direct involvement of the subject in the 
construction of a 'finished product,' hypertext, as has been argued, deals not in 
products but in productivity. The process of work itself replaces 'the work', 
perhaps obeying Gray's repeated exhortation to 'Work As If You Live in the Early 
Days of a Better Nation.' And the work - or graft - of hypertext is still both 
valuable and meaningful (though it might well, by dint of techniques like 
montage, be described as postmodern), for it constructs texts, though it may not 
be as clearly identified with the figure of the author as is the case with print. In 
hypertext the reader too has the responsibility to work and as indicated in 
Chapter 2, hypertexts will frequently involve the collaborative work of more 
for Glasgow's year of 'Cultcha' (as Harry's dealer calls it, Something Leather, p. 171) 
and is taken more notice of by the English middle and upper classes than by the people 
of Glasgow themselves: it is private and elitist rather than public and accessible or 
democratic and the implication is that such art is selfish and solipsistic. A magazine 
interviewer with an upper-class English accent (phonetically represented in Gray's text) 
tells Harry that "to most people nowadays the new things in the galleries look like 
doodling! They add very little beauty or intelligence to the places wha they appia, none 
at all to those who see them. Does it occur to you that yaw art may be a game played for 
nobody's plesha but yaw own? Like doodling. Or mastabation' (Something Leather, p. 
146). For a fairly up-to-date list of public collections of Gray's visual art see King, 2002, 
p. 119. Recent work not included in this list is the magnificent ceiling mural in the Oran 
Mor pub at the bottom of Glasgow's Byres Rd, adjoining Great Western Rd. 
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than one author. The hypertextual graft is a form of productivity: graft, literally, 
is productive work, work that transforms in the operation. Philippe Sollers writes 
in Logics: 'The essential thing is to set the song in motion as a graft and not as a 
meaning, a work, or a spectacle' (quoted in Derrida, 1981, p. 355). Graft, then, 
eschews the notion of completion, of textual product and the unified meaning of 
'the work'. Derrida writes of Sollers's Numbers: 
It is the sustained, discrete violence of an incision that is not apparent in 
the thickness of the text, a calculated insemination of the proliferating 
allogene through which the two texts are transformed, deform each 
other, contaminate each other's content, tend at times to reject each 
other, or pass elliptically one into the other and become regenerated in 
the repetition, along the edges of an overcast seam [un surjetJ. Each 
grafted text continues to radiate back toward the site of its removal, 
transforming that, too as it affects the new territory. Each is defined 
(thought) by the operation and at the same time is defining (thinking) as 
far as the rules and effects of the operation are concerned. 
(Derrida, 1981, p. 335) 
Defining the graft as productive and transformative act, Derrida here also draws 
attention to the seams created by the grafting process; the visibility of these 
seams can be compared to those of the patchwork text, the text stitched 
together by the graft of the reader. As argued in the preceding chapter, 
network-structured hypertexts do not attempt to present themselves in the 
seamless manner of either cinema or virtual reality. By drawing attention to 
their own artifice and constructed ness they rather expose their own seams, 
baring the sutures that hold the text together. The visible sutures of hypertext 
can be contrasted sharply with the cinematic concept of the suture mentioned 
by Ulmer in the last chapter, which functions to bind representation to reality 
and as such pretends invisibility. 
As already argued, texts that display the conditions of their making are likely 
to elicit subjects who, in seeing the way narratives are fabricated, will also see 
how narratives playa large role in their own subjective construction: the 
fabrication of identity or 'self'. The 'self', as outlined in Chapter 3, is a 
constructed entity, a projection created by language. The irony of the self is 
that while it is taken to be constitutive of the subject's 'humanity' - the 
Cartesian self is at the centre of the 'humanist' view of the world - the self is 
projected in words not our own but Other. On entering language, as Lacan said, 
the subject must put on the 'armour of an alienating identity' (Lacan, 1977, p. 
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4). The subject, then, becomes human through adopting discursive codes that 
are inhuman. The commonplace notion that humans are dehumanised or become 
inhuman through their exposure to or engagement with technology therefore 
fails to recognise that the subject who has entered language with a view to 
becoming fully human has also entered into a condition of inhumanity. Whilst 
writing with pen and paper may provide the sort of ffhands-on", immediate 
relationship to text, or to the object of work, so valued by Gray, writing is still a 
technological mediation. But writing of this traditional kind, through habit and 
through its apparent immediacy, just manages to hide the sutures that graft it to 
the desiring-machines of the subject; traditional forms of writing, as pointed out 
in the Introduction, have become so familiar as to seem completely natural. But 
a gap still exists between the subject and the word, regardless of the medium. 
Electronic writing, as an immaterial form lacking the immediacy of the inscribed 
word, simply draws attention to this gap, and to the technological mediation 
that occurs when the subject enters language. 
From a recognition that language is an alien armour, it is a short step to 
argue, as do Donna Haraway, N. Katherine Hayles and others, that the subject 
who engages with digital discursive technologies (and indeed who considers 
these technologies as prostheses) is a cyborg. 'A cyborg,' writes Haraway, 'is a 
cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social 
reality as well as a creature of fiction' (Haraway, 1991, p. 149). Haraway 
contends that: 'By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are 
all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in 
short, we are cyborgs' (ibid., p. 150). Whilst we are simultaneously human and 
inhuman, hybrids of humans and language and, in the digital medium, of human 
and computer interfaces, I would suggest that the cybernetic transition should 
not be seamless. Poster writes that since digital technologies of writing can 
operate in ways akin to the human mind (a topic discussed at some length in 
Chapters 1 and 2), the gap between the subject and the word may seem to have 
been closed by the computer: 'The screen-object and the writing-subject merge 
into an unsettling simulation of unity' (Poster, 1990, p. p. 111). But at the same 
time as this simulation of unity occurs, the subject feels startled by it, and thus 
remains aware or self-conscious of the relationship with and boundary between 
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subject and machine. Poster describes the subject's alarm in the same terms as 
Lacan's mirror-stage of development: 
Human being faces machine in a disquieting specular relation: in its 
immateriality the machine mimics the human being. The mirror effect of 
the computer doubles the subject of writing; the human being recognizes 
itself in the uncanny immateriality of the machine. '" the mirror effects 
of this aspect of the mode of information are noticed with shock. 
(Poster, 1990, p. 112) 
This shock on the part of the subject should serve to prevent the boundaries 
between subject and computer from becoming too indistinct (until, that is, 
digital writing becomes as familiar as have other textual forms and we cease to 
view it even as a technology. In this event we will truly be living under the guise 
of the cyborg). Meantime, the discomfort of the digital textual environment, as 
suggested in earlier chapters, keeps us vigilant. A degree of estrangement from 
the technologies that condition us is a good thing, for as with the schizophrenic's 
estrangement from centred identity it can encourage us to act. The subject of 
digital text, as with the schizophrenic, is not permitted to find the 'place of 
rest, certainty, reconciliation ... [and] tranquillized sleep' that Foucault 
suggested could be found in continuous histories, histories that posit stable 
identities (Foucault, 1982, p. 14); with digital technologies of writing, as yet, 
there is no such comfort zone. 
Haraway, in her discussion of the cyborg, argues sensibly for 'pleasure in the 
confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction' (Haraway, 
1991, p. 150); these boundaries are I would suggest, like those in the fabricated 
hypertext, delimited by sutures, and it is in our own interests to remain Vigilant 
and to ensure that they remain visible. Such attention to the seams or scars of 
self and text can be witnessed among the hypertextual fragments of 
McLaughlin's Notes Toward Absolute Zero. 
[In the fragment 'Relic']: She had a small scar, a line of raised flesh with 
marks from the stitches on either side. It was on her pelvis, the relic of a 
childhood operation. I found it strangely beautiful. 
[In the fragment 'Gesture']: Laughing through thickets of hair, cool cool 
cheek against stomach and scar. ... Listening to your architecture. '" The 
bones, the bones, the bones. The edge of your skeleton, the torn fabric 
of your skin. 
(Notes Toward Absolute Zero) 
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The subject of hypertext, like the hypertextual narrative and like the patchwork 
girl, is grafted together incrementally; it is in process of becoming, rather than a 
finished product. Such patchwork hypertexts do not project or confirm a false 
and fixed identity, but implicate the subject in the creation of new, patchy and 
always difficult projections of self. 'We are,' the French band Air sing in one of 
their songs, 'electronic performers. We are synthesisers.' And we synthesise our 
selves through our engagement with text. 
That McLaughlin's hyperfiction describes the scars as 'strangely beautiful' is 
significant, for it suggests that we should not be ashamed of our patched selves. 
In the case of the creation of the female companion for Frankenstein's creature, 
the construction work is described as a 'filthy process' that horrifies and sickens 
Frankenstein (Frankenstein, p. 159) as it engages him in the production of 
another 'fiend' (ibid., p. 160). In Shelley Jackson's Patchwork Girl, too, the cat, 
in a fragment entitled 'beauty patches' comments: "That poor patched thing will 
hate herself when she's once alive ... If I were you, I'd use her for a mop and 
make another servant that is prettier" (Patchwork Girl). McLaughlin's text 
suggests that the grafted body might be not just pretty but beautiful, and this is 
a sentiment echoed in Gray's Poor Things, in the nominal significance of Bella. 
Bella, through proper nurture, achieves the contradictory status of beautiful 
monstrosity and as such points the way for the constructive and sensitive 
application of technology. As N. Katherine Hayles points out with regard to her 
definition of the cyborg as the 'posthuman', whether such identities are taken to 
be beautiful or monstrous depends very much upon what we decide to see in 
them - whether, to use Hayles's distinction, we see 'terror' or 'pleasure' 
(Hayles, 1999, p. 283). She writes: 
When the self is envisioned as grounded in presence, identified with 
originary guarantees and teleological trajectories, associated with solid 
foundations and logical coherence, the posthuman is likely to be seen as 
antihuman because it envisions the conscious mind as a small subsystem 
running its program of self-construction and self-assurance while 
remaining ignorant of the actual dynamics of complex systems. But the 
posthuman does not really mean the end of humanity. It signals instead 
the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may 
have applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who had the wealth, 
power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings 
exercising their will through individual agency and choice. What is lethal 
is not the posthuman as such but the grafting of the posthuman onto a 
liberalist humanist view of the self. 
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(Hayles, 1999, p. 286-287) 
The patched subject will, however, experience some anxiety regarding its 
possible futures, for unlike unified narratives - especially religious ones - which 
promised subjects a stable position within a stable epoch (and the possibility of a 
similarly stable future), the fragmentary hypertext can offer no such guarantees. 
Indeed the hypertext is only temporary, and the power that its flexibility and 
dynamism may bring may also hold the indication of its limits: the future of 
hypertext is not certain, does not reside in monuments like the printed book, but 
is held in the fragile form of digital and evanescent code, comparable, perhaps, 
to writing in the sand, or to a sandcastle on the beach (to repeat Tom Leonard's 
despairing metaphor regarding the resilience of work done for Alasdair Gray). 
The work of hypertext, unlike fthe work' of the book, will not 'remain and 
explain.' The fragility of the digital text must be mirrored in the subject and in 
any vision of a possible future, yet this fragility, as with the condition of the 
schizophrenic, might make us graft all the harder. Hayles discusses the pOSition 
of the androids in Philip K. Dick's book Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 
(later made into the film Blade Runner), describing them as fschizoid' (see 
Hayles, 1999, p. 160ff.). The androids, known as freplicants' are intensely 
productive, revolutionary, like the schizophrenics of Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-
Oedipus. Yet the basis for their action is their anxiety for their futures, for they 
are destined and programmed to live only half-lives. Their future, that is to say, 
is non-existent and as such their passionate intensity will be short-lived. Harvey, 
quoting from the speech of the replicants' designer, Tyrell, writes: 
"Revel in it," says Tyrell, "a flame that burns twice as intensely lives 
half as long." The replicants exist, in short, in that schizophrenic rush of 
time that Jameson, Deleuze and Guattari, and others see as so central to 
postmodern living. 
(Harvey, 1990, p. 309) 
As a society of schizophrenics, with unstable and patched identities, we too may 
be frantically grafting for our survival. As Gleick earlier stated, fWe live in the 
buzz' of the present time, yet we must continue to construct narratives in order 
to keep living (Gleick, 2000, p. 10). This need for story - of text and of self - has 
been evident for centuries, the 1001 Tales of the Arabian Nights being told as a 
stay against death. That continual (textual) renewal is necessary for life (just as 
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the regeneration of his liver is vital to Prometheus struggling in his bind) is an 
idea that has already been formulated in Rorty's call for edifying discourse, 
discourse that in keeping the conversation going, serves to avert the 'freezing-
over of culture' and 'the dehumanization of human beings' (Rorty, 1980, p. 377). 
Our intense productivity needs, however, to be balanced with a measure of 
slowness and with the resistance to too much acceleration. We must, that is to 
say, take our time with the serious business of textual engagement and 
productivity, and this is a requirement particularly incumbent upon our 
engagement with hypertext, in order that it does not become too hyper. Ulmer 
points to Jonathan Crary's observation that we ought to refuse 'productivist 
injunctions by inducing slow speeds and inhabiting silences ' (Ulmer, 1991, 
section 18). We still need to produce, but we must do so wisely. It would appear, 
then, as a dying man tells Lanark with some conviction, that a 'good life means 
fighting to be human under growing difficulties' (Lanark, p. 55). 
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Institutet Library, Stockholm, 
http://gallery.euroweb.hu/artll/leonardo/ 1 Oanatom/ 1 vitruviu.jpg, © Karolinska 
Institutet, Library; 
Fig. 3.2, Gray's 'Vitruvian Man', illustration taken from front cover of 1982 Janine 
(Penguin, 1985), © Alasdair Gray; 
Fig. 3.3, Part of Gray's mural at the Abbot House, Dunfermline, image taken from digital 
photograph, © Emma Lister. 
Chapter 4: Title illustration from The Ends of Our Tethers (Picador, 1994), © Alasdair 
Gray. 
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